OF KNOWN AND UNKNOWN DEVILS

Mahinda Rajapaksa’s influence may be waning but the Sri Lankan Opposition is not yet a force to reckon with. Glued together by its common dislike for the President, it has no collective vision for the future and is hardly a credible political alternative

Given that even the wise men who study the stars and the planets cannot seem to agree on who will win the Sri Lankan presidential poll, it is best that ordinary mortals like this writer keep away from the business of predicting who Sri Lankans will elect to lead their country, as they head to the polling stations today. On the one hand, they have President Mahinda Rajapaksa who is seeking re-election for a third term, and on the other, they have Mr Mithripala Sirisena, the Opposition’s ‘common candidate’, who until recently was a Minister in the United People’s Freedom Alliance Government. Technically, there are 17 other ‘minor’ candidates to choose from but for all practical purposes, Thursday’s vote is a contest between Mr Rajapaksa and Mr Sirisena. 

When the election was announced on November 20, 2014, it was not expected to be much of a contest at all as there was no real Opposition in sight. Calculating that getting re-elected a third time after more than a decade in power would be difficult for him, Mr Rajapaksa had called for the election two years before the expiry of his Government’s six year term, hoping to maximise his time at the helm while he  riding the popularity wave.

However, what he had possibly not foreseen was an internal revolt. A day after he announced the election, Mr Sirisena jumped ship. A close colleague of the President, he was serving as the Health Minister at the time and was also the general secretary of Mr Rajapaksa’s own Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

Mr Sirisena’s split from the ruling coalition also opened the floodgates for several other disgruntled UPFA leaders to move to the Opposition camp. Within weeks, Mr Rajapaksa lost the support of more than two dozen leaders, including some high profile Ministers and important allies. The January 8 election quickly went from being a cakewalk for the President to, what some pundits are now dubbing, as one of the biggest challenges in Mr Rajapaksa’s political career.

Even within Sri Lanka’s deeply polarised political milieu, there is now a consensus that Mr Sirisena will put up a tough fight of the sort that Mr Rajapaksa had not expected; and that even if the latter manages to return to power, his mandate will be relatively smaller. Poll pundits say that the election will be a close call and may even lead to a second round of counting wherein the preferential votes are taken into consideration.

For now, let’s take a quick look at how the frontrunners stack up against each other. Mr Rajapaksa’s biggest plus point is that he is a more popular, grassroots leader than Mr Sirisena especially among the country’s Sinhala Buddhist majority. Though Mr Sirisena is also a veteran politician with reasonably strong Sinhala Buddhist credentials, he has a relatively low profile and is not exactly a match for Mr Rajapaksa who towers over the Sri Lankan political scene.

Moreover, since Mr Rajapaksa decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009 and ended a three decades long bloody insurgency, he has been regarded as a war hero in Sri Lanka. His overwhelming mandate in 2010 is proof of this. Sure, four years later, some of that public adulation has ebbed but it has not been extinguished. As for Mr Sirisena, even though he was acting Defence Minister in the final weeks of the war, he has not been able to spin any of the credit for himself. All that he has been able to do on this count is ask: Has Mr Rajapaksa equitably delivered the peace dividends that came from the end of war?

Mr Sirisena’s critics have also been quick to point out that that he is backed by two prominent leaders — Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe and Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga — who had failed to defeat the LTTE when they were in power. In fact, Mr Wickremasinghe, when he was Prime Minister (a position he expects to return to, if Mr Sirisena wins) had signed a controversial ceasefire with the LTTE which the Tamil Tigers used to hit back with a vengeance.

Another factor that will play mostly in Mr Rajapaksa’s favour is governance record. Under his rule, the Sri Lankan economy has grown at a healthy pace, unemployment is low and there has been a visible growth in infrastructure. On this count, again, Mr Sirisena has little to show. In fact, one of the Opposition’s weakest points is that it does not have a roadmap for economic development. And because of this, it will probably not be able to capitalise on whatever anti-Rajapaksa sentiment there is, as effectively as it could have.

For example, in recent years, the President’s economic model, which is heavy on foreign-funded, infrastructure projects, has come in for much criticism. The President, his family members (who hold several important portfolios) and his small coterie are believed to have primarily gained from foreign investments while the benefits have not quite trickled down to the people. Also, the rising cost of living has become a major issue but the Opposition has no real solution.

