LOOKING BEYOND ECONOMIC TIES

The Prime Minister’s trip to Germany focussed on boosting trade and technology ties. But the gifts that he exchanged with his host, Chancellor Angela Merkel, offer a sneak peak into the deeper civilisation connect between India and Germany 

The importance of the relationship between India, one of the world’s largest emerging powers, and Germany, the economic anchor of continental Europe, hardly needs to be reiterated. Neither does one have to underscore the fact that the India-Germany bilateral, robust as it may be, is not exactly functioning at its optimal level.

Despite their complimentary national traits and requirements  — if Germany can benefit from access to Indian skilled labour and a large market here, India’s growth story can be fuelled by cutting-edge German technology — and equally importantly, a shared commitment to the universal values of freedom, democracy and equality, the two countries are somehow indifferent to each other. Sure, there has been increasing cooperation at the Government-to-Government and business-to-business levels, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recently concluded trip to Germany shows, but at the people-to-people level, there is still precious little to talk about, beyond Bollywood and Bayern Munich.

This is especially disappointing because the two countries do, in fact, share a deeper civilisational connect that somehow seems to have snapped in the modern age. A re-discovery of this civilisational connect has the potential to truly re-invigorate the India-Germany bilateral and offer young Germans and Indians alike a fresh perspective, as they both seek to re-define their place within a new world order.

The gifts that Mr Modi and German Chancellor Angela Merkel exchanged earlier this week offer a sneak peak into the historical ties that the two nations share. Mr Modi gifted his host, who holds a doctorate in quantum chemistry, reproductions of manuscripts and papers written by Indian Nobel Laureate CV Raman who is known to have been inspired by the famous German scientist Hermann von Helmholtz to pursue a career in science On her part, Ms Merkel on Tuesday gifted Mr Modi an original first edition print of German Indologist Friedrich Max Müller’s book on the Indian spiritual leader, Sri Ramakrishna Paramhansa.

Today, Max Müller is, arguably, the most recognisable German in India. This is as it should be for few other foreigners have contributed so significantly to India’s understanding of its past and its philosophy as he. Best known for editing The Sacred Books of the East, his monumental 50-volume set of English translations of Asian religious text that was published by the Oxford University Press between 1879 and 1910, Max Müller also translated the Upanishads and the Rig Veda.

His other well-known book, that seems to have been largely forgotten in this country today, is titledIndia —What It Can Teach Us. The book is based on his lectures to candidates of the Indian Civil Service examination, on whom he wished to impress the importance of ancient Indian culture and tradition. His last major work, published a year before his death in 1900, was The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. This was the major first publication to discuss all the philosophical systems of India.

But while there is still a reasonable amount of recognition of Max Müller and his work in India, few today remember his contemporary Indologists. For example, Arthur Schopenhauer, who worked around the same time as Max Müller and is considered to be the first Western thinker who incorporated thoughts of the Upanishads in his own philosophy, hardly rings a bell.

Schopenhauer believed that called the availability of Sanskrit literature to the West was “the greatest gift of our century”, and even predicted that ancient Indian philosophy, which he considered to be the “highest human wisdom”, would become the “cherished faith of the West”. In the preface to his best known work, The World As Will And Representation, Schopenhauer writes that one who “has also received and assimilated the sacred primitive Indian wisdom, then he is the best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him”. Interestingly, Schopenhauer was introduced to Indian philosophy through his friend Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, a lesser known philosopher, who had mastered the Sanskrit language.

This is just a small list of a few thinkers from the 19 century. The first German to study Sanskrit can be traced to back to the 17th century to the missionary Heinrich Roth, who lived in India and is believed to have written on Sanskirt grammar but his works were never published. Later, August Wilhelm Schlegel, the first professor of Indology at Bonn University, published his famous book, On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians while poet Friedrich Rückert gained prominence with his translation of the Mahabharat.

At this point, one may rightly question how exactly the study of what obscure German philosophers had to say about India or Indian philosophy would be of any interest to contemporary Indians (or Germans, for that matter). The answer to that is simple: If young Indians (and Germans) are looking to rewrite their terms of engagement with each other and indeed with the world, they will have to find their own unique narrative. Besides, a nation that is ignorant of its past cannot hope to build a strong and secure future — and this is particularly relevant for an emerging power like India that has an otherwise robust  civilisational identity.

