WHY THE OIL DEAL IS NO BIG DEAL

To tackle the supply glut in the oil market, producers need to cut, not cap, their current production. This is not happening even in a best case scenario wherein Iran and Iraq fall in line with Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar and Venezuela, and everybody commits to a global deal

On Tuesday, Saudi Arabia and Russia, along with Qatar and Venezuela, decided to freeze their oil production at January 2016 levels, so as to stabilise oil prices, which have plunged in the past two year because of a supply glut. From a high of $115 per barrel in 2014, prices were down to $27 per barrel this January, and if the markets continue to be so awash in oil, it is possible that the prices would go down to $20 a barrel.

The impact of this price drop on oil-producing and exporting countries, which depend heavily on petrodollars to fuel their economy, needs no explanation. Indeed, the situation had become so dire that even resource-rich Saudi Arabia was feeling the pinch. This forms the backdrop to Tuesday’s deal.

The deal is the first in 15 years between members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and a country that is not part of the cartel. The deal also gains significance because the two countries leading this agreement, Russia and Saudi Arabia, are generally not on the same geo-political plane. In fact, for months, they have been competing with each other in the oil market. While Riyadh has recently stepped into Moscow’s turf and sold oil to eastern Europe, Russia has jumped Saudi Arabia in oil exports to China. Outside the oil market, the two nations are also on opposite sides in the Syrian civil war.

However, while on paper the deal seems like a major development, on the ground, it may not be that big a deal after all. There are two reasons for this.

Missing Pieces: The deal does not include Iran and Iraq — yet. These are the other major oil producers in the world, and without their cooperation, the supply side of the oil price mechanism cannot be controlled. Indeed, the activation of the deal itself is pegged to the assumption that the other players will fall in line.

Iran: Having just been freed from Western sanctions (following an agreement with the P5+1 powers on its nuclear programme) which previously curtailed its oil exports, Iran, the Opec’s the fifth-largest producer, is now looking to leverage its proverbial black gold so as to resuscitate its economy. In the words of Iran’s Opec envoy Mehdi Asali, it is, therefore, “illogical” to expect the country to freeze production.

Indeed, oil production has already been boosted, and by the end of Iranian calendar year (March 20), it is expected that production will reach a record high of 5,00,000 barrels a day. On Monday, Iran sent off its first Europe-bound crude cargo in four years. And over the next 48 hours, it exported more than 7.1 million crude barrels, setting a new record, according to the Managing Director of Iranian Oil Terminals.

Still, on Wednesday, Opec president Mohammed bin Saleh al-Sada, who is also the Qatari Minister of Industry and Energy, met with Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh to discuss a freeze by Tehran. They were joined by the Venezuelan Oil Minister and the Iraqi Oil Minister. While Iran did not commit to a freeze, it still took a positive stance on the issue. “The decision ... to stabilise the market and prices for the benefit of producers and consumers, is supported by us,” Mr Zanganeh told the official news agency after the meeting.

This means that while Iran may have publicly dismissed the idea of a production freeze for now, it may eventually still agree to some sort of a special capping arrangement. This will be for two reasons — First, Iran too is adversely affected by the  low prices, and second, it will only be able to increase production overnight to a certain level; beyond that, it will require large-scale, long-term investment, forcing its production abilities to plateau in the meantime. Hence, if the other producers make a good enough offer to Iran at the point, Iran is expected to at least consider it in all seriousness.

Iraq: In the popular imagination, Iraq may have been written off as besieged by the Islamic State terror group, but on the ground, it has made some significant recoveries and simultaneously also ramped up oil production. In January, Iraq’s output was a record 4.35 million barrels a day, and the International Energy Agency estimates that this figure may still increase. Sure, there are doubts about transporting the oil out of the country but even then, Iraq remains a major player. For now, Iraq is amenable to the deal and can be expected to officially join in, if the others also commit to a cap or a cut.

Inadequate measures: The second reason why the deal isn’t going to be a gamechanger is that even in a best case scenario, with Iran and Iraq on board, it is unlikely to change the oil price trajectory in a significant manner. This is  because the deal proposes a cap, not a  cut, in current production levels. In other words, even if the deal is implemented, the market will still have a over-supply of oil.

In this context, it in interesting to note that most Opec countries, such as Russia and Venezuela, are already pumping record high levels of oil. They are stretched to the maximum, and would have had to slow down even without a deal.

And then there is America’s shale oil factor: To understand the US’s role, one needs to go back a few steps. Historically, the OPEC cartel has managed to keep a strangle-hold on oil prices because demand far outstripped supply. The shale oil boom in the US, however, threatened to change that dynamic. Opec responded by striking at the one major weak point in the shale story: The relatively high-cost of production. The oil cartel pumped up production and deliberately depressed oil prices, hoping that American shale would become unprofitable in comparison.

