HOW HAMAS LAUNCHED ISRAEL'S NEXT ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Israel is back from the brink. But the situation could still boil over any time

Israel is now back from the brink after a tumultuous fortnight, first on the edge of war and then with its government on the verge of collapse. The controversial ceasefire agreement with Hamas, the armed group that controls Gaza, is holding up while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has managed to stay together even after losing a coalition partner. However, the situation could boil over yet again.

For one, the rocket fire from Gaza this month -- 500 missiles poured in on border communities, resulting in Israel bombing 160 Hamas targets -- was only the most recent in a series of such firefights that have repeatedly pushed Israel and Gaza close towards a full scale military confrontation. Also, since 30 March this year, Gazans have been regularly, and often violently, amassing at the border fence with Israel to demand that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be allowed to return and that Israel lift the blockade. The campaign was supposed to be six weeks long--from March 30 to May 15--but has continued to simmer over these past months.

In fact, thousands demonstrated in Gaza even during these past two Fridays--however, this time, Hamas kept them away from the fence as part of the Egypt-mediated ceasefire agreement. The agreement also allowed for Qatari cash to be delivered into the coastal enclave and other economic concessions. These are expected to ease the pressure on Gazans in return for a more durable quiet on Israel’s southern border but the agreement stands on fragile ground.

The Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority (PA), which is the internationally recognised representative of all Palestinians but only controls the West Bank, has also criticised the agreement because it undercuts its own dwindling authority. The PA is led by the Fatah party which was violently ousted from the Gaza strip a decade ago--since then, several reconciliation efforts have failed and the two remain at loggerheads. In fact, it was the PA that recently stopped paying for civil servants’ salaries, electricity and fuel subsidies for Gaza so as to turn up the public pressure on Hamas. It hoped that Hamas would eventually accede to PA’s authority and agree to the reconciliation plan from last year. But the firefight with Israel, the subsequent resignation of the Israeli defence minister, and the brief respite brought by the ceasefire deal only boosted Hamas’ credentials in Gaza; leaving the PA further isolated.

In Israel too, the ceasefire agreement has many critics, particularly in the southern border communities. These critics would like to see a tougher response to Hamas, though that’s hardly a long-term solution. Past military campaigns have taken a toll on civilian life and property without eroding Hamas’ ability to re-build its terror infrastructure. Israel has struggled to establish credible deterrence against Hamas. And now, it has other security concerns, such as Iranian presence on its northern border with Syria. A risk-averse Netanyahu would rather have the situation in Gaza ‘managed’ than erupt in a regional flare-up. This explains his support for the ceasefire agreement which has since become a political hot potato in Israel.

On 14 November, Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned and pulled his hard-right Yisrael Beiteinu party from the Likud-led ruling coalition to protest the ceasefire which he viewed as a capitulation to terror. Soon after, Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked of the right-religious Habayit Hayehudi party also threatened to follow suit. Netanyahu reined them in but the ruling coalition now stands on a paper-thin majority. It has only 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. The tenure of the current government ends in November next year and the Prime Minister can call for elections any time before that (but the vote can only be held at least three months after the election is announced). What Lieberman sought to do with his resignation was to force an early election.

The timing here is important. First, Netanyahu is in a weak spot -- facing criticism for the rocket fire from Gaza and the ceasefire agreement. Second, Lieberman’s own tenure as defence minister has been below par, and his supporters feel he hasn’t delivered on his hardline credentials. By resigning on account of the ceasefire, he distanced himself from what his voters see as the government’s capitulation in Gaza and also positioned himself as a challenger to the right of Bibi. His numbers have since improved though he is hardly a serious contender for the post of prime minister.

Lieberman isn’t alone in favouring an early election. Bennett also made the same calculation. That’s why he publicly blackmailed the Prime Minister and demanded the defence minister’s post -- in a bid to position himself as the next leader of the Right. However, his electoral stunt flopped when Netanyahu called his bluff, and he had to backtrack.

Also wanting an early election (but reluctant to trigger one just yet) is Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon and his centre-right Kulanu party which made a stellar debut in 2015. Polls show that if elections were held now, it wouldn’t do as well; but Kulanu might glean away some Likudniks while Netanyahu’s chips are down.

Netanyahu has responded to all of this by presenting himself as the adult in the room: the statesman who negotiated for peace and quiet while the politicians pushed for war and sought to bring down the government during a national crisis. And now that his government has lived to see another day, Netanyahu’s focus will be on delaying the election as much as possible.

This may seem odd given that he was desperate to have early elections only a few months ago --when his poll numbers were high and before his corruption cases caught up. But now, the situation has changed. Netanyahu needs for some time to pass so that the public can move on from the Gaza crisis. He also needs to buy time to recover from the fallout of the three corruption cases.

In the first quarter of 2019, the attorney general is expected to decide on whether to indict the prime minister in these cases. Even if he decides against an indictment, Netanyahu would not like to go to polls around that time. But he would also not want an election campaign that’s drawn out over a year till next November with a fragile coalition at the helm.

Either way, the polls suggest that he has a good chance of winning, but given his personal and political troubles, he will need more than just the winning votes. He will need the numbers to build a strong coalition that will ultimately protect his four-term legacy that matches only with that of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Meanwhile, his opponents will be preparing for the day after Netanyahu is no longer the prime minister. They would want to make sure they are at the right place at the right time.

What does all of this mean for India? The upheaval in Israeli domestic politics is unlikely to impact India-Israel ties in any significant way. The relationship enjoys bipartisan support in Jerusalem and can be expected to continue along the present path even in a post-Netanyahu era. However, internal political equations as well as the nature of the new coalition government will of course impact how Israeli leaders deal with the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu, for example, doesn’t like large military confrontations; he prefers smaller targeted operations that can be controlled. His successor may have a different approach. The latter may also have to deal with the possibility of the PA collapsing altogether. This will upend Israel’s security equation with the West Bank. For now, India has successfully de-hyphenated its Israel-Palestine policy but this might be challenged in case domestic instability -- both within Israeli and Palestinian political circles -- leads to another regional conflagration.

