Fresh Winds May Blow Soon

Manmohan Singh and the Government he has only nominally led have frittered away the robust Vajpayee legacy in foreign affairs. If the BJP comes to power with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, it could bring tectonic, positive changes in the country’s international relations

 In recent weeks, at least two prominent Indian commentators have opined that if Mr Narendra Modi becomes Prime Minister, as is widely expected, his biggest impact will be felt not so much on India’s economic policy but its foreign policy agenda. On April 9, soon after the BJP released its election manifesto, Firstpost editor R Jagannathan observed, “If Modi were to become PM, foreign and security policy could be in for another churn”, and go through a “sea change”. The same day, C Raja Mohan, one of the country’s most respected journalists and foreign policy analysts, wrote in The Indian Express that the “vagueness” in the BJP manifesto should allow Mr Modi “considerable freedom to put his own stamp on India’s foreign policy”. 

The focus on Mr Modi in the foreign policy sphere is interesting, given that the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate does not have a particularly active profile in this regard. Almost all his time as a senior politician has been spent in Gujarat and he has no experience with the processes that guide India’s engagement with the world. To the casual observer, he may, therefore, seem like an untested hand in foreign policy matters, and more so since Mr Modi has focussed only limited attention on the subject during his election campaign. This is not unusual since  foreign policy is hardly a talking point during elections.

But even as Mr Modi holds the cards close to him in this case, comparisons with Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee have already begun. The last BJP Prime Minister, Mr Vajpayee is credited with taking India’s foreign policy to new highs — he tested nuclear weapons that initially led to international sanctions but eventually brought India nuclear legitimacy; he significantly improved the country’s relations with Pakistan despite the process being disrupted by the Kargil conflict; the joint declaration with China that he signed during his landmark trip to the Middle Kingdom in 2003 still forms the basic framework for border dispute talks; and, finally, it was under his leadership that New Delhi shrugged off its Cold War inhibitions and vitalised ties with the US. Indeed, when Mr Vajpayee demitted the Prime Minister’s Office, he left his successor a rich legacy of global engagement.

Unfortunately, Mr Manmohan Singh and the Government he only nominally led frittered away that legacy in this past decade. As the BJP manifesto notes, “The Congress-led UPA has failed to establish enduring friendly and cooperative relations with India’s neighbours. India’s relations with traditional allies have turned cold. India and its neighbours have drifted apart”. In response, the BJP has vowed to “build a strong, self-reliant and self-confident India” that will “regain its rightful place in the comity of nations”.

This has been interpreted by many as indicative of a “muscular” foreign policy under Mr Modi, although what exactly that means is unclear. What can be expected though is that, if Mr Modi takes up the top job, he will be a strong and decisive leader and craft a foreign policy that furthers the country’s “best national interests” (to use a phrase from the manifesto). 

Similarly, analysts have also been talking about what the BJP means when it says that it will “create a web of allies to mutually further our interests”. Does this mean India may shed its non-alignment policies under Mr Modi? This is highly unlikely. In recent years, India has forged a series of strategic partnerships with different countries while still holding onto its strategic autonomy. There is no reason to believe that a Modi-led Government will stray from that path. However, one can expect a greater emphasis on India’s role as an Asian power — particularly in the strengthening of relations with Japan, China and, to a lesser extent, Singapore and South Korea. 

India’s relations with Japan are already on the upswing and will get another big push if Mr Modi comes to power. Japan has been doing a lot of business with Mr Modi’s Gujarat and those experiences will be carried forward to the national level. Also, Mr Modi has a close personal relationship with Mr Shinzo Abe, the staunchly pro-India Prime Minister of Japan. In 2007, during his first term as Prime Minister, Mr Abe gave a warm welcome to Mr Modi in Tokyo; when Mr Modi returned to Japan in 2012, Mr Abe was in the Opposition, but the duo still met; months later in December that year, when Mr Abe returned to power, Mr Modi personally called to congratulate — a noticeable event given that Mr Modi was not a national leader.  Moreover, both men are portrayed as nationalists focussed on the country’s economic resurgence which makes their partnership almost natural.  

