Delhi's Pragmatic Policy-Making

The Modi Government has done well to refuse to pass a parliamentary resolution criticising Israel for the ongoing conflict in Gaza. Israel is a friend and, like India, it too is also threatened by Islamist terror

 By refusing to censure Israel for its ongoing military campaign in the Gaza Strip, the BJP-led NDA Government has taken a firm and decisive steps towards correcting a historical anomaly in India’s foreign policy. Traditionally, New Delhi has been driven by a strong pro-Arab sentiment, which is what translates into its ‘full support for the Palestinian cause’ stand, even though this has hardly ever helped further our national interest. This policy-tilt can be traced as far back as the Khilafat Movement of the early 20th century which opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in the former Ottoman lands. Later, the Congress also adopted a negative approach towards Jewish nationalism, partly to offset the rising popularity of the staunchly anti-Zionist Muslim League which was then championing the cause of a Muslim homeland. But these appeasement efforts failed as India was eventually partitioned in 1947. By then, the pro-Arab/anti-Israel stance had been hardwired into Indian foreign policy thinking.This was not just a matter of political expediency but also the result of an ideological bias furthered in no small measure by the Mahatma himself. For the Indian leadership, which had just drawn the curtains on 200 years of British rule, Israel was (falsely) seen as a ‘colonial power’, an ‘occupying force’ — labels that still resonate with the old guard here.

Meanwhile, India’s radical support for Arab causes which continued at least till the 1980s brought it almost no rewards. For instance, the Arab nations never favoured India on the Kashmir issue, and till date, their support for Pakistan has not wavered. In fact, one of the reasons why Jawaharlal Nehru accorded official recognition to Israel in the late 1950s (full diplomatic relations were established much later), having opposed the Jewish nation’s membership to the UN in 1949, was because he was upset with Egypt for not supporting India on the Hyderabad issue at the global forum.

Over time, there were several such disappointments — including India’s exclusion from the 1969 Rabat conference which paved the way for the establishment of the powerful Organization of the Islamic Conference, whose doors are still shut for India. There is little merit in listing all such instances but it suffices to say that India’s Arab appeasement foreign policy, mostly an extension of the Congress’s Muslim appeasement on the domestic front, was a lonely, one-way street.

The situation changed gradually after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as India’s own economic liberalisation in 1990s. Though the pro-Arab rhetoric has remained, New Delhi’s policy towards Israel has changed dramatically. Following the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, relations between the two countries have evolved rapidly — the extent and scope of which is not always acknowledged in public. Proof of this is the fact that Israel’s crucial support to India during the Kargil war is hardly ever publicised.

On the other end of the spectrum, India’s Arab appeasement tendencies have also dried up significantly. For instance, though India still allocates 20 million dollars for the Palestinian cause, it has toned down its official language on the Arab-Israeli conflict and taken a largely neutral stand in recent years, occasional deviations (such as the anti-Israel parliamentary resolution passed during the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon) notwithstanding.

Against this backdrop, the new Government’s refusal to pass a parliamentary resolution criticising Israel essentially builds on processes that have been quietly underway for two decades now. The difference is that the incumbent BJP-led Government is not squeamish about India’s ties with Israel, and has no qualms in acknowledging that the Jewish nation has been a long-standing friend of India’s. Also, given its tremendous popular mandate, the Modi Government is neither beholden to the whims of coalition partners (such as the Left parties under UPAI which still romanticise the Palestinian cause, ground realities be damned) nor does it have reason to play vote-bank politics with the Muslim community. This, in turn, allows the Modi Government to take a clear-eyed view of the situation: First, India has no business meddling in the larger Arab-Israeli conflict; second, as far as the current crisis is concerned, it is a case of self defence which Israel, as a sovereign nation under threat, has the right to exercise.

The larger geo-politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict notwithstanding, there can be no two ways about the fact that this latest of fighting has been provoked by Hamas, the globally-designated terrorist group that has been controlling the Gaza Strip since 2006. It hoped that Israel would eventually retaliate and cynically strategised that it could use the assault to regain public support.

Hamas has been at its weakest — politically and economically — in recent times. Gazans are disillusioned with the group which has failed to govern entirely. Moreover, the group’s support bases in Syria have been destroyed and its patrons in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, is once again being driven underground by the military which has come back to power in Cairo. In fact, this was precisely why Hamas, after seven years of bitter rivalry, joined hands with Fatah to form a Unity Government in early June. The arrangement breathed life into the terror outfit which focused on doing what it does best: Street-level resistance. Hamas began firing rockets — first into southern Israel and then all over that country including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv — after Israel arrested many of the group’s supporters in the aftermath of the kidnapping and murder of three Jewish teenagers in West Bank, which in turn led to the retaliatory murder of a Palestinian boy.

After days of incessant rocket fire from Hamas, which could claim only one Israeli life, thanks to the enormously successful Iron Dome which intercepts such missiles, Israel retaliated with airstrikes on Gaza on July 8. Despite the rising Palestinian death toll as a result of Israeli bombing (not to mention Hamas’s use of civilians as human shields), Hamas did not stop its rocket fire and, in fact, spurned ceasefire offers. The situation took a turn for the worse on July 17 when 13 Hamas militants penetrated Israel through underground tunnels and killed two Israeli soldiers near Sufa kibbutz close to the border. The ‘discovery’ of these tunnels prompted an Israeli ground incursion, bringing back memories of the bloody 2008 Operation Cast Lead.