(Mayuri Mukherjee is a security studies scholar at the Tel Aviv University, Israel)

This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think tank.

HOW ISRAEL MADE FRIENDS IN INDIA

Israel’s bottom-up diplomacy has paid off.

The recent award of a $777-million contract to Israel Aerospace Industries for the supply of air and missile defense systems to the Indian Navy has re-emphasized how India-Israel relations have evolved in the last two and a half decades. From outright hostility at the time of independence seven decades ago to a strategic partnership today, the bilateral has come a long way.

That this has been possible in part because of robust defense cooperation between New Delhi and Jerusalem is well-know but what is less acknowledged is the importance of cooperation with Indian States, in fields such as agriculture and water-management. So while the IAI deal made international headlines, the Israel tour of the chief minister of one of India’s most prosperous States, Punjab, went under the radar. During his five-day visit from October 21-25, Capt. Amarinder Singh toured the NaanDanJain agricultural facility, the Dan Region wastewater treatment plant, the Afikim dairy farm, and met with President Reuven Rivlin. Earlier in the year, his counterparts from the States of Gujarat and Haryana also visited Israel, and agriculture featured prominently on both their agendas. 

This decentralized strategy of partnering with different political and private players including State governments, through cooperation in agriculture and allied fields, has long been an integral part of Israeli diplomacy in India – especially in the early years when Jerusalem had few friends in New Delhi.

For example, in 1949, Israel favorably considered India’s request for assistance in agriculture even as India refused to recognize the Jewish State and opposed its UN membership. Israel’s Histadrut maintained ties with India’s labor leaders, many of whom visited the Jewish State. In 1960, two large Indian delegations – one comprising land reforms activists from the Bhoodan movement, and another comprising young farmers – visited Israel. In 1970, India’s leading agriculturist Appasaheb Pawar lived in Israel for months, studying new agro-tech. His brother, Sharad Pawar – who would later serve three terms as Maharashtra chief minister and two as Union Minister – also played an important role in building agri-ties between the two countries.

This decentralized approach to diplomacy continued even after India and Israel established diplomatic ties in 1992. A significant development in itself, it, however, did not translate into policy shifts on the ground. Delhi issued a curt official statement and kept the new bilateral on a low profile. Left-wing parties opposed diplomatic ties and argued that India should have waited till Palestinian statehood had been achieved.

However, the normalization of India-Israel ties coincided with the liberalization of the Indian economy – and States were now empowered to work with foreign governments to bring in economic investment. Israeli diplomats seized the opportunity. Often ignored in the power corridors of Delhi, they sought to build durable partnerships in state capitals.

A slew of chief ministerial visits to Israel, from across party lines, followed--starting with Gujarat’s Chimanbhai Patel (Congress) in 1992, then Maharashtra’s Sharad Pawar (Nationalist Congress Party), who led an 800-member strong delegation to the agritech conference in 1993, then Rajasthan’s Bhairon Singh Shekhawat (Bharatiya Janata Party) in 1994, and Karnataka’s Deve Gowda (Janata Dal-Secular) in 1995.

In 1996, Deve Gowda became Prime Minister and, within six months, hosted President Ezer Weizman in Delhi – even though his own party had opposed normalization. Gowda and Weizman signed four agreements, including one to set up a model farm at India’s premier agriculture research institute near Delhi. By this time, Israeli firms had also begun to build a profile in India – Tahal was working on water management in Gujarat and Rajasthan while Netafim had a joint venture with an Indian firm that it had been doing business with even before 1992. Both Israeli companies now have a pan-India presence.

The bilateral grew stronger with the pro-Israel BJP coming to the helm in Delhi in 1998. In 2000, West Bengal’s Jyoti Basu, a Communist party veteran, broke taboo and visited Israel with a large business delegation. This was a big win but it was derailed by the Second Intifada. Still, Prime Minister AB Vajpayee hosted Ariel Sharon in 2003, indicating a qualitative improvement in bilateral ties.

This was again taken down a notch when the Congress party returned to power in 2004 and rolled back public engagement. However, bilateral trade in general and cooperation in agriculture in particular continued to grow. In 2007, Israel’s NaanDan joined with India’s Jain Irrigation Systems to form NaanDanJain which now provides irrigation solutions across 100 countries. In 2008, the flagship Indo-Israel Agriculture Project was established. Jointly implemented by the India’s horticulture mission and Israel’s MASHAV, it now has more than 15 agricultural centers across nine Indians states.

When the BJP returned to power in 2014, the pro-Israel Prime Minister Narendra Modi was able to build on decades of quiet but effective diplomacy that had already delivered tangible benefits. Modi himself was chief minister of Gujarat for 14 years, during which time his state developed a close partnership with Israel. When he became Prime Minister, few other diplomats had the kind of access to him as the Israeli Ambassador in New Delhi.

Israel’s bottom-up diplomacy has paid off. By focusing on agriculture and water management, instead of, say, lobbying to change India’s foreign policy perspectives, Israel had shifted the core of its India’s policy from a politically-charged single issue (the Palestinian cause) to a much wider non-political grassroots platform. This is not to suggest that cooperation in other areas, particularly defense, was not important – it was and is. But defense cooperation is also inherently susceptible to secrecy and negative opinion, which can be challenging for public diplomacy. In contrast, agricultural cooperation at the state level, allowed Israel to accrue the goodwill of the people, make friends across the ideological spectrum, and shield the bilateral from political upheavals.

(This article was published in the Jerusalem Post on September 30, 2018)

A TIGHTROPE WALK IN WEST ASIA

President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Palestine and Israel, the first by an Indian head of state, is a diplomatic milestone that is equally reflective of how much India’s foreign policy has changed since 1947 and how much it hasn’t

President Pranab Mukherjee’s trip to Palestine and Israel is, of course, historic, given that no other Indian head of state has ever visited either before. While the trip to Palestine was important to reiterate India’s continued support for the Palestinian cause and its commitment to a ‘balanced’ West Asia policy, especially when bilateral ties with Israel are growing strong, the tour of Israel was a natural development. Ties between India and Israel have not only become robust, expanding from defence into agriculture and water management, education and hi-tech, but also more open, particularly under the Modi Government.