Two good examples of how ancient knowledge can be or is being leveraged in the contemporary world is the growing popularity of traditional Indian medicines and therapeutic practices in this country and that of Sanskrit studies in Germany. Unfortunately, the Indian perspectives on these issues have oscillated from completely ignoring the matter on the one hand to romanticizing it on the other. Since Germany has made huge progress in researching ancient India, and Sanskrit classes there are so popular today that universities can’t find enough teachers to cater to the growing demand, these ties have the potential to be leveraged further.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 16, 2015)

SAUDI MUSCLE-FLEXING IN YEMEN

The crisis in Yemen is neither a predominantly Shia-Sunni conflict nor just another proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is a civil war in which a foolhardy Riyadh is intervening to show off its geo-political might. For this, the average Yemeni will pay the price in blood

With approximately 3,500 Indian citizens trapped in Yemen, the latest child of the Arab Spring to collapse, reportage here about the war in that country has, understandably, been focused on the Government’s ongoing evacuation efforts. In the process, the geo-strategic implications of the conflict, wherein a Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebellion has toppled the West-backed Yemeni Government, prompting a military intervention by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Sunni Arab states, have been largely ignored. However, with the Houthis taking charge of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait, it is now imperative to look at the larger picture.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait is a chokepoint, just about 30kms at its widest, located between Yemen in the Arabian Penninsula, and Eritrea and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. It connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and is a crucial linkage in the international waterway that connects Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. This is the route that has traditionally been taken by Indian merchant ships to reach European markets (and vice versa), and is of immense importance to India’s sea-borne trade interests.

Now, there have been some reports and suggestions that the Houthis may shut down the strait and actually choke the shipping lane. This — particularly a long-term shutdown — seems far-fetched. Neither do the Houthis seem to have the maritime capability to enforce such a blockade nor will regional and world powers allow it. Because of previous threats from Somali piracy, the strait is fairly well-guarded with the navies of Russia, Ukraine, the US, UK, France and India routinely patrolling the waters. The immediate concern about Bab-el-Mandeb, therefore, is not a complete shutdown by the Houthis, but greater disruption in an already fragile region.

Yemen, one of the poorest Arab states, is home to Al Qaeda’s most resilient franchise — Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula. Years of American drone strikes and other targeted counter-terror strategies have had some success in containing the group but it is entirely possible that the AQAP will return with a vengeance on the back of a protracted regional war, much like the Islamic State came of age in the political and military chaos of Syria and Iraq. If that happens, piracy and terror attacks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, of the sort we saw in 2008, when Somali pirates seized Saudi Arabia’s Sirius Star oil tanker, or in 2000, when Al Qaeda attacked US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole, will increase. At the very least, such incidents will push up insurance costs for commercial ships; if the strait becomes too risky, the ships will have to take a much longer route.

Unfortunately, a long-drawn out conflict is exactly where we are heading towards, with the ill-advised Saudi-led Sunni Arab coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm. Officially, this operation is being carried out on the request of ousted Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to dislodge the Houthis from power and bring back stability to the country. However, apart from aerial bombing of Houthi targets, there seems to be no larger gameplan for how to achieve this target — either militarily or politically.

It is important to understand that the Houthis, though an anti-Government force, are not terrorists of the Islamic State-type. They are a political force, rooted in Yemen and driven by local causes. Their group was formed in 1992 in the Saada Governorate to protect and promote the interests of the minority Zaidi (a Shia offshoot) community. Found almost exclusively in this northern mountainous region of Yemen, on the border with Saudi Arabia, this community had been ignored by the Sunni Government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh who ruled for 33 years until he had to quit office at the height of the Arab Spring. The Houthi movement criticised the Saleh Government for not just marginalising the minority group but also for being corrupt and inefficient.

Later, when the Saleh Government allowed the US to use Yemeni territory for counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda, the Houthis opposed American intervention. Their voice grew louder with the Iraq war, and after they took their opposition from Saada to the capital city of Sanaa, President Saleh sought to shut them down. This led to six brutal wars between 2004 and 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring came to Yemen and the Houthis were at the forefront of the protest movement. A year later, following an agreement brokered by Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr Saleh was eased out of office but the Houthis were sidelined. A transitional regime, supported by the international community, was put in place while the Houthis positioned themselves as the opposition force.

