IN NAYPYIDAW, DEMOCRACY DAWNS

Last week, Myanmar took one of its most definitive steps towards democracy: It swore in a Parliament comprised mostly of civilian lawmakers, brought to power through a largely free and fair election. However, the new Government still faces many challenges

Ruled by the military junta for five decades, and under a semi-military Government that secured its mandate though a rigged election for the last five years, Myanmar last week took one of its most definitive steps towards becoming a functional democracy: It swore in a new Parliament comprised mostly of civilian lawmakers brought to power through a largely free and fair election. In the 664-seat legislature, political icon and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy, which won a landslide victory in the parliamentary election held last year on November 8, has 390 members, while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, which was previously in charge, has only 42.

However, this does not mean that the military has been marginalised in Parliament since Army-appointed representatives still hold 25 per cent of the seats that were not open for election. But even factoring in this block of unelected members, it is noteworthy that the NLD still has a clear 50 per cent majority in Parliament.

The much-awaited big decision now is: Who will be the next President? NLD chief Suu Kyi is barred from taking the top job, as her sons hold British passports and the Constitution of Myanmar prohibits those with foreign nationals in their immediate family from the Presidency. This clause was specifically inserted to keep Ms Suu Kyi out of the presidential palace and it is possible that in due course of time, the Constitution will be amended.

But for now, there is no clarity on who will be the next leader. Ms Suu Kyi, who has long expressed her desire to be President, is holding back channel talks with the military and The New York Times has reported that the NLD may be offering the Chief Minister’s post in three key States to the USDP. But it’s difficult to tell how these talks are progressing. If the talks fail at least for the time being (keeping the option open for Ms Suu Kyi to take over the presidency later in the term), the focus will be on a proxy President: Ms Suu Kyi has no clear deputy in the party but more importantly, she has already said that irrespective of who wears the President’s tag, it is she who will be the leader of any NLD Government.

Either way, the new Government faces many challenges. First is Government formation. Having been in opposition for so many years, NLD members have no experience in national governance or institutional reform. This will make it enormously difficult for the new Government to guide the country through this crucial period of transition and deliver meaningful change and progress. The public, of course, has high expectations and it will be a huge setback to the democratic process if the Government fails to deliver, and at the end of the next five years, there is much public resentment.

Second, the NLD will have to carefully manage its relations with the military, which remains a powerful force. Ms Suu Kyi has done this with aplomb in recent years. She has a good working relationship with outgoing President Thein Sein  an important factor in the steady democratic transition of the past five years. Remember, when the parliamentary election was held in 2010, Ms Suu Kyi’s NLD, having been unlawfully denied the opportunity to form the Government even after having won the election in 1990, had boycotted. However, since 2012, after election laws were reformed, the NLD participated in several by-elections, all of which it won.

So, to that end, the NLD is off to a safe start. However, one mustn’t undermine the challenges ahead. For one, the possibility of a proxy President will add another variable to the mix and there is no telling how that it will affect the carefully-set equation between the NLD and the old military establishment. Moreover, the military is expected to keep the key portfolios of Defence, Home and Border Operations. This will further complicate matters of day-to-day governance and can easily become a source of friction. It could even lead to a full confrontation that may undermine Myanmar’s democratic transition especially since the military still has emergency powers.

Outside politics, the big issue for the new Government is fructifying the peace process with the ethnic armed groups. The Thein Sein Government made major progress in this regard last year when it signed a peace deal with the ethnic armed groups. However, fighting has continued despite the agreement to cease fire and violent clashes in Shan and Kachin States are threatening to undermine the peace process. This could lead to large-scale economic turbulence that Myanmar is hardly prepared to deal with. 

Also, the situation in Rakhine State, where most Muslim Rohingya are disenfranchised, remains volatile. At home, any decision of the NLD Government on this issue will be viewed through a nationalist lens but outside Myanmar, it will be seen as test of character for the peace laureate-politician. Notably, Ms Suu Kyi has maintained a studied silence on the Rohingya issue which hasn’t gone unnoticed in the international community.

Another long term challenge before the new Government will be dealing with China. Myanmar was close to becoming a Chinese satellite state when the junta decided to the reverse course. This has led to some cooling of ties between China and Myanmar but the latter is still deeply entrenched and unlikely to back away without a fight.

Ms Suu Kyi and the NLD will need deft diplomatic skills to shepherd Myanmar’s ongoing re-engagement with the West, without rocking the boat with a more assertive China that is presumable concerned about its interests being harmed. For this geo-political re-orientation to succeed, the Western countries must also understand that while do have a significant role to play in bringing positive change in Myanmar, and the new Government will, of course, dip into the large reservoir of support and goodwill but everybody needs to be cognizant of domestic and regional sensitivities.

This is also where India comes into play. Myanmar stands at the crossroads of India’s Neighbourhood First and Act East policies; and it is crucial to the development of India’s own North-Eastern States as well as its relations with South East Asia. However, India is still only a minor player in Myanmar despite its longstanding historical and civilisational ties. Though New Delhi has been pragmatic enough to do business with the junta since the 1990s, this has been far below potential. Meanwhile, other regional powers such as Singapore and Thailand, not to mention China, have soared ahead.

India has a lot of catching up to do but a good place to start will be accelerating the transport connectivity projects that are already in the pipeline. At the top of the list is the Rs2,904-crore Kaladan project, which includes a 225km-waterway on the Kaladan River from Sittwe Port to Kaletwa and from there, a 62km-roadway from Kaletwa to the India-Myanmar border. The India-Myanmar-Thailand highway and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are the two other important projects that require immediate attention.