Even security cooperation is no longer brushed under the carpet, as is evident from Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon’s India’s visit in February and the first joint military exercise, announced only days before President Mukherjee’s visit. Importantly, in his address to the Knesset, Mr Mukherjee expressed his gratitude to Israel “for rushing critical defence supplies in 1999”. While Israeli assistance to India during the Kargil war — a turning point in the bilateral which was established only in 1992 — is well-known, this is the first time that there has been such a high-profile, public acknowledgement of the same by the Government of India.

Similarly, in the backdrop of a spate of terror attacks in Israel, President Mukherjee’s blanket condemnation of all forms of terrorism was befitting the situation. It focused on the big picture but without taking sides in a complicated regional issue.

While these are welcome developments, if you were, however, looking for signs that the visit signalled an evolution in India’s foreign policy or a maturation of its world view, you’d be disappointed. Indeed, if there is one major takeaway from the President’s tour, it is this: The more things change, the more they stay the same. And so it has been, that despite the geo-politics of West Asia and the international order in general having changed significantly, that despite India’s relatively recent establishment of ties with Israel having added an entirely new dimension to the narrative, the President of India’s foreign policy pronouncements seem to have been mothballed since 1947.

Sample this: In this speech at Al Quds University in Ramallah, Mr Mukherjee reiterated how India has always been at the “forefront of promoting the Palestinian cause” and noted with pride that, “India voted against the partition of Palestine at the United Nations General Assembly in 1947” — in other words, India voted against the establishment of the State of Israel. While the vote is a fact of history, did the President really need to highlight it, given that Israel has emerged as one of India’s most important partners, and that, only hours later, Mr Mukherjee himself was to travel to the Jewish state? Some may argue that it was important for Mr Mukherjee to highlight India’s pro-Palestine stance to ‘balance’ India’s ties with Israel. Even if this is the case (it isn’t, for President himself said that India’s ties with Israel and Palestine are independent of the other), surely there are better ways to do the ‘balancing act’ without highlighting one’s own mistakes from the past.

India’s vote on the UN partition plan (which came only six months after India had favoured the minority plan at the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine which recommended an Arab state and a Jewish state) was the result of the Congress’s ideological support for the Arabs at the time. Two factors had led to the crystallisation of this ideological tilt within the party and thereby within the Indian foreign policy establishment: First, Mahatma Gandhi wasn’t comfortable with the Zionist movement and viewed the establishment of Israel as a colonial project, being imposed on the ‘Palestinian people’, by the same British empire that he was fighting at home. In doing so, he ignored the well-established fact that Jews had continuously lived in the region for thousands of years and were as much ‘Palestinian’ as the Arabs; but given the Mahatma’s political stature at the time, his views set the tone for all. Second, worried that the Congress would lose public support to the Muslim League, already a veritable political force at that time, the Mahatma and other senior leaders of the party resorted to several Muslim appeasement tactics: Pandering to the Arabs, without any diplomatic reciprocation from Arab states was one of them.

Almost 70 years later, India has made some course corrections — establishing diplomatic ties with Israel being the most significant. Yet, it is disappointing to see that even as we acknowledge these new developments, we refuse to do so wholeheartedly. And so it is that we hold on to outdated policy pronouncements in public, even though in practice, we have all but discarded them. It is true that India’s support for the Palestinian cause today is mostly lip-service, limited to routine budgetary allocations, the occasional gift or two, and some grandstanding at the UN. It is equally true that even though sometimes this posturing takes on anti-Israel hues, Israel itself isn’t particularly perturbed, partly because its own take on the Palestinian issue isn’t that much different from India’s (both want a two-state solution in keeping with the relevant UN resolutions etc) and partly because the Palestinian issue isn’t a really an irritant in bilateral ties. However, this issue isn’t about Israel or even Palestine. This is about the Government of India being pragmatic and confident enough to stand up for its own interests.

Again, some may argue that maintaining lip-service to the Palestinian cause is in India’s interests but that argument also stands on a slippery slope, particularly since Indian politicians often tend to over-compensate. For example, during the last Gaza war, some Left parliamentarians demanded that India snap diplomatic ties with Israel. Before that, in 2011, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh while addressing the UN General Assembly, had called for the establishment of a Palestinian state — with East Jerusalem as its capital. This was an unnecessary addition to India’s official position that has been carried forward till this day. It is not in keeping with ground realities and will prove to be a diplomatic headache for India, if and when there is a resolution to the Palestinian question.

Similarly, President Mukherjee underlined how India had “spearheaded” the international campaign for UN recognition of Palestinian statehood in 2012, and congratulated the people of Palestine on the unfurling of their national flag at the United Nations on September 30. No doubt, both of these were symbolic victories for the Palestinian leadership but they were also meaningless in terms of delivering peace and prosperity to the Palestinian people.

Of course, none of these pronouncements will change the ground realities in New Delhi, Jerusalem or Ramallah, but at some point, India needs to ensure that in its efforts to maintain its policy status quo, it doesn’t become party to a farce.  

This article was published in Oped page of The Pioneer on October 15, 2015

COMING CLOSER, OFFICIALLY

Since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The BJP took the lead in normalising ties, but it was a Congress Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations

It may have taken more than two decades, but if Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon’s India visit is any indication, it seems like India is finally and firmly committed to correcting the historical anomalies of its relationship with Israel.

Mr Ya’alon’s visit comes less than three months after Union Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singh visited Israel and only four months after Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2014.

Mr Ya’alon is the first serving Israeli Defence Minister to visit India, and his presence at a platform like Aero India is an unapologetic acknowledgement of not just the strong relationship between India and Israel, but more specifically, of the close defence ties as well.

Israel is India’s second largest military supplier after Russia and India is reportedly Israel’s biggest defence customer. In 2014 alone, defence trade between the two countries stood at about $2.5 billion. Last year, India also picked the Israeli state-owned anti-tank guided missile over the American Javelin offer in a deal that’s worth $525 million. This year, at Aero India, media reports suggest, India and Israel are expected to sign deals worth $1.5 billion.

