NEW POLITICAL ORDER IN NAYPIDAW

Htin Kyaw is the first civilian to become President of Myanmar since 1962. But his office will be undercut by his party chief, who said that she will rule above the President, and by the continued presence of the military in the legislative and executive wings of Government

Four months after the National League for Democracy won the parliamentary election and several weeks since the new Parliament, comprised mostly of civilian lawmakers brought to power through free and fair election, was sworn in, Myanmar finally has a new President: U Htin Kyaw. He is a confidant of NLD chief and Myanmar’s icon of democracy Aung San Suu Kyi who, ideally, should have occupied the top post but couldn’t because of a constitutional clause that prohibits those with foreign nationals in their immediate family from the presidential palace. Suu Kyi’s two sons are British citizens as was her late husband. Several rounds of negotiations, including three between Suu Kyi and Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in recent weeks, to either amend the Constitution or at least find a way around it, failed to bear fruit. It is still possible that a compromise may be worked out later in the term for Suu Kyi to become President but for now, all that’s in the realm of speculation.

This brings us back to Htin Kyaw who will be sworn into office on April 1. The 69-year-old hasn’t held any major public office and is a little known political figure. However, he has been close to Suu Kyi for many years — the two even went to grade school together. An economist by training, Htin Kyaw also studied computer programming in England and then served as a bureaucrat for some years. He quit his Government job in the early 1990s and then committed himself to party work. In the past three decades, he has worked closely with Suu Kyi, advising her on party and policy matters, particularly on foreign affairs. He also heads the Daw Khi Kyi Foundation, a charitable organisation run by the NLD and named after Suu Kyi’s mother. 

Notably, though Htin Kyaw himself may not have been a prominent figure until his presidential nomination, he definitely has political pedigree and is, of course, part of the NLD inner circle. His father, Min Thu Win, was a literary giant in Myanmar as well as a member of the NLD. In 1990, he was elected to Parliament but resigned eight years later. Htin Kyaw’s wife Su Su Lwin is also a Member of Parliament from the NLD and is on the Foreign Affairs committee. Her father, U Lwin, was one of the founding members of the NLD, working alongside Suu Kyi’s father and Burmese independence hero Major General Aung San. A decorated soldier, he had served as Minister of Finance, Deputy Prime Minister and Member of the State Council before resigning from Government in 1980.

Htin Kyaw is the first civilian to hold the post of President of Myanmar since 1962 but his position will still be undercut by two factors: First, his party chief’s statement, incidentally to an Indian news outlet late last year, that she will rule from above the President; and second, the continued presence of the military in both the legislative and executive wings of the Government. In the first case, there is no telling how the working relationship between the Htin Kyaw and Suu Kyi will play out in matters of day-to-day governance — and whether this arrangement may cause unnecessary friction or even factionalism in the days to come. In the second case, the military can be expected to hold onto its core interests but if the trends that we have seen since 2010 hold strong, then there should also be a continued, even if slow, devolution of power from the military to civilian authorities.

Currently, representatives appointed by the Tatmadaw (military) hold 25 per cent of the seats in Parliament which are not open for election. The Tatmadaw also retains direct control of the Ministries of Defence, Home and Border Affairs. Importantly, it also controls the powerful National Defence and Security Council. The 11-member body that comprises the President, the two Vice Presidents, the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament, the Ministers for Defence, Home, Border Affairs and Foreign Affairs, the Commander-in-Chief and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, is dominated by the military and has expansive powers including calling of diplomatic ties and declaring an emergency. It will be interesting to see if Suu Kyi secures a seat on this council, possibly through the Foreign Minister’s chair.

Additionally, the Tatmadaw also has one of its own in the Office of the Vice President as well. In Myanmar’s political system, both Houses of Parliament nominate one presidential candidate each while the military nominates a third. The nominee with the highest number of votes becomes President while the next two candidates become First and Second Vice President respectively.

In this case, Htin Kyaw, nominated by Lower House of Parliament, won 360 of the 652 votes while the Tatmadaw’s candidate, General Myint Swe, came second with 213 votes, while Upper House candidate (also nominated by the NLD) Henry Van Theo came in third with 79 votes. Van Theo is an ethnic Chin and a Christian and his candidacy adds the much needed minority representation to the executive. However,  Gen Myint Swe, who will serve as First Vice President, may be a possible trouble-spot. He is considered to be a military hardliner and has an unfavourable reputation. Even though NLD leaders didn’t oppose his nomination in public, it is believed that in private they were dismayed. The General led the crackdown on pro-democracy students and monks in 2007 which hasn’t been forgotten and neither has his inability to deliver good governance as the Chief Minister of Yangon gone unnoticed.

In short, the Tatmadaw will retain considerable executive powers, and the success of Myanmar’s first civilian Government in 50 years will depend on its close cooperation with the military. For example, if the Government has to secure a lasting peace with the various armed ethnic groups, it will need the support of the military. Similarly, if the military is in a position where it can at least share credit for economic and political reforms, it will be more willing to the support those reforms. In other words, this current arrangement, though a compromise, is not necessarily a bad thing. In the very least, it factors in the socio-political realities of Myanmar, where the military is an all-pervading force with deeply-entrenched interests that will not go away overnight. This may not make for a picture perfect new democracy but in the long term might prove to be a more stable and resilient model for political transition.