This article was published in The Pioneer on February 8, 2016

CRUCIAL INDIA-VIETNAM BILATERAL

Defence cooperation between the two nations has not received the public attention it deserves. The previous regime had taken important steps to strengthen ties, and the present Government has continued with the thrust. It’s part of India’s growing global maritime footprint

Amidst all the hullabaloo over the Modi Government’s first anniversary, the three-day visit of Vietnamese Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh received little attention. But that should not take away from the growing importance of the India-Vietnam bilateral, for both countries, particularly in the security sector. Vietnam is engaged in a bitter territorial dispute with China, which is looking to turn reefs in the South China Sea into islands that can host airstrips and other military facilities, according to aReuters news report. Vietnam would like India, the other big regional power, to stand up to Chinese belligerence in the South China Sea.

India, on the other hand, is trying to restrain China from taking full control of some of the world’s busiest sea-lanes as well keep the dragon out of its own immediate neighbourhood, the Indian Ocean Region. China had made the stunning revelation last year that it had sent submarines into the Indian Ocean. And more recently, the Pentagon in its report on the South China Sea also noted that Beijing is looking to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean region.

It is plausible that China is seeking to do so through ‘logistics’ overtures, rather than obvious military means (though that must not been ruled out either; only last year, China moved an oil rig, flanked by its naval and coast guard ships, into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, sparking a major diplomatic crisis) but the end result that it has in mind is the same.

Hence, with China’s assertive strategies in mind, India and Vietnam have now agreed to strengthen their defence and military cooperation. On Monday, at the end of delegation-level talks, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and his Vietnamese counterpart General Phung Quang Thanh signed a five-year-long vision statement as well oversaw the signing of a memorandum of understanding for cooperation between the Coast Guards of the two countries.

Notably, while Gen Thanh was meeting with Indian officials on Monday, four Indian warships set off for the South China Sea. The Eastern Fleet deployed stealth frigate INS Satpura, anti-submarine warfare corvette INS Kamorta, the destroyer INS Ranvir and the INS Shakti fleet tanker to the region, to participate in a four-day maritime exercise with Singapore’s Navy. The four Indian warships will also be making port-calls in Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia.

But that’s not all. On Tuesday, China released a White Paper on its military strategy which emphasises increasing the country’s naval reach to “open seas protection”. This is the first time that China has officially taken on the role of regional security provider so far from its shores and called for “active defence”. Clearly, this is a thinly-veiled threat to its smaller neighbours such as Vietnam but also the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, all of whom have maritime disputes with China. It is equally a challenge to India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean region. 

Notably, the Chinese White Paper also outlines plans to build lighthouses in disputed islands in South China Sea — and just in case anyone thought that Beijing wasn’t serious about implementing these measures, the Chinese transport Ministry conducted a groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of two multi-functional lighthouses in the Spratly Islands (which Vietnam claims as its own) on the same day that the Defence Ministry launched the White Paper.

That China released its White Paper less than 24 hours after Vietnam signed a defence pact with India was, of course, coincidental, but it does underline the immediate import of the situation. The Vietnamese are reportedly keen that India train their submarine personnel and there is already some joint military exercises that are ongoing. India is also looking at selling the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile to Vietnam. But the deal is yet to be finalised. Meanwhile, India is continuing with its oil and gas explorations in Vietnamese blocks in the South China Sea, despite recent Chinese objections.

Last year, there were at least three high-level interactions between India and Vietnam in as many months. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Hanoi in August 2014, and President Pranab Mukherjee made a high-profile state visit in September. During Mr Mukherjee’s visit, India extended Vietnam a $100 million line of credit specifically for defence procurement. In October 2014, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung came to India and it was during this trip that New Delhi agreed to supply four patrol vessels to Vietnam to improve the latter’s maritime security capabilities.  Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also been invited for a visit later this year.

The deepening of ties with Vietnam started with the Manmohan Singh Government. There were several high-level visits during the UPA Government’s second term and there was a strong political push to deepen military ties, despite the Government’s general penchant for playing safe and not doing anything that might upset China. The incumbent NDA regime has thankfully continued with the UPA’s efforts to improve ties with Vietnam and will hopefully do so with more vigour and decisiveness, of the sort that has become the hallmark of Mr Modi’s diplomacy.

As such, India and Vietnam have   traditionally had strong bilateral ties,  even if the people-to-people connect has somewhat waned in recent years. Indians today may no longer chant slogans such as ‘Amaar naam, tomaar naam, Vietnam Vietnam’ which was popular in the 1970s Bengal, but political support has remained steadfast. Vietnam has emerged as an important regional partner for India in South East Asia and can be expected play a prominent role in the Modi Government’s Act East policy. India and Vietnam already cooperate in various regional forums such as the Association for South-East Asian Nations, the East Asia Summit, the Mekong Ganga Cooperation and the Asia Europe Meeting

Apart from India, Vietnam has also been looking to firm up its defence ties with other powers including the US. In fact, the US has agreed to partially lift its arms embargo against Vietnam, specifically permitting the sale of American defence equipment.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 28, 2015

BRICS: Getting Back to Business

The group's annual summits have been low on substance in recent years. Still, the upcoming gathering in Brazil has piqued some interest. It is Narendra Modi's first engagement at a multilateral forum and will probably see the finalisation of the BRICS development bank

Over the past few years, the six-country grouping of emerging market economies BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has lost much of its sheen. Home to 40 per cent of the world’s population and accountable for a quarter of the global output, BRICS was trumpeted to be the next big thing on the global stage — both economically and politically — but it seems to have been unable to live up to the hype in either case.

