BREAKTHROUGHS ON THE BORDER

Small-scale border trade, which is different from the industry-scale bilateral trade, contributes only a fraction to the overall economic relationship between nations. But it does have a significant impact at the people-to-people level, as the India-Bangladesh haats show

Generally, political freedom better economic opportunities. However, there are rare cases when newly independent regions find themselves worse off because of the red lines on their maps. This is what happened to India’s North-East in 1947. On the one hand the country gained independence from British rule and awoke to “life and freedom”, to use the words of India’s first Prime Minister; but on the other hand, partition and the consequent establishment of East Pakistan, which was liberated in 1971 to become modern-day Bangladesh, meant that a large part of the new nation found itself cut-off from the ‘mainland’, almost overnight.

The erstwhile Kingdom of Tripuri, for example, received a particularly raw deal. That part of the ancient kingdom which was directly under the British Crown, became East Pakistan (and is now Bangladesh) in 1947, while the rest of it, the autonomous Princely State, joined the Union of India in 1949. Consequently, Tripura, as we know it today, is land-locked on three sides by Bangladesh while the other North-Eastern States are left with a tenuous geographical connect to the rest of the country, through the ‘chicken’s neck’.

The economical implications of these changes have been devastating. The new lines disrupted the old business patterns and nearly destroyed the region’s commercial eco-systems. Road links from the North-East, which passed through East Pakistan, were severed; the Assam Railway segment was cut-off from Indian Railways; Bengal’s jute industry was decapitated; the loss of Chittagong port meant that Indian tea and timber industries had to take a circuitous route to the Calcutta port.

It is only when one understands the scale of disruption that was inflicted during partition can one appreciate the importance of border haats that are being set up on the Indian-Bangladesh border (such haats also exist on the India’s border with Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, China and Pakistan). Defined by the Government of India as over-land trade by way of exchange of commodities from a bilaterally agreed list by people living along both sides of the international border, this arrangement is different from the large-scale trade that happens through land, air or sea ports, requiring customs clearances etc. Border trade happens on a much smaller scale and contributes only a fraction to the overall bilateral trade.

However, it does have a significant impact at the people-to-people level. There are two reasons for this: First, border areas are almost always also remote areas, and residents (be they buyers or sellers) do not have easy access to commercial centres in the heartlands. Hence, border haats are seen as a good alternative. Second, the socio-cultural ties of cross-border residents also provide an impetus for greater economic engagement. Border trade encourages familiarity and trust between communities. Notably, much of the border trade happens through the barter system  without mutual understanding and good faith, this system would not have worked. Also, it has been noticed that as border trade improves, border smuggling usually diminishes as well.

Border haats between India and Bangladesh were common before 1971, when locals exchanged surpluses at their weekly haats. These traditional markets, however, were shut down during the War of Liberation. After the war ended and Bangladesh became a sovereign nation, there was an attempt to restart the trade  in fact, a trade agreement was in the works in 1972 which specifically provided for trading opportunity to people living within 16 kms on either side of the border. to dispose off their goods which were mutually agreed upon. However, the pact wasn’t formalised due to apprehensions from Bangladesh. And when a trade agreement was eventually signed, it did not include border haats.

More than four decades later, the situation has changed dramatically and border haats are back with a bang (especially with regard to Bangladesh, and to some extent, Myanmar). These haats usually open once a week and nationals from both countries living within a four to five kilometer radius can trade locally produced goods and crops. Currencies of both countries are accepted and no taxes are imposed on the sale of designated items which mostly include crops, spices, minor forest products, fish, dairy and poultry products and cottage industry items.

Currently, there are four functional India-Bangladesh haats  Two were set up in 2012 on the Meghalaya-Bangladesh border at Kalaichar (India)-Baliamari (Bangladesh) and Balat (India)-Dalora (Bangladesh). The other two were set up last year in Tripura: The first was in January 2015 at Sabroom in the Southern Tripura district on the Indian side and Feni district on the Bangladeshi side. Then in June 2015, Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina inaugurated via a video link, the Kamala Sagar border haat, located 35km south of Agartala.

At least four other border haats are being planned in Tripura alone  at Kamalpur in Dhalai district, Dharmanagar in North Tripura district and in the subdivisional towns of Khowai and Kailasahar. Overall, India aims to set up 70 markets in the north-eastern States, along its 4,096km border with Bangladesh, which includes a 1,116km riverine boundary.

Of course, border haats alone will not be enough. Political stability (in the Indian States and the neighbouring country) will be key and so will infrastructure development. Thankfully, there is good news on both accounts. While India-Bangladesh ties have become strong and robust, the Modi Administration has prioritised infrastructure development, particularly communication and transport facilities, in the North East. In fact, it was only early last month that the Union Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region sanctioned Rs580 crore for the construction of a railway corridor connecting India’s Agartala with Bangladesh’s Akhaura. The project has been in the works since 2010 and should be completed by 2017. Overall, while there has been significant progress, there is still a whole lot more than needs to be done before the full potential of border trade can be leveraged in a manner that benefits not only border residents but also neighbouring countries and the region at large.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer. A shorter version of this article was earlier published in India Perspectives magazine)

Gateway to a Bright Future

Building Tripura’s trade ties with Bangladesh is part of India’s efforts at boosting friendly neighbourly relations. This will help integrate the rest of North East into Indian economy and open way for trade with South East Asia

Generally, political freedom betters economic opportunities. However, there are cases when newly independent regions find themselves worse off. This is what happened to India’s North East in 1947. The country gained Independence from British rule and awoke to “life and freedom” as India’s first Prime Minister put it, but Partition and the consequent establishment of East Pakistan (liberated in 1971 to become modern-day Bangladesh) meant a large part of the new nation found itself cut-off from the ‘mainland’, almost overnight. 

The erstwhile kingdom of Tripuri received a raw deal. Part of the ancient kingdom directly under the British crown became present-day Bangladesh in 1947 while the rest of it joined the Union of India in 1949. So Tripura, as we know it today, is landlocked on three sides by Bangladesh while other North Eastern states are left with a tenuous geographical connect to the rest of the country through the ‘chicken’s neck’. 