Mr Hadi, also Mr Saleh’s long time Vice President, was at the helm but failed spectacularly in guiding Yemen’s political transition and the Houthis upped their ante against him. In this, Mr Saleh also played a part (it is no coincidence that Bab-el-Mandeb was handed to the Houthis by a section of the Yemeni Army loyal to Mr Saleh). Soon, Mr Hadi lost the plot. The Houthis advanced from their Saada stronghold and and captured Sanaa on September 21, 2014.

There was a period of political reconciliation when a new Cabinet with a new Prime Minister was formed. But tensions grew over the drafting of Yemen’s Constitution and eventually the Houthis besieged the homes of the Prime Minister and the President. On January 21, Mr Hadi and his Cabinet resigned. The embattled President moved to his hometown of Aden where he rescinded his resignation and announced that the port city was the new capital of Yemen. But on March 25, Mr Hadi fled Yemen and appeared in Riyadh on March 26, the day that Saudi Arabia announced its military campaign in Yemen.

Now, this campaign is being portrayed as a Saudi-Iran proxy war fought on sectarian lines. To a certain extent, it is — as the Houthis receive support from Tehran. However, the quantum and quality of this support has been vastly exaggerated. Also, as described earlier, the Houthis are not merely an Iranian proxy force or a mercenary Shiite army. They are a local political group fighting, what is essentially, a civil war. And there’s only one sensible course of action here for foreign powers: Stay away from the mess.

Saudi Arabia’s intervention, and that too on behalf of the weaker party, will only lead to a protracted conflict of the sort we are seeing in Syria and Iraq. There may have been a sliver of hope had the coalition produced some political action plan but there is none. Even the coalition’s military prowess is in doubt — the Saudi military has a bunch of fancy toys but it’s a largely untested force. The Egyptians are slightly better but it should be remembered that Cairo and Riyadh have historically been on opposing sides in Yemeni matters (remember the 1960s North Yemen civil war). Besides, neither of these two big players have the resources to sustain a long-term military operation especially if it involves ground troops. 

So, why is Riyadh getting into this mess? The answer is simple: It has always been paranoid about Yemen and has a history of meddling in its internal affairs. The Arab Spring and the Houthi advance had disrupted its carefully orchestrated political equations and now its seeking a reset. Also, after its successful 2011 intervention to save the Sunni-minority Government of Bahrain, it seems like Saudi Arabia is taking its position as the big brother in the Sunni world a little too seriously — unfortunately, it’s doing so in a manner that’ll only bring about more death and bloodshed to the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 2, 2015)

MALDIVES STUMBLES YET AGAIN

The renewed political persecution of Opposition leader and former President Mohamed Nasheed is an important diplomatic challenge for the Modi Government. India must help Maldives stay the democratic course

The political crisis in the Maldives, stemming from the controversial arrest of former President Mohamed Nasheed, is one of the most significant diplomatic tests for the Government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Mr Nasheed was the archipelago’s first democratically elected head of state and remains one of the most pro-India leaders in the sub-continent.

How India responds to what is clearly a case of political persecution in this context will answer four questions. First, how does India treat its friends and is it willing to go the extra mile for them? Second, does India have the diplomatic (as opposed to the economic, geographic or even historic) clout to maintain its position as the foremost power in the sub-continent? Third, especially with another regional power — China — pushing into India’s near abroad, does New Delhi have the ability protect its interests? Fourth, is India, as the world’s largest democracy, willing to walk the talk on securing democratic ideals in its neighbourhood? 

Let’s start with the Government of India’s official response to the crisis: On February 23, a day after Mr Nasheed was arrested and roughed up by police on his way to court, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement expressing concern at the “recent developments in Maldives” including the “manhandling” of the former President.

As such, the statement was fairly routine, if not downright insipid. At least a section of the commentariat here would have liked a stronger response but these are still early days and one needn’t always fire the big guns in the opening salvo itself. A measured response in public is fine for now, as long as a firm message is being sent across in private.

The Government of India cannot be seen as meddling in the internal affairs of another sovereign nation but neither can it perceived as sitting idly as its friend and ally is given the short shrift. In other words, India will be in the crossfire between the Maldives’s ruling coalition and its opposition parties — but not for the first time.

