INDIA IN THE NEW NUCLEAR AGE

America’s withdrawal from one of the most important arms control treaties of our time is the result of a changing nuclear landscape that challenges policymakers in New Delhi as well.

US president Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia may have received scant attention in India, but in the West, it has already fueled concerns about a third world war involving nuclear weapons. This may seem alarmist but the fact is that Washington’s decision to walk away from one of its most significant arms control agreements with Moscow has important implications for global security--which India cannot ignore, especially as it deals with a changing nuclear landscape in its own backyard.

Signed during the Cold War, the 1987 INF treaty prohibited the US and the former Soviet Union from developing and deploying ground-based intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the treaty did not cover sea-based and air-launched missiles and was only applicable to the US and Russia. This wasn’t a problem at the time, and the treaty was in effective in bringing the two superpowers back from the brink of nuclear war.

Three decades later, however, the situation has changed--with China, North Korea, Pakistan and India all having intermediate-range land missiles. For the US, China’s arsenal is as much a matter of concern as that of Russia who it has accused of cheating on the treaty. US officials including national security adviser John Bolton argue that China’s arsenal poses a threat to US assets and allies in the region--and needs to be brought under an INF-like treaty. China, of course, has little reason to join such a treaty--and, for that matter, so does India.

But that being said, China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific is a matter of concern for India, which also finds reflection in Pakistan’s threat perceptions; thereby, creating a new set of concerns and conditions that could destabilise the region. Indeed, this problem is already taking shape as Pakistan follows India’s quest for sea-based nuclear deterrence.

Earlier this year, Pakistan conducted a second round of tests for the Babur-3 nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), following the first one in January 2017. It is expected that the Babur-3 will be mated with the Agosta 90B diesel-electric submarine. This should give Pakistan an assured second-strike capability--while land-based and air-borne systems can be destroyed in a first attack, nuclear submarines are considered to be much less vulnerable.   

India already has a small sea-based deterrent force. In April 2016, the K-4 nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile was successfully test-fired from aboard the INS Arihant, India’s indigenously built nuclear submarine, which was inducted into service in August that year; thereby, completing India’s nuclear triad. This was in keeping with India’s nuclear doctrine which enumerates a no-first-use policy but also makes clear that a nuclear attack on India will result in massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. For India, to secure such second strike capability, survivability of its nuclear weapons arsenal is key and hence the need for a sea-based force.

In other words, India’s naval nuclearisation--aimed at China, not Pakistan--buttresses New Delhi’s NFU policy and brings strategic stability. Pakistan’s naval nuclearisation, on the other hand, stems from its lack of trust in Indian NFU and is an effort to play catch-up. This is understandable but still destabilizing--both from a strategic as well as tactical point of view.

This may seem counterintuitive: if having nuclear weapons at sea enhances the survivability of Pakistan’s strategic forces, then that should add to strategic stability because Pakistan would have less of a use-it-or-lose-it dilemma. However, unlike India, Pakistan maintains an ambiguous nuclear policy for the use of nuclear weapons. This is meant to deter India, but it also implies that India would have to consider and prepare for a Pakistani first attack.

Almost every scenario involving a Pakistani first use begins with a Pakistan-sponsored spectacular terror attack on Indian soil like the 2001 Parliament attack or the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India sought to respond to the former with a show of force along the international border but Pakistan wasn’t perturbed. This led Indian strategists to propose a more pro-active response--a shallow-thrust offensive into Pakistan to seize a small piece of land to be used as a post-conflict bargaining chip. This strategy, known as Cold Start, isn’t official but it was acknowledged by the Army chief last year and the 2017 Indian military doctrine allows ample space for a similar proactive policy.

Pakistan responded to Cold Start by fielding tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or low-yield short-range nukes which could be used on the battlefield. These seek to lower the nuclear threshold and allow Islamabad greater control of the escalatory ladder (which, otherwise, is in favour of the conventionally bigger power). Moreover, Pakistan justified its TNWs within the framework of full spectrum deterrence, moving away from credible minimum deterrence. Add to this the nukes at sea, and the intended effect, as Abhijnan Rej describes it, is to tie India’s hands in a nuclear bind: If India activates Cold Start, Pakistan can use its TNWs to repel the attack, while its nuclear-tipped missiles at sea would deter an Indian retaliatory attack.

On paper, this seems like a water-tight strategy but it isn’t. For one, TNWs only make the situation even more precarious, as Sylvia Mishra explains. And even with TNWs in the field, there is still strategic space for India to explore pro-active conventional military options against Pakistan as the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ showed. Second, with regard to nuclear submarines, there is ample reason to doubt their survivability, as Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang point out.

Third, putting nuclear weapons on conventional vessels is extremely dangerous for any country and could lead to accidents at sea--for example, if its adversaries are unable to distinguish between conventional and non-conventional submarines or if there is a break in the command-and-control system. At some point, Pakistan will have to choose between submarine-based weapons that are ‘totally secure’ or ‘readily usable’ in a real crisis, and Christopher Clary and Ankit Panda suggest that it will in all probability go with the latter--making both the country and its nuclear weapons less safe.