The economical implications of these changes have been devastating. The new lines disrupted the old business patterns and nearly destroyed the region’s commercial eco systems. Road links from North East, which passed through East Pakistan, were severed; the Assam Railway segment was cut off from Indian Railways; Bengal’s jute industry was decapitated and the loss of Chittagong Port meant that Indian tea and timber industries had to take a circuitous route to Calcutta (now Kolkata) Port. 

It is only when one understands the scale of disruption during Partition can one appreciate the importance of the first India-Bangladesh border haat set up in Tripura. The marketplace has the potential to revolutionise bilateral trade and dramatically improve living standards of border populations in both countries. 

Inaugurated on January 13 by Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Commerce & Industry, Ms Nirmala Sitharaman and Bangladesh’s Commerce Minister Mr Tofail Ahmed, this market is located in the southern Tripura district on Indian side and Feni district on Bangladeshi side. It opens once a week and nationals from both countries living within a 5 km radius can trade locally produced goods and crops. 

The specialty – currencies of both countries are accepted and no local taxes are imposed on the sale of 16 designated items which includes crops, spices, minor forest products (excluding timber), fish, dairy and poultry products and cottage industry items. Four other border haats have been planned in Tripura – one in Sipahijala district, two in Dhalai and a fourth in north Tripura. 

It is no coincidence then that Tripura is being prepared as a nodal point. The region has historically been one integrated economic unit and it is in the fitness of things that pre-Partition trade and communication links be restored to leverage the full potential of the region. Political stability (in India and Bangladesh) and infrastructure development (such as AkhaurahAgartala rail link) will be other key factors. If these factors can be aligned and Tripura-Bangladesh ties strengthened, the whole project that can be quickly scaled up to bring the rest of the North East under its ambit. This, in turn, can serve as India’s gateway to South Asia as envisioned in the North East Vision Plan 2020. 

This article was published in the May-June edition of India Perspectives, the flagship magazine of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India

Sari Diplomacy in South Asia

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s ongoing Bangladesh visit is crucial to rejuvenate bilateral ties, as Sheikh Hasina, discriminated by the West, now looks at other Asian powers, particularly China, for support

 It was in the late 1990s that the term ‘sari diplomacy’ became rather fashionable after Ms Cherie Blair, as Britain’s First Lady, did more for India-UK relations with her red-and-green silk sari, which she wore to the British Indian Golden Jubilee Banquet, than official talks between her husband and the then Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral, had achieved a few weeks earlier. In the years since then, Ms Blair has continued with the trend and is often seen sashaying in six yards of silk at various South Asian events.

Ms Samantha Cameron, wife of the current British Prime Minister, has also followed in her footsteps with much grace and aplomb. Across the pond, the Americans have usually found themselves on the other end of the (un)diplomatic spectrum — notoriously for having subjected one sari-clad Indian envoy to Washington, DC to a pat down at the airport.

Closer home, the men have also taken to some fabulous sari diplomacy (and given it a typically desi twist by bringing their mothers into the fold) as the recent exchange of gifts between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif show.

But as External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj tours Bangladesh on her first solo trip abroad, meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina among others, together they can prove that there’s little to match the charm, versatility and power of sari diplomacy, when it is done by women leaders from South Asia.

Ms Swaraj and Ms Hasina reportedly share a close rapport. The last time they had met was in January 2010 —Ms Swaraj had then just taken over from veteran BJP leader LK Advani as the Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha, and had hosted Prime Minister Hasina, who was on a state visit to New Delhi, in her official capacity. Sure, they talked about politics and education and women’s empowerment but as Ms Swaraj later said in a media interview, “Our baatcheet (as women) could not be complete without the talk of saris”.

No surprise then that the two leaders also exchanged saris at that meeting. While Ms Swaraj gifted Ms Hasina a cream coloured ‘South Indian’ sari with grey border — “I knew cream is her favourite colour”, she said — the Prime Minister gave her a bhalo green Jamdani, which according to then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Dipu Moni, she had handpicked herself.

As Ms Swaraj now travels around Bangladesh, ably aided by Ms Sujatha Singh, the Foreign Secretary, and Ms Sripriya Ranganathan, the Joint Secretary who heads the Bangladesh-Myanmar division at the Ministry of External Affairs, the sari diplomacy motif on the Minister’s entourage is quite unmistakable.

Indeed, earlier this year when Prime Minister Hasina faced harsh criticism from the West for holding a general election that had been boycotted by a cussed Opposition and marred by large scale violence, it was Ms Singh who led India’s efforts in favour of Bangladesh. Not only did she travel to Dhaka to negotiate with the political leadership there and break the deadlock, she also resisted pressures in Washington to toe the Western line and de-legitimise the election. In doing so, she helped reiterate New Delhi’s support for one of its most important and friendly neighbours.

Much of the Western world still doesn’t recognise the Sheikh Hasina regime’s electoral mandate — no, it prefers to support Ms Khaleda Zia’s irresponsible Opposition, allied to Islamist parties whose ability to wreak havoc on the streets far exceeds the percentage of votes they can secure in a free and fair election.

But such dichotomy is typical of the West’s foreign policy. Little else explains why military strongmen in West Asia who have conducted coups that, of course, shall never be labelled as such are rewarded with billions of dollars in aid while Ms Hasina gets the rap for an election that was not exactly up to international standards even as the West drones on about the values of democracy. 

Predictably, such discriminatory attitudes have now compelled the Sheikh Hasina regime to seek closer relations with Great Powers other than the West — primarily China and Japan. These countries do not share the West’s hollow concerns vis-à-vis Bangladesh and have no qualms about working with the incumbent regime.

In fact, the reason why Prime Minister Hasina could not join other South Asian leaders at Mr Modi’s inauguration ceremony in May was because she was on an official visit to Japan at that time. Then, earlier this month, she also travelled to China where she met with the top leadership in Beijing including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Yang and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Yu Zhengsheng.

Now, Bangladesh has always had close commercial ties with China but this trip is believed to have been more than just about business with Prime Minister Hasina reportedly seeking political reassurances as well.