It’s not just the weapons’ sales, per se, that are driving the defence relationship ; there’s a strong strategic component as well. Let us not forget that the big turning point here was the Israeli military assistance to India during the Kargil war. India had only limited experience with this kind of sub-conventional warfare (which, notably, has almost become the norm now) while Israel’s expertise in this field remains unparalleled.

Yet, despite such close collaboration, which, in fact, can be traced back to the 1950s (when India had sought Israeli expertise in agriculture, for example), there has always been a reluctance at the political level to acknowledge the scale of the relationship. In fact, the last time an Israeli leader who had served as Defence Minister, visited India, it was a closely-guarded state secret.

In 1977, Moshe Dayan — he was Foreign Minister at that time but had previously held the defence portfolio — was invited by Prime Minister Morarji Desai. According to US diplomatic cables, released by Wikileaks, the leaders spoke for over an hour and Moshe Dayan believed that “(Egypt’s President Anwar) Sadat had asked Desai to use his influence with Israelis in seeking a Middle East peace settlement”. 

During the meeting, the leaders also discussed establishing diplomatic ties, but Desai said it would not be possible at that time. This was in keeping with the Indian Government’s anti-Israel policy of the time — the result of several factors, from India’s colonial baggage to Mahatma Gandhi’s personal views of the Zionist movement to the Congress’s misguided Muslim appeasement policies. Put together, they produced a strong anti-Israel bias that penetrated deep within India’s foreign policy establishment and have remained to some extent even after full diplomatic relations were formally established in 1992.

That said, it is also equally true that in the two decades since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The Bharatiya Janata Party took the lead in normalising ties but it was a Prime Minister from the Congress, PV Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations.

 His successor from the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Delhi while the Congress-led UPA Government that came next allowed the relationship to flourish — so much so that bilateral trade, which spans across sectors as diverse as education and outer space, is now pegged at six billion dollars from just about $20 million in 1992.

What remains today from the policy baggage of the past is some anti-Israel posturing at international forums and the occasional impediment or irritant caused by individual leaders or bureaucrats within the system. For example, though India steers clear of criticising Israel on Palestinian issues, it continues to support resolutions against Israel at the UNHRC.

 Similarly, as recently as 2013, a senior Congress leader like Mr AK Antony, under whose watch as Defence Minister, India bought millions of dollars of weapons from Israel, reportedly backed out from a scheduled Israel trip at the last minute after he was told of reservations from the Muslim League. A third example here is of India’s odd reluctance to invest in Israel’s off-shore gas field, ostensibly because this might upset Arab states.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is hoped that abnormalities such as these will be ironed out. Mr Modi is known to be a strong supporter of Israel, and so are many of his top team members including Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Home Affairs Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.

It is no coincidence that the $659 million of Israeli arms purchases that have happened since Mr Modi came to power (even though many of the deals were put in place by the UPA regime) are more than Israel’s total defence exports to India in the last three years.

Clichéd as it may sound, the India-Israel bilateral is an idea whose time has come. From India’s point of view, Israel can be a great partner in the Modi Government’s flagship Make in India project. Much of the long-term success of this project hinges on the willingness of foreign Governments and private companies to transfer technology to India.

From Israel’s point of view, a resurgent India presents a lucrative market, especially as Europe, Israel’s traditional buyer, struggles to get back on its feet. Israel’s support for India syncs well with its own Look East policy, which includes other Asian powers such as China, Japan and South Korea.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 20, 2015

IRAN, A STABILISING FACTOR IN WAR-TORN WEST ASIA

Tehran is one of the few power centres that is working to stem the region’s slide into chaos and anarchy

Hardly a day now passes when one doesn’t hear about something terrible happening in West Asia. If it’s not the Islamic State brutes that are beheading, enslaving and murdering people, their compatriots in other parts of the region are routinely blowing up towns and cities while insurgents topple Governments and terror groups take over entire countries.

True, the region has always been a hotspot (if nothing else, there’s always the Israel-Arab conflict) but the situation has undoubtedly worsened in the post Arab Uprising years. Every Great Power worth its salt has sought to bring stability to West Asia — and failed.

One major reason for this is that, not everybody gets the West Asia and nearabouts. The region is extremely complex and few foreign powers can legitimately claim to understand its ever-changing dynamics. Perhaps, the focus should be on strengthening regional powers and allowing them greater space to manage what is really their own backyard.

Traditionally, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been the big boys in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council is also an important force but it’s primarily an economic entity with limited political and no military prowess. Israel also could have been on the list, but given its own complicated relations with most countries in the region, it can hardly play the role of an interlocutor.

 Unfortunately, as of now, Iraq has all but collapsed while Egypt’s regional stature stands greatly diminished as it struggles to get its house in order. Saudi Arabia is a force to contend with, though its one-point agenda of pushing Wahhabism that has fuelled Islamist terrorism across the world, makes it a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution.

Besides, over the years, Saudi Arabia has shown that it couldn’t be bothered with cultivating ties and nurturing relationships because it believes that, with all the money it has, it can easily buy the influence it needs. This has not always worked out well. 

This leaves us with Iran — a large and stable country that has a civilisational connect in the region but has been ignored by the international community, primarily because of its controversial nuclear weapons programme.

 But if you keep that aside, there is an argument to be made for strengthening Iran’s hand in the region’s power matrix. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran doesn’t always have the kind of money to throw around. And so it practises old school diplomacy — working with local leaders, supporting friendly regimes and building up regional institutions.

Take, for example, the fight against the Islamic State. The West’s anti-IS coalition has been a non-starter, and that’s in no small measure because of the double standards of some coalition partners like Jordan and Turkey. The only ones that have succeeded against the Islamic State are the Kurds, but they have little support from the rest of the world. Iran, however, has been actively working with the Kurds and helping them with men and material on the ground.

Iran has also been working closely with the Government in Baghdad so as to stabilise the Iraqi regime, which is the key to retrieving that country from the clutches of the Islamic State. After all, it was the power vacuum in Iraq and Syria that created the fertile grounds for the IS to breed and nurture. Unless, these core issues are addressed, no military intervention can succeed. This, we have learned the hard way in Afghanistan.