Economically, growth rates in all these emerging markets, except China, have dropped considerably. When Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs came up with the acronym in 2001, it was expected that, by 2050, the BRIC economies (South Africa was added to the group much later in 2010) could rival the G7 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan) in terms of global growth. However, in August 2013, Mr O’Neill conceded that the group’s performance had been below par, that he was most disappointed with India’s record and the only country that deserved BRICS status was China.

Politically, the group was supposed to mark the turning point from a unipolar to multipolar global order. But here too BRICS had failed to consolidate its position primarily due to internal disagreements stemming from the group’s inherent dichotomies.
Consequently, the group’s annual summits that bring together the heads of all five member states, though high on style and show, have been low on substance in recent years. Nevertheless, the upcoming BRICS annual summit in Brazil has piqued some interest. This is not to say that there has been a drastic change in course for BRICS but recent developments in India and abroad give enough reason to keep an eye on the happenings in Fortaleza.

For India, the summit is of particular interest because it is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first foreign engagement at a multilateral forum. He has been in office for less than two months during which foreign policy initiatives have received much attention. Mr Modi has made clear that his administration will focus on South Asia but outside of that there is little clarity on how he will script India’s engagement with the rest of the world. The BRICS summit is, therefore, his opportunity to add more substance to his foreign policy.
Much attention will also be on Mr Modi’s meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping — he has met neither leader since taking over as Prime Minister, so this will be a power-packed first. It will be interesting to see how the meetings play out because they will serve as a precursor to state visits scheduled for later in the year. President Xi is expected to visit India in September and President Putin in the coming months.

Another area of interest during Mr  Modi’s Brazil tour will be his meetings with a host of South American leaders. On the invitation of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who is seeking to reiterate her country’s position as the regional leader, all BRICS heads of state will be travelling to Brasilia after the summit to meet with their counterparts from Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Suriname.

It is unclear whether Mr Modi will have bilateral meetings with some or all South American leaders but his interactions will be closely monitored for clues on how India’s relationship with that region may evolve under the new regime in Delhi. Traditionally, India has not had close ties with South America but this has been changing, and in some cases rather rapidly so.

Across the world, the one announcement that has created much excitement about BRICS is that of the development bank. There has been talk of such an institution for a while now but given the many differences between the BRICS member states on key issues, including who would fund the bank and by how much, few had expected that the project would have a real presence outside the communiqués.
However, earlier this month, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong announced that all five countries had reached a broad consensus on their $100 billion development bank. They have reportedly agreed to fund the bank equally — $10 billion each — to create a $50 billion corpus. Other details, such as the location of the bank (Mumbai, Shanghai and Moscow are all in the running although China’s commercial capital seems to be ahead in the race), however, are yet to be finalised.

Once established, the BRICS bank will serve as the developing world’s response to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which are dominated by the US and Europe. For long, emerging economies, who have to take out huge loans from these established institutions to fund their national infrastructure projects, have complained that such financial assistance often comes at a high cost — needless meddling in their sovereign affairs by Western powers. A BRICS bank may then allow emerging economies to sidestep these institutions altogether and, eventually, build their own global governance structures.
Providing an alternative to the existing Western-led political and economic international architecture has always been an important motif for BRICS. However, rarely has the mood of individual BRICS member states been so definitively anti-West. Brazil is upset about the snooping scandal, so is India. China does not appreciate Western interference in South China Sea while Russia is bristling about the sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis.
President Putin, for one, has made a clear shift to the East. Apart from good relations with India, he has now sought to strengthen ties with Beijing in the hope that together they can take on an imposing West. Indeed, there is no denying that the Obama Administration is inadvertently pushing Russia into China’s arms. The landmark $400 billion gas deal signed between the China National Petroleum Corporation and Russia’s Gazprom is just one example. A decade in the making, it was finalised in May and paves the way for Russia to deliver about 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year to China’s burgeoning economy, starting around 2018 — thereby reducing Moscow’s dependence of the European market as well as diversifying China’s energy source basket. Similarly, a cash-strapped Russia’s decision to sell weapons to Pakistan, a friend of China’s may also be seen in this context.

Yet, not all is hunky dory in the blossoming China-Russia relationship. Moscow fears that it may be relegated to the position of a junior partner. In fact, China’s economic might is very much a matter of concern for all other BRICS countries, who worry that the grouping might become China’s fiefdom. In fact, this was one of the reasons why Russia, Brazil and India strongly opposed China’s offer to fund a larger share of the BRICS development bank corpus.

There are several currents and counter-currents at work here. The sixth annual BRICS summit will offer an interesting view into how they play out.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 10, 2014)

Sari Diplomacy in South Asia

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s ongoing Bangladesh visit is crucial to rejuvenate bilateral ties, as Sheikh Hasina, discriminated by the West, now looks at other Asian powers, particularly China, for support

 It was in the late 1990s that the term ‘sari diplomacy’ became rather fashionable after Ms Cherie Blair, as Britain’s First Lady, did more for India-UK relations with her red-and-green silk sari, which she wore to the British Indian Golden Jubilee Banquet, than official talks between her husband and the then Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral, had achieved a few weeks earlier. In the years since then, Ms Blair has continued with the trend and is often seen sashaying in six yards of silk at various South Asian events.