Overall, the trip was quite successful. Five agreements were signed at the Government-to-Government level: First, China promised to give 300 million renminbi every year to Bangladesh for economic and technical cooperation. Second, an agreement to set up 1,320 megawatt coal fired power plant in Bangladesh as a joint venture between China’s National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and Bangladesh’s North-West Power Generation Company Limited. Third, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed for the creation of a Chinese Economic and Investment Zone in Chittagong. Fourth, two Exchanges of Letters were issued on regarding greater cooperation in the field of disaster management and flood management. And fifth, another MoU was also inked with respect to the construction of a multi-lane tunnel under Karnaphuli River. Notably, there were also some agreements in the private sector.

Plans to construct a deep-water port at Sonadia in Cox Bazaar also came up but reportedly made little progress. China is willing to finance the project at a cost of $14 billion but also wants the right to design and operate which Dhaka is reluctant to offer. Most experts are of the opinion that this is a problem that will be resolved sooner than later, eventually allowing China a toe-hold in the Bay of Bengal.

None of this should cause alarm bells to ring in South Block, at least not right away, but they are an important reminder that New Delhi cannot just assume the position of a disinterested big brother in the region and ignore its neighbours at any cost.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 26, 2014)

Standing Up for Sheikh Hasina

Amid fears that the West may not recognise the new Awami League regime in Dhaka, which came to power unopposed after the Opposition boycotted the January 5 election, India has done well to offer a strong counter-narrative in favour of Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s 10th Jatiya Sangsad election has produced a diplomatic challenge for India which, if handled effectively, can be converted into an opportunity for New Delhi to re-establish its credentials as a regional leader. Boycotted by the Opposition, the vote was held this past Sunday in the shadow of violence, leading to a low turnout. Bangladesh’s deadliest national election ever, it expectedly produced an overwhelming, though hollow, victory for the incumbent Awami League regime which was voted into office for the next five years even before the first ballot had been cast.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is expected to form the next Government before the current Parliament expires on January 24, but there are fears that the new regime may not be recognised by the West. The US and EU had indicated as much when they refused to send their election observers and have since taken a strong stance against Prime Minister Hasina for failing to get the Opposition on board. Australia, Canada, the UK, the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations have all expressed varying degrees of disapproval as well. In contrast, India has acknowledged it as a “constitutional requirement”, and has been working with its international partners to ensure that Dhaka is not unfairly censured. This is a step in the right direction.

Over the years, Prime Minister Hasina has proven to be one of India’s most reliable friends in the region — she has cracked down on anti-India terror camps in her country and handed over rebels leaders in the North-East — but New Delhi has done little to hold up its side of the relationship. For instance, it has not been able to deliver on either the land border agreement or the Teesta water arrangement, making Ms Hasina vulnerable to much criticism at home. South Block’s efforts now to stand up for a friend it has somewhat disregarded in recent years, therefore, are important corrective measures. 

In December 2013, for instance, Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh, during her visit to the US, offered a strong counter-narrative to Washington, DC’s sharp criticism of the situation in Bangladesh. Previously, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had also discussed the matter with his counterpart in the UK and according to reports in the Bangladeshi media, the meeting went better than expected. This may explain the British foreign office’s more ‘accommodating’ position on the issue — it has not yet recognised the new regime per se, having only taken note of the election result, but at least has accepted that the vote was held in accordance with Bangladesh’s Constitution.

Additionally, New Delhi is also lobbying with the Commonwealth grouping to shield Dhaka from unwarranted criticism. Here, India’s has an upper-hand thanks to its membership to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group. Overall, it is in the international arena that New Delhi will have to do most of the work because within Bangladesh, the political scenario is so charged and polarised, there is not much space for it to manoeuvre.

Prime Minister Hasina has been urged by New Delhi to resolve the problem through dialogue, and on her part, she has even offered to hold a fresh election if the Opposition discards its campaign of violence. But for now, it doesn’t seem like the latter is in the mood for reconciliation unless its key demand for a non-party caretaker Government is met.

This is unlikely given that the system was abolished in 2011 — with the approval of the courts — and, therefore, Prime Minister Hasina has no compelling reason to give up her ground. Besides, she had offered to meet the Opposition half-way with an all-party caretaker Government before the January 5 election but was rebuffed by an obstinate Khaleda Zia, who, as chief of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, heads the 18-party Opposition alliance.

Some analysts have suggested that India engage the Opposition in Dhaka — a fine thought, if only New Delhi had more leverage with Ms Zia. Unfortunately, the two-time former Prime Minister has kept herself at a distance. Over the past two years, in an attempt to appear even-handed in its dealings with Bangladesh, South Block has made several high-profile attempts to establish a better working relationship with Ms Zia even at the cost of upsetting Ms Hasina. These included a meeting with Vice President Hamid Ansari in Dhaka in 2011, an exclusive lunch with the Prime Minister in New Delhi in 2012 and  the offer for a tête-à-tête with President Pranab Mukherjee in Dhaka in 2013 (that she turned down) — but to no avail.

In fact, not only has Ms Zia refused to reciprocate Delhi’s goodwill gestures, she has heightened her anti-India sloganeering. This is not just a continuation of her traditional political strategies but also reflective of the increased political influence of her extremist ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which maintains a vitriolic opposition to India, not to mention collaborates with jihadi terror networks in the region. Once a fringe party, whose role was limited to providing the mainstream BNP with political muscle, the Jamaat has now emerged as the dominant partner in the relationship.

It seems like Ms Zia herself is still working out the changing dynamics of the partnership. For instance, after Jamaati leader Abdul Qader Mollah was executed for committing war crimes, the Islamists demanded that she take a strong stance on the matter. However, given the wave of popular support in favour of Mollah’s death sentence — this is what sparked the Shahbag protests in the first place — Ms Zia skirted the issue. In retaliation, the Jamaati cadre offered only a lukewarm response to her call to the country to march upon Dhaka in protest against the Hasina Government. Consequently, the much-touted December 29 mega protest march failed to take off.