Essentially, Hamas has sought to attack Israel from the ground below, having failed to inflict any serious damage through airstrikes. This is not a new strategy (Hamas has similar tunnels on the Egypt border that are used to smuggle goods and weapons) but it has enormous security implications for Israel as the case of Gilad Shalit stands proof. In 2006, the Israeli soldier was taken from his border outpost by Hamas militants who had burrowed underground. He was released five years later in exchange for a 1,027 Palestinian militants, many of whom have since returned to their terrorist activities.

Still, the extent and sophistication of the tunnel network, worth millions of dollars (ostensibly Western aid that has been misused), seems to have taken the Israeli military by surprise. Dismantling these (and Hamas’s overall terror infrastructure in Gaza) requires a major on-the-ground offensive which is bound to take a heavy toll on Palestinian as well as Israeli lives. A UN-monitored demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip is the only way to break this cycle of violence, but it is unlikely without serious concessions from both sides.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 24, 2014)

BRICS: Getting Back to Business

The group's annual summits have been low on substance in recent years. Still, the upcoming gathering in Brazil has piqued some interest. It is Narendra Modi's first engagement at a multilateral forum and will probably see the finalisation of the BRICS development bank

Over the past few years, the six-country grouping of emerging market economies BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has lost much of its sheen. Home to 40 per cent of the world’s population and accountable for a quarter of the global output, BRICS was trumpeted to be the next big thing on the global stage — both economically and politically — but it seems to have been unable to live up to the hype in either case.

Economically, growth rates in all these emerging markets, except China, have dropped considerably. When Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs came up with the acronym in 2001, it was expected that, by 2050, the BRIC economies (South Africa was added to the group much later in 2010) could rival the G7 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan) in terms of global growth. However, in August 2013, Mr O’Neill conceded that the group’s performance had been below par, that he was most disappointed with India’s record and the only country that deserved BRICS status was China.

Politically, the group was supposed to mark the turning point from a unipolar to multipolar global order. But here too BRICS had failed to consolidate its position primarily due to internal disagreements stemming from the group’s inherent dichotomies.
Consequently, the group’s annual summits that bring together the heads of all five member states, though high on style and show, have been low on substance in recent years. Nevertheless, the upcoming BRICS annual summit in Brazil has piqued some interest. This is not to say that there has been a drastic change in course for BRICS but recent developments in India and abroad give enough reason to keep an eye on the happenings in Fortaleza.

For India, the summit is of particular interest because it is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first foreign engagement at a multilateral forum. He has been in office for less than two months during which foreign policy initiatives have received much attention. Mr Modi has made clear that his administration will focus on South Asia but outside of that there is little clarity on how he will script India’s engagement with the rest of the world. The BRICS summit is, therefore, his opportunity to add more substance to his foreign policy.
Much attention will also be on Mr Modi’s meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping — he has met neither leader since taking over as Prime Minister, so this will be a power-packed first. It will be interesting to see how the meetings play out because they will serve as a precursor to state visits scheduled for later in the year. President Xi is expected to visit India in September and President Putin in the coming months.

Another area of interest during Mr  Modi’s Brazil tour will be his meetings with a host of South American leaders. On the invitation of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who is seeking to reiterate her country’s position as the regional leader, all BRICS heads of state will be travelling to Brasilia after the summit to meet with their counterparts from Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Suriname.

It is unclear whether Mr Modi will have bilateral meetings with some or all South American leaders but his interactions will be closely monitored for clues on how India’s relationship with that region may evolve under the new regime in Delhi. Traditionally, India has not had close ties with South America but this has been changing, and in some cases rather rapidly so.

Across the world, the one announcement that has created much excitement about BRICS is that of the development bank. There has been talk of such an institution for a while now but given the many differences between the BRICS member states on key issues, including who would fund the bank and by how much, few had expected that the project would have a real presence outside the communiqués.
However, earlier this month, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong announced that all five countries had reached a broad consensus on their $100 billion development bank. They have reportedly agreed to fund the bank equally — $10 billion each — to create a $50 billion corpus. Other details, such as the location of the bank (Mumbai, Shanghai and Moscow are all in the running although China’s commercial capital seems to be ahead in the race), however, are yet to be finalised.

Once established, the BRICS bank will serve as the developing world’s response to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which are dominated by the US and Europe. For long, emerging economies, who have to take out huge loans from these established institutions to fund their national infrastructure projects, have complained that such financial assistance often comes at a high cost — needless meddling in their sovereign affairs by Western powers. A BRICS bank may then allow emerging economies to sidestep these institutions altogether and, eventually, build their own global governance structures.
Providing an alternative to the existing Western-led political and economic international architecture has always been an important motif for BRICS. However, rarely has the mood of individual BRICS member states been so definitively anti-West. Brazil is upset about the snooping scandal, so is India. China does not appreciate Western interference in South China Sea while Russia is bristling about the sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis.
President Putin, for one, has made a clear shift to the East. Apart from good relations with India, he has now sought to strengthen ties with Beijing in the hope that together they can take on an imposing West. Indeed, there is no denying that the Obama Administration is inadvertently pushing Russia into China’s arms. The landmark $400 billion gas deal signed between the China National Petroleum Corporation and Russia’s Gazprom is just one example. A decade in the making, it was finalised in May and paves the way for Russia to deliver about 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year to China’s burgeoning economy, starting around 2018 — thereby reducing Moscow’s dependence of the European market as well as diversifying China’s energy source basket. Similarly, a cash-strapped Russia’s decision to sell weapons to Pakistan, a friend of China’s may also be seen in this context.

