Building an equal partnership

US must take India’s concerns into account if it wants the latter to be a security anchor against China

That there is a nice ring to lofty statements about the shared ideals and values between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s most powerful democracy is without a doubt, much like all the talk about deepening ties between these two countries allows for some solid diplomatic bonhomie. But rhetoric, no matter how pleasant and passionate, does not necessarily convert into good policy. It is against this backdrop that the Third India-US Strategic Dialogue that Union Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna co-chaired with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington, DC on June 13 must be viewed.

The high-level, capstone dialogue between the two countries was instituted in 2010 to promote greater cooperation between the two countries and broaden the scope of bilateral relations. In other words, it is here that the basic framework of India-US relations is defined and demarcated, and then re-defined. The current round of talks, however, has come at a particularly interesting time in the history of the India-US relations.

After a lukewarm start in the late 1990s, ties between India and the US were only strengthened in this past decade. Throughout the mid-2000s, the Bush Administration freely courted New Delhi — their alliance culminating in the groundbreaking India-US civil nuclear energy agreement — but by the time the Obama Administration came to power in 2008, the honeymoon was decidedly over. Washington’s continued pandering to Islamabad, for one, was beginning to take a toll on its relations with New Delhi.

Since then, however, the situation has changed significantly with the US now making it amply clear that it wishes for India to take on a greater role as an ‘ally’.  For instance, during his recent visit to India last week, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta talked at length about India’s importance in the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. More importantly, he also described India as the “linchpin” of the US’s new foreign strategy which envisions a “pivot to Asia”. Introduced earlier this year, the strategy is essentially America’s response to a changing world order — notably to China’s alarming growth as an economic and military powerhouse that has come at a time when its own influence is waning. Today, as Washington attempts to re-calibrate its relations with Beijing, it has decided to hedge its bet with New Delhi.

Now, the ball is in India’s court. If New Delhi indeed wishes to be part of this new gameplan, the chatter coming out of Washington’s power corridoors is that the former must do more to show greater commitment — it must prove that it is indeed willing to be US’s partner. India’s response in this situation is a definite policy challenge, and how exactly Mr Krishna and his delegation rise to the occasion is to be seen. Still, the team will do well to lay down some ground rules that delineate what exactly it is that New Delhi wants from the US.

Here are the top five non-negotiables that must feature on Mr Krishna’s agenda.

First: Don’t ask us to fight your war with China.

Although Washington will never say it in as many words, what it essentially wants from India is a positive affirmation that in case of a US-China military stand-off (or an outright war, which is of course quite unlikely), New Delhi will stand by its side. That is the crux of the whole “linchpin” narrative. But India has its own issues with China that range from long-festering border disputes to disagreements over sovereign rights in the South China Sea. These again have to be balanced with the fact that today China is India’s biggest trading partner — bigger than the US even. Plus, China is in India’s immediate neighbourhood and, simply put, New Delhi cannot afford to have a confrontational relationship with Beijing for it will be at the cost of our national interest. Washington must understand and acknowledge that.

Second: Stop bullying us over Iran

New Delhi is already doing as much as it possibly can in this situation — it has cut down on its Iranian oil imports as desired by Washington so as to squeeze Tehran over its controversial nuclear programme — but India has its limits too. We don’t like the idea of a bomb in the hands of the Ayatollah anymore than the Americans do, but the fact of the matter is that India needs Iran to meet its rapidly growing energy demands. As an emerging market economy, it is simply not possible for India to completely give up on cheap Iranian oil. Further, Tehran also provides New Delhi key access to the rest of Central Asia and finally, there is no denying that the two share a cultural relationship that goes back centuries. If Washington expects New Delhi to publicly censure Tehran, especially at a time when there is little proof that the former’s own policy of sanctions is working, it really is asking for too much.

Third: Please turn off the Pakistani aid tap, for a change.

If anything , the events of this past year — from the Raymond Davis episode and the unilateral raid that killed Osama bin Laden to the attack on Western targets in Afghanistan by Pakistani militants and the shutting of Nato supply routes — have made it crystal clear that billions of dollars in American aid have bought Washington absolutely no leverage, either in Islamabad or in Rawalpindi. Since the money is literally going down the drain to ultimately fund terror activities that hurt both US and Indian interests, New Delhi must insist that Washington turn off the aid tap. And that should serve as the first step in a long process of holding Pakistan accountable for its many crimes.

Fourth: Clean up the mess in Afghanistan before you leave from there.

There is also no denying that the locals are far from ready to protect their country from the Taliban. And it is not just the security forces but even Afghanistan’s political class is unprepared to resist a Taliban takeover that is sure to happen once Nato troops leave that country in 2014. Hence, it is imperative that India impress upon the US that a rushed exit from Afghanistan will only undo hard-earned gains in the region. If New Delhi fails to do, it will be the one left holding the can afterwards.

Fifth: Give us space and time.

Just like in a successful marriage both partners need adequate personal space and enough time to grow and eventually find their place in the relationship, the same rules apply here too. India has shown that it is committed to building a strong alliance with the US but it must be allowed to do so on its own terms. New Delhi must be an equal partner in its ties with Washington — and not a subordinate member of a group led by the US, Cold War-style.

Ultimately, the US must acknowledge that only an independent and empowered India can make for an effective partner.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 14.)