Ultimately, Ms Zia will have to reconsider her alliance with the Jamaatis but in the foreseeable future, the political logjam in Dhaka will probably get worse before it gets better. Social unrest, in the form of hartals, blockades and nation-wide shutdowns will also continue, as the Opposition can be expected to turn up the heat. It is under these circumstances of political instability and uncertainty in Dhaka, fuelled by violence and anarchy on the streets across Bangladesh, that Prime Minister Hasina will take oath for her third consecutive term in office — and she will require the wholehearted support of her friends and allies.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 9, 2014)

Futile Bid at Damage Control

Foreign policy will not be among the glorious legacies that Manmohan Singh will leave behind. But that will not be for want of trying, although on many occasions he blundered badly. Ties with Pakistan remain strained, since he has been repeatedly outsmarted 

Coming at the tail end of his almost decade-long prime ministerial tenure, Mr Manmohan Singh’s trip to the US for the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly should, ideally, have been about consolidating, if not celebrating, his foreign policy legacy. Instead, it turned out to be a last-ditch attempt to salvage his image. Be it his lacklustre speech to the General Assembly or his meetings with US President Barack Obama, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, each one of these was essentially just an exercise in damage control. Here’s how:

The Singh-Sharif Meet: That this one was even held in the first place is  a little victory for Mr Singh. The meeting was not confirmed until the very last minute, and exactly a day after it was finalised a terror attack in Jammu that claimed nearly a dozen lives, put tremendous pressure on the Prime Minister to call off the talk. Such incidents have been happening with increased frequency since Mr Nawaz Sharif was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan earlier this year. Earlier, we had the brutal beheading of two Indian soldiers in January. Since then, there has continued ceasefire violations along the Line of Control — and most in New Delhi believed that the time was not right for a high-level summit. But having still committed himself to the New York meet, Mr Singh was right in not caving to forces that wanted to disrupt the peace process. Unfortunately, this is pretty much the only positive take-away from the Singh-Sharif meet — and few are possibly more disappointed about this than Mr Singh himself.

Having spent his entire nine years in office nurturing the fond hope that he will be the one to script a landmark India-Pakistan peace deal, sometimes even at the cost of India’s security interests, in the final analysis Mr Singh has been able to do next to nothing. This is despite the fact that he inherited Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s legacy of vastly improved bilateral ties between the two countries. He clearly failed to carry it forward. In this context, the New York meeting was little more than a pointless conciliatory gesture from India that made the Pakistani Prime Minister (who came to power promising better ties with New Delhi) look good, and gave the latter the opportunity to bid Mr Singh farewell.

At best, it was also an excuse for some diplomatic amusement — and no, this is not a reference to Mr Sharif’s PJ about village women, but that he, of all people, would whine about India taking up Pakistan’s shenanigans with the US when it was he who had pleaded for Washington to intervene during the Kargil conflict.

The Singh-Obama Meet: This one came at a time when the India-US bilateral has slowed down significantly, having initially raced forth into the 21st century. The decade between 1998 and 2008 saw the India-US relationship come into its own with the world’s largest democracy forging a strong sense of fellowship with the world’s most powerful democracy and acknowledging each other as natural partners. For the first time, Washington’s India policy was dehyphenated from Pakistan while the landmark nuclear deal literally energised the India-US bilateral. In Washington, President George W Bush had used all his political capital to push through that deal while in New Delhi, Prime Minister Singh put his Government at stake. But, if in those years, India and the US were like teenagers in the throes of first love, as one analyst put it, post-2008 their relationship seems to have matured and settled into a humdrum routine. And so, ambitious plans for bilateral cooperation have got stuck in the bureaucratic maze that is as much Delhi as Washington — think of the nuclear liability clause, the tightening of the visa regime and restrictive trade practices. Unfortunately neither Mr Singh, who has already been reduced to a lame-duck Prime Minister, nor Mr Obama, whose Government is shutting down, was currently in a position to resolve any of these issues, even though now would have been the time to give the India-US bilateral that extra push so that it doesn’t plateau before reaching its full potential. And so, the nuclear negotiations, for one, have been left for a later date.

Still, the meeting was not as much of a failure as some had predicted it would be. President Obama, for instance, deserves credit for being graceful enough to spare Mr Singh the litany of complaints against Indian trade practices that American companies have thrown at him. Similarly, Prime Minister Singh, often derided for being soft on terror, deserves a word in praise for highlighting the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, particularly the support that organisations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba receive from state actors in that country. Indeed, Mr Singh’s description of Pakistan as the “epicentre of terror” took many by surprise. Also, talks on defence co-operation between Ashton Carter and Shiv Shankar Menon have been positive, with the US offering a deal to India that, it claims, it has not offered to its Nato allies even.

The Singh-Hasina Meet: Though largely ignored in the international and the national media, this was possibly the most important of Mr Singh’s engagement, given that it was the only meeting that had the potential of immediate impact. While the Prime Minister’s discussions with Prime Minister Sharif and President Obama would have done little to change the ground realities of either the India-Pakistan or the India-US bilateral, his talks with Ms Hasina was crucial to India-Bangladesh relations, which are at a crossroads. This bilateral too has evolved significantly in the recent past, thanks primarily to Ms Hasina who has left no stone unturned to address India’s primary concerns regarding terror fugitives hiding in Bangladesh. But Mr Singh and his Government have failed to put the deliverables from their end — the land border agreement and the Teesta water deal — on the table. This has left Ms Hasina, who is bracing for a tough re-election battle later this year, in an uncomfortable position. The Prime Minister has promised to push these measures through during the Winter Session of Parliament. In the meantime, the progress made in the power-sharing deal — the two leaders will jointly inaugurate a power transmission system on October 5 — is good diplomacy. It will hopefully placate to some extent an otherwise very disappointed Ms Hasina.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on October 3, 2013)

Let Them Reap What They Sowed

There is already legitimate fear that, as the besieged Jamaati leadership of Bangladesh seeks refuge in India, it will be welcomed with open arms by unscrupulous elements to foment communal trouble here. That must not be encouraged

The March 30 rally organised in support of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh by a group of Islamist parties in Kolkata was, unfortunately, largely overlooked by the national media. Yet, those who cared to scan through the news capsules have been rightly alarmed by this blatant display of support for a group of men responsible for the massacre of three million people. Between the months of March and December 1971, the Jamaatis’ razakar militia collaborated with the Pakistani Army to squash the nationalist Bengali movement in what was then East Pakistan. In the process, they raped, maimed and killed millions, burnt down entire villages and displaced millions more.