Ms Samantha Cameron, wife of the current British Prime Minister, has also followed in her footsteps with much grace and aplomb. Across the pond, the Americans have usually found themselves on the other end of the (un)diplomatic spectrum — notoriously for having subjected one sari-clad Indian envoy to Washington, DC to a pat down at the airport.

Closer home, the men have also taken to some fabulous sari diplomacy (and given it a typically desi twist by bringing their mothers into the fold) as the recent exchange of gifts between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif show.

But as External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj tours Bangladesh on her first solo trip abroad, meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina among others, together they can prove that there’s little to match the charm, versatility and power of sari diplomacy, when it is done by women leaders from South Asia.

Ms Swaraj and Ms Hasina reportedly share a close rapport. The last time they had met was in January 2010 —Ms Swaraj had then just taken over from veteran BJP leader LK Advani as the Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha, and had hosted Prime Minister Hasina, who was on a state visit to New Delhi, in her official capacity. Sure, they talked about politics and education and women’s empowerment but as Ms Swaraj later said in a media interview, “Our baatcheet (as women) could not be complete without the talk of saris”.

No surprise then that the two leaders also exchanged saris at that meeting. While Ms Swaraj gifted Ms Hasina a cream coloured ‘South Indian’ sari with grey border — “I knew cream is her favourite colour”, she said — the Prime Minister gave her a bhalo green Jamdani, which according to then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Dipu Moni, she had handpicked herself.

As Ms Swaraj now travels around Bangladesh, ably aided by Ms Sujatha Singh, the Foreign Secretary, and Ms Sripriya Ranganathan, the Joint Secretary who heads the Bangladesh-Myanmar division at the Ministry of External Affairs, the sari diplomacy motif on the Minister’s entourage is quite unmistakable.

Indeed, earlier this year when Prime Minister Hasina faced harsh criticism from the West for holding a general election that had been boycotted by a cussed Opposition and marred by large scale violence, it was Ms Singh who led India’s efforts in favour of Bangladesh. Not only did she travel to Dhaka to negotiate with the political leadership there and break the deadlock, she also resisted pressures in Washington to toe the Western line and de-legitimise the election. In doing so, she helped reiterate New Delhi’s support for one of its most important and friendly neighbours.

Much of the Western world still doesn’t recognise the Sheikh Hasina regime’s electoral mandate — no, it prefers to support Ms Khaleda Zia’s irresponsible Opposition, allied to Islamist parties whose ability to wreak havoc on the streets far exceeds the percentage of votes they can secure in a free and fair election.

But such dichotomy is typical of the West’s foreign policy. Little else explains why military strongmen in West Asia who have conducted coups that, of course, shall never be labelled as such are rewarded with billions of dollars in aid while Ms Hasina gets the rap for an election that was not exactly up to international standards even as the West drones on about the values of democracy. 

Predictably, such discriminatory attitudes have now compelled the Sheikh Hasina regime to seek closer relations with Great Powers other than the West — primarily China and Japan. These countries do not share the West’s hollow concerns vis-à-vis Bangladesh and have no qualms about working with the incumbent regime.

In fact, the reason why Prime Minister Hasina could not join other South Asian leaders at Mr Modi’s inauguration ceremony in May was because she was on an official visit to Japan at that time. Then, earlier this month, she also travelled to China where she met with the top leadership in Beijing including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Yang and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Yu Zhengsheng.

Now, Bangladesh has always had close commercial ties with China but this trip is believed to have been more than just about business with Prime Minister Hasina reportedly seeking political reassurances as well.

Overall, the trip was quite successful. Five agreements were signed at the Government-to-Government level: First, China promised to give 300 million renminbi every year to Bangladesh for economic and technical cooperation. Second, an agreement to set up 1,320 megawatt coal fired power plant in Bangladesh as a joint venture between China’s National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and Bangladesh’s North-West Power Generation Company Limited. Third, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed for the creation of a Chinese Economic and Investment Zone in Chittagong. Fourth, two Exchanges of Letters were issued on regarding greater cooperation in the field of disaster management and flood management. And fifth, another MoU was also inked with respect to the construction of a multi-lane tunnel under Karnaphuli River. Notably, there were also some agreements in the private sector.

Plans to construct a deep-water port at Sonadia in Cox Bazaar also came up but reportedly made little progress. China is willing to finance the project at a cost of $14 billion but also wants the right to design and operate which Dhaka is reluctant to offer. Most experts are of the opinion that this is a problem that will be resolved sooner than later, eventually allowing China a toe-hold in the Bay of Bengal.

None of this should cause alarm bells to ring in South Block, at least not right away, but they are an important reminder that New Delhi cannot just assume the position of a disinterested big brother in the region and ignore its neighbours at any cost.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 26, 2014)

Fresh Winds May Blow Soon

Manmohan Singh and the Government he has only nominally led have frittered away the robust Vajpayee legacy in foreign affairs. If the BJP comes to power with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, it could bring tectonic, positive changes in the country’s international relations

 In recent weeks, at least two prominent Indian commentators have opined that if Mr Narendra Modi becomes Prime Minister, as is widely expected, his biggest impact will be felt not so much on India’s economic policy but its foreign policy agenda. On April 9, soon after the BJP released its election manifesto, Firstpost editor R Jagannathan observed, “If Modi were to become PM, foreign and security policy could be in for another churn”, and go through a “sea change”. The same day, C Raja Mohan, one of the country’s most respected journalists and foreign policy analysts, wrote in The Indian Express that the “vagueness” in the BJP manifesto should allow Mr Modi “considerable freedom to put his own stamp on India’s foreign policy”. 