A second look at no-first use

Thirteen years after Atal Bihari Vajpayee committed India to a no-first use nuclear strike policy, his Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh believes the time has come to revisit and revise this strategy. Referring to India’s increasingly multi-dimensional security concerns, especially Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal and deteriorating political situation, he has cautioned the Government against sitting in yesterday’s policy. He has a point.

The year was 1998. America was the undoubted global superpower and the tall Twin Towers graced the New York City skyline. China was growing but was far from being a global player. Pakistan had a popularly elected Prime Minister in Mr Nawaz Sharif. The Buddhas of Bamiyan from the sixth century stood tall and proud in central Afghanistan. India was still a developing nation, although the effects of economic liberalisation introduced under the earlier Union Minister for Finance Manmohan Singh were gradually becoming conspicuous. No one was yet talking of an Asian century. Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee was Prime Minister and it had been less than three months since India had test-exploded five nuclear weapons in a nondescript town in Rajasthan. 

During a debate on foreign policy in Parliament, Mr Vajpayee made a historic announcement that defined India's position as an emerging nuclear power -- he said that the country was committing itself to a distinct unilateral and global no-first-use nuclear strike policy. In other words, Mr Vajpayee promised that neither would India use its nuclear weapons against another state that does not possess nuclear weapons nor would it be the first to strike another nuclear power. Based on the principle of minimum deterrence, the policy went a long way in discrediting foreign criticism that the country was moving away from the principles of disarmament and setting the stage for another arms race. A no-first-use policy helped portray India as a responsible and non-aggressive nation, as was the need of the hour. 

Now, fast forward to 2011. A bearded old man who lives in remote mountain caves wields more power and influences more people than any world leader, business tycoon or matinee idol. America has lost its edge and the Twin Towers no longer exist. In a new global order that is now supposedly multi-polar, China has redefined the idea of an ‘Asian Tiger' while Pakistan is a malfunctioning state that is struggling with its democratic credentials. In other words, this is a new world which has presented before us a new set of realities, challenges and situations. Consequently, the policies and principles of 1998 may or may not be relevant any longer in 2011 and either way, deserve to be revisited. 

Little wonder then exactly 13 years after Prime Minister Vajpayee made his landmark announcement, his Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh, while participating in a similar Lok Sabha debate on foreign policy, pointed out that India's no-first-use policy is "greatly in need of revision" and cautioned the present Government against "sitting in yesterday's policy". Referring to India's increasingly multi-dimensional security concerns, the senior BJP leader has urged the Congress-led UPA regime to undertake a thorough review of India's strategic policy. 

Much to Mr Singh's credit, he has also specifically pointed fingers at Pakistan's fast growing nuclear arsenal -- a matter of grave concern that is often brushed under the carpet or simply ignored by the current regime. As Mr Singh mentioned, Pakistan possesses at least 100 to 110 nuclear warheads, which is double that of India's nuclear stockpile. But more than the sheer number of nuclear warheads, what is vastly more worrisome is the fact that these either remain in particularly unsafe hands or are at risk of falling into them. No matter how much we wish to sugar-coat the matter, we cannot, and indeed should not, undermine the fact that Pakistan is a dysfunctional state, run by a powerless Government that is a puppet in the hands of its huge military establishment and has absolutely no control over the extensive terror networks that have engulfed the country. It is, thus, imperative that the Government of India approach the possibly outdated no-first-use policy with an open mind and realistic expectations. 

Sadly, the present administration has shown little inclination towards either. Days after Mr Singh made his recommendations, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs SM Krishna categorically stated that there would be no reconsideration of the policy. It seems like Mr Krishna has decided to continue with a strategy that is obviously way past its expiry date only so that he can be seen as the bearer of India's commitment to "universal, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament". In itself, the aforementioned principle is praiseworthy but nonetheless unsuitable for present day circumstances. 

Let us not forget that a few days ago, former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf described India as an "existential threat" to its neighbour and the sole reason why his country possesses nuclear weapons. He also said that 90 per cent of Indian soldiers have an anti-Pakistan orientation. Irrespective of the degree of truth in his statement, it surely does point us to the mindset of every soldier on the other side of the border. Last time we checked, they were not big fans of India either. But what makes it worse is that the Pakistani military has access to power that is way beyond its means. In fact, it would not be wrong to assume that power in Pakistan is not in the hands of politicians in Islamabad but lies with the Generals in Rawalpindi. Thankfully for Pakistan, such is not the case in India where we at least have a functioning democracy, warts and all. 

It must also be mentioned that India's foreign policy towards Pakistan as it stands today is also one that needs to be revised. As Mr Singh pointed out during the debate, it is unclear if our bilateral ties are governed by the "spirit of the Shimla Agreement, the spirit of Sharm el-Sheikh or more recently the Thimphu spirit". This confusion has been sadly manifest in recent events during which India has tended to go soft on its neighbour in contrast to its earlier no-compromise stance. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's  invitation to President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minsiter Yousuf Raza Gilani to enjoy an afternoon of cricket at Mohali -- cricket diplomacy, they call it -- despite the fact that the two leaders have done nothing to assist with India's investigation into the 26/11 attack on Mumbai is a telling example of all that is wrong with our foreign policy.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on March 29, 2011.)