While the shale industry did feel the pressure, the impact wasn’t as intense as Opec had calculated especially as shale prices continued on a downward path. Any let up at this point in the Opec’s efforts to keep oil prices low will give US shale companies just the breather they are looking for to get back into business.

Past experiences: A third problem with any Opec deal is cheating. In general, Opec members are not particularly transparent with their production figures and this leads to mistrust within the group. Non-Opec members are no better either. The last time there was a global deal of this sort — in 2001, when Saudi Arabia convinced Mexico, Norway and Russia to commit to production cuts — Russia went back on its word and, in fact, raised exports.

This oped was published in The Pioneer on February 18, 2016

THE IRAN DEAL ISN’T ABOUT A BOMB

Iran can still get the bomb if it wants to, but the deal incentivises Tehran to restrain itself from doing so, by giving the West Asian power a stake in the global economy. However, it doesn’t tackle the issue of Iran’s subversive terror activities across the world

Last week, world powers signed a landmark deal with Iran that aims to rein in the controversial Iranian nuclear programme in return for relief from debilitating economic sanctions.  Much of the commentary about the deal has focused on the technical aspects: How many centrifuges are being removed? How much of the uranium stockpile is being destroyed? To what percentage can Iran enrich the remaining uranium? What kind of verification processes have been built into the deal? Are these good enough to ensure that Iran won’t cheat on the deal?

While this focus on the technical minutiae is understandable, and one can expect continued hairsplitting on the issue, it must not take away from the larger picture of what the deal means for Iran as a regional power and how it will affect the chronically unstable geo-politics of West Asia. In this context, let’s get one thing straight:  The Iran deal is not really about the bomb.

The Obama Administration wants us to believe that the deal closes all of Iran’s pathways to the bomb but in reality, it only contains the Iranian nuclear programme for a period of 15 years. For these years, Iran’s breakout period — the time needed to produce a bomb — has been increased from three months to a year. Some of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will still be in place, and 15 years later, if Iran chooses to produce a nuclear bomb, it will be able to do so. Ultimately, Iran is an intellectually sophisticated and scientifically advanced country, and its ability to produce a bomb has rarely been under any serious doubt — deal or no deal.

So, if the bomb is not the issue, then what is the deal about all about? The deal is about two issues. On one hand, the sanctions were hurting the Iranians and the regime in Tehran understood that its interests were better served if it put aside its bomb-making ambitions and negotiated for sanctions relief. On the other hand, world powers, having acknowledged that Iran could get a bomb either way, realised that their best chance of preventing such a development was to incentivise Tehran to restrain itself — by lifting the sanctions and gradually giving it a stake in the global economy, in the hope that once within the international system, Iran will behave in a more responsible manner.

Now, this doesn’t seem like a fool-proof mechanism. What if Iran cheats? In all probability, Iran will try to push the boundaries of the deal and test the limits of the verification process. It isn’t clear at this point how world powers will react to this. Yes, they say that the sanctions will snap back at the slightest hint of bad behaviour but that’s far easier said than done. There will be punitive action, of course, for large-scale violation but there is lot of gray area in the case of low-level mischief. Expect Iran to play around here a bit but it is unlikely that it will go completely overboard because that makes no sense at all.

To better predict if Iran will be faithful to the deal, it may help to compare, as another columnist Abhijit Iyer-Mitra suggested in his column in The Pioneer earlier this week, the Iran deal with the Indian nuclear deal. Signed exactly a decade ago in July 2005, the Indian nuclear deal brought India, a non-signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that had tested nuclear weapons, under the global nuclear tent. This cleared the pathway for not just better relations with the US but also India’s deeper integration into the global system. The Iran deal works on a similar idea: Resolve one nuclear issue to better engage on all other issues.

However, the Iranian case and the Indian case differ in two key aspects: First, unlike India, Iran was a signatory to the NPT and broke the rules of the nuclear club when it announced its nuclear weapons programme. Second, India’s entry into the nuclear regime was based on its spotless non-proliferation record and the acknowledgment that it is a responsible and rational power. Iran, however, has a long record of using regional proxies to secure its interests in an already unstable neighbourhood. Also, its repeated calls for the annihilation of Israel make it extremely difficult to accept Tehran as a responsible power.

Indeed, it is this kind of bad behaviour that actually makes the rest of the world jittery about Iran. Except for perhaps a handful of nuclear non-proliferation purists who are automatically opposed to any new power acquiring nuclear weapons, the thought of Iran getting the bomb would possible not have got the rest of the world so riled up had only ayatollahs in Tehran come across as more trustworthy folks.

Instead, the world sees the kind of de-stabilising influence that the Iran-supported Hezbollah has had in Lebanon; it sees the cravenness of Hamas, also supported by Iran, which uses Gazans as cannon fodder against Israel; it sees how the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are propping up the murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria while supporting the Houthis in Yemen, not to mention stoking some ‘revolutionary fire’ in Bahrain. 