(This article was published in oped section of The Pioneer on March 17, 2016)

BREAKTHROUGHS ON THE BORDER

Small-scale border trade, which is different from the industry-scale bilateral trade, contributes only a fraction to the overall economic relationship between nations. But it does have a significant impact at the people-to-people level, as the India-Bangladesh haats show

Generally, political freedom better economic opportunities. However, there are rare cases when newly independent regions find themselves worse off because of the red lines on their maps. This is what happened to India’s North-East in 1947. On the one hand the country gained independence from British rule and awoke to “life and freedom”, to use the words of India’s first Prime Minister; but on the other hand, partition and the consequent establishment of East Pakistan, which was liberated in 1971 to become modern-day Bangladesh, meant that a large part of the new nation found itself cut-off from the ‘mainland’, almost overnight.

The erstwhile Kingdom of Tripuri, for example, received a particularly raw deal. That part of the ancient kingdom which was directly under the British Crown, became East Pakistan (and is now Bangladesh) in 1947, while the rest of it, the autonomous Princely State, joined the Union of India in 1949. Consequently, Tripura, as we know it today, is land-locked on three sides by Bangladesh while the other North-Eastern States are left with a tenuous geographical connect to the rest of the country, through the ‘chicken’s neck’.

The economical implications of these changes have been devastating. The new lines disrupted the old business patterns and nearly destroyed the region’s commercial eco-systems. Road links from the North-East, which passed through East Pakistan, were severed; the Assam Railway segment was cut-off from Indian Railways; Bengal’s jute industry was decapitated; the loss of Chittagong port meant that Indian tea and timber industries had to take a circuitous route to the Calcutta port.

It is only when one understands the scale of disruption that was inflicted during partition can one appreciate the importance of border haats that are being set up on the Indian-Bangladesh border (such haats also exist on the India’s border with Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, China and Pakistan). Defined by the Government of India as over-land trade by way of exchange of commodities from a bilaterally agreed list by people living along both sides of the international border, this arrangement is different from the large-scale trade that happens through land, air or sea ports, requiring customs clearances etc. Border trade happens on a much smaller scale and contributes only a fraction to the overall bilateral trade.

However, it does have a significant impact at the people-to-people level. There are two reasons for this: First, border areas are almost always also remote areas, and residents (be they buyers or sellers) do not have easy access to commercial centres in the heartlands. Hence, border haats are seen as a good alternative. Second, the socio-cultural ties of cross-border residents also provide an impetus for greater economic engagement. Border trade encourages familiarity and trust between communities. Notably, much of the border trade happens through the barter system  without mutual understanding and good faith, this system would not have worked. Also, it has been noticed that as border trade improves, border smuggling usually diminishes as well.

Border haats between India and Bangladesh were common before 1971, when locals exchanged surpluses at their weekly haats. These traditional markets, however, were shut down during the War of Liberation. After the war ended and Bangladesh became a sovereign nation, there was an attempt to restart the trade  in fact, a trade agreement was in the works in 1972 which specifically provided for trading opportunity to people living within 16 kms on either side of the border. to dispose off their goods which were mutually agreed upon. However, the pact wasn’t formalised due to apprehensions from Bangladesh. And when a trade agreement was eventually signed, it did not include border haats.

More than four decades later, the situation has changed dramatically and border haats are back with a bang (especially with regard to Bangladesh, and to some extent, Myanmar). These haats usually open once a week and nationals from both countries living within a four to five kilometer radius can trade locally produced goods and crops. Currencies of both countries are accepted and no taxes are imposed on the sale of designated items which mostly include crops, spices, minor forest products, fish, dairy and poultry products and cottage industry items.

Currently, there are four functional India-Bangladesh haats  Two were set up in 2012 on the Meghalaya-Bangladesh border at Kalaichar (India)-Baliamari (Bangladesh) and Balat (India)-Dalora (Bangladesh). The other two were set up last year in Tripura: The first was in January 2015 at Sabroom in the Southern Tripura district on the Indian side and Feni district on the Bangladeshi side. Then in June 2015, Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina inaugurated via a video link, the Kamala Sagar border haat, located 35km south of Agartala.

At least four other border haats are being planned in Tripura alone  at Kamalpur in Dhalai district, Dharmanagar in North Tripura district and in the subdivisional towns of Khowai and Kailasahar. Overall, India aims to set up 70 markets in the north-eastern States, along its 4,096km border with Bangladesh, which includes a 1,116km riverine boundary.