The focus on Mr Modi in the foreign policy sphere is interesting, given that the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate does not have a particularly active profile in this regard. Almost all his time as a senior politician has been spent in Gujarat and he has no experience with the processes that guide India’s engagement with the world. To the casual observer, he may, therefore, seem like an untested hand in foreign policy matters, and more so since Mr Modi has focussed only limited attention on the subject during his election campaign. This is not unusual since  foreign policy is hardly a talking point during elections.

But even as Mr Modi holds the cards close to him in this case, comparisons with Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee have already begun. The last BJP Prime Minister, Mr Vajpayee is credited with taking India’s foreign policy to new highs — he tested nuclear weapons that initially led to international sanctions but eventually brought India nuclear legitimacy; he significantly improved the country’s relations with Pakistan despite the process being disrupted by the Kargil conflict; the joint declaration with China that he signed during his landmark trip to the Middle Kingdom in 2003 still forms the basic framework for border dispute talks; and, finally, it was under his leadership that New Delhi shrugged off its Cold War inhibitions and vitalised ties with the US. Indeed, when Mr Vajpayee demitted the Prime Minister’s Office, he left his successor a rich legacy of global engagement.

Unfortunately, Mr Manmohan Singh and the Government he only nominally led frittered away that legacy in this past decade. As the BJP manifesto notes, “The Congress-led UPA has failed to establish enduring friendly and cooperative relations with India’s neighbours. India’s relations with traditional allies have turned cold. India and its neighbours have drifted apart”. In response, the BJP has vowed to “build a strong, self-reliant and self-confident India” that will “regain its rightful place in the comity of nations”.

This has been interpreted by many as indicative of a “muscular” foreign policy under Mr Modi, although what exactly that means is unclear. What can be expected though is that, if Mr Modi takes up the top job, he will be a strong and decisive leader and craft a foreign policy that furthers the country’s “best national interests” (to use a phrase from the manifesto). 

Similarly, analysts have also been talking about what the BJP means when it says that it will “create a web of allies to mutually further our interests”. Does this mean India may shed its non-alignment policies under Mr Modi? This is highly unlikely. In recent years, India has forged a series of strategic partnerships with different countries while still holding onto its strategic autonomy. There is no reason to believe that a Modi-led Government will stray from that path. However, one can expect a greater emphasis on India’s role as an Asian power — particularly in the strengthening of relations with Japan, China and, to a lesser extent, Singapore and South Korea. 

India’s relations with Japan are already on the upswing and will get another big push if Mr Modi comes to power. Japan has been doing a lot of business with Mr Modi’s Gujarat and those experiences will be carried forward to the national level. Also, Mr Modi has a close personal relationship with Mr Shinzo Abe, the staunchly pro-India Prime Minister of Japan. In 2007, during his first term as Prime Minister, Mr Abe gave a warm welcome to Mr Modi in Tokyo; when Mr Modi returned to Japan in 2012, Mr Abe was in the Opposition, but the duo still met; months later in December that year, when Mr Abe returned to power, Mr Modi personally called to congratulate — a noticeable event given that Mr Modi was not a national leader.  Moreover, both men are portrayed as nationalists focussed on the country’s economic resurgence which makes their partnership almost natural.  

As regards China, alarmists have already raised red flags about Mr Modi’s comments, made in Arunachal Pradesh, on protecting India’s territorial integrity. They have been quick to assume that this means India may take on a provocative stance against China, which it can ill-afford, even though the Chinese themselves dismissed the statements as catering to domestic concerns during an election campaign. Also, there is reason enough to assume that under his leadership, India’s relations with China will realise their full potential, especially in trade. Mr Modi has travelled to China four times already and, in 2011, was received in the Great Hall of the People, a landmark event largely ignored by the Indian media.  

The BJP manifesto also says, “Instead of being led by Big Power interests, we will engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond.” This again has been interpreted as a snub to the West, particularly the US which finds no mention in the manifesto. But before reading too much into it, let’s not forget that no other country is individually named in the manifesto. Also, given Mr Modi’s reputation as a realist politician, one can be reasonably sure that he will not allow relations between the two countries to deteriorate on his watch. If anything, given Mr Modi’s emphasis on economic ties, one can expect a significant strengthening of trade relations between the two countries which have plateaued in recent years. However, the US’s earlier insult of Mr Modi will remain in the backdrop — so do not be surprised if he drops by Tehran on his way to Washington, DC.

Finally, there has been a lot of hullabaloo over the BJP’s promise to design an “independent strategic nuclear programme” by updating the current doctrine in keeping with the challenges of time. This was being widely seen as the party’s code for junking the ‘no first use’ principle; and Modi-baiters conveniently used this to fuel fears of ‘war-mongering’ by the man commonly described as a ‘Hindu nationalist strongman’ — no matter that there is consensus across India’s strategic community that the NFU needs to be revisited at the earliest.

Their bubble of vacuous commentary burst as soon as BJP president Rajnath Singh put to rest all speculation about the NFU being revised. It remains unclear why Mr Singh made such a definitive statement; the nuclear doctrine is not a major electoral plank — but it is hoped that, if Mr Modi comes to power, he will update India’s nuclear policy, as promised in his party manifesto.