But Pakistan isn’t the only state moving in the direction of ‘easy nukes’. In recent years, Russia has been toying with the idea of using TNWs in a conventional war in a “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy . And the US has responded, in  the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, by advocating for “useable” nuclear weapons and full spectrum deterrence. These pose a challenge to policymakers across the world as they seek to manage old hostilities while responding to new developments in technology and geo-politics.

2017 IN REVIEW: INDIA

From enhancing capabilities for connectivity and security in the region to staring down the neighborhood bully to clearing out outdated ideological policy formulations, 2017 saw India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi take on a more self-assured and assertive approach–at home and abroad. And there is reason enough to expect that this trend will continue into 2018 as the ruling party continues to consolidate power in the run up to the 2019 general elections.

Doklam Standoff

When considering the events of this past year, the Doklam crisis emerges at the top of the list. The 73-day military standoff pitted India against China, and sparked fears that the world’s two most populous, nuclear-armed neighbors were on the brink of war. The border dispute between the two has quietly festered for many decades, but aggressive border intrusions in recent years have threatened that trend of peace. It is unclear if these intrusions will compel both parties to resolve the dispute sooner rather than later, but for now it adds to a growing list of irritants in their relationship.

Though the standoff was resolved through diplomacy this time, there is ample reason to worry that such conflagrations may disrupt regional stability. In fact, on December 1, the Chinese military hinted that it will not withdraw its troops from the Doklam region as is customary during the harsh winter months, but instead maintain a sizeable presence. Currently, India enjoys a tactical military advantage—its Doka La post oversees the area of the actual standoff. However, with China beefing up its own presence in the region—which borders the vital sliver of land that connects India’s northeastern states with the rest of the country—New Delhi cannot afford to be complacent.

The crisis will, of course, impact the ongoing border negotiations between India and China, but it also tests India’s abilities as a regional security provider. Technically, Doklam is disputed between Bhutan and China, and India intervened to protect Bhutanese sovereignty. For now, whether India can or will be a counter-balance to China is an open question, but in this context, recent efforts to revive the decade-old idea of a security allianceamong India, Japan, Australia, and the United States to bring stability to the Indo-Pacific region is of significant interest.

India and the Quad

The first official-level discussion on the Quad since 2007 took place in November, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia summits in Manila, and though the grouping is still in an embryonic stage, it is worth noting that the Malabar naval exercisebetween India, the United States and Japan is growing bigger and more complex with every passing year. Of course, India has sought to make clear that the grouping isn’t directed at any one country but Delhi’s participation in the Quad meeting does indicate a more confident and assertive foreign policy vision–and a willingness to work more closely with friends—both old (Japan) and new (the United States, Australia). Notably, this also ties in nicely with the United States’ Asia policy under Trump, which envisages a wider role for India in the Indo-Pacific as well as in South Asia. Herein, the inauguration of two new India-Afghanistan trade routes that bypass Pakistan indicate how the many pieces of the geopolitical puzzle fit together.  

India-Israel Ties

India’s assertive and confident foreign policy approach was also evident in Modi’s trip to Israel in July, the first-ever official visit to the Jewish state by an Indian prime minister. Though relations between India and Israel have grown significantly since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1992, a pre-Modi India was reluctant to acknowledge the full potential and scope of the partnership, fearing that this would upset Arab states. Since 2014, the Modi government, however, has sought to dismiss these outdated policy formulations: de-hyphenating India’s Israel and Arab state policies, and leveraging the India-Israel bilateral for all that it has to offer—in sectors as diverse as defense, agriculture, and water technology.

Developments in Kashmir

In Kashmir, the state’s reinvigorated anti-militancy campaign, “Operation All Out,” has eliminated nearly 200 militants as of November 19. The Army has said that there will be no let up in its efforts during the winter season, so this is an ongoing operation and, therefore, it’s too early to assess its impact at the political level. For example, in October, the central government appointed former Intelligence Bureau (IB) director Dineshwar Sharma as India’s interlocutor to Jammu and Kashmir, but he hasn’t fared any better than his predecessors as of yet.

However, on the ground, it seems that the government has been able to turn things around after the unrest in mid-2016 that continued well into 2017 following the killing of militant leader Burhan Wani. The turning point came with the Lashkar-e-Taiba terror attack on Hindu pilgrims in south Kashmir—the only major attack on civilians in the country in 2017 but the deadliest targeting Amarnath yatris since 2000. The July attack galvanized “Operation All Out” and has since sought to hollow out the ranks of the anti-militancy operation. Expectedly, there have been reprisal attacks on police and military positions, but for now, it is the government that seems to have the upper hand.