Yet, not all is hunky dory in the blossoming China-Russia relationship. Moscow fears that it may be relegated to the position of a junior partner. In fact, China’s economic might is very much a matter of concern for all other BRICS countries, who worry that the grouping might become China’s fiefdom. In fact, this was one of the reasons why Russia, Brazil and India strongly opposed China’s offer to fund a larger share of the BRICS development bank corpus.

There are several currents and counter-currents at work here. The sixth annual BRICS summit will offer an interesting view into how they play out.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 10, 2014)

Sari Diplomacy in South Asia

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s ongoing Bangladesh visit is crucial to rejuvenate bilateral ties, as Sheikh Hasina, discriminated by the West, now looks at other Asian powers, particularly China, for support

 It was in the late 1990s that the term ‘sari diplomacy’ became rather fashionable after Ms Cherie Blair, as Britain’s First Lady, did more for India-UK relations with her red-and-green silk sari, which she wore to the British Indian Golden Jubilee Banquet, than official talks between her husband and the then Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral, had achieved a few weeks earlier. In the years since then, Ms Blair has continued with the trend and is often seen sashaying in six yards of silk at various South Asian events.

Ms Samantha Cameron, wife of the current British Prime Minister, has also followed in her footsteps with much grace and aplomb. Across the pond, the Americans have usually found themselves on the other end of the (un)diplomatic spectrum — notoriously for having subjected one sari-clad Indian envoy to Washington, DC to a pat down at the airport.

Closer home, the men have also taken to some fabulous sari diplomacy (and given it a typically desi twist by bringing their mothers into the fold) as the recent exchange of gifts between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif show.

But as External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj tours Bangladesh on her first solo trip abroad, meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina among others, together they can prove that there’s little to match the charm, versatility and power of sari diplomacy, when it is done by women leaders from South Asia.

Ms Swaraj and Ms Hasina reportedly share a close rapport. The last time they had met was in January 2010 —Ms Swaraj had then just taken over from veteran BJP leader LK Advani as the Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha, and had hosted Prime Minister Hasina, who was on a state visit to New Delhi, in her official capacity. Sure, they talked about politics and education and women’s empowerment but as Ms Swaraj later said in a media interview, “Our baatcheet (as women) could not be complete without the talk of saris”.

No surprise then that the two leaders also exchanged saris at that meeting. While Ms Swaraj gifted Ms Hasina a cream coloured ‘South Indian’ sari with grey border — “I knew cream is her favourite colour”, she said — the Prime Minister gave her a bhalo green Jamdani, which according to then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Dipu Moni, she had handpicked herself.

As Ms Swaraj now travels around Bangladesh, ably aided by Ms Sujatha Singh, the Foreign Secretary, and Ms Sripriya Ranganathan, the Joint Secretary who heads the Bangladesh-Myanmar division at the Ministry of External Affairs, the sari diplomacy motif on the Minister’s entourage is quite unmistakable.

Indeed, earlier this year when Prime Minister Hasina faced harsh criticism from the West for holding a general election that had been boycotted by a cussed Opposition and marred by large scale violence, it was Ms Singh who led India’s efforts in favour of Bangladesh. Not only did she travel to Dhaka to negotiate with the political leadership there and break the deadlock, she also resisted pressures in Washington to toe the Western line and de-legitimise the election. In doing so, she helped reiterate New Delhi’s support for one of its most important and friendly neighbours.

Much of the Western world still doesn’t recognise the Sheikh Hasina regime’s electoral mandate — no, it prefers to support Ms Khaleda Zia’s irresponsible Opposition, allied to Islamist parties whose ability to wreak havoc on the streets far exceeds the percentage of votes they can secure in a free and fair election.

But such dichotomy is typical of the West’s foreign policy. Little else explains why military strongmen in West Asia who have conducted coups that, of course, shall never be labelled as such are rewarded with billions of dollars in aid while Ms Hasina gets the rap for an election that was not exactly up to international standards even as the West drones on about the values of democracy. 

Predictably, such discriminatory attitudes have now compelled the Sheikh Hasina regime to seek closer relations with Great Powers other than the West — primarily China and Japan. These countries do not share the West’s hollow concerns vis-à-vis Bangladesh and have no qualms about working with the incumbent regime.

In fact, the reason why Prime Minister Hasina could not join other South Asian leaders at Mr Modi’s inauguration ceremony in May was because she was on an official visit to Japan at that time. Then, earlier this month, she also travelled to China where she met with the top leadership in Beijing including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Yang and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Yu Zhengsheng.

Now, Bangladesh has always had close commercial ties with China but this trip is believed to have been more than just about business with Prime Minister Hasina reportedly seeking political reassurances as well.