Of course, border haats alone will not be enough. Political stability (in the Indian States and the neighbouring country) will be key and so will infrastructure development. Thankfully, there is good news on both accounts. While India-Bangladesh ties have become strong and robust, the Modi Administration has prioritised infrastructure development, particularly communication and transport facilities, in the North East. In fact, it was only early last month that the Union Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region sanctioned Rs580 crore for the construction of a railway corridor connecting India’s Agartala with Bangladesh’s Akhaura. The project has been in the works since 2010 and should be completed by 2017. Overall, while there has been significant progress, there is still a whole lot more than needs to be done before the full potential of border trade can be leveraged in a manner that benefits not only border residents but also neighbouring countries and the region at large.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer. A shorter version of this article was earlier published in India Perspectives magazine)

WHY THE OIL DEAL IS NO BIG DEAL

To tackle the supply glut in the oil market, producers need to cut, not cap, their current production. This is not happening even in a best case scenario wherein Iran and Iraq fall in line with Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar and Venezuela, and everybody commits to a global deal

On Tuesday, Saudi Arabia and Russia, along with Qatar and Venezuela, decided to freeze their oil production at January 2016 levels, so as to stabilise oil prices, which have plunged in the past two year because of a supply glut. From a high of $115 per barrel in 2014, prices were down to $27 per barrel this January, and if the markets continue to be so awash in oil, it is possible that the prices would go down to $20 a barrel.

The impact of this price drop on oil-producing and exporting countries, which depend heavily on petrodollars to fuel their economy, needs no explanation. Indeed, the situation had become so dire that even resource-rich Saudi Arabia was feeling the pinch. This forms the backdrop to Tuesday’s deal.

The deal is the first in 15 years between members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and a country that is not part of the cartel. The deal also gains significance because the two countries leading this agreement, Russia and Saudi Arabia, are generally not on the same geo-political plane. In fact, for months, they have been competing with each other in the oil market. While Riyadh has recently stepped into Moscow’s turf and sold oil to eastern Europe, Russia has jumped Saudi Arabia in oil exports to China. Outside the oil market, the two nations are also on opposite sides in the Syrian civil war.

However, while on paper the deal seems like a major development, on the ground, it may not be that big a deal after all. There are two reasons for this.

Missing Pieces: The deal does not include Iran and Iraq — yet. These are the other major oil producers in the world, and without their cooperation, the supply side of the oil price mechanism cannot be controlled. Indeed, the activation of the deal itself is pegged to the assumption that the other players will fall in line.

Iran: Having just been freed from Western sanctions (following an agreement with the P5+1 powers on its nuclear programme) which previously curtailed its oil exports, Iran, the Opec’s the fifth-largest producer, is now looking to leverage its proverbial black gold so as to resuscitate its economy. In the words of Iran’s Opec envoy Mehdi Asali, it is, therefore, “illogical” to expect the country to freeze production.

Indeed, oil production has already been boosted, and by the end of Iranian calendar year (March 20), it is expected that production will reach a record high of 5,00,000 barrels a day. On Monday, Iran sent off its first Europe-bound crude cargo in four years. And over the next 48 hours, it exported more than 7.1 million crude barrels, setting a new record, according to the Managing Director of Iranian Oil Terminals.

Still, on Wednesday, Opec president Mohammed bin Saleh al-Sada, who is also the Qatari Minister of Industry and Energy, met with Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh to discuss a freeze by Tehran. They were joined by the Venezuelan Oil Minister and the Iraqi Oil Minister. While Iran did not commit to a freeze, it still took a positive stance on the issue. “The decision ... to stabilise the market and prices for the benefit of producers and consumers, is supported by us,” Mr Zanganeh told the official news agency after the meeting.

This means that while Iran may have publicly dismissed the idea of a production freeze for now, it may eventually still agree to some sort of a special capping arrangement. This will be for two reasons — First, Iran too is adversely affected by the  low prices, and second, it will only be able to increase production overnight to a certain level; beyond that, it will require large-scale, long-term investment, forcing its production abilities to plateau in the meantime. Hence, if the other producers make a good enough offer to Iran at the point, Iran is expected to at least consider it in all seriousness.

Iraq: In the popular imagination, Iraq may have been written off as besieged by the Islamic State terror group, but on the ground, it has made some significant recoveries and simultaneously also ramped up oil production. In January, Iraq’s output was a record 4.35 million barrels a day, and the International Energy Agency estimates that this figure may still increase. Sure, there are doubts about transporting the oil out of the country but even then, Iraq remains a major player. For now, Iraq is amenable to the deal and can be expected to officially join in, if the others also commit to a cap or a cut.

Inadequate measures: The second reason why the deal isn’t going to be a gamechanger is that even in a best case scenario, with Iran and Iraq on board, it is unlikely to change the oil price trajectory in a significant manner. This is  because the deal proposes a cap, not a  cut, in current production levels. In other words, even if the deal is implemented, the market will still have a over-supply of oil.

In this context, it in interesting to note that most Opec countries, such as Russia and Venezuela, are already pumping record high levels of oil. They are stretched to the maximum, and would have had to slow down even without a deal.