Instead, Mr Sirisena’s campaign has put the debate over the executive presidency system at the centre of the poll agenda. Through the 18th constitutional amendment, made possible because the ruling coalition has a two thirds majority in Parliament, Mr Rajapaksa had given to the President’s office additional powers (including the power to appoint the Chief Justice and the election commissioner) that has weakened other democratic institutions and given rise to fears of a soft dictatorship. Now, Mr Sirisena has promised to either amend or repeal that amendment but it’s difficult to believe him because it means he will be using his powerful position to make it less powerful. Moreover, this is an abstract issue that doesn’t have as much traction as bread-and-butter matters.

The other big drawback for Mr Sirisena is, ironically, also his primary source of strength: The large section of Sri Lankan polity which has rallied around him. Thirty six parties make up the Opposition coalition and, while they might just able to pull together their votebanks and collectively push Mr Sirisena to victory, they definitely send out mixed signals. The parties have disparate, if not conflicting, ideologies, interests and agendas and come across as opportunistic. The dynamics of the minority votebank is a good example of this.

With the support of the Tamil National Alliance and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (a former UPFA member), the Opposition hopes to capture the minority votebank which is supposedly alienated from the Rajapaksa camp that has been accused of Sinhala majoritarianism. However, since the Sinhala ultra-nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (another former UPFA member) is also a member of the Opposition coalition, it is unclear how many of the minority votes will actually come through. The JHU is the parent organisation of the Bodu Bala Sena which has been held responsible for last year’s anti-Muslim riots, and the party is also not in favour of greater Tamil autonomy. In fact, with regard to the latter, Mr Sirisena’s positions are almost identical to that of Mr Rajapaksa, thereby giving the Tamils no reason to see him as an alternative political force.

Also, though Mr Sirisena is the face of the opposition, he isn’t always viewed as its driving force. Ms Kumaratunga and Mr Wickremasinghe are seen as the real power centres. This is bound to hurt the Opposition as both leaders are considered to be past their political prime. Mr Sirisena’s only real advantage over Mr Rajapaksa is that he is viewed as a clean politician, as opposed to the incumbent who is perceived as corrupt and dictatorial. Finally, despite the hype around the Sirisena campaign, the fact that apart from opposing Mr Rajapaksa, it has no positive agenda of its own. This is a problem that is sure to blow up if the Opposition actually comes to power.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 8, 2015

Reaching Out To Our Neighbours

Prime Minister Modi’s bilateral engagement with heads of Government of SAARC nations and Mauritius within less than 24 hours of taking over, marks an unprecedented push in New Delhi’s relations with South Asian countries

 The inauguration of Narendra Damodardas Modi as the 15th Prime Minister of India on May 26 was a grand political spectacle, unlike any other that the world had witnessed in recent times. It was a fitting celebration of the world’s largest electoral exercise which had produced a historic popular mandate, of the kind that comes but only once in a generation, and whose strength cannot be undone by cheap pseudo-intellectual chicanery. Apart from the participation of a wide cross-section of Indian stakeholders, the invitation to regional leaders was a diplomatic masterstroke.

The presence of all eight heads of Government from Afghanistan, Bangladesh (represented by its Speaker of Parliament), Bhutan, the Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka at the swearing-in ceremony reiterated in no uncertain terms India’s civilisational role and position in South Asia. To use a term popularised by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the sub-continent has always been India’s ‘near abroad’, it’s ‘sphere of influence’. It is here that India’s global engagement will always be rooted, and it is here that India, as the largest social, political and economic entity, will set the agenda for regional discourse. In some ways then perhaps, the inauguration was akin to the Emperor’s coronation where all the Kings came calling.

Some may find this analogy to be imperialist in tone, and understandably so. In the past, India’s smaller neighbours have occasionally cribbed about the big brother. Yet, the fact that all eight South Asian leaders graciously attended the swearing-in of the new Prime Minister of India and his Council of Ministers shows that they all acknowledge the geo-political imperatives of the region. There is consensus that the region has the potential to become a global powerhouse if only there was greater cooperation among its members, none of whom (and this includes India) have unfortunately been able to capitalise on their inherent assets and advantages. 

And this is where the ball falls back into India’s court. As the big power in South Asia, it is India’s responsibility to engage more actively with its neighbours and lead the sub-continent towards greater regional cooperation and integration. Unfortunately, in this past decade, under the myopic guidance of the Congress-led UPA regime, India has failed in that effort. Hemmed in by decelerating growth rates and a political executive that lay paralysed for years together, New Delhi had somewhat turned away from its neighbours and isolated some of its closest friends.