As regards China, alarmists have already raised red flags about Mr Modi’s comments, made in Arunachal Pradesh, on protecting India’s territorial integrity. They have been quick to assume that this means India may take on a provocative stance against China, which it can ill-afford, even though the Chinese themselves dismissed the statements as catering to domestic concerns during an election campaign. Also, there is reason enough to assume that under his leadership, India’s relations with China will realise their full potential, especially in trade. Mr Modi has travelled to China four times already and, in 2011, was received in the Great Hall of the People, a landmark event largely ignored by the Indian media.  

The BJP manifesto also says, “Instead of being led by Big Power interests, we will engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond.” This again has been interpreted as a snub to the West, particularly the US which finds no mention in the manifesto. But before reading too much into it, let’s not forget that no other country is individually named in the manifesto. Also, given Mr Modi’s reputation as a realist politician, one can be reasonably sure that he will not allow relations between the two countries to deteriorate on his watch. If anything, given Mr Modi’s emphasis on economic ties, one can expect a significant strengthening of trade relations between the two countries which have plateaued in recent years. However, the US’s earlier insult of Mr Modi will remain in the backdrop — so do not be surprised if he drops by Tehran on his way to Washington, DC.

Finally, there has been a lot of hullabaloo over the BJP’s promise to design an “independent strategic nuclear programme” by updating the current doctrine in keeping with the challenges of time. This was being widely seen as the party’s code for junking the ‘no first use’ principle; and Modi-baiters conveniently used this to fuel fears of ‘war-mongering’ by the man commonly described as a ‘Hindu nationalist strongman’ — no matter that there is consensus across India’s strategic community that the NFU needs to be revisited at the earliest.

Their bubble of vacuous commentary burst as soon as BJP president Rajnath Singh put to rest all speculation about the NFU being revised. It remains unclear why Mr Singh made such a definitive statement; the nuclear doctrine is not a major electoral plank — but it is hoped that, if Mr Modi comes to power, he will update India’s nuclear policy, as promised in his party manifesto.

(This op-ed was published in The Pioneer on April 17, 2014)

Our Friend Across The Oceans

The India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high, and it is the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership that may potentially re-define the Indo-Pacific security paradigm

With Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe being feted as the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade this year, New Delhi has underlined its reciprocal interest in Tokyo’s initiative to bolster bilateral ties between the two countries. The Prime Minister’s visit comes just about a month after India had the honour of hosting the Emperor and Empress of Japan — a historic tour and perhaps the most potent gesture from Tokyo towards India’s new-found centrality in Japan’s foreign policy scheme. That in between these two visits, Japan’s Foreign Minister Itsunori Onodera also came calling not only reiterates the fact that the India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high but more specifically, underscores the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership.

Since his return to office in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe’s has sought to re-work Japan’s pacifist post-War Constitution, keeping in mind two factors: First, protect Japanese strategic interests against the backdrop of a changing security paradigm (read: increasing Chinese belligerence in the neighbourhood) and second, re-invigorate the moribund Japanese economy — which also serves as a response to China’s emergence as a global powerhouse — by expanding its highly advanced defence industry. The latter, of course, is just one part of Prime Minister Abe’s larger economic revival plan that includes fiscal stimulus, tightening monetary policy and re-structuring economic structures. Most of these efforts have been paying off. Now, they have all been smartly packaged within the nationalist narrative of putting Japan on the path to realising its destiny as the Land of the Rising Sun.

Japan’s global strategic policy under Prime Minister Abe has been carefully articulated in its National Security Strategy that was released in December 2013, alongside a National Defence Programme Guidelines and the establishment of a national security council (which, interestingly, coincided with the Chinese setting up a similar body). That Tokyo has gone so far as to the put out a security doctrine, not to mention constitute an NSC, is in itself a rare though welcome move.

From India’s perspective, it gets even better — a casual overview of the security doctrine makes clear that Japan views this country as one of the “primary drivers” of its “proactive contribution to peace” policy. Against this backdrop, it is to be expected that bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries that has increased significantly in recent years will now grow exponentially. Joint naval exercises, for instance, have already become a fairly regular affair. Even the coast guards of the two countries held their first joint exercise in the Arabian Sea on January 14. More cooperation in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations is on the cards already.

Additionally, there is now a push for more cooperation between the Indian Air Force and the Japanese Air Self Defence Force. This will be a huge step forward and, in fact, was one of the most important issues discussed during the Japanese Defence Minister’s visit earlier this month.