Economic Reforms

Another example of assertive policymaking this year has been the rollout of the Goods and Services Tax. This is the single largest tax reform in the country since independence. It unifies India’s two-trillion-dollar economy and effectively converts it into a single market. Also a big win for cooperative federalism, this tax reform has been in the works for about two decades but is still riddled with flaws and loopholes. This was perhaps only to be expected, nevertheless, it will be interesting to see if the Modi administration continues with its reform agenda–especially as it enters the last phase of its five-year tenure, and all political parties prepare to go into election mode next year.

State Elections and the BJP

In this context, the state elections of 2017–which arguably serve as a sort of mid-term assessment of the ruling party–provide some valuable inputs. Five states went to the polls in the first half of the year–Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa, and Manipur. While the Congress managed a rare victory in Punjab, the BJP won Uttar Pradesh and managed to form a government in all the other states as well. The BJP also achieved two electoral triumphs in Himachal Pradesh, a Congress-BJP battleground state, and Gujarat, a BJP stronghold, in December. During the year, the Indian Electoral College voted BJP leaders Ramnath Kovind and Venkaiah Naidu as President and Vice President respectively. The BJP also increased its strength in the Upper House where, for the first time, it emerged as the single largest party–by mid-2018, it is expected to have a majority, paving the way for easy passage of just about any legislative item. 

Conclusion

The ruling coalition has been consolidating power at all levels of the polity and will go into the New Year on a high note. Whether it uses that momentum to push for reform, growth, and development remains to be seen.

Editor’s note: This article was published by the Stimson Center on its regional policy platform--South Asian Voices. It was the fourth piece in the '2017: Year in Review' series. In this six-part series, contributors assess the most significant domestic and foreign policy developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal in 2017 and how these developments will impact the countries and the region in 2018. Read the entire series here.

Click here to read this article in Hindi

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Image 1: The Kremlin

Image 2: Sam Panthaky/AFP via Getty Images

TOO MANY COOKS FOR SYRIAN BROTH

The Russia-Turkish confrontation on Tuesday won't spark a war but it may disrupt the global coalition that’s slowly coming together to fight the Islamic State. The situation is fast evolving, and India must decide if it's comfortable sitting out of the defining conflict of this time

The downing of a Russian military jet by Turkish forces on Tuesday was only the latest flashpoint in the increasingly internationalised Syrian crisis, which, of course, is fundamentally linked to the global threat posed by the Islamic State terror group. The confrontation came less than two weeks after the Paris attack, which claimed more than 130 lives and the aftermath of which continues to unravel with France and neighbouring Belgium on high alert. In between, a Russian commercial jet that had just departed from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh was bombed over the Sinai peninsula. Before that there were terror attacks, linked to the Islamic State, in Lebanon and Turkey.

Though the incident sent alarm bells ringing in world capitals — after all, it was the first time since the end of the Cold War that a Russian fighter plane was shot down by a Nato member state — and sparked a flurry of World War III headlines, it was actually not that surprising. There had been a similar scare in October when Turkey brought down what was thought to be a Russian aircraft but turned out to be a drone. More recently, Turkey has repeatedly complained about Russian jets, carrying out missions in Syria, violating its airspace. Besides, given how crowded the Syrian airspace is these days, with American, British, French, Arab, Turkish and Russian jets in the sky, it was only a matter of time before such a kerfuffle transpired.

But while this is a matter of concern, it is unlikely to lead to an escalation between Turkey and Russia. Sure, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a hard stance against Turkey, calling the attack a “stab in the back” and accusing the Government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of conspiring with the Islamic State, but it makes no sense for him to launch a full scale attack given that he already has his hands full with the mess in Ukraine and consequent Western sanctions. Besides, if Russia really wants revenge, its much more likely to do so indirectly — by propping up the Kurds. And so it is no surprise that on Wednesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said in no uncertain terms that Moscow does not “intend to wage a war on Turkey”.

Similarly, US President Barack Obama statement supporting Turkey’s right to protect its sovereignty in this context notwithstanding, there is no reason to worry that Nato will jump in to battle to defend Turkey — this is simply not that big an issue. Also, if Turkey had a problem with its airspace being violated, it has more than made its point by shooting down a Russian jet. Hence, immediately after the emergency meeting that Turkey called with its Nato allies, Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg, while expressing support for Turkey, also called for “de-escalation” and “diplomacy”. 

The more serious concern following Tuesday’s incident is, therefore, not a Nato-Russia confrontation but the atmosphere of acrimony and brinkmanship that it has fuelled. In recent days, following the Paris attack, the West and Russia have been inching towards greater cooperation against the Islamic State: Russia, which had mostly been attacking rebels groups fighting against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since it began military operations in September, had begun striking Islamic State targets as well. The Vienna talks, held a day after the Paris attack, had also made more progress than expected.

Meanwhile, French President  François Hollande has been lobbying world powers, with some degree of success it would seem, to put up a united front against the Islamic State. He will be in Moscow on Thursday and visited Washington, DC, on Tuesday to discuss greater cooperation (though, notably, Mr Lavrov cancelled his trip to Istanbul after the shooting). Importantly, the UN Security Council also passed a resolution earlier this week, calling for all necessary action to be taken against the Islamic State. Though this was a goodwill gesture rather than a firm commitment, it indicated a rare convergence of interests.