And then there is America’s shale oil factor: To understand the US’s role, one needs to go back a few steps. Historically, the OPEC cartel has managed to keep a strangle-hold on oil prices because demand far outstripped supply. The shale oil boom in the US, however, threatened to change that dynamic. Opec responded by striking at the one major weak point in the shale story: The relatively high-cost of production. The oil cartel pumped up production and deliberately depressed oil prices, hoping that American shale would become unprofitable in comparison.

While the shale industry did feel the pressure, the impact wasn’t as intense as Opec had calculated especially as shale prices continued on a downward path. Any let up at this point in the Opec’s efforts to keep oil prices low will give US shale companies just the breather they are looking for to get back into business.

Past experiences: A third problem with any Opec deal is cheating. In general, Opec members are not particularly transparent with their production figures and this leads to mistrust within the group. Non-Opec members are no better either. The last time there was a global deal of this sort — in 2001, when Saudi Arabia convinced Mexico, Norway and Russia to commit to production cuts — Russia went back on its word and, in fact, raised exports.

This oped was published in The Pioneer on February 18, 2016

IN NAYPYIDAW, DEMOCRACY DAWNS

Last week, Myanmar took one of its most definitive steps towards democracy: It swore in a Parliament comprised mostly of civilian lawmakers, brought to power through a largely free and fair election. However, the new Government still faces many challenges

Ruled by the military junta for five decades, and under a semi-military Government that secured its mandate though a rigged election for the last five years, Myanmar last week took one of its most definitive steps towards becoming a functional democracy: It swore in a new Parliament comprised mostly of civilian lawmakers brought to power through a largely free and fair election. In the 664-seat legislature, political icon and Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy, which won a landslide victory in the parliamentary election held last year on November 8, has 390 members, while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, which was previously in charge, has only 42.

However, this does not mean that the military has been marginalised in Parliament since Army-appointed representatives still hold 25 per cent of the seats that were not open for election. But even factoring in this block of unelected members, it is noteworthy that the NLD still has a clear 50 per cent majority in Parliament.

The much-awaited big decision now is: Who will be the next President? NLD chief Suu Kyi is barred from taking the top job, as her sons hold British passports and the Constitution of Myanmar prohibits those with foreign nationals in their immediate family from the Presidency. This clause was specifically inserted to keep Ms Suu Kyi out of the presidential palace and it is possible that in due course of time, the Constitution will be amended.

But for now, there is no clarity on who will be the next leader. Ms Suu Kyi, who has long expressed her desire to be President, is holding back channel talks with the military and The New York Times has reported that the NLD may be offering the Chief Minister’s post in three key States to the USDP. But it’s difficult to tell how these talks are progressing. If the talks fail at least for the time being (keeping the option open for Ms Suu Kyi to take over the presidency later in the term), the focus will be on a proxy President: Ms Suu Kyi has no clear deputy in the party but more importantly, she has already said that irrespective of who wears the President’s tag, it is she who will be the leader of any NLD Government.

Either way, the new Government faces many challenges. First is Government formation. Having been in opposition for so many years, NLD members have no experience in national governance or institutional reform. This will make it enormously difficult for the new Government to guide the country through this crucial period of transition and deliver meaningful change and progress. The public, of course, has high expectations and it will be a huge setback to the democratic process if the Government fails to deliver, and at the end of the next five years, there is much public resentment.

Second, the NLD will have to carefully manage its relations with the military, which remains a powerful force. Ms Suu Kyi has done this with aplomb in recent years. She has a good working relationship with outgoing President Thein Sein  an important factor in the steady democratic transition of the past five years. Remember, when the parliamentary election was held in 2010, Ms Suu Kyi’s NLD, having been unlawfully denied the opportunity to form the Government even after having won the election in 1990, had boycotted. However, since 2012, after election laws were reformed, the NLD participated in several by-elections, all of which it won.

So, to that end, the NLD is off to a safe start. However, one mustn’t undermine the challenges ahead. For one, the possibility of a proxy President will add another variable to the mix and there is no telling how that it will affect the carefully-set equation between the NLD and the old military establishment. Moreover, the military is expected to keep the key portfolios of Defence, Home and Border Operations. This will further complicate matters of day-to-day governance and can easily become a source of friction. It could even lead to a full confrontation that may undermine Myanmar’s democratic transition especially since the military still has emergency powers.

Outside politics, the big issue for the new Government is fructifying the peace process with the ethnic armed groups. The Thein Sein Government made major progress in this regard last year when it signed a peace deal with the ethnic armed groups. However, fighting has continued despite the agreement to cease fire and violent clashes in Shan and Kachin States are threatening to undermine the peace process. This could lead to large-scale economic turbulence that Myanmar is hardly prepared to deal with. 

Also, the situation in Rakhine State, where most Muslim Rohingya are disenfranchised, remains volatile. At home, any decision of the NLD Government on this issue will be viewed through a nationalist lens but outside Myanmar, it will be seen as test of character for the peace laureate-politician. Notably, Ms Suu Kyi has maintained a studied silence on the Rohingya issue which hasn’t gone unnoticed in the international community.

Another long term challenge before the new Government will be dealing with China. Myanmar was close to becoming a Chinese satellite state when the junta decided to the reverse course. This has led to some cooling of ties between China and Myanmar but the latter is still deeply entrenched and unlikely to back away without a fight.