Overall, the trip was quite successful. Five agreements were signed at the Government-to-Government level: First, China promised to give 300 million renminbi every year to Bangladesh for economic and technical cooperation. Second, an agreement to set up 1,320 megawatt coal fired power plant in Bangladesh as a joint venture between China’s National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and Bangladesh’s North-West Power Generation Company Limited. Third, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed for the creation of a Chinese Economic and Investment Zone in Chittagong. Fourth, two Exchanges of Letters were issued on regarding greater cooperation in the field of disaster management and flood management. And fifth, another MoU was also inked with respect to the construction of a multi-lane tunnel under Karnaphuli River. Notably, there were also some agreements in the private sector.

Plans to construct a deep-water port at Sonadia in Cox Bazaar also came up but reportedly made little progress. China is willing to finance the project at a cost of $14 billion but also wants the right to design and operate which Dhaka is reluctant to offer. Most experts are of the opinion that this is a problem that will be resolved sooner than later, eventually allowing China a toe-hold in the Bay of Bengal.

None of this should cause alarm bells to ring in South Block, at least not right away, but they are an important reminder that New Delhi cannot just assume the position of a disinterested big brother in the region and ignore its neighbours at any cost.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 26, 2014)

No Looking Back on Robust India-Israel Ties

The Modi-led Government is expected to further strengthen the deep relations that Jerusalem and New Delhi enjoy. The latter has been by India’s side on many critical occasions in recent years, even though New Delhi could not openly acknowledge the fact for various, misplaced, geo-political reasons

On March 26, 1949, KL Panjabi, Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, wrote to H Cynozicz, the representative of the Jewish Agency in India: “As discussed personally, we [Government of India] are particularly in need of experts in the following matters: 1. Expert in Cooperative Farming 2. Expert in Intensive Cultivation  3. Two or three experts in drilling tubewells both with percussion rigs as well as as rotary rigs”. The letter curiously requested Cynozicz to take up the matter “with your people in Palestine”. It was a sign of the times — India was yet to recognise Israel and would not do so until late 1950. Full diplomatic ties were to be established only in 1992.

In the meantime, India offered vociferous support to Arab causes for just about nothing in return, while relations with Israel went on the downward spiral. So much so that New Delhi even refused humanitarian aid during 1967 famine. Yet, in a parallel world of sorts, successive Indian Governments not only maintained ties with Israel but also sought Israeli assistance — for instance, military aid came from Israel during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh (which, ironically, still does not recognise the Jewish nation).

The situation turned around gradually after 1984 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met his Israeli counterpart at the UN General Assembly. Three years earlier, Mr Subramanian Swamy, then a member of the Janata Party, had undertaken the first publicised tour of Israel by an Indian leader, which contributed in no small measure towards the normalising of ties.

Once the ball was set rolling, India-Israel relations grew rapidly. Apart from Israel’s steadfast pro-India stance on Kashmir, its diplomatic support during the 1998 nuclear tests, followed by military assistance during the 1999 Kargil conflict, firmly established the Jewish state as a reliable friend. By the dawn of the new millennium, New Delhi had quietly but firmly corrected its course.

So, while it continues to make noises on the Arab/Palestinian causes, particularly in international forums — think  Mr Manmohan Singh’s UN address calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital or Ms Pratibha Patil’s obscure demand in Damascus that the Golan Heights be returned to Syria — behind the scenes, New Delhi and Jerusalem have forged a solid alliance.

Defence cooperation is, of course, one of the most important anchors of the India-Israel bilateral. Israel is one of India’s largest arms supplier, second only to Russia. The bilateral arms trade over the last decade is estimated at $10 billion. Several Israeli systems and software now power Indian defence systems. For example, Israel’s Phalcon airborne warning and control system serves as India’s eyes in the skies while the latest range of Mig-21 Bisons and Su-30 MKI aircraft also boast of high-end Israeli technology.

India and Israel have also signed a homeland security deal which establishes a framework for institutionalised cooperation in counter-terrorism, border protection and intelligence sharing. Homeland security is an area wherein both Israel and India face similar challenges but the former, because of its history and location, has far greater expertise and superior technology. For example, years before India faced 26/11, five PLO members travelling from Lebanon, came to Tel Aviv on a boat and spread mayhem across that city. They took over Savoy Hotel and held guests and staff hostage overnight until Israeli special forces flushed them out. The year was 1973.

Another area of cooperation that has gained tremendous strength in recent years is agriculture — marking the completion of a full circle since the 1940s. With the signing of an Action Plan in 2008 which now extends upto 2015, between India’s National Horticulture Mission and Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation, Israel has been sharing its best-practices and helping build capacity in the Indian agriculture sector. Across India, 28 Centres of Excellence have been set up for rapid transfer of technology, such as drip irrigation and ‘fertigation’.

The Centre in Gharaunda, Karnal, for instance, produces hybrid plug seedlings of tomatoes, cherry-tomatoes, coloured capsicum and cucumbers which have dramatically increased crop yields while also reducing water use and cutting down on pesticides and fertilisers. Similarly, in the Dapoli centre in Maharashtra, mango trees have been rejuvenated to produce better quality and more quantity fruit. If scaled up, it can revolutionise the mango industry in the Konkan. Similar success stories have also emerged in  the fields water treatment and desalination. There are also plans of incorporating Israeli technology in the cleaning up of the Ganga. In fact, Gujarat, under Mr Narendra Modi, was one of the States to partner with Israel in the field of agriculture. Now, with Mr Modi at the helm, relations between the two countries are expected to scale greater heights.