(This op-ed was published in The Pioneer on April 17, 2014)

Our Friend Across The Oceans

The India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high, and it is the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership that may potentially re-define the Indo-Pacific security paradigm

With Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe being feted as the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade this year, New Delhi has underlined its reciprocal interest in Tokyo’s initiative to bolster bilateral ties between the two countries. The Prime Minister’s visit comes just about a month after India had the honour of hosting the Emperor and Empress of Japan — a historic tour and perhaps the most potent gesture from Tokyo towards India’s new-found centrality in Japan’s foreign policy scheme. That in between these two visits, Japan’s Foreign Minister Itsunori Onodera also came calling not only reiterates the fact that the India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high but more specifically, underscores the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership.

Since his return to office in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe’s has sought to re-work Japan’s pacifist post-War Constitution, keeping in mind two factors: First, protect Japanese strategic interests against the backdrop of a changing security paradigm (read: increasing Chinese belligerence in the neighbourhood) and second, re-invigorate the moribund Japanese economy — which also serves as a response to China’s emergence as a global powerhouse — by expanding its highly advanced defence industry. The latter, of course, is just one part of Prime Minister Abe’s larger economic revival plan that includes fiscal stimulus, tightening monetary policy and re-structuring economic structures. Most of these efforts have been paying off. Now, they have all been smartly packaged within the nationalist narrative of putting Japan on the path to realising its destiny as the Land of the Rising Sun.

Japan’s global strategic policy under Prime Minister Abe has been carefully articulated in its National Security Strategy that was released in December 2013, alongside a National Defence Programme Guidelines and the establishment of a national security council (which, interestingly, coincided with the Chinese setting up a similar body). That Tokyo has gone so far as to the put out a security doctrine, not to mention constitute an NSC, is in itself a rare though welcome move.

From India’s perspective, it gets even better — a casual overview of the security doctrine makes clear that Japan views this country as one of the “primary drivers” of its “proactive contribution to peace” policy. Against this backdrop, it is to be expected that bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries that has increased significantly in recent years will now grow exponentially. Joint naval exercises, for instance, have already become a fairly regular affair. Even the coast guards of the two countries held their first joint exercise in the Arabian Sea on January 14. More cooperation in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations is on the cards already.

Additionally, there is now a push for more cooperation between the Indian Air Force and the Japanese Air Self Defence Force. This will be a huge step forward and, in fact, was one of the most important issues discussed during the Japanese Defence Minister’s visit earlier this month.

Another issue that figured prominently on the agenda was the ShinMaywa US-2i aircraft. Japan has offered this multi-role amphibian aircraft to India, and India is seriously considering the offer. The US-2i will go a long way in strengthening the country’s naval aviation segment and also help with search and rescue operations, thereby extending our capabilities in providing humanitarian assistance. A joint working group was set up last year to work out the modalities of the deal. In fact, the plan was to sign the deal during Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming visit but unfortunately it has not worked out as such.

But nevertheless, Japan’s offer to sell this aircraft to India must be viewed against the backdrop of Tokyo now shedding it traditional reticence on defence trade. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the sale of any weapons and defence technology. It was initially designed to block any support to Communist countries but eventually evolved into a blanket ban. However, since the 1980s, successive Governments have been chipping it away — most notably in 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda allowed the transfer of defence technology, and recently Prime Minister Abe has sought to lift the export ban in its entirety.

For now, Japan can still sell the US-2i to India without the friend-or-foe detection system (which is what makes it a fighter aircraft). Some say that the missing part can be retroactively fitted possibly with Israeli systems that are supposedly superior anyway. Either way, the potential for cooperation in this field is immense especially as India seeks to modernise its armed forces. 

On the political front, Minister Onodera’s visit will be followed by the third 2+2 dialogue that brings together the foreign and defence ministers of both countries, the Fourth Defence Policy Dialogue that will be conducted at the Defence Secretary level, and finally a trip to Japan by the Indian Defence Minister. In general, there is a consensus favouring more high-level deliberations including annual exchanges between military personnel and the political leadership alike.

Almost all of this is in keeping with Prime Minister Abe’s past record of seeking strong ties with India, not just on a bilateral basis but also as part of multilateral arrangements. Back in 2007, when Mr Abe was serving his first term as Prime Minister, he had delivered a landmark speech to the Indian Parliament wherein he etched out a grand civilisational partnership between the two nations. At that time, he also laid the foundation of a ‘security quadrilateral’ between Japan, India, the US and Australia. In fact, this was followed by Operation Malabar in the same year that saw a bilateral naval exercise between India and the US extended to include Australia, Japan and also Singapore. China was understandably livid and issued strong demarches to everybody and that was the end of that. 

But when he returned to India in 2011, he made a conscious effort to firm up his 2007 strategy by calling for the “two great democracies to meet at sea — for a better and safer Asia”. His pointed references to China made it clear that he would not cower before the might of Beijing, as some others have in recent years.

In fact, one of the reasons why Japan is seeking new partners is because it is reportedly displeased with its traditional ally, the US’s refusal to take a harder line against China. The fact remains that for all the talk about a rebalance to Asia, Washington, DC, has more or less accepted China’s recent imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone which covers the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands administered by Japan and claimed by Beijing. In India, however, the situation strikes a far more sympathetic note.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 23, 2014)

Left to Fend for Itself in Asia

India remains an important player in the New Silk Road project which hopes to integrate the Afghan economy into that of Central and South Asia. But can it succeed without the US's help? America seems to have given up on the initiative

 From all available reports, there isn’t much to write home about the first India-China dialogue on Central Asia that happened in Beijing last week, apart from the fact that it happened. Still the two-day meet, which was similar in structure to the recent bilateral dialogues on Africa, West Asia, Afghanistan and counter-terrorism, managed to briefly move the spotlight to Central Asia — the newest theatre of Sino-Indian rivalry and the one where New Delhi is seemingly performing the worst.