Ms Suu Kyi and the NLD will need deft diplomatic skills to shepherd Myanmar’s ongoing re-engagement with the West, without rocking the boat with a more assertive China that is presumable concerned about its interests being harmed. For this geo-political re-orientation to succeed, the Western countries must also understand that while do have a significant role to play in bringing positive change in Myanmar, and the new Government will, of course, dip into the large reservoir of support and goodwill but everybody needs to be cognizant of domestic and regional sensitivities.

This is also where India comes into play. Myanmar stands at the crossroads of India’s Neighbourhood First and Act East policies; and it is crucial to the development of India’s own North-Eastern States as well as its relations with South East Asia. However, India is still only a minor player in Myanmar despite its longstanding historical and civilisational ties. Though New Delhi has been pragmatic enough to do business with the junta since the 1990s, this has been far below potential. Meanwhile, other regional powers such as Singapore and Thailand, not to mention China, have soared ahead.

India has a lot of catching up to do but a good place to start will be accelerating the transport connectivity projects that are already in the pipeline. At the top of the list is the Rs2,904-crore Kaladan project, which includes a 225km-waterway on the Kaladan River from Sittwe Port to Kaletwa and from there, a 62km-roadway from Kaletwa to the India-Myanmar border. The India-Myanmar-Thailand highway and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are the two other important projects that require immediate attention.

This article was published in The Pioneer on February 8, 2016

THE OTHER TERROR ATTACK ON INDIA

While the Pathankot assault is being analysed threadbare, Mazar-e-Sharif has pretty much fallen off the radar even though the latter is an important indicator of how the Afghan security situation is evolving since US-led forces ended combat operations in that country

In the haze of the Pathankot saga, the simultaneous attack on the Indian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan, has received limited attention.  And almost all of that has focused on the Jaish-e-Mohammed-Afzal Guru connection that seems to link the two episodes.

Now, while there is no doubt that both incidents were designed to rollback recent progresses on the India-Pakistan front as well as the India-Afghanistan front, and that in the larger picture they are inextricably linked, it is important to look at them individually for a more nuanced understanding. The Pathankot attack, of course, is being analysed threadbare but Mazar-e-Sharif has pretty much fallen off the radar — though the latter is an important indicator of how the security situation in Afghanistan is evolving especially since US-led forces officially ended combat operations in the country at the end of 2014.

The January 4 attack on the Indian consulate, which claimed the life of one policeman and injured 11 others, comes at a time when such incidents have unfortunately become the norm, with 2015 being the bloodiest year for Afghanistan since 2001. Indeed, 2015 was also the year that saw the Taliban take control of a major urban centre for the first time since the Americans had chased them out of Kabul. In September, the northern hub of Kunduz was under Taliban control for two weeks, after which Afghan forces, with US air support, were able to take back the city. The episode was not just a strategic or political loss, it also dealt a severe psychological blow.

Worse still, after Kunduz, the Taliban have continued to attack high-profile targets: In December, a suicide bomber detonated his device outside Bagram air field killing six US airmen. Weeks later, militants dressed in Army fatigues penetrated Kandahar airport; that same day, the Taliban overran a district centre in Helmand, the southern Province which borders Pakistan and was an insurgent stronghold. In recent months, Helmand has been the site of fierce fighting between the Taliban and Afghan soldiers, and the former have, worryingly, been able to make significant inroads into the Province.

In fact, this Sunday, the Taliban were able to break through the frontlines of the strategically important Sangin district, and it wasn’t until Tuesday that Afghan forces, assisted by British soldiers, were able to take back important buildings in the area. However, fighting continues in Marjah, another town of the embattled Province, where one American soldier was killed and two others injured on Tuesday, prompting a dozen American airstrikes on Wednesday.

Outside Helmand, in Kabul, there was yet another bomb blast on Tuesday night  bringing the total number of militant attacks in the capital city to four before even the first week of the New Year was over. Three of these attacks have happened over 48 hours: The day of the Mazar-e-Sharif attack saw a Taliban truck bomb strike a heavily-guarded residential compound in Kabul that was housing foreign contractors, killing two and wounding more than 30 civilians; and a separate bomb went off near the airport in the capital city.

Clearly, the hard-won gains of this past decade-and-a-half remain under threat, and may still be reversed. This is exactly what many security analysts had predicted when the Obama Administration had announced its ill-advised troop withdrawal plan in the first place. Of course, what was supposed to be a ‘withdrawal’ plan eventually became a ‘drawdown’ with more than 9,000 US soldiers remaining in Afghanistan even after 2014, when combat operations were officially ended, military bases handed over, and flags lowered.

Then, after the fall of Kunduz, there was a major shift in October 2015 when President Obama announced that instead of just 1,000 troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2016, more than 5,500 will stay in the country at least through 2017. Whether this course correction will be enough to fix the policy mistakes of the past, we’ll know over the course of this year.