Over the years, Iran and Iranian proxies have been implicated in a series of terror attacks across the world. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hezbollah, for example, was involved in a series of bombings and assassination of American and Israeli targets; it also had an understanding with Al Qaeda and the Taliban for training jihadis; the elite Quds force was involved in the war in Iraq. The hey-days of Iran-sponsored Shia terror (as opposed to Saudi-sponsored Sunni terror) may be behind us but it will be foolish to assume that hey won’t make a comeback.

Since the late 2000s, Iranian proxy groups have become more active with terror attacks planned across the world, from Azerbaijan and Cyprus to Jordan and Turkey to Thailand and even India. Most, including the 2011 bungled assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador to the US in Washington, DC, were foiled. But the extent of the criminal conspiracy was underlined with the serial attacks of February 2012 — a foiled attack on the American Ambassador to Baku; followed by the bombing of an Israeli diplomat’s car in New Delhi; followed by another bombing in Tbilisi in Georgia; followed by an explosion in Bangkok in a home rented by Iranians. The attacks were part of one big conspiracy and even though they were all operational failures, they did not dissuade the terrorists who tasted success with the July 18 bombing of Burgas airport in Bulgaria in 2012.

With the lifting of all (not just nuclear) sanctions, it is expected that about $100 billion will pour into Iran, at least some of which will most definitely be used to support these proxy groups, UN resolutions notwithstanding. Iran’s rival powers in the region know this, and they have already been the turning up the heat in response (think of the utterly pointless Saudi operation in Yemen). At least in the short term then, one can expect more instability in West Asia — as an ascendant Iran consolidates its position in the region.

Does this mean that the Iran deal was a bad idea? Not necessarily. The deal doesn’t guarantee peace but its still the best chance that the world has, to forge a change for the better. The alternative would have been maintaining the status quo which would have only alienated Iran further. This would have strengthened the hardliners in Tehran and made the bomb even more easily accessible to the ayatollahs. The deal is an opportunity to bring Iran into the global mainstream and give it one less reason to go rogue.

Also, in the immediate future, a rapprochement with Iran opens the door for more seamless Western cooperation with Tehran is some key strategic areas like the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and in efforts to improve Afghanistan’s economic prospects. In fact, it will be interesting to see if Iran can eventually emerge as a counter-balance to Saudi Arabia, the fountainhead of Sunni terrorism wreaks havoc across the world today.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 23, 2015)

SAUDI MUSCLE-FLEXING IN YEMEN

The crisis in Yemen is neither a predominantly Shia-Sunni conflict nor just another proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is a civil war in which a foolhardy Riyadh is intervening to show off its geo-political might. For this, the average Yemeni will pay the price in blood

With approximately 3,500 Indian citizens trapped in Yemen, the latest child of the Arab Spring to collapse, reportage here about the war in that country has, understandably, been focused on the Government’s ongoing evacuation efforts. In the process, the geo-strategic implications of the conflict, wherein a Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebellion has toppled the West-backed Yemeni Government, prompting a military intervention by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Sunni Arab states, have been largely ignored. However, with the Houthis taking charge of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait, it is now imperative to look at the larger picture.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait is a chokepoint, just about 30kms at its widest, located between Yemen in the Arabian Penninsula, and Eritrea and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. It connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and is a crucial linkage in the international waterway that connects Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. This is the route that has traditionally been taken by Indian merchant ships to reach European markets (and vice versa), and is of immense importance to India’s sea-borne trade interests.

Now, there have been some reports and suggestions that the Houthis may shut down the strait and actually choke the shipping lane. This — particularly a long-term shutdown — seems far-fetched. Neither do the Houthis seem to have the maritime capability to enforce such a blockade nor will regional and world powers allow it. Because of previous threats from Somali piracy, the strait is fairly well-guarded with the navies of Russia, Ukraine, the US, UK, France and India routinely patrolling the waters. The immediate concern about Bab-el-Mandeb, therefore, is not a complete shutdown by the Houthis, but greater disruption in an already fragile region.

Yemen, one of the poorest Arab states, is home to Al Qaeda’s most resilient franchise — Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula. Years of American drone strikes and other targeted counter-terror strategies have had some success in containing the group but it is entirely possible that the AQAP will return with a vengeance on the back of a protracted regional war, much like the Islamic State came of age in the political and military chaos of Syria and Iraq. If that happens, piracy and terror attacks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, of the sort we saw in 2008, when Somali pirates seized Saudi Arabia’s Sirius Star oil tanker, or in 2000, when Al Qaeda attacked US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole, will increase. At the very least, such incidents will push up insurance costs for commercial ships; if the strait becomes too risky, the ships will have to take a much longer route.

Unfortunately, a long-drawn out conflict is exactly where we are heading towards, with the ill-advised Saudi-led Sunni Arab coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm. Officially, this operation is being carried out on the request of ousted Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to dislodge the Houthis from power and bring back stability to the country. However, apart from aerial bombing of Houthi targets, there seems to be no larger gameplan for how to achieve this target — either militarily or politically.

