While the Pathankot assault is being analysed threadbare, Mazar-e-Sharif has pretty much fallen off the radar even though the latter is an important indicator of how the Afghan security situation is evolving since US-led forces ended combat operations in that country
In the haze of the Pathankot saga, the simultaneous attack on the Indian consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan, has received limited attention. And almost all of that has focused on the Jaish-e-Mohammed-Afzal Guru connection that seems to link the two episodes.
Now, while there is no doubt that both incidents were designed to rollback recent progresses on the India-Pakistan front as well as the India-Afghanistan front, and that in the larger picture they are inextricably linked, it is important to look at them individually for a more nuanced understanding. The Pathankot attack, of course, is being analysed threadbare but Mazar-e-Sharif has pretty much fallen off the radar — though the latter is an important indicator of how the security situation in Afghanistan is evolving especially since US-led forces officially ended combat operations in the country at the end of 2014.
The January 4 attack on the Indian consulate, which claimed the life of one policeman and injured 11 others, comes at a time when such incidents have unfortunately become the norm, with 2015 being the bloodiest year for Afghanistan since 2001. Indeed, 2015 was also the year that saw the Taliban take control of a major urban centre for the first time since the Americans had chased them out of Kabul. In September, the northern hub of Kunduz was under Taliban control for two weeks, after which Afghan forces, with US air support, were able to take back the city. The episode was not just a strategic or political loss, it also dealt a severe psychological blow.
Worse still, after Kunduz, the Taliban have continued to attack high-profile targets: In December, a suicide bomber detonated his device outside Bagram air field killing six US airmen. Weeks later, militants dressed in Army fatigues penetrated Kandahar airport; that same day, the Taliban overran a district centre in Helmand, the southern Province which borders Pakistan and was an insurgent stronghold. In recent months, Helmand has been the site of fierce fighting between the Taliban and Afghan soldiers, and the former have, worryingly, been able to make significant inroads into the Province.
In fact, this Sunday, the Taliban were able to break through the frontlines of the strategically important Sangin district, and it wasn’t until Tuesday that Afghan forces, assisted by British soldiers, were able to take back important buildings in the area. However, fighting continues in Marjah, another town of the embattled Province, where one American soldier was killed and two others injured on Tuesday, prompting a dozen American airstrikes on Wednesday.
Outside Helmand, in Kabul, there was yet another bomb blast on Tuesday night bringing the total number of militant attacks in the capital city to four before even the first week of the New Year was over. Three of these attacks have happened over 48 hours: The day of the Mazar-e-Sharif attack saw a Taliban truck bomb strike a heavily-guarded residential compound in Kabul that was housing foreign contractors, killing two and wounding more than 30 civilians; and a separate bomb went off near the airport in the capital city.
Clearly, the hard-won gains of this past decade-and-a-half remain under threat, and may still be reversed. This is exactly what many security analysts had predicted when the Obama Administration had announced its ill-advised troop withdrawal plan in the first place. Of course, what was supposed to be a ‘withdrawal’ plan eventually became a ‘drawdown’ with more than 9,000 US soldiers remaining in Afghanistan even after 2014, when combat operations were officially ended, military bases handed over, and flags lowered.
Then, after the fall of Kunduz, there was a major shift in October 2015 when President Obama announced that instead of just 1,000 troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2016, more than 5,500 will stay in the country at least through 2017. Whether this course correction will be enough to fix the policy mistakes of the past, we’ll know over the course of this year.
An important factor here will, of course, be the performance of the Afghan Army which has proved its mettle as a fighting force but still needs better equipment and more training. Another factor will be internal dynamics of the Taliban itself. After the death of the group’s long-time head Mullah Omar was announced last year (two years after his actual demise), the Afghan Taliban has been in a flux.
The new leader, Mullah Mansour, has struggled to consolidate his control. In November 2015, a rival splinter group emerged under Mullah Rasool and the two factions have fought some bloody battles in Zabul, Herat and Farah Provinces.
Additionally, several foot soldiers have abandoned the Taliban tag, preferring instead to fly the banner of the Islamic State terror group, whose actual ground presence is hotly debated but its jihadi lure remains undeniable. Now, the Islamic State and the Taliban are now fighting each other — for example, earlier this week the Taliban captured the Batikot and Chaparhar districts of Nangarhar Province from the Islamic State, which, however, retains control of Nazyan district.
In the short term, this power jostling will lead to more violence and bloodshed. Already, there is a consensus that the recent bombings in Kabul and the Taliban’s heightened efforts to takeover Helmand Province are a fallout of Mullah Mansour’s desperate attempts to establish his position, especially in the run-up to the peace talks, scheduled for January 11 in Islamabad. Notably, the talks were cancelled last year after Mullah Omar’s death was announced, and since then there has been no structured dialogue.
In the long term, a fractured Taliban will be a weaker Taliban; making it easier, for instance, to coerce one group of fighters into a peace settlement while another can be militarily defeated. While deft diplomacy will be key, and Kabul’s international allies will be expected to do their part in this context, the focus for now has to be on ensuring that the Afghan forces have the upper hand on the ground.
If the militants, already on a resurgent-high, come to the negotiating table emboldened by battle wins, they will have no reason to concede, and Afghanistan will hurtle towards a civil war. However, if the Afghan forces and their international support team can take advantage of the instability within their primary enemy, they should be able rollback the recent losses. A small window of opportunity might just have opened up, after all.
This article was published in the Oped section of The Pioneer on January 7, 2016
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