Four decades later, a handful of those razakars are finally being brought to book, thanks to the war crimes trial initiated by the Government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. However, if the coalition of Islamic organisations in Kolkata have their way, the likes of Jamaat-e-Islami vice-president Delware Hussain Sayeedi (whose crimes during 1971 earned him the nickname ‘Butcher of Mirpur’) and his brand of merry men will go scot free, never to be held accountable for their heinous actions.

Members of the Islamist coalition — that includes groups such as the All-Bengal Muslim Youth Federation, the Sunnat-ul-Jama’at, the Madrasa Student Union and the Welfare Party of India, among others — that gathered at the Shahid Minar grounds in central Kolkata this past weekend, believe that the trial against Sayeedi and other Jamaat leaders is unfair and politically motivated. Specifically, they remain opposed to the death sentence handed down to Sayeedi, the senior-most Jamaati in Bangladesh, who they argue is being persecuted for his religious and political beliefs.

Now, the Islamists in Kolkata are by no means the first or the only group of people to claim that the trial is unjust. Others have also said that Bangladesh’s international war crimes tribunal does not always meet global standards; but then again, the tribunal, for the most part, has credibly defended itself against these allegations. Even then, it is one thing to hold the legal processes of the tribunal to scrutiny and quite another to say that Sayeedi and his ilk committed no crimes at all, which is exactly what the Jamaat supporters would like you to believe. In fact, Syed Jalaluddin Umari, the chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, which is the Indian franchise of the Jamaati party, has even gone so far as to say that there were no war crimes at all during the 1971 war.

Such a perversion of the truth is, no doubt, both appalling and infuriating; yet, it is by no means illegal. In a democratic country such as ours, there is space — political, social and constitutional — for the peaceful expression of even the most virulent of opinions. To that extent, the protesters were well within their rights to hold a rally, even if it was to support mass murderers. But as galling as that may have been, it was perhaps still not as morally reprehensible as the deafening silence maintained by the political establishment of West Bengal on the issue. Indeed, in the several days that have passed since the March 30 rally, neither of the State’s two main political outfits — the Trinamool Congress or the Left Front — has thought it fit to offer a counter-response.

Interestingly, this is despite the fact that the average Bengali, including the vast majority of Bengali Muslims, remains vehemently opposed to the Jamaatis and their brand of politics. For instance, the chief of the one of the Islamist groups Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind, Maulana Siddiqullah Chowdhury, who has made no secret about his support for the likes of Sayeedi, was routed in the 2011 Assembly election. He was contesting from the Domkol constituency of Murshidabad district, which is almost 90 per cent Muslim, and yet he managed to secure less than three per cent of the votes. He had played the religion card to the fullest.

Moreover, mainstream Bengali society has come out in whole-hearted support of the Shahbagh protesters — as is evidenced by the many exhibitions, panel discussions and cultural events that have been organised in Kolkata and elsewhere to show solidarity for Bengalis across the border. So, why then are those who have been elected by this same society and claim to represent Bengal, so reluctant to rein in fringe elements and speak up for the majority of the people?

The answer, as expected, lies in the dirty details of vote-bank politics. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress rode to power on the back of minority votes. In fact, Islamist organisations played an important role in mobilising public support during the Singur protests which proved to be the game-changer in the 2011 Assembly election. Expectedly, therefore, Ms Banerjee has spent the past two years engaging in the worst kind of minority appeasement politics that there can be, and her Government’s silent support for the Jamaati supporters is only further proof of that.

As for the Left Front, do not forget that this Muslim vote-bank was traditionally its own, and that the Front will do nothing to further alienate this group, given that it already lost some part of the pie to the Trinamool. There is nothing new in this kind of cynical vote-bank politics — indeed, it is the routine in the country; yet, the moral bankruptcy of Bengal’s political establishment that has been reflected in its decision to maintain such a conspiracy of silence, is deeply disturbing.

Equally worrying also is the implications this might have on India’s national security. With the protests in Bangladesh only gaining in strength, the Jamaatis there have also notched up their game. Their ‘march to Dhaka’ that has been scheduled for later this week that is expected to unleash yet another round of violence and bloodshed is proof of this. The Government of Bangladesh, in response, has also intensified its crackdown on the Jamaatis, and there is enough evidence to suggest that the latter are already fleeing their country and moving into India. In fact, Indian troops along the porous Bangladesh border have already been put on high alert to tackle the crisis.

It in against this backdrop that a section of Muslim Bengalis’ support for the Jamaatis, and the tacit support they receive from the Government of West Bengal, becomes hugely problematic. There is already legitimate fear that, as the Jamaati leadership of Bangladesh seeks refuge in India, it will be welcomed with open arms only to foment communal tensions in the near future. Add to this mix, news reports that Bangladesh’s police believes that the terror group, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, is also being revived under the leadership of Jamaat leaders in coordination with some Afghan war veterans, and the situation seems definitively terrifying.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 4, 2013.)

From one blunder to another

India's foreign policy in the sub-continent has consistently suffered from an unacceptable degree of short-sightedness. New Delhi has exhibited a rare ignorance of its immediate surroundings,leading to repeated embarrassments in the region

That the plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority, which until recently was neither a burning issue in the island nation nor a matter of high priority for Tamils in India, has now taken on such proportions so as to threaten the collapse of the Union Government here, is absurd, to say the least. On Tuesday, the DMK pulled its support to the ruling coalition in order to protest against New Delhi’s support for what it perceived to be a weak resolution against Colombo’s treatment of its Tamil citizens, at the upcoming Geneva session of the United Nation’s top human rights body. Even though that did not bring down the Congress-led UPA Government, which continues to hang by a thread nevertheless, it compelled New Delhi to the propose amendments to the US-sponsored UN resolution.