It is important to understand that the Houthis, though an anti-Government force, are not terrorists of the Islamic State-type. They are a political force, rooted in Yemen and driven by local causes. Their group was formed in 1992 in the Saada Governorate to protect and promote the interests of the minority Zaidi (a Shia offshoot) community. Found almost exclusively in this northern mountainous region of Yemen, on the border with Saudi Arabia, this community had been ignored by the Sunni Government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh who ruled for 33 years until he had to quit office at the height of the Arab Spring. The Houthi movement criticised the Saleh Government for not just marginalising the minority group but also for being corrupt and inefficient.

Later, when the Saleh Government allowed the US to use Yemeni territory for counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda, the Houthis opposed American intervention. Their voice grew louder with the Iraq war, and after they took their opposition from Saada to the capital city of Sanaa, President Saleh sought to shut them down. This led to six brutal wars between 2004 and 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring came to Yemen and the Houthis were at the forefront of the protest movement. A year later, following an agreement brokered by Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr Saleh was eased out of office but the Houthis were sidelined. A transitional regime, supported by the international community, was put in place while the Houthis positioned themselves as the opposition force.

Mr Hadi, also Mr Saleh’s long time Vice President, was at the helm but failed spectacularly in guiding Yemen’s political transition and the Houthis upped their ante against him. In this, Mr Saleh also played a part (it is no coincidence that Bab-el-Mandeb was handed to the Houthis by a section of the Yemeni Army loyal to Mr Saleh). Soon, Mr Hadi lost the plot. The Houthis advanced from their Saada stronghold and and captured Sanaa on September 21, 2014.

There was a period of political reconciliation when a new Cabinet with a new Prime Minister was formed. But tensions grew over the drafting of Yemen’s Constitution and eventually the Houthis besieged the homes of the Prime Minister and the President. On January 21, Mr Hadi and his Cabinet resigned. The embattled President moved to his hometown of Aden where he rescinded his resignation and announced that the port city was the new capital of Yemen. But on March 25, Mr Hadi fled Yemen and appeared in Riyadh on March 26, the day that Saudi Arabia announced its military campaign in Yemen.

Now, this campaign is being portrayed as a Saudi-Iran proxy war fought on sectarian lines. To a certain extent, it is — as the Houthis receive support from Tehran. However, the quantum and quality of this support has been vastly exaggerated. Also, as described earlier, the Houthis are not merely an Iranian proxy force or a mercenary Shiite army. They are a local political group fighting, what is essentially, a civil war. And there’s only one sensible course of action here for foreign powers: Stay away from the mess.

Saudi Arabia’s intervention, and that too on behalf of the weaker party, will only lead to a protracted conflict of the sort we are seeing in Syria and Iraq. There may have been a sliver of hope had the coalition produced some political action plan but there is none. Even the coalition’s military prowess is in doubt — the Saudi military has a bunch of fancy toys but it’s a largely untested force. The Egyptians are slightly better but it should be remembered that Cairo and Riyadh have historically been on opposing sides in Yemeni matters (remember the 1960s North Yemen civil war). Besides, neither of these two big players have the resources to sustain a long-term military operation especially if it involves ground troops. 

So, why is Riyadh getting into this mess? The answer is simple: It has always been paranoid about Yemen and has a history of meddling in its internal affairs. The Arab Spring and the Houthi advance had disrupted its carefully orchestrated political equations and now its seeking a reset. Also, after its successful 2011 intervention to save the Sunni-minority Government of Bahrain, it seems like Saudi Arabia is taking its position as the big brother in the Sunni world a little too seriously — unfortunately, it’s doing so in a manner that’ll only bring about more death and bloodshed to the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 2, 2015)

IRAN, A STABILISING FACTOR IN WAR-TORN WEST ASIA

Tehran is one of the few power centres that is working to stem the region’s slide into chaos and anarchy

Hardly a day now passes when one doesn’t hear about something terrible happening in West Asia. If it’s not the Islamic State brutes that are beheading, enslaving and murdering people, their compatriots in other parts of the region are routinely blowing up towns and cities while insurgents topple Governments and terror groups take over entire countries.

True, the region has always been a hotspot (if nothing else, there’s always the Israel-Arab conflict) but the situation has undoubtedly worsened in the post Arab Uprising years. Every Great Power worth its salt has sought to bring stability to West Asia — and failed.

One major reason for this is that, not everybody gets the West Asia and nearabouts. The region is extremely complex and few foreign powers can legitimately claim to understand its ever-changing dynamics. Perhaps, the focus should be on strengthening regional powers and allowing them greater space to manage what is really their own backyard.

Traditionally, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been the big boys in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council is also an important force but it’s primarily an economic entity with limited political and no military prowess. Israel also could have been on the list, but given its own complicated relations with most countries in the region, it can hardly play the role of an interlocutor.