The current Turkey-Russia episode threatens these gains — and one can hardly write off the possibility that this precisely may have been Ankara’s game plan all along. There can be no two ways about the fact that the Islamic State was able to grow into the monster that it is today because Ankara facilitated the transfer of arms, funds and foreign fighters to rebel groups in Syria, including the Islamic State, in a desperate bid to bring down the Assad regime. Some Turkish officials have also been found to have links with Islamic State leaders and there have been strong allegations of elements within the Turkish Government benefitting from the Islamic State’s illicit activities particularly in oil trade. Moreover, Ankara has used the Islamic State as a weapon in its longstanding dispute with the Kurds, who are the only force on the ground that have been able to push back the Islamic State.

This brings us to the fundamental differences between Turkey and Russia in their approach to the Islamic State and the Syrian conflict: While Turkey’s primary aim is removal of the Assad regime, Russia’s is the exact opposite. Fighting the Islamic State is not a priority for either, though Russia doesn’t mind bombing the terror targets these days while Turkey has been strengthening them all along. Yet, it’s hard to imagine how a solution can be crafted without Russia and Turkey on the same page — and this is just looking at two of the many stakeholders in the conflict.

On a different note, it might be worth asking: What, if any, is India’s role here? Even if one assumes that India is not directly impacted by the conflict, at least for the time being, it still has major interests in West Asia, be they trade and investments, diaspora and remittances, and of course oil and energy security. Moreover, India is an aspiring Great Power that wants to have a say in the international system and is actively campaigning for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.

Yet, in the five years since the war in Syria broke out, India has contributed precious little to the conflict resolution process. It has made clear that it is opposed to foreign military intervention and regime change from the outside, and that a political solution is the only answer; it has also maintained its diplomatic relations with Damascus, an old Delhi friend. But while these are wise policy positions, they are not prescriptive measures.

At the multilateral level, India participated in two major initiatives regarding the Syrian conflict. In both cases, there was little to write home about. First, in 2011, it joined hands with its IBSA partners — Brazil and South Africa, all of whom were temporary members of the UNSC at that time — to push for a statement calling for the immediate halt of violent in Syria. The statement was the first that the world body had issued on what was then a six-month-long conflict and, to that extent, was a modest success for all three members. However, the delegation that they led to Syria soon after was a failure. In early 2014, India was one among the 30 countries that participated in the Geneva-II talks but here too, then External Affairs Minister, Mr Salman Khurshid, mostly just reiterated New Delhi’s known positions on the issues. Perhaps, it is no surprise then that India hasn’t been invited to the ongoing Vienna talks.

To be fair, India has good reason to not want to get its hands dirty: The situation is a mess and India doesn’t really face any immediate pressing threats that it cannot handle from home. That said, India has strong relations with almost all the regional and major powers, enormous goodwill in much of West Asia, and finally, civilisational ties with the region. Should it not leverage these assets to making meaningful contribution? Equally importantly, can an aspiring global power afford to sit out of what is possibly the defining crisis of our times?

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on November 26, 2015)

THE IRAN DEAL ISN’T ABOUT A BOMB

Iran can still get the bomb if it wants to, but the deal incentivises Tehran to restrain itself from doing so, by giving the West Asian power a stake in the global economy. However, it doesn’t tackle the issue of Iran’s subversive terror activities across the world

Last week, world powers signed a landmark deal with Iran that aims to rein in the controversial Iranian nuclear programme in return for relief from debilitating economic sanctions.  Much of the commentary about the deal has focused on the technical aspects: How many centrifuges are being removed? How much of the uranium stockpile is being destroyed? To what percentage can Iran enrich the remaining uranium? What kind of verification processes have been built into the deal? Are these good enough to ensure that Iran won’t cheat on the deal?

While this focus on the technical minutiae is understandable, and one can expect continued hairsplitting on the issue, it must not take away from the larger picture of what the deal means for Iran as a regional power and how it will affect the chronically unstable geo-politics of West Asia. In this context, let’s get one thing straight:  The Iran deal is not really about the bomb.

The Obama Administration wants us to believe that the deal closes all of Iran’s pathways to the bomb but in reality, it only contains the Iranian nuclear programme for a period of 15 years. For these years, Iran’s breakout period — the time needed to produce a bomb — has been increased from three months to a year. Some of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will still be in place, and 15 years later, if Iran chooses to produce a nuclear bomb, it will be able to do so. Ultimately, Iran is an intellectually sophisticated and scientifically advanced country, and its ability to produce a bomb has rarely been under any serious doubt — deal or no deal.

So, if the bomb is not the issue, then what is the deal about all about? The deal is about two issues. On one hand, the sanctions were hurting the Iranians and the regime in Tehran understood that its interests were better served if it put aside its bomb-making ambitions and negotiated for sanctions relief. On the other hand, world powers, having acknowledged that Iran could get a bomb either way, realised that their best chance of preventing such a development was to incentivise Tehran to restrain itself — by lifting the sanctions and gradually giving it a stake in the global economy, in the hope that once within the international system, Iran will behave in a more responsible manner.