It is interesting to note in this regard that the proposed amendments come after the original resolution, criticising the Sri Lankan Government of committing war crimes in the final phase of its war against the Tamil terrorist group LTTE, has been significantly watered down. The new resolution which was tabled at the UN Human Rights Council on Monday tones down the international community’s supposed concerns for regarding human rights violations in Sri Lanka — not just during the war which ended in May 2009 but also in the four years since then. Moreover, three new paragraphs have also been added that support Sri Lanka and welcomes the Government’s announcement to hold elections to the Provincial Council in the Tamil-majority Northern Province in September 2013. Finally, the revised draft also refers to rebuilding infrastructure in Northern Sri Lanka and how the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission report can serve as the basis of national reconciliation. Many believe that these revisions are the handiwork of Indian diplomats who on the international stage have struggled to shield Sri Lanka from undeserved Western ire.

Unfortunately, it seems that even if India may have won the fight abroad, it is sure to lose at home — especially, if harsher amendments are re-introduced into the draft. And that is not all. The Government is also mulling over the DMK’s demand that India pass a parliamentary resolution condemning Sri Lanka. If such a resolution is indeed passed, little else could be more damaging to India’s national interests. Not only will such a resolution be in violation of principles that have formed the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy over the decades but it will also open the floodgates for other countries to pass similar resolutions against India. In fact, the manner in which the Pakistani National Assembly recently passed a resolution regarding Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru and how his hanging has adversely affected the law and order in Kashmir, already shows how vulnerable India is. At that time, India bristled at the thought of Pakistani intervention in its internal affairs, and rightly so.

But now, it must also understand that the treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka — though it may be a matter of enormous concern for India — is India’s business to only a limited extent. The matter is entirely for that country’s Government, its Sinhala majority population and its Tamil minority community to sort out. New Delhi may at best, cajole and coax Colombo to do the right thing, but it cannot meddle in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs.

Besides, if India really has the best interests of Sri Lankan Tamils at heart, it must know that the Sri Lankan Government alone can further their cause. Towards that end, the sensible thing to do is work with the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, not seek to isolate him — as this UN resolution seeks to do.

In fact, India should have strongly resisted the West’s efforts to humiliate Sri Lanka back in 2012 when a similar resolution was first passed in the UNHRC, especially at a time when that war-ravaged country was just about beginning to rebuild itself. Equally importantly, it should have called for a global acknowledgement of the fact that Sri Lanka is the only country in the world to have successfully defeated a terrorist organisation — a stellar achievement conspicuously ignored by the West that has been more keen to highlight the alleged war crimes committed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s men during the final phase of the war.

The decision to publicly censure Sri Lanka in 2012 was also a direct result of the Manmohan Singh Government giving in to the tantrums of the DMK, a powerful regional ally. Worse still, this was not the first time the Union Government had capitulated in a manner that would eventually hurt national interest. In September 2011, New Delhi caved before Kolkata as a result of which the Teesta water sharing agreement — supposed to be signed during Prime Minister Singh’s historic trip to Dhaka — fell through. This not only embarrassed the Prime Minister but also upset his counterpart in Dhaka, Sheikh Hasina.

The Bangladeshi Premier had already done more than her fair share to help the Indian Government when she handed over to New Delhi militants who had taken refuge in her country. But in turn she received next to nothing, even though she is facing a stiff re-election challenge and could well use the Teesta treaty to consolidate her position. Moreover, it is in India’s interest to support Prime Minister Hasina’s secular, democratic and strongly pro-India Government (as opposed to one that could potentially be led by her rival Khaleda Zia, who partners with Islamists and is not really a friend of New Delhi.)

Unfortunately, India’s foreign policy in the sub-continent has consistently suffered from an unacceptable degree of short-sightedness. In fact, even though India’s ties with almost all its neighbours go back several hundred years, New Delhi has exhibited a rare ignorance of its immediate surroundings, resulting in a sclerotic foreign policy in the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 21, 2013.)

Yes to tolerance, no to Islamists

President Pranab Mukherjee’s recent trip to Bangladesh came in the backdrop of the ongoing Shahbagh Square protests in Dhaka where people are demanding stringent punishment to the 1971 war criminals and a ban on fundamentalists. The visit is a message of support

Given the present situation in Bangladesh where Islamists are on a rampage and more than 70 people have already lost their lives, it comes as no surprise that President Pranab Mukherjee was advised against visiting Dhaka earlier this week. But by sticking to his schedule nevertheless and going ahead with the visit, which on hindsight can be termed as hugely successful, Mr Mukherjee did more to strengthen India’s relationship with Bangladesh than any other leader has possibly done in recent time.

For one, the visit was his first one abroad after taking over as President, and the soft diplomatic appeal of India’s first Bengali President choosing Bangladesh for his first foreign trip was simply irresistible. More importantly, the visit was the key to expressing India’s solidarity with the people of Bangladesh at a time when they are struggling to right historic wrongs and eventually redefine their future as a secular, democratic country.

From a political point of view, it was of course a huge show of support for Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League-led Government that have consistently been good friends to India. Indeed, by not cowering before the goons of the Jamaat-e-Islami who have unleashed mayhem in that country, Mr Mukherjee has sent out a strong message against fundamentalist elements in Bangladesh and for democratic movements.

Of course, some experts have criticised his trip for being ill-timed and partisan; they have argued that the President should have postponed the visit so that it would allow him to distance himself from the ongoing internal turmoil in Bangladesh as well as leave enough diplomatic space for New Delhi to work with a Government that could well be formed by today’s Opposition parties.

This line of argument gained traction particularly after Opposition leader and chief of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party Khaleda Zia cancelled her meeting with Mr Mukherjee, prompting some to wrongly suggest that the President was unnecessarily polarising the situation for New Delhi. There was absolutely no reason why Mr Mukherjee should have played safe and chickened out just because Begum Zia was too petty a politician to rise above partisan politics and honour her commitment to a visiting head of state.