In Nepal, India failed to provide enough support to that country’s fledgling democracy even as Prime Ministers walked in and out of the revolving doors of Kathmandu. In Sri Lanka, when President Mahinda Rajapaksa (after having militarily defeated the Tamil terrorist group) was bullied by the West, New Delhi did not have the spine to stand up for him. In Bangladesh, we kept ourselves at an arm’s length from one of our closest friends, even as Dhaka dutifully held up its side of the bargain. With Pakistan we frittered the hard-won gains from the previous decade and the relationship was hollowed out from within. Further out in Afghanistan, we did only slightly better in helping the war torn country rebuild, but still remained below optimal. Even in the Maldives and Bhutan, we were disconnected from our friends, a lesson that we learnt the hard way. In each of these cases, the space that was ceded by a listless Indian regime was quickly sought to be captured by other rising powers wanting to expand their footprints in the region. If India didn’t get its act together, it risked being alienated, and shall one dare say, even besieged, in its own backyard.

Thankfully, the new Government has already begun the process of course-correction. The invitation to the inauguration was the first step towards resuscitating the India Narrative in South Asia. The next step was the bilateral meetings that took place the day after the swearing-in ceremony. And if the reported outcome of these meetings is anything to go by, India is already on the right path.  According to the Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister Modi had ‘substantive’ meetings with all the leaders.

With Afghan President Hamid Karzai, he discussed the recent terror attack on India’s consulate in Herat and reiterated India’s commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. To Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay, he assured India’s unflinching support to Bhutan’s socio-economic development. The duo also agreed to start four new joint hydro-electric projects and strengthen security cooperation.

Security issues were also discussed with President Abdullah Yameen of the Maldives. Islamists have been gaining a strong foothold there, and this has been a matter of concern for India. With Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam of Mauritius, Mr Modi highlighted cooperation in the maritime security sector as well as strengthening of the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which has been neglected for some time now. In the meeting with Prime Minister Sushil Koirala of Nepal, the focus was on ensuring that the democratic process in the Himalayan nation is taken to fruition with the adoption of the much-delayed Constitution. Additionally, Mr Modi also stressed on expediting the completion of the many infrastructure projects in Nepal that India was supporting, especially in the hydro-power and transmission sectors.

With President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister focussed on effective implementation of the national reconciliation process and also highlighted the importance of the 13th Amendment in delivering on the aspirations of the Tamil community for a life of equality, justice, peace and dignity in a united Sri Lanka. In his meeting with Speaker of Bangladesh Parliament Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury, Mr Modi acknowledged the cooperation extended by Bangladesh in all areas of mutual interest including security, power, border management, rail and road transport.

Of course, it was Mr Modi’s meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan that received the most public attention. In this case, perhaps the issues that were left untouched were as important as the matters that were discussed between the two leaders. On the one hand, Prime Minister Modi’s strong stance on terrorism, his insistence that the 26/11 trial be taken to its logical conclusion and his simultaneous focus on improving trade ties offered a blueprint of how his Government will seek to map India-Pakistan relations. On the other hand, Prime Minister Sharif’s silence on the Kashmir issue and the fact he did not meet with separatist leaders (as Pakistani leaders almost always do) spoke volumes. Indeed, Mr Sharif, who defied Army pressure at home to make it to Delhi, cut a perfectly statesman-like figure during visit that included calling upon Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a significant goodwill gesture. That he did not embarrass his hosts with provocative comments (another Pakistani norm) was also much appreciated.

Expectedly, the Modi-Sharif meeting has come under a fair bit of criticism. Some commentators, who had opposed former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with Mr Sharif in New York this past September, have now also refused to endorse Mr Modi’s bilateral on the same principle — that without any change in the ground situation and no possibility of a concrete deliverable, a high-level meeting is empty symbolism. This, however, is an unnecessarily hawkish approach. First, the bilateral meetings were courtesy calls demanded by protocol, and refusing one with Mr Sharif (while entertaining all other leaders) would have amounted to insulting the guest. Second, it is unfair to use the same yardstick for Mr Modi and Mr Singh at this stage because the new Prime Minister has just started off with a clean slate. If he fumbles, like Mr Singh did at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and fails to make progress over time, he too will be called out for indulging in empty symbolism. But for now, this meeting is best viewed as a welcome, warm-up exercise. Third, by extending the olive branch to Mr Sharif, Mr Modi has effectively softened his own hardliner image and put a possibly worried neighbour somewhat at ease. Equally importantly, he has insured himself from being tagged a war-monger, in case he has to take strong measures against Pakistan at a later date.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 29, 2014)

From one blunder to another

India's foreign policy in the sub-continent has consistently suffered from an unacceptable degree of short-sightedness. New Delhi has exhibited a rare ignorance of its immediate surroundings,leading to repeated embarrassments in the region

That the plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority, which until recently was neither a burning issue in the island nation nor a matter of high priority for Tamils in India, has now taken on such proportions so as to threaten the collapse of the Union Government here, is absurd, to say the least. On Tuesday, the DMK pulled its support to the ruling coalition in order to protest against New Delhi’s support for what it perceived to be a weak resolution against Colombo’s treatment of its Tamil citizens, at the upcoming Geneva session of the United Nation’s top human rights body. Even though that did not bring down the Congress-led UPA Government, which continues to hang by a thread nevertheless, it compelled New Delhi to the propose amendments to the US-sponsored UN resolution.