In the run-up to the 2014 general election that brought the incumbent regime, led by President Abdullah Yameen, to power, there was a similar political crisis in 2013 wherein the interim Government of the time, had sought to keep Mr Nasheed out of the electoral race. Notably, this interim Government had taken over after Mr Nasheed was controversially ousted from office in February 2012, following a mutiny by the Maldivian police and the Army.

The removal marked the return of the old guard in Male and the process came a full circle with the presidency of Mr Yameen, the half-brother of Mr Maumoon Gayoom who had ruled Maldives with an iron hand for three decades.

In 2012, as Male slipped into political turmoil, the Indian Government was caught napping. It was unable to protect Mr Nasheed even though the latter had reportedly asked for Indian assistance. In 2013, however, the Manmohan Singh administration did a far better job: After Mr Nasheed took refuge in the Indian High Commission in Male, Indian diplomats secured a peace deal of sorts that allowed Mr Nasheed to fight the election in 2014. Whether the Modi Government will be able to do something similar now and extricate Mr Nasheed again, will be closely watched.

For now, there has been little movement in the public domain but it may be pertinent to note that when a high-level delegation from Mr Nasheed’s party, the Maldivian Democratic Party, visited New Delhi between 19 and 22 February, at a time when the crisis was just building up, not a single member of the Modi Government met with the Maldivian leaders.

Four days earlier, on February 15, Maldivian Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon (she is Mr Gayoom’s daughter) had called on External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in New Delhi and reportedly reiterated Male’s commitment that there would be no political witch-hunt.

Delhi seems to have taken these words at face value and gone ahead with planning the Prime Minister’s Indian Ocean tour which was to include Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius and Maldives later this month. Now, it seems that Maldives leg has been put on hold. The MEA has not announced any dates for Maldives even though Ms Maumoon has already said that her Government will be welcoming Mr Modi soon.

A prime ministerial trip to Maldives at this point will be a de facto (and ill-advised) endorsement of the policies of the Yameen Government while a refusal to make the trip is sure to annoy the regime, which is already on the defensive. Note that even before Delhi had put out an official statement on the Nasheed crisis, Ms Maumoon publicly called upon India to abide by the Panchsheel principles and steer clear of domestic politics. 

Generally speaking, the Indian establishment has strong ties with the Gayoom/Yameen camp as well, but those linkages haven’t prevented the latter from seeking closer relations with China, occasionally even at the cost of upsetting India. The GMR controversy is, of course, well-known in this context but there are also more recent, instances. For example, in December 2014, the Yameen Government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese on the Maritime Silk Route project; Male and Beijing are already negotiating a free trade agreement; the two have also set up a joint commission to monitor large infrastructure projects.

China is already building housing units on Hulhumale island, and a link road at Laamu Atoll which has been identified as a potential special economic zone; it is also doing a feasibility report on constructing a bridge connecting the Maldives’ only international airport on Hulhule island to Male city and has expressed interest in developing the airport as well. The Maldives is also looking to collaborate with China in oil and gas exploration projects.

The Yameen Government’s overtures to China have been so blatant that its own Ministers have expressed concern. It is assumed that this is why Mr Mohamed Nazim, who was serving as Defence Minister until January 20, was removed from office, following a midnight raid on his house on January 18. He was arrested on February 10. Aware of how closely the Maldivian Defence Forces work with India, Mr Nazim had red-flagged his Government’s “exponentially growing” security ties with China, to use the words of the Chinese Ambassador in Male. For example, China recently gifted 150 motorbikes to Maldivian Police.

Incidentally, Mr Nazim was at the forefront of the protest against Mr Nasheed in 2012 but has since been pushed off the regime ship. Within the Maldivian political establishment, there seems to be growing unease about the Yameen Government’s high-handedness. The Jumhooree Party recently quit the ruling coalition and joined hands with the MDP, while the Adhaalath Party has also been making some noises. India should take advantage of these developments to ensure that the country stays the democratic course.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 5, 2015

COMING CLOSER, OFFICIALLY

Since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The BJP took the lead in normalising ties, but it was a Congress Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations

It may have taken more than two decades, but if Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon’s India visit is any indication, it seems like India is finally and firmly committed to correcting the historical anomalies of its relationship with Israel.

Mr Ya’alon’s visit comes less than three months after Union Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singh visited Israel and only four months after Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2014.