Re-imagining diplomacy in the 21st century

Israel’s outgoing Ambassador to India Alon Ushpiz offers his assessment of the emerging bilateral

On his three-year tenure: It's impossible to put three years in India in a nutshell but you don't leave India the way you came here.

As one of your Foreign Secretaries  told me, diplomacy is about creating options for your Government. And the Israel-India relation is a good example of what diplomacy should look like in the 21st century — a combination of classic diplomacy and one that creates tangible things together that impact the daily lives of Indians and Israelis.

On the big takeaways from his tenure: The anchoring of the agricultural centres of excellence; Industrial R&D supplemented by academic research; and the public security agreement, which can be a strategic gamechanger.

On deliverables in the near future: In agriculture, we hope to finalise the second three-year working plan. I'm also hopeful about brining in Israeli water technology mainly with re-cycling in mind. Israel recycles 80 per cent of its sewage. India can too. We are natural water friends.

On the free trade agreement: Another round of negotiations is coming up in July. This will be the ninth round since 2010. The economic engine of the relationship is an indispensable one. We have moved from $180 million to five billion dollars in trade and can easily double or triple the number. But for that we need an FTA.

The FTA will also shift the focus to more high tech fields of interaction. This is what we are good at and this is what our economies demand.

On investment in infrastructure projects: Much of the investment, worth millions of dollars, is in the hands of private Israeli companies. Also, the Israeli Port Authority is building a port in Gujarat. Renewable energy projects in north India have shown great results too. The desalination project in Tamil Nadu is impressive. When the gate opens and you walk into the plant, it looks exactly like the one on the shores of the Mediterranean — except that everybody is Indian.

On the 2012 attack on the Embassy: You have very few cases of a foreign Government — Iran — sending its assassins to kill a hosted diplomat in the heart of the capital. Your people cracked the case and they have provided us with security that enables us to do our work.

On his love for Calcutta: Calcutta has a special place in my heart. It's exploding with energy and there's a lot of culture and tremendouly interesting people. I have always enjoyed my interactions with the Chief Minister and am grateful for her friendship and support. I am also a big fan of Bengali cuisine.  

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 12, 2014)

Reaching Out To Our Neighbours

Prime Minister Modi’s bilateral engagement with heads of Government of SAARC nations and Mauritius within less than 24 hours of taking over, marks an unprecedented push in New Delhi’s relations with South Asian countries

 The inauguration of Narendra Damodardas Modi as the 15th Prime Minister of India on May 26 was a grand political spectacle, unlike any other that the world had witnessed in recent times. It was a fitting celebration of the world’s largest electoral exercise which had produced a historic popular mandate, of the kind that comes but only once in a generation, and whose strength cannot be undone by cheap pseudo-intellectual chicanery. Apart from the participation of a wide cross-section of Indian stakeholders, the invitation to regional leaders was a diplomatic masterstroke.

The presence of all eight heads of Government from Afghanistan, Bangladesh (represented by its Speaker of Parliament), Bhutan, the Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka at the swearing-in ceremony reiterated in no uncertain terms India’s civilisational role and position in South Asia. To use a term popularised by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s, the sub-continent has always been India’s ‘near abroad’, it’s ‘sphere of influence’. It is here that India’s global engagement will always be rooted, and it is here that India, as the largest social, political and economic entity, will set the agenda for regional discourse. In some ways then perhaps, the inauguration was akin to the Emperor’s coronation where all the Kings came calling.

Some may find this analogy to be imperialist in tone, and understandably so. In the past, India’s smaller neighbours have occasionally cribbed about the big brother. Yet, the fact that all eight South Asian leaders graciously attended the swearing-in of the new Prime Minister of India and his Council of Ministers shows that they all acknowledge the geo-political imperatives of the region. There is consensus that the region has the potential to become a global powerhouse if only there was greater cooperation among its members, none of whom (and this includes India) have unfortunately been able to capitalise on their inherent assets and advantages. 

And this is where the ball falls back into India’s court. As the big power in South Asia, it is India’s responsibility to engage more actively with its neighbours and lead the sub-continent towards greater regional cooperation and integration. Unfortunately, in this past decade, under the myopic guidance of the Congress-led UPA regime, India has failed in that effort. Hemmed in by decelerating growth rates and a political executive that lay paralysed for years together, New Delhi had somewhat turned away from its neighbours and isolated some of its closest friends.

In Nepal, India failed to provide enough support to that country’s fledgling democracy even as Prime Ministers walked in and out of the revolving doors of Kathmandu. In Sri Lanka, when President Mahinda Rajapaksa (after having militarily defeated the Tamil terrorist group) was bullied by the West, New Delhi did not have the spine to stand up for him. In Bangladesh, we kept ourselves at an arm’s length from one of our closest friends, even as Dhaka dutifully held up its side of the bargain. With Pakistan we frittered the hard-won gains from the previous decade and the relationship was hollowed out from within. Further out in Afghanistan, we did only slightly better in helping the war torn country rebuild, but still remained below optimal. Even in the Maldives and Bhutan, we were disconnected from our friends, a lesson that we learnt the hard way. In each of these cases, the space that was ceded by a listless Indian regime was quickly sought to be captured by other rising powers wanting to expand their footprints in the region. If India didn’t get its act together, it risked being alienated, and shall one dare say, even besieged, in its own backyard.