An important factor here will, of course, be the performance of the Afghan Army which has proved its mettle as a fighting force but still needs better equipment and more training. Another factor will be internal dynamics of the Taliban itself. After the death of the group’s long-time head Mullah Omar was announced last year (two years after his actual demise), the Afghan Taliban has been in a flux.

The new leader, Mullah Mansour, has struggled to consolidate his control. In November 2015, a rival splinter group emerged under Mullah Rasool and the two factions have fought some bloody battles in Zabul, Herat and Farah Provinces.

Additionally, several foot soldiers have abandoned the Taliban tag, preferring instead to fly the banner of the Islamic State terror group, whose actual ground presence is hotly debated but its jihadi lure remains undeniable. Now, the Islamic State and the Taliban are now fighting each other — for example, earlier this week the Taliban captured the Batikot and Chaparhar districts of Nangarhar Province from the Islamic State, which, however, retains control of Nazyan district.

In the short term, this power jostling will lead to more violence and bloodshed. Already, there is a consensus that the recent bombings in Kabul and the Taliban’s heightened efforts to takeover Helmand Province are a fallout of Mullah Mansour’s desperate attempts to establish his position, especially in the run-up to the peace talks, scheduled for January 11 in Islamabad. Notably, the talks were cancelled last year after Mullah Omar’s death was announced, and since then there has been no structured dialogue.

In the long term, a fractured Taliban will be a weaker Taliban; making it easier, for instance, to coerce one group of fighters into a peace settlement while another can be militarily defeated. While deft diplomacy will be key, and Kabul’s international allies will be expected to do their part in this context, the focus for now has to be on ensuring that the Afghan forces have the upper hand on the ground.

If the militants, already on a resurgent-high, come to the negotiating table emboldened by battle wins, they will have no reason to concede, and Afghanistan will hurtle towards a civil war. However, if the Afghan forces and their international support team can take advantage of the instability within their primary enemy, they should be able rollback the recent losses. A small window of opportunity might just have opened up, after all.

This article was published in the Oped section of The Pioneer on January 7, 2016

WHAT HAPPENS IN PAKISTAN...

If America is serious about fighting the jihadi challenge that the San Bernardino terrorists pose, then it needs to focus its attention, not on Iraq and Syria, but on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — the two major state sponsors of terror that it has mollycoddled for long

A day after the gruesome San Bernardino attack, US President Barack Obama’s address to the nation was ostensibly designed to reassure the American people that the Government was doing everything to keep them safe. Yet, it left many at unease — and rightly so. Early on in his speech, Mr Obama makes clear that, even though one of the attackers had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State hours before going on the rampage, there was nothing to link the attack in material terms to any foreign terrorist group. This is correct. But having made this assertion, oddly, the President then goes on to explain how his Government is working to defeat the Islamic State, while glossing over the fact that both terrorists, Tashfeen Malik and her husband Syed Rizwan Farooq, had links to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where they were presumably radicalised!

To be fair, Farooq’s path to radicalisation is still unclear. Born and raised in America, he seemed like a well-adjusted citizen, with a decent middle-class job    who raised no red flags — except that he sought and married a conservative woman like Malik. In fact, it increasingly seems like even though Farooq was, of course, also radicalised, it was Malik who was the mastermind.

Malik was born in Pakistan’s Punjab Province but taken to Saudi Arabia as a child in 1989, and raised in that country. While in Saudi Arabia, Malik’s father notably moved away from the relatively liberal Barelvi school of Sunni Islam that his family practiced in Pakistan and adopted the more puritanical Deobandi school. He also gradually distanced himself and his children from their family in Pakistan. Nevertheless, in 2007, Malik returned to Pakistan to study pharmacy at the Bahauddin Zakariya University in Multan, also in the Punjab Province. After graduation in 2012, she enrolled at the conservative Al Huda International School in the same city where she studied Islam for a year. In 2014, she married Farooq, whom she had met online, and moved to the US.

Malik’s time in Multan, Punjab, in general, and the institutions she attended there in particular, offer some interesting clues about how she may have been radicalised. Once the spiritual heartland of South Asian Sufi Islam, Pakistani Punjab, especially its much poorer southern parts, has seen a steady flow of Saudi money in recent decades — an estimated $100 million — which has been used to destroy the region’s moderate brand of Islam and create in its place a hotbed for Sunni terrorism.

US diplomatic cables sent from Pakistan between 2009 and 2011, and released by Wikileaks, document how maulanas from radical madarssas, bankrolled by the Saudis, approached poor families with multiple children, convinced them that their poverty was the result of the un-Islamic worship of idols at Sufi shrines, and finally persuaded the parents that the only way to return to the path of true Islam was to give up one of their children to the cause — for which, of course, they were paid a fair amount of cash. This is how the radicals recruited children as young as seven or eight years of age, indoctrinated them, and then either sent them off for further jihadi training or employed them as preachers for the next generation of Islamists.

