Days after he hosted Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in New Delhi, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe in Tokyo during the course of his three-day visit that ends Thursday, there is no ignoring the dragon in the room. Sample this from Mr Singh’s speech on Tuesday to a high-profile gathering that included Indian and Japanese parliamentarians: “This region faces multiple challenges, unresolved issues and unsettled questions. Historical differences persist despite our growing inter-dependence; prosperity has not fully eliminated disparities within and between states; and there are continuing threats to stability and security.”
Now, place this against the backdrop of the recent Chinese incursion into Indian territory. Had it spun out of control, that episode could have well morphed into a full-scale military confrontation. Also, add to the picture China’s renewed effort to grab the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands administered by Japan. This, many strategists believe, today poses the most serious risk of a militarised conflict between the two nations since the second world war.
And this is just one illustration of how both India and Japan have a common interest in containing Chinese belligerence in Asia. Apart from the border dispute, India, for instance, also remains deeply concerned about China’s proximity to Pakistan and its continued support for the rogue regime in North Korea, which again is known to proliferate arms and weapons technology to Pakistan. Similarly, for Japan, it is China’s increasingly hostile posturing in the South and East China that is becoming untenable.
At the crux of much of this lies China’s hunger for more and more resource that comes amid growing domestic unrest. In other words, there is nothing to suggest that Chinese aggression in the region will diminish. If anything, it will be ramped up over the years — more the reason why India and Japan must join hands and strengthen their security partnership.
Already, New Delhi and Tokyo have institutionalised the ‘2+2 dialogue’ involving their respective Defence and Foreign Secretaries. This is a one-of-its-kind arrangement that India and Japan have, and it is only testimony to the increasing importance of their bilateral relationship particularly within a national and regional security paradigm.
Yet another reason that adds to the urgency of the India-Japan bilateral ties, especially in the China context, is the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. Designed primarily to contain China, the strategy has India as its so-called lynchpin. Add to this the pre-established alliance between the US and Japan, and pieces of this puzzle begins to fall in place. While America may have lost some of its global influence in recent years, there is no denying that it still has one of the world’s most powerful militaries which could still prove to be a strategic game-changer any day.
But while these geo-political imperatives should bring the two countries closer, it is the return of Mr Abe to power that should add the much-needed momentum to the relationship. For years now, ties between India and Japan have been on a slow if steady track, but as the time now comes to take it to the next level, a booster shot is necessary. Who better to administer that shot than Mr Abe?
Apart from the fact that he is possibly the most pro-India of all Japanese leaders in recent times, the Liberal Democratic Party leader is also known for his staunchly nationalist views and is the least likely to take Chinese aggression lying down. Let us not forget that it was he, who in a historic address to the Indian Parliament in 2004, first spoke of the Indo-Pacific as a security paradigm and later went so far ahead as to suggest an informal military alliance between Japan, India, the US and Australia. Unfortunately, that idea never really took off. Even if the Japanese Prime Minister decides to resuscitate it, most strategists believe that it is unlikely to take any definite shape — mostly because it would make China furious. But that still does not change the fact that the Japanese Prime Minister views India as a strategic partner, and if Mr Singh’s Tokyo trip is anything to go by, New Delhi has signalled its willingness to embrace Mr Abe’s view of the Indo-Pacific.
However, if the India-Japan bilateral relationship has to realise its full potential, even within the security paradigm alone, Tokyo will first have to unshackle itself from post-War inhibitions. As of now, Japan does not export arms or weapons technology to India because of the three principles enshrined in its Constitution that effectively prevent such exchanges. Announced in 1967, these principles ban arms export to (i) communist countries (ii) countries to which arms exports are banned under UN resolutions, and (iii) countries which are or may be involved in an international military conflict. However, in 1976 the Liberal Democratic Party Government of the time expanded the restrictions to cover other countries not described in the principles, and also brought under cover defence-related technologies; thereby, imposing a veritable blanket ban on arms export.
It was not until 1983 that Tokyo made an exemption for the first time by allowing the export of military technologies to the US. In December 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of the Democratic Party of Japan relaxed the three principles and set fresh standards for arms exports. Under the new regime, export of defense equipment related to peacemaking and international cooperation is now permitted while co-development and co-production of defense equipment is also allowed if the partner country has a cooperative relationship with Japan over national security issues.
Naturally, this works well for India — and more so now that, given Mr Abe’s personal willingness to expand India-Japan security coordination, the Prime Minister can be trusted to take a more lenient approach towards exports arms to India.
It must be kept in mind that since India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, prior permission from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is needed when it comes to exporting dual-use products and technologies (such as the US-2 amphibious aircraft which Japan might soon sell to India) that may be used for the development or production of weapons. It is in situations such as these that it will help tremendously to have someone like Mr Abe in the driver’s seat.
Still, Tokyo will do well to shed its old stand on the issue of India not having acceded to the NPT, especially if it wishes to work with New Delhi in the civil nuclear energy arena — the other big picture idea that could redefine India-Japan relations.
After all, in 2008, even the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the export of nuclear-related products and technologies to non-NPT member countries, unanimously approved India’s exemption from the export restriction list. While it is true that since 2010, Japan and India have been discussing a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement but the fact is that negotiations have been deadlocked since Tokyo insists on a provision that, should India resume nuclear testing, cooperation between the two countries will cease.
This obviously is not amenable to New Delhi, which has maintained a principled stance on the matter. In this case, Japan will do well to learn a lesson from the US which signed the civil nuclear deal with India, keeping its eyes firmly on China.
(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 30, 2013.)
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