 Unfortunately, as of now, Iraq has all but collapsed while Egypt’s regional stature stands greatly diminished as it struggles to get its house in order. Saudi Arabia is a force to contend with, though its one-point agenda of pushing Wahhabism that has fuelled Islamist terrorism across the world, makes it a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution.

Besides, over the years, Saudi Arabia has shown that it couldn’t be bothered with cultivating ties and nurturing relationships because it believes that, with all the money it has, it can easily buy the influence it needs. This has not always worked out well. 

This leaves us with Iran — a large and stable country that has a civilisational connect in the region but has been ignored by the international community, primarily because of its controversial nuclear weapons programme.

 But if you keep that aside, there is an argument to be made for strengthening Iran’s hand in the region’s power matrix. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran doesn’t always have the kind of money to throw around. And so it practises old school diplomacy — working with local leaders, supporting friendly regimes and building up regional institutions.

Take, for example, the fight against the Islamic State. The West’s anti-IS coalition has been a non-starter, and that’s in no small measure because of the double standards of some coalition partners like Jordan and Turkey. The only ones that have succeeded against the Islamic State are the Kurds, but they have little support from the rest of the world. Iran, however, has been actively working with the Kurds and helping them with men and material on the ground.

Iran has also been working closely with the Government in Baghdad so as to stabilise the Iraqi regime, which is the key to retrieving that country from the clutches of the Islamic State. After all, it was the power vacuum in Iraq and Syria that created the fertile grounds for the IS to breed and nurture. Unless, these core issues are addressed, no military intervention can succeed. This, we have learned the hard way in Afghanistan.

In fact, even in the case of Afghanistan, Iran has sought to play the role of a regional stabiliser. The Americans were able to quickly topple the Taliban in the early days of the war primarily because of Iranian support. More recently, Tehran has also sought to persuade Pakistan (which is known to seek ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan) to not meddle in Kabul’s affairs. This is a point that India has also sought to underline but, understandably, with little effect, in Pakistan.

In fact, in terms of larger foreign policy principles, both India and Iran are staunchly opposed to foreign interventions and agree that is only well-mediated, political solutions are the only real solutions to some of the most crises of our times. Perhaps, the only point on which India and Iran have divergent positions is with regard to Israel.

While Iran doesn’t even recognise the Jewish state, India’s relations with Israel have strengthened significantly in the past two decades. While there is not much that India can do to change that dynamic, one can take comfort in the fact that both Iran and Israel say that neither will be the first to make the aggressive move.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 13, 2015

This isn’t terrorists’ playground

Hemmed in by their operational limitations that prevent them from attacking a heavily fortified West, Iran’s frustrated terror proxies are now targeting their subjects elsewhere. The attack on the Israeli diplomat in New Delhi last year was just one example of that

Given how little progress has been made with regard to the attack on Israeli diplomat Tal Yehoshua Koren a year after her car was bombed in New Delhi, the recent efforts of Delhi Police to revive the investigation into that terror case are welcome. This past Tuesday, Delhi Police sent a reminder to five countries, including Iran, seeking their cooperation in the case. It is commonly believed that the investigation hit a roadblock when Tehran refused to cooperate with New Delhi and execute the four Interpol Red Corner arrest warrants issued against Iranian nationals including the main suspected bomber Houshang Afshar — all of whom are suspected members of the Quds Force, the elite unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The fifth accused in the case is an Urdu journalist Syed Mohammed Ahmed Kazmi, who was arrested in March last year and released on bail by the Supreme Court in October.

It goes without saying that India’s law enforcement agencies must see this case to its logical conclusion — after all, February 13, 2012, was the first time that a foreign diplomat was attacked within this country by a suspected terrorist group of another country. It is imperative for India to make clear that it will not tolerate such activities on its soil. And this is a message that must be sent out loud and clear so as to ensure that India is not viewed as a soft target by groups such as the Quds Force and its primary terrorist proxy Hezbollah that are looking to implement their devious agendas in countries they perceive to be as ‘low security’.

The attack in New Delhi came at a time when there is ample evidence to suggest that the Quds Force and the Hezbollah have embarked on a new, global campaign of violence particularly against American, Israeli and Jewish targets but also against Western interests in general. It is important, therefore, to view the February 13, 2012, attack in New Delhi as part of a wider, international terror campaign which even though does not target Indian citizens or Indian interests specifically but could still be played out within the territorial borders of India.

Of course, this is not the first time that Iranian terror proxies have wanted to bring down Western targets. The Hezbollah, for instance, has a long history of such attacks that go back to the early 80s. At the time, the group operated mostly in its home country of Lebanon but quickly expanded its activities abroad. Consequently, in 1992, Hezbollah operatives used a car bomb driven by a suicide bomber to attack the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 civilians. Two years later, the group used the same method to blow up the Jewish community centre in the Argentinian capital and killed 85 people. Two years later in 1996, the Hezbollah joined forced with the Quds Force to bomb Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.