In fact, even in the case of Afghanistan, Iran has sought to play the role of a regional stabiliser. The Americans were able to quickly topple the Taliban in the early days of the war primarily because of Iranian support. More recently, Tehran has also sought to persuade Pakistan (which is known to seek ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan) to not meddle in Kabul’s affairs. This is a point that India has also sought to underline but, understandably, with little effect, in Pakistan.

In fact, in terms of larger foreign policy principles, both India and Iran are staunchly opposed to foreign interventions and agree that is only well-mediated, political solutions are the only real solutions to some of the most crises of our times. Perhaps, the only point on which India and Iran have divergent positions is with regard to Israel.

While Iran doesn’t even recognise the Jewish state, India’s relations with Israel have strengthened significantly in the past two decades. While there is not much that India can do to change that dynamic, one can take comfort in the fact that both Iran and Israel say that neither will be the first to make the aggressive move.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 13, 2015

No Hiding From This Relationship

The Narendra Modi Government must seize this moment to ‘normalise' the India-Israel bilateral, so that Israel gets the respect and support that India accords to its friends, irrespective of the political party in power in New Delhi

The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu this Sunday in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly was undoubtedly a landmark one. It was the first official engagement between the top leaders of the two countries in more than a decade, and marked a unique coming-out-of-the-closet moment for the India-Israel bilateral. While the two countries have quietly worked with each other since independence, formal diplomatic relations were  established only 1992; and even in the two decades since then, the relationship has been underplayed. This has been despite Israel’s steadfast support to India, and increased cooperation between the two countries in fields as diverse as agriculture and outer space. In this context, some have noted that the little attention given to Sunday's meeting does not do justice to its high significance. While this is a valid point, the fact that there wasn’t much of a hullabaloo about the meeting tells another story of how far the bilateral has progressed in these past two decades.

The last time an Indian Prime Minister met with the Israeli Prime Minister was in 2003, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee hosted Ariel Sharon. The tour,  though successful, was also marked by staunch opposition from large sections of the Indian Left, which condemned the Government for hobnobbing with the man who had been dubbed as “the killer of Muslims” and portrayed the meeting as a grave insult to India’s Muslim population in particular. Much water has flowed under the bridge since then, but Palestinian issues remain somewhat of a tender point in India — even if only in some university campuses and newspaper Op-ed pages. That there was not even a pipsqueak of protest even from these quarters shows that there is broad political consensus on the India-Israel bilateral. The Modi Government must now seize this moment to ‘normalise’ (for want of a better word) the bilateral, so that Israel gets the attention, respect and support that India accords to its friends — irrespective of the political party in power.

Up until now, the India-Israel bilateral has remained as some sort of a ‘BJP project’ as it is leaders of the BJP who have most often advocated better relations with Israel. At the top of the list is the indomitable Subramanian Swamy, who was the first senior Indian politician to visit Israel. Prime Minister Vajpayee also deserves full credit for being the only Indian head of Government to have hosted an Israeli Prime Minister. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj is a self-declared fan of Israel and has also served as chief of the India-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Committee. When the Gaza crisis erupted this summer, she put up a strong defence for India’s pro-Israel stance in the Lok Sabha.

As for Prime Minister Modi, he has a long-standing relationship with the Israelis. Like all the aforementioned leaders, he too has travelled to Israel and is well aware of how much the Jewish nation can offer India. During his tenure as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, he successfully brought Israeli technology, investment, innovation to his State — and it is widely believed that few diplomats had the kind of access to him as the Israeli Ambassador to New Delhi. Against this backdrop, it is in the fitness of things that after one Prime Minister from the BJP welcomed his Israeli counterpart home, another has proudly acknowledged the India-Israel partnership on the global stage.

This, however, is not to suggest that the Congress did nothing for the India-Israel bilateral. Even if one does not count in Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao who established diplomatic ties with Israel, given his strained relationship with the Congress high command, there can be no two ways about the fact that the India-Israel bilateral grew rapidly and robustly under the UPA regime of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Israel quickly became one of India’s biggest defence suppliers, second only to Russia, and bilateral trade has boomed from a $20 million in 1992 to six billion dollars now. There was even a high-level visit during the UPA years by former External Affairs Minister SM Krishna. 

Also, the pro-Arab ideological tendencies (which resulted in anti-Israel gestures) that the Congress had inherited from its previous generation of leaders seeking to win over Muslim voters and minimise the influence of the Muslim League during Independence, had lost currency. For example, while some may have been reading much into the fact that Prime Minister Modi did not bring up the Gaza issue during his meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the fact is that this has been the template for years now. Palestinian/Arab issues are almost never brought up by Indian leaders in their meetings with Israeli leaders and diplomats, who, however, often get an earful from the Europeans and Americans.

In effect, the Congress’s ‘anti-Israel’ policy of the past had, in recent years, been reduced to supporting largely meaningless resolutions against the Jewish nation at the UN. Its so-called support for the Palestinian cause was also limited to a small budgetary allowance and a big handshake with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the UNGA. Notably, Mr Modi did not meet Mr Abbas in New York this time — this was reportedly because of scheduling issues, but either way, it comes as no surprise, given the Prime Minister’s strong dislike for meaningless photo-ops.

That said, some parts of the old template still remain — and even the Modi Government hasn’t been able clear them out. India’s vote in favour of the anti-Israel resolution at the UN Human Rights Council, is one example. But the consequent public backlash it generated shows that the Government needs to catch up with popular sentiment. For years, Israel has been viewed more favourably in India than in most other countries.

Apart from the fact that Jews in India have never faced religious persecution, Indians today have a special admiration for Israel — a tiny country that has not just survived, but thrived, even amidst relentless hostility. Though it is unfair to compare Israel’s relationship with its Arab neighbours and India’s with its South Asian neighbours, the point is that Indians understand what it is like to live in a difficult neighbourhood.

