A Politician's Coming of Age

Aung San Suu Kyi's public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum meet, completes her transformation from being a mere political dissident to an Opposition leader who desires to lead Myanmar in the near future

Aung San Suu Kyi's public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum meet, completes her transformation from being a mere political dissident to an Opposition leader who desires to lead Myanmar in the near future The latest edition of the World Economic Forum on East Asia that concluded in Naypidaw last Friday was arguably the most vocal acknowledgment from the international community of one the biggest developments in South Asia in recent years: Political reform in Myanmar. 

World leaders, industry titans and civil society activists from around the globe had gathered in the newly-built capital city to celebrate what the Forum called the ‘courageous transformation’ of Myanmar and to chart that country’s way forward. It was against this backdrop that Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s best known pro-democracy icon, announced to the world her desire to take on her country’s top job.

“I want to run for President, and I’m quite frank about it”, said the 67-year-old at the Forum, where she was the undisputed star of the show. While this was not the first time that Ms Suu Kyi had spoken of her presidential ambitions, her forthright approach combined with the timing and the venue amplified the impact of her statement which made headlines around the world. Be that as it may, the fact remains that Ms Suu Kyi cannot run for election, and she knows that. Under the present Constitution, anyone who is married to a foreign citizen or whose children hold foreign passports is prohibited from running for either President or the Vice President’s office. Ms Suu Kyi’s deceased husband was British and her sons also hold British passports. A Constitutional amendment is of course the most obvious solution to this problem but it is easier said than done, as several procedural difficulties stand in the way.

First, such an amendment to the Constitution would require a 75 per cent parliamentary approval which will be hard to come by, since 25 per cent of the seats in Parliament are reserved for the military while the bulk of the remaining is occupied by military loyalists. Second, even if Parliament were to somehow pass the amendment, the proposed change would then have to be approved by the majority in a national referendum before it could come into effect. Organising such a referendum is laborious and time-consuming, and offers a perfectly legitimate excuse for the Generals looking to prevent Ms Suu Kyi from running for President.

In other words, a long and arduous path lies ahead before Ms Suu Kyi’s desire to lead her country can turn into reality. And through much of that journey she will have to manoeuvre and out-manoeuvre the men in uniform who, while they may have grudgingly warmed up to her, somewhat, in recent times, they are by no means willing to concede any real political space or power yet. Let us not forget that the rule regarding relatives with foreign citizenship was introduced by the junta only in 2008 —just two years before the landmark general election of 2010 that paved the way for a semi-civilian Government to take over the reins from the military — with the sole intention of keeping Ms Suu Kyi away from the presidency.

And if that isn’t enough, sample this: According to the Wall Street Journal, immediately after Ms Suu Kyi announced her presidential ambitions at the World Economic Forum, President Thein Sein (a former Army General who shed his fatigues to take charge as a civilian ruler in 2010) cancelled her invitation to the gala dinner that he was hosting later that evening. And this is despite reports that the two leaders share a strong, personal bond that many observers believe played an important role in facilitating Ms Suu Kyi’s return to the political mainstream in Myanmar.

But either way, there is no denying that with Ms Suu Kyi’s public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum, her transformation from a political dissident to an Opposition leader is now complete. And while there is little by way to predict how it will shape her career as a politician in the years ahead — especially since much of it will also be determined by how the military responds to her political rise — this is a good time to look back at the past two years that she has spent in active politics after being released from decades of house arrest.

Three events stand out: First, Ms Suu Kyi’s cleansweep victory in the by-elections held in April 2012 that saw her National League for Democracy win 43 of the 44 seats it had contested. Not that there was ever any doubt about how much support she commandeered among her people, but still, the electoral victory was an important indicator of the power she could wield within a democratically-elected Government — something that must have made the Generals cringe.

Second, Ms Suu Kyi’s support for the Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Division was both a huge risk and a political game-changer. The mine is currently being developed by a Chinese firm and has been met with severe opposition from locals who accuse the Government-run Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited of land grab. Ms Suu Kyi headed the commission that investigated the matter and reported in favour of the regime, as she believed that commitments made by the previous Government to foreign investors had to be honoured — or else, potential investors will be reluctant to invest in the country. This is something that Myanmar simply cannot afford. While this bought her the Generals’ confidence as someone who was a ‘fair player’, it also led to much criticism from certain segments of the public which felt that she had sold out to the military; others pointed fingers at her for supporting crony capitalism.

Third, Ms Suu Kyi’s studied silence on the issue of Rohingya Muslims who violently clashed with the country’s Buddhist majority, also disappointed many who expected her, as a proponent of democratic values, to take a stronger position. But as a politician, Ms Suu Kyi saw no merit in polarising an already difficult and historically complex situation. Also, by highlighting the issue she would have played into the hands of the military, which would like nothing better than a ‘national security’ crisis that could shore up its image and importance  at a time such as this. 

That, as an opposition leader, Ms Suu Kyi faces a tough challenge, is without a doubt. One only has to look at how the regime has ensnared her — while losing no political capital itself — in both the cases described above, to understand the gravity of the situation. And there will be more of these double-edged swords in the future too. For instance, there have been reports that after the 2015 election, the regime may offer her the position of Foreign Minister. Not only will such a move make the Generals look good, it will effectively allow them to enlist Ms Suu Kyi as their official spokesperson. For Ms Suu Kyi, of course, this would just be more of the tightrope situation that she is already having to navigate.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 13, 2013.)