The Dialogue may have been designed to bring both countries on the same page as they increase their engagement in Central Asia, but New Delhi knows well that Beijing has long since raced ahead of it. In fact, India lags behind not just China but all other major players in the region — definitely the US and Russia but also Iran and Turkey. This is despite the fact that India has civilisational ties with Central Asia that go back centuries; more recently, New Delhi has also made a conscious effort towards strengthening its presence in that region. The Government of India’s official Connect Central Asia policy was unveiled by Minister of State for External Affairs E Ahamed at the India-Central Asia Dialogue in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek in June 2012. More than a year later, the policy remains more aspirational than it is in the actual.

Yet, a strong presence in Central Asia is important for India for two key factors: Energy security and military security. In the first case, India currently receives almost all of its oil and gas from West Asia but given how volatile that region can be, it is a good idea to look for other suppliers. Moreover, as the country’s energy demands continue to grow, New Delhi has no choice but to tap into other sources. In this context, energy-rich and proximate Central Asia is best positioned to become India’s next big oil and gas supplier.

China faces much the same challenges (growing economy, growing population) — except that it seems to have responded to them much better, as is evident from the deep inroads that it has already made into the Central Asian energy market. Beijing’s two trillion-dollar-strong foreign exchange reserves and a ruthlessly efficient Government not encumbered by the demands of democracy, have meant it has consistently managed to out-bid New Delhi in oil deals not just in Central Asia but across the world. For example, just weeks before the dialogue in Beijing, India lost to China the world’s largest oil find in five decades — the giant Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan.

In November 2012, India’s state-run ONGC Videsh Limited had struck a deal with America’s ConocoPhillips to buy the latter’s 8.4 per cent stake in Kashagan for five billion dollars.  However, the deal fell through in July when the Kazakh Government itself stepped in and informed ConocoPhillips that its own national oil company, KazMunaiGaz, will buy the American company’s stake for the same amount. Kazakh law allows the Government certain pre-emption rights as a result of which it has the authority to buy any oil asset for sale in the country at the price agreed on by the buyer and seller. KazMunaiGaz will now sell that stake to China National Petroleum Corp for a reported $5.3-5.4 billion.

But China is only one of India’s problems in Central Asia. What has most significantly limited New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts in that region is a stubborn Pakistan which has wholly refused India overland access to Central Asia, through Afghanistan. Ideally this would have been the shortest route for India; however, that is not to be — one of the big reasons why the ambitious Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India oil pipeline project, for example, has been a non-starter.

Consequently, New Delhi has had to look for new routes that bypass Pakistan altogether. Towards that end, the North-South Transportation Corridor which connects India to the Central Asian region through Iran was envisaged as a game-changer. Initiated in 2003, this project aims to connect the port in Mumbai to the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas through maritime transport, and then develop road and rail networks linking these two ports with Afghanistan and other Central Asian republics. Some initial progress was made in this regard — India’s Border Road Organisation invested $136 million to set up a road link from Zaranj to Delaran which was inaugurated in 2009. This 215km long road is a crucial part of what is known as Afghanistan’s garland road network that goes around the country connecting Herat to Kabul via Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. But this road link apart, the North-South Transportation Corridor has mostly been gathering dust for a decade now.

In the meantime, the Chinese have aggressively built similar road and rail networks penetrating deep into the heart of Central Asian Region. The Karakoram Highway, which is under-construction in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and stands a direct threat to India’s security interests in that region, is also essentially an extension of this plan, and so is the Gwadar port in Pakistan that is being developed as a counter-balance to the Chabahar port in Iran, located less than 200km away.

This brings us to military-security aspect of India-Central Asia dynamic. As of now, India’s military footprint in that region is next to nothing. New Delhi had sought to shore up its prospects by taking over the Ayni air base in Tajikistan which would have given tremendous strategic depth in the region but its plans have most definitely been thwarted by Russia, the big brother in the region. India began renovating the Ayni air-field, located just outside the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, in 2004 and up until the end of 2010, Indian engineers were still working there. However, in the last three years, the Tajik Government which depends considerably on Moscow for financial aid, seems to have made clear that it will only let Russia use the air-base.

India’s other military assets in the region include a military hospital in Farkhor, also in Tajikistan. Set up in 2001 to treat Northern Alliance members fighting the Taliban, it was shut down after the US removed the militant group from power. But in recent years, there have been talks of re-opening that field hospital. 

The India-Tajik relationship is as far as India’s military presence goes in that region. And while there have been some positive indications of improving that footprint, it is unlikely to change significantly in the near future. Not only because China and Pakistan will do all that they can to limit India’s presence but also because Russia will probably not go all out to support India. The US is the only country which has unequivocally stated that it would like India to emerge as its regional partner (this explains Russia’s reluctance) especially post the 2014 Afghan pullout.

India remains an important player in its New Silk Road project that hopes to integrate the Afghan economy into that of Central and South Asia. But America’s diminished clout at this point (the NSR project has been all but discarded) it is unclear how far Washington, DC will be able to help on the ground. In other words, India is on its own.

(This article was published in the Op-ed sector of The Pioneer on August 22, 2013.)