Thankfully, the new Government has already begun the process of course-correction. The invitation to the inauguration was the first step towards resuscitating the India Narrative in South Asia. The next step was the bilateral meetings that took place the day after the swearing-in ceremony. And if the reported outcome of these meetings is anything to go by, India is already on the right path.  According to the Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister Modi had ‘substantive’ meetings with all the leaders.

With Afghan President Hamid Karzai, he discussed the recent terror attack on India’s consulate in Herat and reiterated India’s commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. To Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay, he assured India’s unflinching support to Bhutan’s socio-economic development. The duo also agreed to start four new joint hydro-electric projects and strengthen security cooperation.

Security issues were also discussed with President Abdullah Yameen of the Maldives. Islamists have been gaining a strong foothold there, and this has been a matter of concern for India. With Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam of Mauritius, Mr Modi highlighted cooperation in the maritime security sector as well as strengthening of the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which has been neglected for some time now. In the meeting with Prime Minister Sushil Koirala of Nepal, the focus was on ensuring that the democratic process in the Himalayan nation is taken to fruition with the adoption of the much-delayed Constitution. Additionally, Mr Modi also stressed on expediting the completion of the many infrastructure projects in Nepal that India was supporting, especially in the hydro-power and transmission sectors.

With President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister focussed on effective implementation of the national reconciliation process and also highlighted the importance of the 13th Amendment in delivering on the aspirations of the Tamil community for a life of equality, justice, peace and dignity in a united Sri Lanka. In his meeting with Speaker of Bangladesh Parliament Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury, Mr Modi acknowledged the cooperation extended by Bangladesh in all areas of mutual interest including security, power, border management, rail and road transport.

Of course, it was Mr Modi’s meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan that received the most public attention. In this case, perhaps the issues that were left untouched were as important as the matters that were discussed between the two leaders. On the one hand, Prime Minister Modi’s strong stance on terrorism, his insistence that the 26/11 trial be taken to its logical conclusion and his simultaneous focus on improving trade ties offered a blueprint of how his Government will seek to map India-Pakistan relations. On the other hand, Prime Minister Sharif’s silence on the Kashmir issue and the fact he did not meet with separatist leaders (as Pakistani leaders almost always do) spoke volumes. Indeed, Mr Sharif, who defied Army pressure at home to make it to Delhi, cut a perfectly statesman-like figure during visit that included calling upon Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a significant goodwill gesture. That he did not embarrass his hosts with provocative comments (another Pakistani norm) was also much appreciated.

Expectedly, the Modi-Sharif meeting has come under a fair bit of criticism. Some commentators, who had opposed former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with Mr Sharif in New York this past September, have now also refused to endorse Mr Modi’s bilateral on the same principle — that without any change in the ground situation and no possibility of a concrete deliverable, a high-level meeting is empty symbolism. This, however, is an unnecessarily hawkish approach. First, the bilateral meetings were courtesy calls demanded by protocol, and refusing one with Mr Sharif (while entertaining all other leaders) would have amounted to insulting the guest. Second, it is unfair to use the same yardstick for Mr Modi and Mr Singh at this stage because the new Prime Minister has just started off with a clean slate. If he fumbles, like Mr Singh did at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and fails to make progress over time, he too will be called out for indulging in empty symbolism. But for now, this meeting is best viewed as a welcome, warm-up exercise. Third, by extending the olive branch to Mr Sharif, Mr Modi has effectively softened his own hardliner image and put a possibly worried neighbour somewhat at ease. Equally importantly, he has insured himself from being tagged a war-monger, in case he has to take strong measures against Pakistan at a later date.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 29, 2014)

India poll: A view from Pakistan

Though fear-mongering about the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate and his Hindu nationalist credentials continues, many in Pakistan are of the opinion that a strong leader like Narendra Modi will, in fact, be good for bilateral relations

It is easy to see why John Oliver’s satirical take on the Indian election has gone viral in this country. The British comedian chastises the American media for ignoring the world’s largest democratic exercise and pokes fun at the apparent ‘Fox-ification’ of Indian media. Finally, he notes that the last time America heard a rags to riches story about a tea-seller boy from India, it threw an Oscar at it. This some may say is of the most sane commentaries on the Indian general election to have been produced by Western media.

But jokes apart, there has been much high commentary in the Western media about the Indian general election and expectedly much of it has focussed on Narendra Modi — widely expected to sweep the polls and become Prime Minister later this month. Several foreign magazines have written, often in depth, about Mr Modi, commonly described as a Hindu nationalist leader, and their reportage is used at home to gauge the ‘support’ (or the lack of it) that the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate enjoys on the international platform. Especially given Mr Modi’s chequered past with the West — the US denied him a visa for allegedly ‘sponsoring’ the 2002 violence in Gujarat and Europe effectively blacklisted him until recently — the coverage of his candidacy in the foreign Press has evoked much domestic interest.