Things changed, however, at the turn of the century when Al Qaeda grabbed headlines with its spectacular attack on the Twin Towers of New York in September 2001. In response, as America led the Western world in its global war on terror, the Hezbollah was reluctant to be trapped in the crosshairs. And so, the group, then led by Imad Mughniyah, consciously rolled back its activities, particularly its global operations. It was also around this time that Hezbollah actively worked to gain a certain sense of autonomy from Iran which had always been the “senior partner” in the relationship, in the words of a senior US intelligence officer.

But this period of relative quiet lasted only a short while. In February 2008, Imad Mughniyah was assassinated leading to the rejuvenation of Hezbollah’s international operations arm, the Islamic Jihad Organisation, under the leadership of Mustafa Badreddine and Talal Hamiyeh. The primary aim of the IJO at that time was to avenge the death of Mughniya. In his  paper, Mr Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy describes the “three-tiered shadow war” that Iran and the Hezbollah planned to take down American and Israeli and Jewish targets. According to Mr Levitt, the targets were divided into three categories — tourists, diplomats and Jewish centres. While the Hezbollah was to carry out attacks on tourists, considered to be easy targets, the more skilled Quds Force was to focus on the high-profile targets.

But as Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah declared an “open war”, Israeli and American security officials were immediately put on guard, allowing them to disrupt a series of terror attacks planned by Hezbollah and the Quds Force. It started with the fiasco in Baku in May 2008 when planned bombings of US and Israeli Embassies were exposed. Then in September 2009, a Hezbollah terror attack in Turkey was foiled despite the tremendous logistical support from the Quds Force. Finally after yet another failed attack in Jordan in January 2010, “a massive operational revaluation” of the IJO was undertaken, says Mr Levitt based on his interviews with Israeli intelligence officials.

Following the overhaul of 2010, the Hezbollah-Quds combine came up with three major goals: Apart from the avenging the death of Imad Mughniya and terrorising Western targets, protecting Iran’s nuclear interests was added to the list. It was also around this time that the Quds Force created a special external operations unit — Unit 400 — that would later engineer the New Delhi attack.

Throughout 2010 and 2011, terror attacks were planned but foiled across the world from Cyprus to Azerbaijan and Turkey. In October 2011, the most brazen of attacks come to the fore with the bungled assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador to the US in Washington, DC. This was to be followed by the arrest of a Lebanese national, Hussein Artris, in Bangkok in January 2012 who eventually led Thai police to the 8,800 pound of chemicals he and his associate had stockpiled to attack Israeli diplomats. Then came the serial attacks of February 2012 around the death anniversary of Mughniya. On February 12, an attack on the American Ambassador to Baku was foiled but followed by the car explosion in New Delhi. Then, a similar bomb was discovered in Tbilisi in Georgia hours later. On February 14, an explosion was reported in Bangkok in a home rented by the Iranians.

Eventually, investigators would tie the three attacks as part of one major conspiracy. And even though all the attacks were operational failures, they would do little to dissuade the terrorists who would venture even into Africa before eventually tasting success with the July 18, 2012 bombing of Burgas airport in Bulgaria.

The point here is that, while both the Quds Force and the Hezbollah have been sloppy and inefficient in their activities all this while, they are sure to learn from their mistakes. They will eventually get better and then, it is countries like India (and Bulgaria and Azerbaijan) that have relatively low level security measures as compared to countries like the United States and Israel, for instance, that will be their early targets.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 21, 2013.)

Building an equal partnership

US must take India’s concerns into account if it wants the latter to be a security anchor against China

That there is a nice ring to lofty statements about the shared ideals and values between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s most powerful democracy is without a doubt, much like all the talk about deepening ties between these two countries allows for some solid diplomatic bonhomie. But rhetoric, no matter how pleasant and passionate, does not necessarily convert into good policy. It is against this backdrop that the Third India-US Strategic Dialogue that Union Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna co-chaired with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington, DC on June 13 must be viewed.

The high-level, capstone dialogue between the two countries was instituted in 2010 to promote greater cooperation between the two countries and broaden the scope of bilateral relations. In other words, it is here that the basic framework of India-US relations is defined and demarcated, and then re-defined. The current round of talks, however, has come at a particularly interesting time in the history of the India-US relations.

After a lukewarm start in the late 1990s, ties between India and the US were only strengthened in this past decade. Throughout the mid-2000s, the Bush Administration freely courted New Delhi — their alliance culminating in the groundbreaking India-US civil nuclear energy agreement — but by the time the Obama Administration came to power in 2008, the honeymoon was decidedly over. Washington’s continued pandering to Islamabad, for one, was beginning to take a toll on its relations with New Delhi.