Another issue that figured prominently on the agenda was the ShinMaywa US-2i aircraft. Japan has offered this multi-role amphibian aircraft to India, and India is seriously considering the offer. The US-2i will go a long way in strengthening the country’s naval aviation segment and also help with search and rescue operations, thereby extending our capabilities in providing humanitarian assistance. A joint working group was set up last year to work out the modalities of the deal. In fact, the plan was to sign the deal during Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming visit but unfortunately it has not worked out as such.

But nevertheless, Japan’s offer to sell this aircraft to India must be viewed against the backdrop of Tokyo now shedding it traditional reticence on defence trade. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the sale of any weapons and defence technology. It was initially designed to block any support to Communist countries but eventually evolved into a blanket ban. However, since the 1980s, successive Governments have been chipping it away — most notably in 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda allowed the transfer of defence technology, and recently Prime Minister Abe has sought to lift the export ban in its entirety.

For now, Japan can still sell the US-2i to India without the friend-or-foe detection system (which is what makes it a fighter aircraft). Some say that the missing part can be retroactively fitted possibly with Israeli systems that are supposedly superior anyway. Either way, the potential for cooperation in this field is immense especially as India seeks to modernise its armed forces. 

On the political front, Minister Onodera’s visit will be followed by the third 2+2 dialogue that brings together the foreign and defence ministers of both countries, the Fourth Defence Policy Dialogue that will be conducted at the Defence Secretary level, and finally a trip to Japan by the Indian Defence Minister. In general, there is a consensus favouring more high-level deliberations including annual exchanges between military personnel and the political leadership alike.

Almost all of this is in keeping with Prime Minister Abe’s past record of seeking strong ties with India, not just on a bilateral basis but also as part of multilateral arrangements. Back in 2007, when Mr Abe was serving his first term as Prime Minister, he had delivered a landmark speech to the Indian Parliament wherein he etched out a grand civilisational partnership between the two nations. At that time, he also laid the foundation of a ‘security quadrilateral’ between Japan, India, the US and Australia. In fact, this was followed by Operation Malabar in the same year that saw a bilateral naval exercise between India and the US extended to include Australia, Japan and also Singapore. China was understandably livid and issued strong demarches to everybody and that was the end of that. 

But when he returned to India in 2011, he made a conscious effort to firm up his 2007 strategy by calling for the “two great democracies to meet at sea — for a better and safer Asia”. His pointed references to China made it clear that he would not cower before the might of Beijing, as some others have in recent years.

In fact, one of the reasons why Japan is seeking new partners is because it is reportedly displeased with its traditional ally, the US’s refusal to take a harder line against China. The fact remains that for all the talk about a rebalance to Asia, Washington, DC, has more or less accepted China’s recent imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone which covers the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands administered by Japan and claimed by Beijing. In India, however, the situation strikes a far more sympathetic note.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 23, 2014)

Warmth of the Rising Sun

Tokyo must shed its old stand on the issue of India not having signed the NPT, especially if it wishes to work with New Delhi in the civil nuclear energy arena, which is the other big picture idea that could redefine India-Japan relations

Days after he hosted Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in New Delhi, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe in Tokyo during the course of his three-day visit that ends Thursday, there is no ignoring the dragon in the room. Sample this from Mr Singh’s speech on Tuesday to a high-profile gathering that included Indian and Japanese parliamentarians: “This region faces multiple challenges, unresolved issues and unsettled questions. Historical differences persist despite our growing inter-dependence; prosperity has not fully eliminated disparities within and between states; and there are continuing threats to stability and security.”

Now, place this against the backdrop of the recent Chinese incursion into Indian territory. Had it spun out of control, that episode could have well morphed into a full-scale military confrontation. Also, add to the picture China’s renewed effort to grab the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands administered by Japan. This, many strategists believe, today poses the most serious risk of a militarised conflict between the two nations since the second world war.

And this is just one illustration of how both India and Japan have a common interest in containing Chinese belligerence in Asia. Apart from the border dispute, India, for instance, also remains deeply concerned about China’s proximity to Pakistan and its continued support for the rogue regime in North Korea, which again is known to proliferate arms and weapons technology to Pakistan. Similarly, for Japan, it is China’s increasingly hostile posturing in the South and East China that is becoming untenable.