With political and popular support aligned, now is the time to complete the ‘normalisation’ process of the India-Israel bilateral. Even those who are critical of Israel’s policies and would perhaps like to lobby New Delhi on these matters should support this move — ‘normalisation’ of relations will create space for a more honest conversation; it will mean that those in India who support Israel do not have to be constantly defensive about the bilateral; and finally, it will allow the mainstream Right in India to effectively rein in fringe elements, who have been using the ‘support Israel’ platform to gain easy publicity for their extremist campaigns.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on October 2, 2014)

Between Bombing and Building

If plans to rebuild Gaza are to succeed, the Palestinian Authority has to sideline Hamas, take over power, implement the reconstruction plan under the watchful eyes of the international community and commit to demilitarisation of the strip

After the conflict in Gaza ended last month, many wondered which side had won and which side had lost. Others asked, and rightly so, if there were any winners or losers at all. On the one hand, exuberant leaders of Hamas, the internationally designated terror organisation that holds power in Gaza, suddenly appeared from their underground bunkers to rejoice that their resistance had succeeded. On the other hand, Israeli leaders, facing severe international criticism for responding in a supposedly disproportionate manner to rocket fire from Hamas, claimed that the group’s military capabilities had been dealt a severe blow, even as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself seemed unsure if deterrence had been re-established. Still, when the Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire came into effect on August 26, almost everybody heaved a sigh of relief.

The deal in itself was a modest one: While the Palestinians agreed to hold their fire, Israel agreed to open its border crossings into Gaza (which were open through much of the war anyway), permit a larger number of trucks to move in with goods and relief material everyday, reduce its security buffer from 300metres to 100metres, and allow Gazan fishermen to venture six miles off the coast instead of just three miles. None of these are major concessions; they are confidence building measures at best.

The big issues for both sides —for the Palestinians, building a sea port and an airport in Gaza and the release of security prisoners; and for the Israelis, the demilitarisation of Gaza — will come up for discussion, only if the current ceasefire arrangement holds for a month.

Three weeks in, the situation has been remained largely peaceful, allowing for discussions on the reconstruction of Gaza. The strip was effectively flattened during the 51 days of fighting this summer. According to UN and Palestinian estimates, 20,000 homes were destroyed and another 40,000 damaged; half of Gaza’s hospitals were damaged, nine are still closed; it’s sole power plant has only just started functioning again, 360 factories have been damaged and 126 completely destroyed; 22 schools destroyed and an estimated 188 damaged; and 35,000 dunams of agricultural land affected. Also,1,00,000 of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents are still internally displaced, 40 per cent lack access to running water, and 18 hour long power cuts are the norm.

On Tuesday, the UN announced that it had brokered an agreement to rebuild this tiny Mediterranean strip. The deal is designed to repair the damage caused during the conflict and also initiate the process of long-term development in Gaza. International donors are already lining up to contribute to the reconstruction plan and finalise its delivery mechanism. Two important meetings have been scheduled: The first in New York on September 22 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and the second in Cairo on October 12. If past experiences are anything to go by, there should be no shortage of funds. However, the question is who will put them to use and how.

The initial signs are ominous. The day the UN’s Middle East envoy Richard Serry announced the formalisation of the plan to the Security Council, there was mortar fire in to southern Israel for the first time since the war ended. While Hamas has denied any role in this, the firing is a grim reminder of how fragile the ceasefire agreement really is and how easily the situation can deteriorate. But even if the peace holds, implementing the reconstruction programme will be easier said than done.

The biggest roadblock here is Hamas’ control over Gaza. Because the group is a designated terrorist organisation, many donor nations cannot legally work with it. Also, as long as a group like Hamas that does not even recognise Israel’s right to exist holds power, there are few chances for an enduring peace deal. This makes donors rightfully sceptical of investing in the reconstruction of Gaza as it will quite possibly be reduced to rubble yet again. Finally, the international community cannot reward Hamas, which has provoked war and brought death and destruction upon its own people, with billions of dollars in aid that it can wilfully distribute among impoverished Gazans (or, more likely, use to buy missiles and rockets and build more terror tunnels into Israel).

The August ceasefire agreement, therefore, calls upon Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas to do the job, which will be monitored by the UN, but there is nothing to suggest that Hamas will relinquish control of the Gaza strip. Even though the rival factions joined hands earlier this year to form a Unity Government, they are hardly on the same page. President Abbas had publicly criticised Hamas’s rocket fire into Israel and more recently charged the Islamist group with running a “shadow Government”. Hamas, on the other hand, is reportedly enjoying a post-war high. Its ratings have soared and there is nothing to suggest that the PA is prepared to wrench control from it.

This takes us back to the situation in 2009. After the end of Operation Cast Lead, which played out on an identical template, a huge donor conference was held in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to raise funds for the re-construction of Gaza. Approximately $4.7 billion was pledged with Europe offering $1.25 billion (of which $220 million came from Denmark alone), Saudi Arabia one billion dollars and the US another $900 million. The conference raised almost double the funds than what the PA had expected but much of that money never came through due to political and security reasons.

Still, after Operation Cast Lead, the Gazan economy saw some growth and development as illicit tunnel trade through the Sinai flourished. This time, however, the Egyptian military has shut down the tunnels and effectively choked what was once Gaza’s lifeline.

Today, the strip is a cesspool of guns and weapons — the war saw rockets being fired from schools and hospitals — and unless, Gaza is demilitarised, effective reconstruction will remain a distant dream. Unfortunately, Hamas has consistently refused to lay down arms, and is unlikely to change its mind any time soon.