When the situation began to grow out of hand, with extremists imposing no-go zones in some parts etc, local leaders sought to intervene but found their hands were tied by the conservative elements within the bureaucracy that had been planted by the Zia-ul Haq regime in previous years. Additionally, Punjab was also the jihadi nursery where the ISI raised its anti-India outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. In fact, JeM chief Azhar Masood, who was released by India after the hijacking of IC-814, belonged to southern Punjab while Ajmal Kasab, coming in a generation later, was repeatedly mentioned in US diplomatic cables as a typical example of how the vicious cycle of Saudi-funded jihadi terror turns.

Malik’s own story mirrors this phenomenon as well — the small town of Karor Lal Esan where she was born, in Layyah district of south Punjab, was named after the mystic Hazrat Lal Esan who is believed to have recited a Quranic verse 10 million times while standing on one leg. However, the Multan that a the Saudi-bred Malik returned to in 2007 was already notorious for radical sectarian activity. So much so, that The New York Times reports, university officials in Multan cooperated with law enforcement and intelligence authorities to “monitor for extremist activity on campus”.

It was also during this time in 2007 that the bloody siege of Lal Masjid happened — according to official estimates, the confrontation between the radical clerics of the mosque and the Pakistani military led to 154 deaths (although unofficial figures are much higher). Tensions between the pro-Taliban Lal Masjid clergy, supported in no small measure by women militants of the adjoining Jamia Hafsa madarssa, were brewing since 9/11 when then President Pervez Musharraf announced Pakistani support for the US war against terror. Matters came to a head when Jamia Hafsa militants abducted Chinese nationals among others for running a neighbourhood brothel in 2006. The Musharraf Government had no choice but to crackdown — there was a week-long siege and intense firefights between Pakistani soldiers and the heavily-armed militants. The campus was secured after eight days but the episode sparked a fresh wave of militancy across Pakistan.

The Lal Masjid story is important here because it has been reported that Tashfeen Malik had connections with the mosque’s head priest, Maulana Abul Aziz, and his wife, who now leads Jamia Hafsa. US authorities have brought this to the notice of Pakistani officials through Mr Shahbaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of Punjab and the Prime Minister’s brother. The Sharifs have a long history of protecting Abdul Aziz who has also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. On paper, he is a wanted man in Pakistan but that hasn’t stopped him from delivering public sermons and leading mass campaigns, as the Dawn newspaper reported last month.

There is no evidence yet to suggest if the Lal Masjid gang from Pakistan, instead of the Islamic State butchers from Syria or Iraq, provided material support to Malik and her husband for the San Bernardino attack but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Also, even if there was no direct support, there can be no two ways around the fact that Malik and Farooq derived their ideological nourishment from the putrid Sunni extremist eco-system that Saudi Arabia has spawned around the world and Pakistan cradled with special care.

If America is serious about fighting the jihadi challenge that the likes of Malik and Farooq pose, then it needs to focus its attention on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, not Iraq and Syria (which, arguably, are just symptoms, not the cause of jihadi terror). For too long, Washington, DC has mollycoddled these two major state sponsors of terror because first, they served its geo-political interests (although the disastrous Afghan campaign shows even that’s not entirely true) and second, the luxury of distance meant that America, unlike say India or Afghanistan, didn’t quite have to suffer the blowback of Saudi and Pakistani terror policies.

However, as global trends are change — the House of Saud, for example, is feeling the heat from the drop in oil prices — and America is, hopefully, realising that even its strongest homeland security systems cannot keep out the insidious jihadi ideology flowing from Saudi Arabia or that, in the words of a sharp Pakistani commentator, what happens in Pakistan no longer stays in Pakistan, there is an opportunity for a change in tact and policy. Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem like the Obama Administration at least is ready to take it up.

(This article was published in oped section of The Pioneer on December 10, 2015)

TOO MANY COOKS FOR SYRIAN BROTH

The Russia-Turkish confrontation on Tuesday won't spark a war but it may disrupt the global coalition that’s slowly coming together to fight the Islamic State. The situation is fast evolving, and India must decide if it's comfortable sitting out of the defining conflict of this time

The downing of a Russian military jet by Turkish forces on Tuesday was only the latest flashpoint in the increasingly internationalised Syrian crisis, which, of course, is fundamentally linked to the global threat posed by the Islamic State terror group. The confrontation came less than two weeks after the Paris attack, which claimed more than 130 lives and the aftermath of which continues to unravel with France and neighbouring Belgium on high alert. In between, a Russian commercial jet that had just departed from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh was bombed over the Sinai peninsula. Before that there were terror attacks, linked to the Islamic State, in Lebanon and Turkey.

Though the incident sent alarm bells ringing in world capitals — after all, it was the first time since the end of the Cold War that a Russian fighter plane was shot down by a Nato member state — and sparked a flurry of World War III headlines, it was actually not that surprising. There had been a similar scare in October when Turkey brought down what was thought to be a Russian aircraft but turned out to be a drone. More recently, Turkey has repeatedly complained about Russian jets, carrying out missions in Syria, violating its airspace. Besides, given how crowded the Syrian airspace is these days, with American, British, French, Arab, Turkish and Russian jets in the sky, it was only a matter of time before such a kerfuffle transpired.