Mr Ya’alon is the first serving Israeli Defence Minister to visit India, and his presence at a platform like Aero India is an unapologetic acknowledgement of not just the strong relationship between India and Israel, but more specifically, of the close defence ties as well.

Israel is India’s second largest military supplier after Russia and India is reportedly Israel’s biggest defence customer. In 2014 alone, defence trade between the two countries stood at about $2.5 billion. Last year, India also picked the Israeli state-owned anti-tank guided missile over the American Javelin offer in a deal that’s worth $525 million. This year, at Aero India, media reports suggest, India and Israel are expected to sign deals worth $1.5 billion.

It’s not just the weapons’ sales, per se, that are driving the defence relationship ; there’s a strong strategic component as well. Let us not forget that the big turning point here was the Israeli military assistance to India during the Kargil war. India had only limited experience with this kind of sub-conventional warfare (which, notably, has almost become the norm now) while Israel’s expertise in this field remains unparalleled.

Yet, despite such close collaboration, which, in fact, can be traced back to the 1950s (when India had sought Israeli expertise in agriculture, for example), there has always been a reluctance at the political level to acknowledge the scale of the relationship. In fact, the last time an Israeli leader who had served as Defence Minister, visited India, it was a closely-guarded state secret.

In 1977, Moshe Dayan — he was Foreign Minister at that time but had previously held the defence portfolio — was invited by Prime Minister Morarji Desai. According to US diplomatic cables, released by Wikileaks, the leaders spoke for over an hour and Moshe Dayan believed that “(Egypt’s President Anwar) Sadat had asked Desai to use his influence with Israelis in seeking a Middle East peace settlement”. 

During the meeting, the leaders also discussed establishing diplomatic ties, but Desai said it would not be possible at that time. This was in keeping with the Indian Government’s anti-Israel policy of the time — the result of several factors, from India’s colonial baggage to Mahatma Gandhi’s personal views of the Zionist movement to the Congress’s misguided Muslim appeasement policies. Put together, they produced a strong anti-Israel bias that penetrated deep within India’s foreign policy establishment and have remained to some extent even after full diplomatic relations were formally established in 1992.

That said, it is also equally true that in the two decades since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The Bharatiya Janata Party took the lead in normalising ties but it was a Prime Minister from the Congress, PV Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations.

 His successor from the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Delhi while the Congress-led UPA Government that came next allowed the relationship to flourish — so much so that bilateral trade, which spans across sectors as diverse as education and outer space, is now pegged at six billion dollars from just about $20 million in 1992.

What remains today from the policy baggage of the past is some anti-Israel posturing at international forums and the occasional impediment or irritant caused by individual leaders or bureaucrats within the system. For example, though India steers clear of criticising Israel on Palestinian issues, it continues to support resolutions against Israel at the UNHRC.

 Similarly, as recently as 2013, a senior Congress leader like Mr AK Antony, under whose watch as Defence Minister, India bought millions of dollars of weapons from Israel, reportedly backed out from a scheduled Israel trip at the last minute after he was told of reservations from the Muslim League. A third example here is of India’s odd reluctance to invest in Israel’s off-shore gas field, ostensibly because this might upset Arab states.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is hoped that abnormalities such as these will be ironed out. Mr Modi is known to be a strong supporter of Israel, and so are many of his top team members including Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Home Affairs Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.

It is no coincidence that the $659 million of Israeli arms purchases that have happened since Mr Modi came to power (even though many of the deals were put in place by the UPA regime) are more than Israel’s total defence exports to India in the last three years.

Clichéd as it may sound, the India-Israel bilateral is an idea whose time has come. From India’s point of view, Israel can be a great partner in the Modi Government’s flagship Make in India project. Much of the long-term success of this project hinges on the willingness of foreign Governments and private companies to transfer technology to India.

From Israel’s point of view, a resurgent India presents a lucrative market, especially as Europe, Israel’s traditional buyer, struggles to get back on its feet. Israel’s support for India syncs well with its own Look East policy, which includes other Asian powers such as China, Japan and South Korea.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 20, 2015

IRAN, A STABILISING FACTOR IN WAR-TORN WEST ASIA

Tehran is one of the few power centres that is working to stem the region’s slide into chaos and anarchy

Hardly a day now passes when one doesn’t hear about something terrible happening in West Asia. If it’s not the Islamic State brutes that are beheading, enslaving and murdering people, their compatriots in other parts of the region are routinely blowing up towns and cities while insurgents topple Governments and terror groups take over entire countries.