Since then, however, the situation has changed significantly with the US now making it amply clear that it wishes for India to take on a greater role as an ‘ally’.  For instance, during his recent visit to India last week, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta talked at length about India’s importance in the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. More importantly, he also described India as the “linchpin” of the US’s new foreign strategy which envisions a “pivot to Asia”. Introduced earlier this year, the strategy is essentially America’s response to a changing world order — notably to China’s alarming growth as an economic and military powerhouse that has come at a time when its own influence is waning. Today, as Washington attempts to re-calibrate its relations with Beijing, it has decided to hedge its bet with New Delhi.

Now, the ball is in India’s court. If New Delhi indeed wishes to be part of this new gameplan, the chatter coming out of Washington’s power corridoors is that the former must do more to show greater commitment — it must prove that it is indeed willing to be US’s partner. India’s response in this situation is a definite policy challenge, and how exactly Mr Krishna and his delegation rise to the occasion is to be seen. Still, the team will do well to lay down some ground rules that delineate what exactly it is that New Delhi wants from the US.

Here are the top five non-negotiables that must feature on Mr Krishna’s agenda.

First: Don’t ask us to fight your war with China.

Although Washington will never say it in as many words, what it essentially wants from India is a positive affirmation that in case of a US-China military stand-off (or an outright war, which is of course quite unlikely), New Delhi will stand by its side. That is the crux of the whole “linchpin” narrative. But India has its own issues with China that range from long-festering border disputes to disagreements over sovereign rights in the South China Sea. These again have to be balanced with the fact that today China is India’s biggest trading partner — bigger than the US even. Plus, China is in India’s immediate neighbourhood and, simply put, New Delhi cannot afford to have a confrontational relationship with Beijing for it will be at the cost of our national interest. Washington must understand and acknowledge that.

Second: Stop bullying us over Iran

New Delhi is already doing as much as it possibly can in this situation — it has cut down on its Iranian oil imports as desired by Washington so as to squeeze Tehran over its controversial nuclear programme — but India has its limits too. We don’t like the idea of a bomb in the hands of the Ayatollah anymore than the Americans do, but the fact of the matter is that India needs Iran to meet its rapidly growing energy demands. As an emerging market economy, it is simply not possible for India to completely give up on cheap Iranian oil. Further, Tehran also provides New Delhi key access to the rest of Central Asia and finally, there is no denying that the two share a cultural relationship that goes back centuries. If Washington expects New Delhi to publicly censure Tehran, especially at a time when there is little proof that the former’s own policy of sanctions is working, it really is asking for too much.

Third: Please turn off the Pakistani aid tap, for a change.

If anything , the events of this past year — from the Raymond Davis episode and the unilateral raid that killed Osama bin Laden to the attack on Western targets in Afghanistan by Pakistani militants and the shutting of Nato supply routes — have made it crystal clear that billions of dollars in American aid have bought Washington absolutely no leverage, either in Islamabad or in Rawalpindi. Since the money is literally going down the drain to ultimately fund terror activities that hurt both US and Indian interests, New Delhi must insist that Washington turn off the aid tap. And that should serve as the first step in a long process of holding Pakistan accountable for its many crimes.

Fourth: Clean up the mess in Afghanistan before you leave from there.

There is also no denying that the locals are far from ready to protect their country from the Taliban. And it is not just the security forces but even Afghanistan’s political class is unprepared to resist a Taliban takeover that is sure to happen once Nato troops leave that country in 2014. Hence, it is imperative that India impress upon the US that a rushed exit from Afghanistan will only undo hard-earned gains in the region. If New Delhi fails to do, it will be the one left holding the can afterwards.

Fifth: Give us space and time.

Just like in a successful marriage both partners need adequate personal space and enough time to grow and eventually find their place in the relationship, the same rules apply here too. India has shown that it is committed to building a strong alliance with the US but it must be allowed to do so on its own terms. New Delhi must be an equal partner in its ties with Washington — and not a subordinate member of a group led by the US, Cold War-style.

Ultimately, the US must acknowledge that only an independent and empowered India can make for an effective partner.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 14.)

Don’t spare terror-sponsoring states

Israel’s Minister for Energy and Water Resources Uzi Landau says democracies should jointly fight terror

As the Arab Spring turns cold and bitter, threatening to break the fragile peace that has somehow held together the vast and disparate region of West Asia, Israel has watched its position turn precarious in this past year. With its peace treaty with Egypt under threat, the crucial Sinai pipeline repeatedly bombed and sworn enemy Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, these are uncertain times for the Jewish nation.

But, for a country that has fought at least six major wars for its survival and is surrounded by adversaries, Israel remains more than prepared and vigilant to handle any future crisis. In an exclusive interview to The Pioneer, Israel’s Minister for Energy and Water Resources Uzi Landau explains how his country is preparing to face the challenges that lie ahead.