 (This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on September 18,2014)

Delhi's Pragmatic Policy-Making

The Modi Government has done well to refuse to pass a parliamentary resolution criticising Israel for the ongoing conflict in Gaza. Israel is a friend and, like India, it too is also threatened by Islamist terror

 By refusing to censure Israel for its ongoing military campaign in the Gaza Strip, the BJP-led NDA Government has taken a firm and decisive steps towards correcting a historical anomaly in India’s foreign policy. Traditionally, New Delhi has been driven by a strong pro-Arab sentiment, which is what translates into its ‘full support for the Palestinian cause’ stand, even though this has hardly ever helped further our national interest. This policy-tilt can be traced as far back as the Khilafat Movement of the early 20th century which opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in the former Ottoman lands. Later, the Congress also adopted a negative approach towards Jewish nationalism, partly to offset the rising popularity of the staunchly anti-Zionist Muslim League which was then championing the cause of a Muslim homeland. But these appeasement efforts failed as India was eventually partitioned in 1947. By then, the pro-Arab/anti-Israel stance had been hardwired into Indian foreign policy thinking.This was not just a matter of political expediency but also the result of an ideological bias furthered in no small measure by the Mahatma himself. For the Indian leadership, which had just drawn the curtains on 200 years of British rule, Israel was (falsely) seen as a ‘colonial power’, an ‘occupying force’ — labels that still resonate with the old guard here.

Meanwhile, India’s radical support for Arab causes which continued at least till the 1980s brought it almost no rewards. For instance, the Arab nations never favoured India on the Kashmir issue, and till date, their support for Pakistan has not wavered. In fact, one of the reasons why Jawaharlal Nehru accorded official recognition to Israel in the late 1950s (full diplomatic relations were established much later), having opposed the Jewish nation’s membership to the UN in 1949, was because he was upset with Egypt for not supporting India on the Hyderabad issue at the global forum.

Over time, there were several such disappointments — including India’s exclusion from the 1969 Rabat conference which paved the way for the establishment of the powerful Organization of the Islamic Conference, whose doors are still shut for India. There is little merit in listing all such instances but it suffices to say that India’s Arab appeasement foreign policy, mostly an extension of the Congress’s Muslim appeasement on the domestic front, was a lonely, one-way street.

The situation changed gradually after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as India’s own economic liberalisation in 1990s. Though the pro-Arab rhetoric has remained, New Delhi’s policy towards Israel has changed dramatically. Following the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, relations between the two countries have evolved rapidly — the extent and scope of which is not always acknowledged in public. Proof of this is the fact that Israel’s crucial support to India during the Kargil war is hardly ever publicised.

On the other end of the spectrum, India’s Arab appeasement tendencies have also dried up significantly. For instance, though India still allocates 20 million dollars for the Palestinian cause, it has toned down its official language on the Arab-Israeli conflict and taken a largely neutral stand in recent years, occasional deviations (such as the anti-Israel parliamentary resolution passed during the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon) notwithstanding.

Against this backdrop, the new Government’s refusal to pass a parliamentary resolution criticising Israel essentially builds on processes that have been quietly underway for two decades now. The difference is that the incumbent BJP-led Government is not squeamish about India’s ties with Israel, and has no qualms in acknowledging that the Jewish nation has been a long-standing friend of India’s. Also, given its tremendous popular mandate, the Modi Government is neither beholden to the whims of coalition partners (such as the Left parties under UPAI which still romanticise the Palestinian cause, ground realities be damned) nor does it have reason to play vote-bank politics with the Muslim community. This, in turn, allows the Modi Government to take a clear-eyed view of the situation: First, India has no business meddling in the larger Arab-Israeli conflict; second, as far as the current crisis is concerned, it is a case of self defence which Israel, as a sovereign nation under threat, has the right to exercise.

The larger geo-politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict notwithstanding, there can be no two ways about the fact that this latest of fighting has been provoked by Hamas, the globally-designated terrorist group that has been controlling the Gaza Strip since 2006. It hoped that Israel would eventually retaliate and cynically strategised that it could use the assault to regain public support.

Hamas has been at its weakest — politically and economically — in recent times. Gazans are disillusioned with the group which has failed to govern entirely. Moreover, the group’s support bases in Syria have been destroyed and its patrons in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, is once again being driven underground by the military which has come back to power in Cairo. In fact, this was precisely why Hamas, after seven years of bitter rivalry, joined hands with Fatah to form a Unity Government in early June. The arrangement breathed life into the terror outfit which focused on doing what it does best: Street-level resistance. Hamas began firing rockets — first into southern Israel and then all over that country including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv — after Israel arrested many of the group’s supporters in the aftermath of the kidnapping and murder of three Jewish teenagers in West Bank, which in turn led to the retaliatory murder of a Palestinian boy.

After days of incessant rocket fire from Hamas, which could claim only one Israeli life, thanks to the enormously successful Iron Dome which intercepts such missiles, Israel retaliated with airstrikes on Gaza on July 8. Despite the rising Palestinian death toll as a result of Israeli bombing (not to mention Hamas’s use of civilians as human shields), Hamas did not stop its rocket fire and, in fact, spurned ceasefire offers. The situation took a turn for the worse on July 17 when 13 Hamas militants penetrated Israel through underground tunnels and killed two Israeli soldiers near Sufa kibbutz close to the border. The ‘discovery’ of these tunnels prompted an Israeli ground incursion, bringing back memories of the bloody 2008 Operation Cast Lead.

Essentially, Hamas has sought to attack Israel from the ground below, having failed to inflict any serious damage through airstrikes. This is not a new strategy (Hamas has similar tunnels on the Egypt border that are used to smuggle goods and weapons) but it has enormous security implications for Israel as the case of Gilad Shalit stands proof. In 2006, the Israeli soldier was taken from his border outpost by Hamas militants who had burrowed underground. He was released five years later in exchange for a 1,027 Palestinian militants, many of whom have since returned to their terrorist activities.

Still, the extent and sophistication of the tunnel network, worth millions of dollars (ostensibly Western aid that has been misused), seems to have taken the Israeli military by surprise. Dismantling these (and Hamas’s overall terror infrastructure in Gaza) requires a major on-the-ground offensive which is bound to take a heavy toll on Palestinian as well as Israeli lives. A UN-monitored demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip is the only way to break this cycle of violence, but it is unlikely without serious concessions from both sides.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 24, 2014)

No Looking Back on Robust India-Israel Ties

The Modi-led Government is expected to further strengthen the deep relations that Jerusalem and New Delhi enjoy. The latter has been by India’s side on many critical occasions in recent years, even though New Delhi could not openly acknowledge the fact for various, misplaced, geo-political reasons

On March 26, 1949, KL Panjabi, Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, wrote to H Cynozicz, the representative of the Jewish Agency in India: “As discussed personally, we [Government of India] are particularly in need of experts in the following matters: 1. Expert in Cooperative Farming 2. Expert in Intensive Cultivation  3. Two or three experts in drilling tubewells both with percussion rigs as well as as rotary rigs”. The letter curiously requested Cynozicz to take up the matter “with your people in Palestine”. It was a sign of the times — India was yet to recognise Israel and would not do so until late 1950. Full diplomatic ties were to be established only in 1992.