Arab Spring comes to Burma first

With its structured, top-down reform process, Burma has a far better chance at democracy than West Asia

If, on April 23 as scheduled, Burma’s best known dissident Aung San Suu Kyi is indeed sworn in as a newly-elected Member of Parliament, it will undoubtedly be a watershed moment in that country’s history. Ms Suu Kyi has been a glorious icon of democracy. For her to finally occupy a seat in her country’s Parliament is by far the most potent symbol of democratic reform that could have possibly come from Burma which, after five decades of military rule, has now launched a process of top-down political transition.


Burma’s move towards democracy began last year when the country’s long serving Commander-in-Chief Senior General Than Shwe resigned from his position as head of state and handed over the reins to General U Thein Sein. By all accounts, it was a carefully guided and tightly controlled change-of-guard that went so far as to manipulate the general election of November 2010 as well as handpick the successor. No wonder then, when Mr Thein Sein was sworn as President in March 2011, Burma and the rest of the world were suspicious, if not outright dismissive, of his bold assurances of political and economic reform. The mild mannered President was after all a career soldier who had only recently shed his military uniform to take up position in the country’s new semi-civilian Government. Democracy in Burma was still a long way off, critics had argued.


That was March 2011. Around the same time, large-scale popular protests by disgruntled masses had brought down deeply entrenched regimes in Arabia and were threatening to dismantle more in the region. Tunisia’s Ben Ali had already fled to Saudi Arabia, while Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak had left office after his presidency was besieged by an 18-day long protest movement beginning at Tahrir Square. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi was facing the biggest challenge ever to his 40-year-long leadership stint; in Yemen, then President Abdullah Saleh’s presidency was tottering, while in Syria the supposedly reformist President Bashar al-Assad was coming under increasing pressure to allow for a more open and inclusive society. The popular narrative of 2011 was that democracy was finally coming to Arabia. Once the Libyan despot was deposed, the Yemeni President forced in the footsteps of his Egyptian counterpart and the Syrian leader persuaded to accelerate his reform process, large parts of West Asia which had for so long resisted political change, would finally embark on the path to democracy.


Unarguably, the big story of democratic transition — made almost irresistible by its fable-like moral framework of how the good guys triumphed over the bad — was supposed to be playing out in Arabian desert, not in the distance hinterland of Burma.


In reality, however, that has far from been the case. Today, a little more than a year after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ came to West Asia, democracy is still elusive in the region. Autocrats there have been replaced by Islamists or entire countries have been pushed the brink of civil war and anarchy. Talk of a long and bitter Arab Winter now dominates all narative.


In Burma, however, a definite whiff of optimism is in the air. The new President had promised to overhaul the country’s dilapidated political structure, its decrepit economy and its decaying social fabric and has actually managed to walk the talk. Mr Thein Sein’s nominally civilian Government has indeed put in place a wide-ranging reform process, as the International Crisis Group detailed in a recent report.

For instance, in his March 2011 speech, the President had promised to reach out to political dissidents. Weeks later, he made good on that promise by offering the olive branch to Ms Suu Kyi, his establishment’s biggest critic. Indeed, Ms Suu Kyi’s agreeing to return to mainstream Burmese politics that she had long since boycotted, not only signalled a huge step towards political reconciliation but was also the strongest affirmation of Mr Thein Sein’s commitment to democracy.


Between March 2011 and 2012, the Burmese Government released almost all its political prisoners. In fact, some 300 of them were freed in January this year to allow them to participate in the April by-election. Also, unlike in the past, when released political prisoners continued to be under strict Government scrutiny, this time they have been able to easily resume their political activities freely and even travel abroad.


Under Mr Thein Sein’s watch, the Burmese legislatures have also emerged as key drivers of reform, taking tremendous initiatives to legislate on democratic rights and economic reforms. Most heartening perhaps is the fact that the country’s Parliament has shown a remarkably bipartisan spirit. The Opposition still has only a small share of seats there, but its motions have received overwhelming support from the military-backed ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, and vice-versa.


Furthermore, the new Government has also expanded several basic freedoms. Blocks on the internet have been removed and media censorship has been largely done away with. Business, entertainment and sports related news can now be published without being pre-screened; political articles still have to be sent to the censor board although there is talk that the board will abolished by the end of the year and replaced by a self-regulatory Press Council.


That apart, a largely successful attempt has also been made to reconcile with nearly all ethnic armed groups with at least 11 ceasefire agreements having been put in place. The Kanchin Independence Organ-isation is the only major group with which an agreement is yet to be reached, but community leaders agree that they have had fruitful talks with the Government. On the economic front too, there have been changes in the right direction such as a series of tax reforms and other measures to strengthen the Burmese currency, the kyat. Indeed, a managed float of the kyat at the start of this fiscal year was perhaps the most important step taken towards restructuring the Burmese economy.


Finally, the much talked-about threat from hardliners within the party has also proved to be a false alarm. Of course, there are individuals from the old guard whose interests will be hurt as the reforms get underway, and they may even succeed in scuttling some of these measures. But these people do not form a well-defined group. Overall, it is highly unlikely that these elements will ever coalesce in a manner that could possibly threaten Burma’s transition to democracy. After all, the process was internally initiated, not externally imposed upon the country.


Make no mistake: If Burma is walking the path of reform today, it is because the country’s ruling elite — not just one or two reform-minded leaders — collectively believe that it is time to restructure and rebuild. It is precisely because such a broad-based buy-in into the reform process exists that its reversal is highly improbable.


This does not mean that Burma will face no challenges in the years ahead. It most definitely will, but for now, that country has a far better chance at democracy than any other nation which has been hit by the ‘Arab Spring’ wave.


(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 19, 2012.)