Now, this doesn’t seem like a fool-proof mechanism. What if Iran cheats? In all probability, Iran will try to push the boundaries of the deal and test the limits of the verification process. It isn’t clear at this point how world powers will react to this. Yes, they say that the sanctions will snap back at the slightest hint of bad behaviour but that’s far easier said than done. There will be punitive action, of course, for large-scale violation but there is lot of gray area in the case of low-level mischief. Expect Iran to play around here a bit but it is unlikely that it will go completely overboard because that makes no sense at all.

To better predict if Iran will be faithful to the deal, it may help to compare, as another columnist Abhijit Iyer-Mitra suggested in his column in The Pioneer earlier this week, the Iran deal with the Indian nuclear deal. Signed exactly a decade ago in July 2005, the Indian nuclear deal brought India, a non-signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that had tested nuclear weapons, under the global nuclear tent. This cleared the pathway for not just better relations with the US but also India’s deeper integration into the global system. The Iran deal works on a similar idea: Resolve one nuclear issue to better engage on all other issues.

However, the Iranian case and the Indian case differ in two key aspects: First, unlike India, Iran was a signatory to the NPT and broke the rules of the nuclear club when it announced its nuclear weapons programme. Second, India’s entry into the nuclear regime was based on its spotless non-proliferation record and the acknowledgment that it is a responsible and rational power. Iran, however, has a long record of using regional proxies to secure its interests in an already unstable neighbourhood. Also, its repeated calls for the annihilation of Israel make it extremely difficult to accept Tehran as a responsible power.

Indeed, it is this kind of bad behaviour that actually makes the rest of the world jittery about Iran. Except for perhaps a handful of nuclear non-proliferation purists who are automatically opposed to any new power acquiring nuclear weapons, the thought of Iran getting the bomb would possible not have got the rest of the world so riled up had only ayatollahs in Tehran come across as more trustworthy folks.

Instead, the world sees the kind of de-stabilising influence that the Iran-supported Hezbollah has had in Lebanon; it sees the cravenness of Hamas, also supported by Iran, which uses Gazans as cannon fodder against Israel; it sees how the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are propping up the murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria while supporting the Houthis in Yemen, not to mention stoking some ‘revolutionary fire’ in Bahrain. 

Over the years, Iran and Iranian proxies have been implicated in a series of terror attacks across the world. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Hezbollah, for example, was involved in a series of bombings and assassination of American and Israeli targets; it also had an understanding with Al Qaeda and the Taliban for training jihadis; the elite Quds force was involved in the war in Iraq. The hey-days of Iran-sponsored Shia terror (as opposed to Saudi-sponsored Sunni terror) may be behind us but it will be foolish to assume that hey won’t make a comeback.

Since the late 2000s, Iranian proxy groups have become more active with terror attacks planned across the world, from Azerbaijan and Cyprus to Jordan and Turkey to Thailand and even India. Most, including the 2011 bungled assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador to the US in Washington, DC, were foiled. But the extent of the criminal conspiracy was underlined with the serial attacks of February 2012 — a foiled attack on the American Ambassador to Baku; followed by the bombing of an Israeli diplomat’s car in New Delhi; followed by another bombing in Tbilisi in Georgia; followed by an explosion in Bangkok in a home rented by Iranians. The attacks were part of one big conspiracy and even though they were all operational failures, they did not dissuade the terrorists who tasted success with the July 18 bombing of Burgas airport in Bulgaria in 2012.

With the lifting of all (not just nuclear) sanctions, it is expected that about $100 billion will pour into Iran, at least some of which will most definitely be used to support these proxy groups, UN resolutions notwithstanding. Iran’s rival powers in the region know this, and they have already been the turning up the heat in response (think of the utterly pointless Saudi operation in Yemen). At least in the short term then, one can expect more instability in West Asia — as an ascendant Iran consolidates its position in the region.

Does this mean that the Iran deal was a bad idea? Not necessarily. The deal doesn’t guarantee peace but its still the best chance that the world has, to forge a change for the better. The alternative would have been maintaining the status quo which would have only alienated Iran further. This would have strengthened the hardliners in Tehran and made the bomb even more easily accessible to the ayatollahs. The deal is an opportunity to bring Iran into the global mainstream and give it one less reason to go rogue.

Also, in the immediate future, a rapprochement with Iran opens the door for more seamless Western cooperation with Tehran is some key strategic areas like the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and in efforts to improve Afghanistan’s economic prospects. In fact, it will be interesting to see if Iran can eventually emerge as a counter-balance to Saudi Arabia, the fountainhead of Sunni terrorism wreaks havoc across the world today.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 23, 2015)

COMING CLOSER, OFFICIALLY

Since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The BJP took the lead in normalising ties, but it was a Congress Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations

It may have taken more than two decades, but if Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon’s India visit is any indication, it seems like India is finally and firmly committed to correcting the historical anomalies of its relationship with Israel.