And so it is no surprise that The Financial Times’s full throated endorsement of Mr Modi is the talking point this week much like The Economist’s criticism last month created ripples in Delhi’s commentariat. But while the attention paid to first world media is understandable, there has unfortunately been almost no focus in India on how Mr Modi is perceived by some of our immediate neighbours.

Let us take a look at Pakistan: As expected, sections of the Establishment there continue to take a belligerent line against Mr Modi and indeed, there is much fear mongering about him in the media as well. The most recent example of this is, of course, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan’s statement that, if elected as India’s Prime Minister, Mr Modi will “destabilise” regional peace. The harsh comment was in response to Mr Modi’s statement on underworld don Dawood Ibrahim whose residence in Karachi is an open secret but for Mr Khan it was “touching last limit of enmity towards Pakistan”. Similarly, writing in The News newspaper, South Asia analyst Brian Cloughley warns in his April 14 article that, “it’s unlikely he’ll (Modi) be good for relations with Pakistan. The former tea-boy is a bellicose ultra-nationalist... Pakistan had better be prepared for sparks to fly.”

Such analysis is common but there has also been a tempering of the anti-Modi narrative in Pakistan. A good example of this is former Pakistani Ambassador to the UN Munir Akram’s article in The Dawn newspaper. He writes, that given the “disenchantment with the Congress party Government’s economic policies and performance, and Modi’s reputed credentials as an effective and business-friendly administrator”, Mr Modi is “being mainstreamed”.

He too warns that, “Modi’s rehabilitation... has potentially serious implications for Pakistan” as “although Modi has moderated his anti-Muslim rhetoric... he and the BJP could revert to the Hindu hardline if needed to secure their core fundamentalist base... leading to an early crisis in India-Pakistan relations.” 

Further, Mr Akram opines that a BJP victory will foment violent social unrest in India for which Pakistan will be blamed, “unleashing another crisis in bilateral relations”. Interestingly at the end of his article, he tones down and advises the Pakistani Government “not to take a public position against Modi or the BJP” and “open a security dialogue with India”.

A similar sense of duality is reflected in Amir Mateen’s piece in The News wherein the author notes that while, “Questions lurk about how Modi will impact India’s secularism; if he will escalate tension between India and Pakistan and roll back the existing confidence-building measures; how he might resort to jingoism in Kashmir, interfere in Balochistan or restart a proxy war in Afghanistan… not all Pakistanis think the same way. Tiny Pakistani intellectual elite also sees better chance of détente under a strong BJP leader than was possible under a weak Manmohan Singh.”

Interestingly, in recent weeks, Islamabad’s new envoy in New Delhi has walked the extra mile in favour of Mr Modi. After Mr Modi said in an interview that he will carry forward the foreign policy legacy of the BJP’s last Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who took bilateral ties to a new high inspite of a military conflict, Pakistani High Commissioner Abdul Basit said he was “encouraged” by those remarks. Notably, he also downplayed Bihar BJP leader Giriraj Singh’s obnoxious comment that those who opposed Mr Modi would be sent to Pakistan. That statement played on the worst kind of political prejudices associated with the saffron party and, by dismissing it as high-pitched rhetoric, High Commissioner Basit made clear that he and his Government were not going to be taken in by the sound and fury characteristic of most elections.

Also, earlier this week, the Delhi correspondent of The Telegraph reported that senior Pakistani diplomats had said that Pakistan “wants the controversial Hindu nationalist Narendra Modi to become India’s next Prime Minister because it believes he will provide the strong leadership necessary for peace talks”. This, the paper noted was a considerable shift in the official line as put out by Mr Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s national security adviser and de facto Foreign Minister. In a previous interview, Mr Aziz had said that his Government was willing to “deal with” Mr Modi. Now, Pakistani diplomats say, that Mr Modi is in fact, “Islamabad’s preferred choice”. According to The Telegraph, Pakistani officials are hoping to grant India ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status which they hope will not only incentivise New Delhi to begin a fresh dialogue but also provide Mr Modi, who is known for his business-friendly policies, “an opportunity to open new talks without appearing weak”.

Of course, given India’s previous experience with Pakistan, be it with regard to peace talks or MFN status, these statements must be taken with more than just a pinch of salt. But that does not diminish the fact that this line of thinking, even if it is restricted to only a segment of the Pakistani establishment, is a positive development.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 1, 2014)

Fresh Winds May Blow Soon

Manmohan Singh and the Government he has only nominally led have frittered away the robust Vajpayee legacy in foreign affairs. If the BJP comes to power with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, it could bring tectonic, positive changes in the country’s international relations

 In recent weeks, at least two prominent Indian commentators have opined that if Mr Narendra Modi becomes Prime Minister, as is widely expected, his biggest impact will be felt not so much on India’s economic policy but its foreign policy agenda. On April 9, soon after the BJP released its election manifesto, Firstpost editor R Jagannathan observed, “If Modi were to become PM, foreign and security policy could be in for another churn”, and go through a “sea change”. The same day, C Raja Mohan, one of the country’s most respected journalists and foreign policy analysts, wrote in The Indian Express that the “vagueness” in the BJP manifesto should allow Mr Modi “considerable freedom to put his own stamp on India’s foreign policy”. 