But then again, perhaps it is a bit too much to expect any better from someone like Begum Zia who, less than a week ago, had publicly supported the rioting Jamaatis that unsurprisingly form her most important electoral ally. Instead of trying to rein them in, the two-time former Prime Minister of Bangladesh accused the Awami League Government of running a hate campaign against the Jamaat-e-Islami whose top leaders are currently on trial for committing crimes against humanity during the 1971 War of Liberation. At that time, the Jamaatis colluded with the Pakistani Army to perpetrate the genocide of Bengalis, in which three million were killed and 10 million became refugees. It was the Army-Jamaatis’ desperate bid to suppress the nationalist movement that would eventually lead to the birth of sovereign Bangladesh.

Yet, even if they failed in their efforts to keep the Bengali people chained to their masters in Pakistan at that time, the Jamaatis never really gave up on their ways or their old agenda. In the four decades since the War of Liberation, the Jamaat-e-Islami has effectively functioned as a front organisation for its Pakistani patrons, while the party’s leaders have persisted with their efforts to inject into the Bangladeshi mainstream the most retrograde version of political Islam.

It comes as no surprise then that in the days since the International War Crimes Tribunal sentenced to death the most senior of Jamaati leaders Delwar Hossein Sayeedi, the Islamists have not only clashed with protesters and police but also attacked Hindu minorities. Temples have been razed to the ground and Hindu villages targeted — much like they were four decades ago by the razakars of those days. Clearly, things have not really changed in the intervening years, and even as Bangladesh tries to heal the wounds of its bloody past, it seems like the ghosts of 1971 may return to haunt the nation again.

Against this backdrop, it is imperative that India plays a more active role in ensuring that the situation in Bangladesh does not boil over onto its own borders. It must urge the Sheikh Hasina Government to deal with the Jamaatis with a firm hand so that they do not rear their ugly head again, especially in the event of a pro-Islamist Government coming to power.

In fact, the ongoing protests at Dhaka’s Shahbagh Square are essentially a response to this fear. Of course, the central theme of the protests is still about bringing to justice the 1971 war criminals and ensuring they get the punishment they deserve, but let us not forget that one of the other key demands of the protesters is a ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami and its brand of virile Islamist politics.

What is happening in Bangladesh is a historic development, as it marks the first time since Turkey decided to go secular that a Muslim-majority nation has chosen a secular identity for itself over its allegiance to a universal ummah. That India must support the right-thinking Bangladeshi people in securing these aspirations goes without saying, especially since they remain threatened by the devious designs of the Jamaatis.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 7, 2013.)

Razakars must now pay for their sins

The International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh has sentenced to death one person for his role in the genocide of Bengalis preceding the 1971 war

More than 41 years after he and his team of razakars went on the rampage — looting, abducting, torturing, raping and killing members largely of the Hindu minority community of what was then East Pakistan, Abdul Kalam Azad's murderous past has finally caught up with him. This past Monday the 66-year-old former leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami was sentenced to death by the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh, which convicted him of committing crimes against humanity.

Set up almost three years ago, the Tribunal has been trying those responsible for the genocide of Bengalis that preceded the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, and the verdict against Abdul Kalam Azad is the first that it has delivered, marking a defining moment in the history of Bangladesh. The verdict is a huge victory for the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League Government which initiated the legal proceedings. Even though critics of the Tribunal say that it does not meet all the international standards of jurisprudence, the panel still has tremendous popular support in Bangladesh. Also, the verdict against Azad puts the Bangladesh National Party-led Opposition in a spot, given its long time alliance with the Jamaatis.

Azad, better known as Bacchu Razakar, was a junior leader of the student wing of the Jamaat in 1971 and a member of the Razakar Bahini — the auxiliary para-militia that was raised by the Pakistani Army and its Islamist allies to eliminate the Bengali nationalist resistance movement. For the past four decades, the people of Bangladesh have sought justice for the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by the razakars and their Pakistani patrons in uniforms in the nine long months between March and December of 1971 when they killed more than three million Bengalis even as millions more fled to their homes to seek refuge primarily in the Indian State of West Bengal. In some ways then, this landmark verdict against Bacchu Razakar helps an entire nation take a step towards closure.

It might still be a while, though, before this razakar is actually, if ever, hanged by the neck, as ordered by the Tribunal, for the former Jamaati-turned-television evangelist is absconding. He went underground hours before the Tribunal issued an arrest warrant against him in April 2012, and it is widely believed that he is hiding in the port city of Karachi in Pakistan. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to hope that this first verdict will lay the ground for more such landmark judgements as several others continue to stand trial for the heinous crimes they committed in 1971.

Primary among these would be the firebrand Delwar Hossein Saeedi. The first person to be indicted by the Tribunal back in 2011, Saeedi has been charged on 19 counts including rape and murder, and has also been accused of ethnic cleansing. While working with the notorious Al Badr group, Saeedi is believed to have forcibly converted several Hindus to Islam, apart from having raised a small cohort that specialised in looting the wealth and capturing the property left behind by displaced Hindus. Worse still, during those tortuous nine months of 1971, Saeedi routinely led Pakistani soldiers to secret meetings of freedom-fighters and Hindu family hideouts where the men were shot at sight and women picked up and taken away to be ravaged in Army camps.

Today, Saeedi, like many of the other razakars, fancies himself to be a leading Islamic intellectual, but that does nothing to wash away the blood on his hands. And, this applies in equal measure to the likes of Ghulam Azam, the 90-year-old who led the Jamaat-e-Islami until 2000, to Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid who is currently the secretary-general of that party, and to Motiur Rahman Nizami who in 1971 was the president of that party's Islami Chattra Sangha (students wing) and has been accused of, among other things, setting up Al Badr.

It is important to mention here that almost every one of these men has either held or continues to hold important positions within Bangladesh's political class. And, as the Tribunal noted in its judgement on Monday, it is exactly because these “perpetrators of the crimes could not be brought to book” and “the impunity they enjoyed held back political stability”, that Bangladesh “saw the ascend of militancy and the developments “destroyed the nation's Constitution.” Thankfully, the time has now come to reverse that process.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 23, 2013.)