Mr Ya’alon’s visit comes less than three months after Union Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singh visited Israel and only four months after Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2014.

Mr Ya’alon is the first serving Israeli Defence Minister to visit India, and his presence at a platform like Aero India is an unapologetic acknowledgement of not just the strong relationship between India and Israel, but more specifically, of the close defence ties as well.

Israel is India’s second largest military supplier after Russia and India is reportedly Israel’s biggest defence customer. In 2014 alone, defence trade between the two countries stood at about $2.5 billion. Last year, India also picked the Israeli state-owned anti-tank guided missile over the American Javelin offer in a deal that’s worth $525 million. This year, at Aero India, media reports suggest, India and Israel are expected to sign deals worth $1.5 billion.

It’s not just the weapons’ sales, per se, that are driving the defence relationship ; there’s a strong strategic component as well. Let us not forget that the big turning point here was the Israeli military assistance to India during the Kargil war. India had only limited experience with this kind of sub-conventional warfare (which, notably, has almost become the norm now) while Israel’s expertise in this field remains unparalleled.

Yet, despite such close collaboration, which, in fact, can be traced back to the 1950s (when India had sought Israeli expertise in agriculture, for example), there has always been a reluctance at the political level to acknowledge the scale of the relationship. In fact, the last time an Israeli leader who had served as Defence Minister, visited India, it was a closely-guarded state secret.

In 1977, Moshe Dayan — he was Foreign Minister at that time but had previously held the defence portfolio — was invited by Prime Minister Morarji Desai. According to US diplomatic cables, released by Wikileaks, the leaders spoke for over an hour and Moshe Dayan believed that “(Egypt’s President Anwar) Sadat had asked Desai to use his influence with Israelis in seeking a Middle East peace settlement”. 

During the meeting, the leaders also discussed establishing diplomatic ties, but Desai said it would not be possible at that time. This was in keeping with the Indian Government’s anti-Israel policy of the time — the result of several factors, from India’s colonial baggage to Mahatma Gandhi’s personal views of the Zionist movement to the Congress’s misguided Muslim appeasement policies. Put together, they produced a strong anti-Israel bias that penetrated deep within India’s foreign policy establishment and have remained to some extent even after full diplomatic relations were formally established in 1992.

That said, it is also equally true that in the two decades since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The Bharatiya Janata Party took the lead in normalising ties but it was a Prime Minister from the Congress, PV Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations.

 His successor from the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Delhi while the Congress-led UPA Government that came next allowed the relationship to flourish — so much so that bilateral trade, which spans across sectors as diverse as education and outer space, is now pegged at six billion dollars from just about $20 million in 1992.

What remains today from the policy baggage of the past is some anti-Israel posturing at international forums and the occasional impediment or irritant caused by individual leaders or bureaucrats within the system. For example, though India steers clear of criticising Israel on Palestinian issues, it continues to support resolutions against Israel at the UNHRC.

 Similarly, as recently as 2013, a senior Congress leader like Mr AK Antony, under whose watch as Defence Minister, India bought millions of dollars of weapons from Israel, reportedly backed out from a scheduled Israel trip at the last minute after he was told of reservations from the Muslim League. A third example here is of India’s odd reluctance to invest in Israel’s off-shore gas field, ostensibly because this might upset Arab states.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is hoped that abnormalities such as these will be ironed out. Mr Modi is known to be a strong supporter of Israel, and so are many of his top team members including Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Home Affairs Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.

It is no coincidence that the $659 million of Israeli arms purchases that have happened since Mr Modi came to power (even though many of the deals were put in place by the UPA regime) are more than Israel’s total defence exports to India in the last three years.

Clichéd as it may sound, the India-Israel bilateral is an idea whose time has come. From India’s point of view, Israel can be a great partner in the Modi Government’s flagship Make in India project. Much of the long-term success of this project hinges on the willingness of foreign Governments and private companies to transfer technology to India.

From Israel’s point of view, a resurgent India presents a lucrative market, especially as Europe, Israel’s traditional buyer, struggles to get back on its feet. Israel’s support for India syncs well with its own Look East policy, which includes other Asian powers such as China, Japan and South Korea.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 20, 2015

NEW RULES FOR THE GREAT GAME

Under the Modi Government, India is re-calibrating its relationship with the Great Powers, as the Obama visit stands proof. Now, it will be interesting to see how New Delhi projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums

This past fortnight has been a particularly busy one for Indian diplomacy. It started with US President Barack Obama’s visit to the country which was followed by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s relatively low key trip to China which included a trilateral meeting with Russia. Both visits are parts of larger processes wherein India, under the Narendra Modi Government, is re-defining the terms of its engagement with Great Powers. President Obama’s visit builds upon the Prime Minister US tour in September 2014 while Ms Swaraj’s Beijing trip sets the stage for the next India-China summit. Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s India visit last November, Mr Modi is now scheduled to travel to China in May, just before he completes his first year in office. In between, Russian President Vladimir Putin was in New Delhi for the annual India-Russia summit, and all the heads of Government also had an opportunity to deliberate during the G20 summit in Australia last year.