At the crux of much of this lies China’s hunger for more and more resource that comes amid growing domestic unrest. In other words, there is nothing to suggest that Chinese aggression in the region will diminish. If anything, it will be ramped up over the years — more the reason why India and Japan must join hands and strengthen their security partnership.

Already, New Delhi and Tokyo have institutionalised the ‘2+2 dialogue’ involving their respective Defence and Foreign Secretaries. This is a one-of-its-kind arrangement that India and Japan have, and it is only testimony to the increasing importance of their bilateral relationship particularly within a national and regional security paradigm.

Yet another reason that adds to the urgency of the India-Japan bilateral ties, especially in the China context, is the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. Designed primarily to contain China, the strategy has India as its so-called lynchpin. Add to this the pre-established alliance between the US and Japan, and pieces of this puzzle begins to fall in place. While America may have lost some of its global influence in recent years, there is no denying that it still has one of the world’s most powerful militaries which could still prove to be a strategic game-changer any day.

But while these geo-political imperatives should bring the two countries closer, it is the return of Mr Abe to power that should add the much-needed momentum to the relationship. For years now, ties between India and Japan have been on a slow if steady track, but as the time now comes to take it to the next level, a booster shot is necessary. Who better to administer that shot than Mr Abe?

Apart from the fact that he is possibly the most pro-India of all Japanese leaders in recent times, the Liberal Democratic Party leader is also known for his staunchly nationalist views and is the least likely to take Chinese aggression lying down. Let us not forget that it was he, who in a historic address to the Indian Parliament in 2004, first spoke of the Indo-Pacific as a security paradigm and later went so far ahead as to suggest an informal military alliance between Japan, India, the US and Australia. Unfortunately, that idea never really took off. Even if the Japanese Prime Minister decides to resuscitate it, most strategists believe that it is unlikely to take any definite shape — mostly because it would make China furious. But that still does not change the fact that the Japanese Prime Minister views India as a strategic partner, and if Mr Singh’s Tokyo trip is anything to go by, New Delhi has signalled its willingness to embrace Mr Abe’s view of the Indo-Pacific.

However, if the India-Japan bilateral relationship has to realise its full potential, even within the security paradigm alone, Tokyo will first have to unshackle itself from post-War inhibitions. As of now, Japan does not export arms or weapons technology to India because of the three principles enshrined in its Constitution that effectively prevent such exchanges. Announced in 1967, these principles ban arms export to (i) communist countries (ii) countries to which arms exports are banned under UN resolutions, and (iii) countries which are or may be involved in an international military conflict. However, in 1976 the Liberal Democratic Party Government of the time expanded the restrictions to cover other countries not described in the principles, and also brought under cover defence-related technologies; thereby, imposing a veritable blanket ban on arms export.

It was not until 1983 that Tokyo made an exemption for the first time by allowing the export of military technologies to the US. In December 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of the Democratic Party of Japan relaxed the three principles and set fresh standards for arms exports. Under the new regime, export of defense equipment related to peacemaking and international cooperation is now permitted while co-development and co-production of defense equipment is also allowed if the partner country has a cooperative relationship with Japan over national security issues.

Naturally, this works well for India — and more so now that, given Mr Abe’s personal willingness to expand India-Japan security coordination, the Prime Minister can be trusted to take a more lenient approach towards exports arms to India.

It must be kept in mind that since India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, prior permission from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is needed when it comes to exporting dual-use products and technologies (such as the US-2 amphibious aircraft which Japan might soon sell to India) that may be used for the development or production of weapons. It is in situations such as these that it will help tremendously to have someone like Mr Abe in the driver’s seat.

Still, Tokyo will do well to shed its old stand on the issue of India not having acceded to the NPT, especially if it wishes to work with New Delhi in the civil nuclear energy arena — the other big picture idea that could redefine India-Japan relations.

After all, in 2008, even the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the export of nuclear-related products and technologies to non-NPT member countries, unanimously approved India’s exemption from the export restriction list. While it is true that since 2010, Japan and India have been discussing a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement but the fact is that negotiations have been deadlocked since Tokyo insists on a provision that, should India resume nuclear testing, cooperation between the two countries will cease. 

This obviously is not amenable to New Delhi, which has maintained a principled stance on the matter. In this case, Japan will do well to learn a lesson from the US which signed the civil nuclear deal with India, keeping its eyes firmly on China.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 30, 2013.)