In the meantime, India offered vociferous support to Arab causes for just about nothing in return, while relations with Israel went on the downward spiral. So much so that New Delhi even refused humanitarian aid during 1967 famine. Yet, in a parallel world of sorts, successive Indian Governments not only maintained ties with Israel but also sought Israeli assistance — for instance, military aid came from Israel during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh (which, ironically, still does not recognise the Jewish nation).

The situation turned around gradually after 1984 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met his Israeli counterpart at the UN General Assembly. Three years earlier, Mr Subramanian Swamy, then a member of the Janata Party, had undertaken the first publicised tour of Israel by an Indian leader, which contributed in no small measure towards the normalising of ties.

Once the ball was set rolling, India-Israel relations grew rapidly. Apart from Israel’s steadfast pro-India stance on Kashmir, its diplomatic support during the 1998 nuclear tests, followed by military assistance during the 1999 Kargil conflict, firmly established the Jewish state as a reliable friend. By the dawn of the new millennium, New Delhi had quietly but firmly corrected its course.

So, while it continues to make noises on the Arab/Palestinian causes, particularly in international forums — think  Mr Manmohan Singh’s UN address calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital or Ms Pratibha Patil’s obscure demand in Damascus that the Golan Heights be returned to Syria — behind the scenes, New Delhi and Jerusalem have forged a solid alliance.

Defence cooperation is, of course, one of the most important anchors of the India-Israel bilateral. Israel is one of India’s largest arms supplier, second only to Russia. The bilateral arms trade over the last decade is estimated at $10 billion. Several Israeli systems and software now power Indian defence systems. For example, Israel’s Phalcon airborne warning and control system serves as India’s eyes in the skies while the latest range of Mig-21 Bisons and Su-30 MKI aircraft also boast of high-end Israeli technology.

India and Israel have also signed a homeland security deal which establishes a framework for institutionalised cooperation in counter-terrorism, border protection and intelligence sharing. Homeland security is an area wherein both Israel and India face similar challenges but the former, because of its history and location, has far greater expertise and superior technology. For example, years before India faced 26/11, five PLO members travelling from Lebanon, came to Tel Aviv on a boat and spread mayhem across that city. They took over Savoy Hotel and held guests and staff hostage overnight until Israeli special forces flushed them out. The year was 1973.

Another area of cooperation that has gained tremendous strength in recent years is agriculture — marking the completion of a full circle since the 1940s. With the signing of an Action Plan in 2008 which now extends upto 2015, between India’s National Horticulture Mission and Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation, Israel has been sharing its best-practices and helping build capacity in the Indian agriculture sector. Across India, 28 Centres of Excellence have been set up for rapid transfer of technology, such as drip irrigation and ‘fertigation’.

The Centre in Gharaunda, Karnal, for instance, produces hybrid plug seedlings of tomatoes, cherry-tomatoes, coloured capsicum and cucumbers which have dramatically increased crop yields while also reducing water use and cutting down on pesticides and fertilisers. Similarly, in the Dapoli centre in Maharashtra, mango trees have been rejuvenated to produce better quality and more quantity fruit. If scaled up, it can revolutionise the mango industry in the Konkan. Similar success stories have also emerged in  the fields water treatment and desalination. There are also plans of incorporating Israeli technology in the cleaning up of the Ganga. In fact, Gujarat, under Mr Narendra Modi, was one of the States to partner with Israel in the field of agriculture. Now, with Mr Modi at the helm, relations between the two countries are expected to scale greater heights.

Re-imagining diplomacy in the 21st century

Israel’s outgoing Ambassador to India Alon Ushpiz offers his assessment of the emerging bilateral

On his three-year tenure: It's impossible to put three years in India in a nutshell but you don't leave India the way you came here.

As one of your Foreign Secretaries  told me, diplomacy is about creating options for your Government. And the Israel-India relation is a good example of what diplomacy should look like in the 21st century — a combination of classic diplomacy and one that creates tangible things together that impact the daily lives of Indians and Israelis.

On the big takeaways from his tenure: The anchoring of the agricultural centres of excellence; Industrial R&D supplemented by academic research; and the public security agreement, which can be a strategic gamechanger.

On deliverables in the near future: In agriculture, we hope to finalise the second three-year working plan. I'm also hopeful about brining in Israeli water technology mainly with re-cycling in mind. Israel recycles 80 per cent of its sewage. India can too. We are natural water friends.

On the free trade agreement: Another round of negotiations is coming up in July. This will be the ninth round since 2010. The economic engine of the relationship is an indispensable one. We have moved from $180 million to five billion dollars in trade and can easily double or triple the number. But for that we need an FTA.

The FTA will also shift the focus to more high tech fields of interaction. This is what we are good at and this is what our economies demand.

On investment in infrastructure projects: Much of the investment, worth millions of dollars, is in the hands of private Israeli companies. Also, the Israeli Port Authority is building a port in Gujarat. Renewable energy projects in north India have shown great results too. The desalination project in Tamil Nadu is impressive. When the gate opens and you walk into the plant, it looks exactly like the one on the shores of the Mediterranean — except that everybody is Indian.

On the 2012 attack on the Embassy: You have very few cases of a foreign Government — Iran — sending its assassins to kill a hosted diplomat in the heart of the capital. Your people cracked the case and they have provided us with security that enables us to do our work.

On his love for Calcutta: Calcutta has a special place in my heart. It's exploding with energy and there's a lot of culture and tremendouly interesting people. I have always enjoyed my interactions with the Chief Minister and am grateful for her friendship and support. I am also a big fan of Bengali cuisine.  

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 12, 2014)