Though it’s too early to present a full picture of India’s foreign policy under BJP-led NDA regime, some of the salient features of the Modi doctrine, at least with regard to Great Power engagement, are becoming clear. At the top of the list is the end of anti-Americanism which has been best symbolised by the presence of the US President as the Republic Day parade. Though the US has long since ceased to be a subject of suspicion in contemporary public discourse, especially among the youth who have been raised on a staple diet of Americana, within India’s encrusted political and bureaucratic circles, the residues of that reflexively anti-US posture have remained. 

Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had sought to change that discourse but could only do that much with just one term in office. Thankfully, his successor Manmohan Singh, much more pro-America than the average Congress politician, continued without his efforts. Mr Singh dragged the Left-leaning political class, kicking and screaming (and quite literally so), into the 21st century geo-political scene and forced them to accept that India stood to benefit from a partnership with America. This is what led to the signing of the historic nuclear deal that legitimised India’s status as a nuclear power and also paved the way for the country to do nuclear commerce globally. It was also during Mr Singh’s tenure that defence cooperation was incorporated into the bilateral, another hugely symbolic policy shift, that also opened up the market for billions of dollars of weapons and technology trade.

Unfortunately, Mr Singh had exhausted all his political capital in the early years of his first term, and could not take the India-US project to its logical conclusion. Americans, who had lobbied the world to make an exception (no matter how well-deserved) for India, saw the 2010 nuclear liability law as a betrayal of sorts for it shut out US suppliers from the Indian market. Meanwhile, Indian politicians like Mr AK Antony, who served as the Defence Minister in the UPA Government, actively scuttled American projects and repeatedly spurned Washington’s offers to upgrade the relationship.

It is against this backdrop that the Obama visit needs to be evaluated. As some commentators have pointed out, tangible deliverables from the summit have been few: For example, though the Modi Government has said that it has ironed out most of those problems with regard to the operationalisation of the nuclear deal, the agreements are yet to be signed. But that’s okay. Often, complex negotiations such as these get stuck at the bureaucratic level and high-level political exchanges help remove the blockages. This is what the Obama visit, and the Modi visit before that, achieved. Equally importantly, the overwhelmingly positive optics of the visit, which critics have sought to write-off as style statements without substance, were, in fact, necessary to send out a clear and unambiguous message that India and America are friends and partners, and they will be doing business together, irrespective of how that fits into your ideological leanings.

The second big take-away from the Obama tour was the revitalisation of the American rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific, with India at its strategic core. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region didn’t get as much attention as the extensive US-India Joint Statement but it was here that the strategic aspect of the relationship came into full bloom. The US has now made clear that it wants India to play a leading role as a ‘security provider’ in the Indo-Pacific region (to use a term that Ms Hillary Clinton had famously used). In  other words, it wants India to ‘balance’ China’s tendencies to become the neighbourhood bully. Now, this is technically an old policy, as anybody who remembers Washington’s ‘pivot to Asia’ will tell you.

But the latter never quite took off, especially from India’s perspective. The Obama Administration was seen as pandering to Beijing, and more so, after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 that damaged America’s credentials as the world’s only superpower. Also, a still instinctively anti-US and somewhat diffident India did not appreciate either being dragged into a potential US-China crossfire or being portrayed as bulwark against China. America’s pivot to Asia (which hinged on solid India-US ties) didn’t quite dovetail with its ‘pivot to India’. The latter came first, in the early 2000s, with the Bush Administration; but it was petering out by the time the Obama Administration introduced the Asia Pivot.

Now, it seems that the two are better aligned. Apart from India and the US being on a much stronger footing than before, the Obama Administration has also firmed its view on the India-China dynamic, while India, under the Modi Government, is willing to play a more assertive role in the region. Additionally, America’s efforts to bring in more regional actors (Vietnam, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, apart from Japan) into the equation go well with India’s own Look East policy and its overall idea of an Asian century.

China, expectedly, is not happy with the developments. Yes, it can play Pakistan if it feels India is getting out of hand but that card is fast becoming a double-edged sword. Nonetheless, as Minister Swaraj’s recently concluded Beijing trip shows, China is not making a big deal about any of this — at least, not right away. We’ll know more when Mr Modi visits China. Remember, President Xi’s visit was dampened by Chinese transgressions along the Line of Actual Control. Either way, the focus of the Modi Government’s China policy is on economic issues. The Chinese tend to let these move at their own pace, without linking them to strategic issues.

Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see how India projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums. For example, the Russia-India-China joint communiqué, signed in Beijing by Ms Swaraj, had the usual anti-US tone, similar to many a BRICS declaration. Talk about India joining the SCO also includes concern over how much Delhi will be able gain from joining forums that are considered to be China-dominated. Finally, despite all the promised cooperation between the US and India on clean energy and climate change issues, there are still no guarantees that the two will find common ground in Paris later this year.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 5, 2015

Taking Responsibility for SAARC

India fancies itself as a global power. However, its claims to leadership have always been undercut by the fact that it has failed to deliver on its home turf in South Asia. Prime Minister Modi has promised to change that by leading Saarc from the front

The big question at the 18th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is this: Will India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, finally step up and take leadership responsibility for the forum? For the eight member grouping that includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, this is an existential question. For Prime Minister Modi, who has sought to establish a strong foreign credential in his first six months in office, this will be his biggest, diplomatic test — and he knows it.

The South Asian forum which turns 30 next year has largely been a disappointment, if not an entirely failed project. Look at it any which way you want but there is no denying that Saarc has been unable to deliver on two of its basic promises: Prevent war between its member states and encourage greater economic cooperation among them. Some of this failure is the result of geography — except for Afghanistan and Pakistan which share a border with each other, all the others only share a border with India, thereby making Saarc a rather India-centric project; some of the others causes can be attributed to history — while under the British Raj, the region functioned as a cohesive trading unit, it split up into rather inward-looking nations that were wary of free enterprise, and defined by bitterly contested borders, in the post-colonial period.

The difficult bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan, inarguably one of the biggest roadblocks for Saarc, is a product of both history and geography. Moreover, as recent reports about Pakistan playing spoilsport in signing the important rail transport network treaty shows, this is a problem that is not going away anytime soon. Having said that, however, it is also important to underline that Pakistan is not the only one responsible for the sad state of affairs at Saarc. India, its Pakistan problems notwithstanding, has also failed to in its role as the group’s natural leader.

In the early years of Saarc, India routinely gave preference to developing its relations with its neighbours on a bilateral basis, rather than strengthening the multilateral forum. It was only after the economic liberalisation of the 1990s that New Delhi’s approach began to change. As the country grew stronger, and indeed more confident of itself, it also became more willing to assert itself on regional and international forums.

Very quickly, India went from a country that wanted no part of any pie (think Non-Aligned Movement) to demanding a finger in every pie. As India’s international profile grew stronger, and Saarc continued to wither away, many wondered if this country had outgrown its neighbourhood.  Having been found access to the global high table, was India now disinterested in its home turf?

The narrative changed again with Prime Minister IK Gujral’s foreign policy doctrine which said that India’s welfare was intrinsically linked to the fortunes of its neighbours, and focussed New Delhi’s efforts on South Asia. Successive Governments led by Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, carried forward this policy — at least in spirit, even if implementation was often patchy.

Now, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also reiterated the neighbours-come-first policy. And it is hoped that, unlike his predecessor, he will be able to convert policy formulations into practicable solutions. His invitation to all the Saarc leaders for this inauguration ceremony earlier this year, reminiscent of an emperor’s coronation where the kings come calling, was, a diplomatic masterstroke. Not only was it befitting the landmark mandate that he had been given but, more importantly in this context, it was a powerful signal to the rest of the neighbourhood that India, under Prime Minister Modi, will no longer shy away from its leadership responsibilities in South Asia. But strong signals apart, what about the substance? After all, even with the best of intentions, Mr Modi can’t turn things around single-handedly. 

For one, there are certain issues, like Pakistan, that lie beyond his control. Given the current situation in Pakistan, there is no space for a peace deal on matters related to Kashmir and other boundary disputes. Also, on the issue of terrorism, there is little that India can do, except for strengthening its fences, if Pakistani deliberately rears snakes at home, hoping to let them loose them this country. Outside of the Pakistan problem, India also has little control on political developments in other countries (for example, coups and rigged elections) which tend to fuel instability in the region. Sure, India can, and should, play a supportive role (as it did in Nepal with reconciliation of the Maoists) but it cannot force wholesale political changes (like keeping Islamists out of power).

But while the challenges facing Mr Modi in the region are myriad, there is also ample scope for him to bring about changes that can impact and improve the lives of more than a billion citizens.  A good place to start with the Saarc reform process is at home. Economically, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world —intra-regional trade is abysmally low at just five per cent of the total official trade; intra-regional investments are equally paltry. And India, by far the biggest economic entity in the region, is also embarrassingly the least open to intra-regional trade.

Talk of reversing this situation has been going on for quite a few years now. For example, in 2007, when India was leading the Saarc summit, President Pranab Mukherjee, then serving as External Affairs Minister under the UPA regime, had said at a conference of Saarc parliamentarians that this country, as the largest nation in the region, was willing to “to accept asymmetrical responsibilities, including opening up her markets to her South Asian neighbours without insisting on reciprocity.” Unfortunately, there was little change on the ground.

Economic cooperation apart, Mr Modi could also look at enhancing collaboration in some of the other areas where joint challenges exist. For example, climate change is a major concern for all members particularly the Maldives. Similarly, energy security is a pressing matter for all South Asian countries, with the exception of Bhutan to some extent.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on November 27, 2014)