Warmth of the Rising Sun

Tokyo must shed its old stand on the issue of India not having signed the NPT, especially if it wishes to work with New Delhi in the civil nuclear energy arena, which is the other big picture idea that could redefine India-Japan relations

Days after he hosted Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in New Delhi, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe in Tokyo during the course of his three-day visit that ends Thursday, there is no ignoring the dragon in the room. Sample this from Mr Singh’s speech on Tuesday to a high-profile gathering that included Indian and Japanese parliamentarians: “This region faces multiple challenges, unresolved issues and unsettled questions. Historical differences persist despite our growing inter-dependence; prosperity has not fully eliminated disparities within and between states; and there are continuing threats to stability and security.”

Now, place this against the backdrop of the recent Chinese incursion into Indian territory. Had it spun out of control, that episode could have well morphed into a full-scale military confrontation. Also, add to the picture China’s renewed effort to grab the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands administered by Japan. This, many strategists believe, today poses the most serious risk of a militarised conflict between the two nations since the second world war.

And this is just one illustration of how both India and Japan have a common interest in containing Chinese belligerence in Asia. Apart from the border dispute, India, for instance, also remains deeply concerned about China’s proximity to Pakistan and its continued support for the rogue regime in North Korea, which again is known to proliferate arms and weapons technology to Pakistan. Similarly, for Japan, it is China’s increasingly hostile posturing in the South and East China that is becoming untenable.

At the crux of much of this lies China’s hunger for more and more resource that comes amid growing domestic unrest. In other words, there is nothing to suggest that Chinese aggression in the region will diminish. If anything, it will be ramped up over the years — more the reason why India and Japan must join hands and strengthen their security partnership.

Already, New Delhi and Tokyo have institutionalised the ‘2+2 dialogue’ involving their respective Defence and Foreign Secretaries. This is a one-of-its-kind arrangement that India and Japan have, and it is only testimony to the increasing importance of their bilateral relationship particularly within a national and regional security paradigm.

Yet another reason that adds to the urgency of the India-Japan bilateral ties, especially in the China context, is the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. Designed primarily to contain China, the strategy has India as its so-called lynchpin. Add to this the pre-established alliance between the US and Japan, and pieces of this puzzle begins to fall in place. While America may have lost some of its global influence in recent years, there is no denying that it still has one of the world’s most powerful militaries which could still prove to be a strategic game-changer any day.

But while these geo-political imperatives should bring the two countries closer, it is the return of Mr Abe to power that should add the much-needed momentum to the relationship. For years now, ties between India and Japan have been on a slow if steady track, but as the time now comes to take it to the next level, a booster shot is necessary. Who better to administer that shot than Mr Abe?

Apart from the fact that he is possibly the most pro-India of all Japanese leaders in recent times, the Liberal Democratic Party leader is also known for his staunchly nationalist views and is the least likely to take Chinese aggression lying down. Let us not forget that it was he, who in a historic address to the Indian Parliament in 2004, first spoke of the Indo-Pacific as a security paradigm and later went so far ahead as to suggest an informal military alliance between Japan, India, the US and Australia. Unfortunately, that idea never really took off. Even if the Japanese Prime Minister decides to resuscitate it, most strategists believe that it is unlikely to take any definite shape — mostly because it would make China furious. But that still does not change the fact that the Japanese Prime Minister views India as a strategic partner, and if Mr Singh’s Tokyo trip is anything to go by, New Delhi has signalled its willingness to embrace Mr Abe’s view of the Indo-Pacific.

However, if the India-Japan bilateral relationship has to realise its full potential, even within the security paradigm alone, Tokyo will first have to unshackle itself from post-War inhibitions. As of now, Japan does not export arms or weapons technology to India because of the three principles enshrined in its Constitution that effectively prevent such exchanges. Announced in 1967, these principles ban arms export to (i) communist countries (ii) countries to which arms exports are banned under UN resolutions, and (iii) countries which are or may be involved in an international military conflict. However, in 1976 the Liberal Democratic Party Government of the time expanded the restrictions to cover other countries not described in the principles, and also brought under cover defence-related technologies; thereby, imposing a veritable blanket ban on arms export.

It was not until 1983 that Tokyo made an exemption for the first time by allowing the export of military technologies to the US. In December 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of the Democratic Party of Japan relaxed the three principles and set fresh standards for arms exports. Under the new regime, export of defense equipment related to peacemaking and international cooperation is now permitted while co-development and co-production of defense equipment is also allowed if the partner country has a cooperative relationship with Japan over national security issues.

Naturally, this works well for India — and more so now that, given Mr Abe’s personal willingness to expand India-Japan security coordination, the Prime Minister can be trusted to take a more lenient approach towards exports arms to India.

It must be kept in mind that since India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, prior permission from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is needed when it comes to exporting dual-use products and technologies (such as the US-2 amphibious aircraft which Japan might soon sell to India) that may be used for the development or production of weapons. It is in situations such as these that it will help tremendously to have someone like Mr Abe in the driver’s seat.

Still, Tokyo will do well to shed its old stand on the issue of India not having acceded to the NPT, especially if it wishes to work with New Delhi in the civil nuclear energy arena — the other big picture idea that could redefine India-Japan relations.

After all, in 2008, even the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the export of nuclear-related products and technologies to non-NPT member countries, unanimously approved India’s exemption from the export restriction list. While it is true that since 2010, Japan and India have been discussing a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement but the fact is that negotiations have been deadlocked since Tokyo insists on a provision that, should India resume nuclear testing, cooperation between the two countries will cease. 

This obviously is not amenable to New Delhi, which has maintained a principled stance on the matter. In this case, Japan will do well to learn a lesson from the US which signed the civil nuclear deal with India, keeping its eyes firmly on China.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 30, 2013.)