But while this is a matter of concern, it is unlikely to lead to an escalation between Turkey and Russia. Sure, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a hard stance against Turkey, calling the attack a “stab in the back” and accusing the Government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of conspiring with the Islamic State, but it makes no sense for him to launch a full scale attack given that he already has his hands full with the mess in Ukraine and consequent Western sanctions. Besides, if Russia really wants revenge, its much more likely to do so indirectly — by propping up the Kurds. And so it is no surprise that on Wednesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said in no uncertain terms that Moscow does not “intend to wage a war on Turkey”.

Similarly, US President Barack Obama statement supporting Turkey’s right to protect its sovereignty in this context notwithstanding, there is no reason to worry that Nato will jump in to battle to defend Turkey — this is simply not that big an issue. Also, if Turkey had a problem with its airspace being violated, it has more than made its point by shooting down a Russian jet. Hence, immediately after the emergency meeting that Turkey called with its Nato allies, Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg, while expressing support for Turkey, also called for “de-escalation” and “diplomacy”. 

The more serious concern following Tuesday’s incident is, therefore, not a Nato-Russia confrontation but the atmosphere of acrimony and brinkmanship that it has fuelled. In recent days, following the Paris attack, the West and Russia have been inching towards greater cooperation against the Islamic State: Russia, which had mostly been attacking rebels groups fighting against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since it began military operations in September, had begun striking Islamic State targets as well. The Vienna talks, held a day after the Paris attack, had also made more progress than expected.

Meanwhile, French President  François Hollande has been lobbying world powers, with some degree of success it would seem, to put up a united front against the Islamic State. He will be in Moscow on Thursday and visited Washington, DC, on Tuesday to discuss greater cooperation (though, notably, Mr Lavrov cancelled his trip to Istanbul after the shooting). Importantly, the UN Security Council also passed a resolution earlier this week, calling for all necessary action to be taken against the Islamic State. Though this was a goodwill gesture rather than a firm commitment, it indicated a rare convergence of interests.

The current Turkey-Russia episode threatens these gains — and one can hardly write off the possibility that this precisely may have been Ankara’s game plan all along. There can be no two ways about the fact that the Islamic State was able to grow into the monster that it is today because Ankara facilitated the transfer of arms, funds and foreign fighters to rebel groups in Syria, including the Islamic State, in a desperate bid to bring down the Assad regime. Some Turkish officials have also been found to have links with Islamic State leaders and there have been strong allegations of elements within the Turkish Government benefitting from the Islamic State’s illicit activities particularly in oil trade. Moreover, Ankara has used the Islamic State as a weapon in its longstanding dispute with the Kurds, who are the only force on the ground that have been able to push back the Islamic State.

This brings us to the fundamental differences between Turkey and Russia in their approach to the Islamic State and the Syrian conflict: While Turkey’s primary aim is removal of the Assad regime, Russia’s is the exact opposite. Fighting the Islamic State is not a priority for either, though Russia doesn’t mind bombing the terror targets these days while Turkey has been strengthening them all along. Yet, it’s hard to imagine how a solution can be crafted without Russia and Turkey on the same page — and this is just looking at two of the many stakeholders in the conflict.

On a different note, it might be worth asking: What, if any, is India’s role here? Even if one assumes that India is not directly impacted by the conflict, at least for the time being, it still has major interests in West Asia, be they trade and investments, diaspora and remittances, and of course oil and energy security. Moreover, India is an aspiring Great Power that wants to have a say in the international system and is actively campaigning for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.

Yet, in the five years since the war in Syria broke out, India has contributed precious little to the conflict resolution process. It has made clear that it is opposed to foreign military intervention and regime change from the outside, and that a political solution is the only answer; it has also maintained its diplomatic relations with Damascus, an old Delhi friend. But while these are wise policy positions, they are not prescriptive measures.

At the multilateral level, India participated in two major initiatives regarding the Syrian conflict. In both cases, there was little to write home about. First, in 2011, it joined hands with its IBSA partners — Brazil and South Africa, all of whom were temporary members of the UNSC at that time — to push for a statement calling for the immediate halt of violent in Syria. The statement was the first that the world body had issued on what was then a six-month-long conflict and, to that extent, was a modest success for all three members. However, the delegation that they led to Syria soon after was a failure. In early 2014, India was one among the 30 countries that participated in the Geneva-II talks but here too, then External Affairs Minister, Mr Salman Khurshid, mostly just reiterated New Delhi’s known positions on the issues. Perhaps, it is no surprise then that India hasn’t been invited to the ongoing Vienna talks.

To be fair, India has good reason to not want to get its hands dirty: The situation is a mess and India doesn’t really face any immediate pressing threats that it cannot handle from home. That said, India has strong relations with almost all the regional and major powers, enormous goodwill in much of West Asia, and finally, civilisational ties with the region. Should it not leverage these assets to making meaningful contribution? Equally importantly, can an aspiring global power afford to sit out of what is possibly the defining crisis of our times?

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on November 26, 2015)