Muslim rage is not about Islam

The outrage and the violent protests organised by Islamists across the world have nothing to do with the supposed desecration of religion. Instead, these incidents are calibrated attempts by so-called religious leaders to firm up their politics, even at the cost of people’s lives

Even before the crowd from the previous protest had returned home, a new mob had gathered on the streets. It had been gaining strength throughout the day as hundreds arrived loaded in trucks and buses, and more people from the outside kept pouring in. Over the next couple of hours, the crowd swelled in numbers and a few local leaders gradually took their position at the helm — soon, they were whipping up outrage against some vaguely defined but provocatively conveyed threat to their religion, their Prophet or their holy book. Timing was the key, so one waited cautiously for the crowd to be sufficiently riled and then, just when the passions peaked, it was let loose like a pack of blood thirsty wolves. What followed was hours, even days, of looting, raiding, pillaging, plundering and killing. Until finally, the security forces showed up and brought the situation somewhat under control.

This is a fairly accurate description of the events as they unfolded in the little Upazila of Ramu, located in the coastal Cox’s Bazar district in Bangladesh’s southern division of Chittagong on September 29 and 30, when Islamists went on the rampage in the area and attacked Buddhist temples and homes, after they discovered a picture of a burnt Quran on Facebook that was alleged ‘tagged’ to a local Buddhist boy.

According to the latest reports available, at least 12 temples were desecrated and nearly 50 Buddhist homes systematically destroyed. But the moot point here lies not in the details of this heinous incident that has deeply scarred Bangladesh’s socio-religious fabric but in the fact that the description applies to almost any ‘Muslim protest’ that has erupted in recent times in response to a supposed act of religious outrage.

Indeed, instead of Ramu Upazila, the narrative can just as easily be placed in Masuri village in Uttar Pradesh here in India, where a similar crowd went berserk and brutally attacked the local police station after someone found pages torn out of the Quran by the railway tracks last month. The narrative also fits well in many other places — from Mumbai’s Azad Maidan where a crowd protesting atrocities against Muslims in Burma and elsewhere went on a rampage to the US Embassy compound in Benghazi where an armed mob protesting a shoddily-made, obscure anti-Islamic film killed the American Ambassador to Libya.

Look closely and a clear pattern of pre-meditated violence that emerges through each of these cases is unmistakable. The cause of the violence and the outrage here is inconsequential. It can be anything — a book that nobody has heard of, a movie that nobody has seen because it was never publicly released, a photograph that is quite possibly doctored, a quote that remains unattributed, a conspiracy theory or even a cartoon. It doesn’t matter.  What matters is how, and of course with what result, that singular instance of outrage (real or imagined) is perverted so as to make it look like it is a universal insult to Islam and its 1.7 billion followers around the world.

First, the Islamists go all out to introduce that supposed object of religious insult — almost always an obscure one — to their local audience. Then, they systemically manufacture outrage against that same object. The campaign is almost always framed within the narrative of a victim-community; a community that has been and continues to be wronged by the world. Ridiculous as it may sound, the idea of being at the receiving end of a global conspiracy is particularly tempting and as we know from past experience, hugely effective. Finally, what serves as an icing on the cake is the fact that Islamists, almost everywhere in the world, are an especially well-organised group. This automatically allows them mobilise large sections of the population and mount an effective campaign.

In other words, the bottomline here is that the protests may be hinged around an Islamic (or more specifically, anti-Islamic) subject, but in reality they have little to do with religion. Instead, the issue is of politics and power-play. Religion is merely an excuse used by the Islamists to whip up passion and mobilise social groups so that they can ultimately implement the latter’s agenda. Indeed, this is an argument that even Muslims political observers themselves have made. For instance, Mr Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the US, in his recently published article on ‘Muslim rage’ minces no words when he says, “The phenomenon of outrage over insults to Islam and its final Prophet is a function of modern-era politics. It started during Western colonial rule, with Muslim politicians seeking issues to mobilize their constituents… and Islamists emerged to claim that Islam is not merely a religion but also a political ideology.”

Indeed, Mr Haqqani traces back an early prototype of this kind of mass mobilisation within the Muslim world to a book published in British India back in 1927. Titled Rangeela Rasool (Playboy Prophet), it was a “salacious version of Muhammad’s life”, says Mr Haqqani, but “hardly a bestseller”. In fact, much the like anti-Islamic film that today is all the rage, so to say, this book too went largely unnoticed until two years after its publication when some Muslim politicians raised a hue and cry over it. The British Government of the day even arrested and tried the publisher but he was acquitted — only to be later stabbed to death by one Ilmuddin, an illiterate carpenter known only by his first name, in Lahore. Ilmuddin soon became a local hero of sorts. Islamist groups nicknamed him Ghazi (warrior) and he was defended in court by a man no less than Mohamed Ali Jinnnah (although on purely technical grounds, as Mr Haqqani points out in his essay). The book continued to be a polarising point between the Hindus and Muslims of undivided India and exacted its price in blood during Partition as well.

It is interesting to note that it was after this case of Ilmuddin that the British amended the Indian Penal Code to include punishment for blasphemy and incitement of religious hatred. It is equally ironical that a little less than a century later, another young man would once again share Ilmuddin’s fate and how! In January 2011, Mumtaz Qadri would also be celebrated as a national hero for killing Salman Taseer, the powerful Pakistani Governor of Punjab would had dared to opposed his country’s draconian blasphemy laws.

The lessons to be learnt from the past and the present are clear. These protests, wherever they may erupt, are not just a product of politics disguised as religion, but that they must be exposed as such. 

The moment the state begins to legitimise such violence as being a genuine case of religious grievance; it loses the plot and half the battle. The Bangladeshi Government realises this, which is why the whole deal about the Facebook picture was underplayed. The Pakistani Government on the other hand doesn’t get it at all and so, it had the Ishq-e-Rasool day, during which several persons where killed. India must learn its lessons from all this and stop pampering hardliners.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on October 4, 2012.)