It is interesting to note in this regard that the proposed amendments come after the original resolution, criticising the Sri Lankan Government of committing war crimes in the final phase of its war against the Tamil terrorist group LTTE, has been significantly watered down. The new resolution which was tabled at the UN Human Rights Council on Monday tones down the international community’s supposed concerns for regarding human rights violations in Sri Lanka — not just during the war which ended in May 2009 but also in the four years since then. Moreover, three new paragraphs have also been added that support Sri Lanka and welcomes the Government’s announcement to hold elections to the Provincial Council in the Tamil-majority Northern Province in September 2013. Finally, the revised draft also refers to rebuilding infrastructure in Northern Sri Lanka and how the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission report can serve as the basis of national reconciliation. Many believe that these revisions are the handiwork of Indian diplomats who on the international stage have struggled to shield Sri Lanka from undeserved Western ire.

Unfortunately, it seems that even if India may have won the fight abroad, it is sure to lose at home — especially, if harsher amendments are re-introduced into the draft. And that is not all. The Government is also mulling over the DMK’s demand that India pass a parliamentary resolution condemning Sri Lanka. If such a resolution is indeed passed, little else could be more damaging to India’s national interests. Not only will such a resolution be in violation of principles that have formed the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy over the decades but it will also open the floodgates for other countries to pass similar resolutions against India. In fact, the manner in which the Pakistani National Assembly recently passed a resolution regarding Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru and how his hanging has adversely affected the law and order in Kashmir, already shows how vulnerable India is. At that time, India bristled at the thought of Pakistani intervention in its internal affairs, and rightly so.

But now, it must also understand that the treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka — though it may be a matter of enormous concern for India — is India’s business to only a limited extent. The matter is entirely for that country’s Government, its Sinhala majority population and its Tamil minority community to sort out. New Delhi may at best, cajole and coax Colombo to do the right thing, but it cannot meddle in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs.

Besides, if India really has the best interests of Sri Lankan Tamils at heart, it must know that the Sri Lankan Government alone can further their cause. Towards that end, the sensible thing to do is work with the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, not seek to isolate him — as this UN resolution seeks to do.

In fact, India should have strongly resisted the West’s efforts to humiliate Sri Lanka back in 2012 when a similar resolution was first passed in the UNHRC, especially at a time when that war-ravaged country was just about beginning to rebuild itself. Equally importantly, it should have called for a global acknowledgement of the fact that Sri Lanka is the only country in the world to have successfully defeated a terrorist organisation — a stellar achievement conspicuously ignored by the West that has been more keen to highlight the alleged war crimes committed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s men during the final phase of the war.

The decision to publicly censure Sri Lanka in 2012 was also a direct result of the Manmohan Singh Government giving in to the tantrums of the DMK, a powerful regional ally. Worse still, this was not the first time the Union Government had capitulated in a manner that would eventually hurt national interest. In September 2011, New Delhi caved before Kolkata as a result of which the Teesta water sharing agreement — supposed to be signed during Prime Minister Singh’s historic trip to Dhaka — fell through. This not only embarrassed the Prime Minister but also upset his counterpart in Dhaka, Sheikh Hasina.

The Bangladeshi Premier had already done more than her fair share to help the Indian Government when she handed over to New Delhi militants who had taken refuge in her country. But in turn she received next to nothing, even though she is facing a stiff re-election challenge and could well use the Teesta treaty to consolidate her position. Moreover, it is in India’s interest to support Prime Minister Hasina’s secular, democratic and strongly pro-India Government (as opposed to one that could potentially be led by her rival Khaleda Zia, who partners with Islamists and is not really a friend of New Delhi.)

Unfortunately, India’s foreign policy in the sub-continent has consistently suffered from an unacceptable degree of short-sightedness. In fact, even though India’s ties with almost all its neighbours go back several hundred years, New Delhi has exhibited a rare ignorance of its immediate surroundings, resulting in a sclerotic foreign policy in the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 21, 2013.)