The focus on Mr Modi in the foreign policy sphere is interesting, given that the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate does not have a particularly active profile in this regard. Almost all his time as a senior politician has been spent in Gujarat and he has no experience with the processes that guide India’s engagement with the world. To the casual observer, he may, therefore, seem like an untested hand in foreign policy matters, and more so since Mr Modi has focussed only limited attention on the subject during his election campaign. This is not unusual since  foreign policy is hardly a talking point during elections.

But even as Mr Modi holds the cards close to him in this case, comparisons with Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee have already begun. The last BJP Prime Minister, Mr Vajpayee is credited with taking India’s foreign policy to new highs — he tested nuclear weapons that initially led to international sanctions but eventually brought India nuclear legitimacy; he significantly improved the country’s relations with Pakistan despite the process being disrupted by the Kargil conflict; the joint declaration with China that he signed during his landmark trip to the Middle Kingdom in 2003 still forms the basic framework for border dispute talks; and, finally, it was under his leadership that New Delhi shrugged off its Cold War inhibitions and vitalised ties with the US. Indeed, when Mr Vajpayee demitted the Prime Minister’s Office, he left his successor a rich legacy of global engagement.

Unfortunately, Mr Manmohan Singh and the Government he only nominally led frittered away that legacy in this past decade. As the BJP manifesto notes, “The Congress-led UPA has failed to establish enduring friendly and cooperative relations with India’s neighbours. India’s relations with traditional allies have turned cold. India and its neighbours have drifted apart”. In response, the BJP has vowed to “build a strong, self-reliant and self-confident India” that will “regain its rightful place in the comity of nations”.

This has been interpreted by many as indicative of a “muscular” foreign policy under Mr Modi, although what exactly that means is unclear. What can be expected though is that, if Mr Modi takes up the top job, he will be a strong and decisive leader and craft a foreign policy that furthers the country’s “best national interests” (to use a phrase from the manifesto). 

Similarly, analysts have also been talking about what the BJP means when it says that it will “create a web of allies to mutually further our interests”. Does this mean India may shed its non-alignment policies under Mr Modi? This is highly unlikely. In recent years, India has forged a series of strategic partnerships with different countries while still holding onto its strategic autonomy. There is no reason to believe that a Modi-led Government will stray from that path. However, one can expect a greater emphasis on India’s role as an Asian power — particularly in the strengthening of relations with Japan, China and, to a lesser extent, Singapore and South Korea. 

India’s relations with Japan are already on the upswing and will get another big push if Mr Modi comes to power. Japan has been doing a lot of business with Mr Modi’s Gujarat and those experiences will be carried forward to the national level. Also, Mr Modi has a close personal relationship with Mr Shinzo Abe, the staunchly pro-India Prime Minister of Japan. In 2007, during his first term as Prime Minister, Mr Abe gave a warm welcome to Mr Modi in Tokyo; when Mr Modi returned to Japan in 2012, Mr Abe was in the Opposition, but the duo still met; months later in December that year, when Mr Abe returned to power, Mr Modi personally called to congratulate — a noticeable event given that Mr Modi was not a national leader.  Moreover, both men are portrayed as nationalists focussed on the country’s economic resurgence which makes their partnership almost natural.  

As regards China, alarmists have already raised red flags about Mr Modi’s comments, made in Arunachal Pradesh, on protecting India’s territorial integrity. They have been quick to assume that this means India may take on a provocative stance against China, which it can ill-afford, even though the Chinese themselves dismissed the statements as catering to domestic concerns during an election campaign. Also, there is reason enough to assume that under his leadership, India’s relations with China will realise their full potential, especially in trade. Mr Modi has travelled to China four times already and, in 2011, was received in the Great Hall of the People, a landmark event largely ignored by the Indian media.  

The BJP manifesto also says, “Instead of being led by Big Power interests, we will engage proactively on our own with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond.” This again has been interpreted as a snub to the West, particularly the US which finds no mention in the manifesto. But before reading too much into it, let’s not forget that no other country is individually named in the manifesto. Also, given Mr Modi’s reputation as a realist politician, one can be reasonably sure that he will not allow relations between the two countries to deteriorate on his watch. If anything, given Mr Modi’s emphasis on economic ties, one can expect a significant strengthening of trade relations between the two countries which have plateaued in recent years. However, the US’s earlier insult of Mr Modi will remain in the backdrop — so do not be surprised if he drops by Tehran on his way to Washington, DC.

Finally, there has been a lot of hullabaloo over the BJP’s promise to design an “independent strategic nuclear programme” by updating the current doctrine in keeping with the challenges of time. This was being widely seen as the party’s code for junking the ‘no first use’ principle; and Modi-baiters conveniently used this to fuel fears of ‘war-mongering’ by the man commonly described as a ‘Hindu nationalist strongman’ — no matter that there is consensus across India’s strategic community that the NFU needs to be revisited at the earliest.

Their bubble of vacuous commentary burst as soon as BJP president Rajnath Singh put to rest all speculation about the NFU being revised. It remains unclear why Mr Singh made such a definitive statement; the nuclear doctrine is not a major electoral plank — but it is hoped that, if Mr Modi comes to power, he will update India’s nuclear policy, as promised in his party manifesto.

(This op-ed was published in The Pioneer on April 17, 2014)