With elections bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power, in post-Mubarak Egypt, the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which Mr Landau rightly describes as the “cornerstone for stability and future peace in West Asia”, now hangs in balance. Only late last week, at least two senior leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political wing now heads the Egyptian Parliament, threatened to “review” the treaty with Israel if the US cuts aid to Egypt. On his part, Mr Landau insists that Israel “will do whatever is possible to continue with the peace agreement and use it as a base to develop other peace agreements in the area,” but expresses deep concerns at the manner which events are unfolding across Arabia.

Mr Landau remarks, “However, and I hate to say ‘however’, when I look around West Asia, I see this huge span of territory from the Atlantic in the west to the Persian Gulf and beyond in the east convulsing in an earthquake which is bringing down regimes that until now had been stable, such as the ones in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and even Yemen.” He points to the “terrible undercurrents” in Syria and elsewhere and notes that “under the guise of democracy and free elections, the Muslim Brotherhood and the radical Islamist elements are making their way to the helm of affairs.”

This is a matter of great concern especially since “the more civil parts of society that came to the streets in order to have a free and more democratic country find themselves pushed to the back.” Mr Landau’s comparison of the anti-Government protests in West Asia with the Iranian revolution of 1978 that brought the radical regime of Ayatollah Khomeini to power is interesting.

Those still in doubt must take note of the fact that the Sinai pipeline which runs through Egypt and delivers gas to Israel as well as Jordan was bombed for the 12th time in this past year — on February 5. Since the protests in West Asia began, gas supplies to Israel had come to a halt. They were renewed only in January. “We are doing whatever we possibly can to renew the flow,” Mr Landau says, emphasising that the natural gas agreement with Egypt is perhaps the most important economic agreement between the two countries. But at the same time, he adds, Israel is also looking to “offset this lack of natural gas by other sources of energy.” Unfortunately, his options — coal and heavy oil — are limited, more expensive and bad for the environment.

Luckily for Israel, new offshore gas fields have been found and Mr Landau believes that there is enough to meet the country’s needs for the next 50 to 60 years, if not more. Additionally, Israel is also developing and diversifying its own sources of energy. “In a worst case scenario, if something happens to hamper natural gas supply for certain period of time, we have others ways to sustain ourselves,” says Mr Landau. Then, as an after thought, he adds, “Please note, I am coming from, as it is described in the Bible, the land of milk and honey. But, it doesn’t say anything about natural gas, or energy.”

Yet, in this context, energy security is perhaps everybody’s greatest concern. Especially with the ongoing global standoff with Iran, West Asia’s energy equations with the rest of the world will possibly have to be re-formulated. This, however, Mr Landau does not see as a problem. He reasons that “Iran’s many enemies including Saudi Arabia might actually be more than eager to offset the losses incurred by those previously buying Iranian oil with their own oil. It simply needs time to adjust to a system.”

The oil sanctions against Iran that have been recently imposed by the US and the European Union have had a crippling effect on that country’s economy although is still unclear if they will actually prevent Tehran from pursuing its controversial enrichment programme. Mr Landau agrees, “I am not sure if the sanctions will work,” he says, but adds, “They should be stepped to make clear to the Iranian Government that no one is prepared to see a nuclear Iran.”

If Mr Landau strikes a pragmatic posture here, he is equally clear in his mind that his country will not hesitate to take affirmative action if such a need arises. He insists that Iran is a “major exporter of terrorism” and that it is linked to various terror organisations such as Hizbullah, Hamas and Al Qaeda.

After all, if Iran goes nuclear, it will only set in motion another nuclear arms race, with Saudi Arabia immediately looking to acquire nuclear weapons. Given the latter’s vast financial resources and close ties with Pakistan, the development will have worrying consequences for India. Moreover, as Mr Landau asks, “What kind of world is this going to be? Remember, you are not speaking of responsible regimes. You are speaking of those who couldn’t care any less.”

So how does the world deal with such rogue regimes that terrorise the world? To that, Mr Landau counters, “Why does terror exist? Because it works; because terrorists see that they can go ahead and have some benefits.”

He adds, “Only if terrorists and terror-sponsoring states are met head on, and shown that terror will never pay, will this mindless violence stop. I think this really should be the policy of every free country.”

It is but natural for the conversation, while on terror, should veer towards the recent attacks on Israeli embassy cars in New Delhi and Tbilisi — and towards the alleged role of Iran in the attacks. When asked how Israel responds to such attacks, Mr Landau points out that his country has been under attack ever since it came into existence. There have been wars, terror attacks, bombings and more at regular intervals. “But we continue our day to day routine, giving up nothing.” This, he says, is as much a challenge as successfully combating terrorists in the battlefield and elsewhere is.

With India facing much of the same challenges as Israel, Mr Landau hopes that this country too will be able to fight terror without compromising on its core principles of equality, liberty, freedom and democracy. “We both live in difficult neighbourhoods and yet we maintain our democracies. Our Parliaments are still functioning,” he remarks. This in itself should form the basis of a strong relationship between India and Israel.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 23, 2012.)