True, the region has always been a hotspot (if nothing else, there’s always the Israel-Arab conflict) but the situation has undoubtedly worsened in the post Arab Uprising years. Every Great Power worth its salt has sought to bring stability to West Asia — and failed.

One major reason for this is that, not everybody gets the West Asia and nearabouts. The region is extremely complex and few foreign powers can legitimately claim to understand its ever-changing dynamics. Perhaps, the focus should be on strengthening regional powers and allowing them greater space to manage what is really their own backyard.

Traditionally, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been the big boys in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council is also an important force but it’s primarily an economic entity with limited political and no military prowess. Israel also could have been on the list, but given its own complicated relations with most countries in the region, it can hardly play the role of an interlocutor.

 Unfortunately, as of now, Iraq has all but collapsed while Egypt’s regional stature stands greatly diminished as it struggles to get its house in order. Saudi Arabia is a force to contend with, though its one-point agenda of pushing Wahhabism that has fuelled Islamist terrorism across the world, makes it a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution.

Besides, over the years, Saudi Arabia has shown that it couldn’t be bothered with cultivating ties and nurturing relationships because it believes that, with all the money it has, it can easily buy the influence it needs. This has not always worked out well. 

This leaves us with Iran — a large and stable country that has a civilisational connect in the region but has been ignored by the international community, primarily because of its controversial nuclear weapons programme.

 But if you keep that aside, there is an argument to be made for strengthening Iran’s hand in the region’s power matrix. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran doesn’t always have the kind of money to throw around. And so it practises old school diplomacy — working with local leaders, supporting friendly regimes and building up regional institutions.

Take, for example, the fight against the Islamic State. The West’s anti-IS coalition has been a non-starter, and that’s in no small measure because of the double standards of some coalition partners like Jordan and Turkey. The only ones that have succeeded against the Islamic State are the Kurds, but they have little support from the rest of the world. Iran, however, has been actively working with the Kurds and helping them with men and material on the ground.

Iran has also been working closely with the Government in Baghdad so as to stabilise the Iraqi regime, which is the key to retrieving that country from the clutches of the Islamic State. After all, it was the power vacuum in Iraq and Syria that created the fertile grounds for the IS to breed and nurture. Unless, these core issues are addressed, no military intervention can succeed. This, we have learned the hard way in Afghanistan.

In fact, even in the case of Afghanistan, Iran has sought to play the role of a regional stabiliser. The Americans were able to quickly topple the Taliban in the early days of the war primarily because of Iranian support. More recently, Tehran has also sought to persuade Pakistan (which is known to seek ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan) to not meddle in Kabul’s affairs. This is a point that India has also sought to underline but, understandably, with little effect, in Pakistan.

In fact, in terms of larger foreign policy principles, both India and Iran are staunchly opposed to foreign interventions and agree that is only well-mediated, political solutions are the only real solutions to some of the most crises of our times. Perhaps, the only point on which India and Iran have divergent positions is with regard to Israel.

While Iran doesn’t even recognise the Jewish state, India’s relations with Israel have strengthened significantly in the past two decades. While there is not much that India can do to change that dynamic, one can take comfort in the fact that both Iran and Israel say that neither will be the first to make the aggressive move.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 13, 2015

NEW RULES FOR THE GREAT GAME

Under the Modi Government, India is re-calibrating its relationship with the Great Powers, as the Obama visit stands proof. Now, it will be interesting to see how New Delhi projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums

This past fortnight has been a particularly busy one for Indian diplomacy. It started with US President Barack Obama’s visit to the country which was followed by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s relatively low key trip to China which included a trilateral meeting with Russia. Both visits are parts of larger processes wherein India, under the Narendra Modi Government, is re-defining the terms of its engagement with Great Powers. President Obama’s visit builds upon the Prime Minister US tour in September 2014 while Ms Swaraj’s Beijing trip sets the stage for the next India-China summit. Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s India visit last November, Mr Modi is now scheduled to travel to China in May, just before he completes his first year in office. In between, Russian President Vladimir Putin was in New Delhi for the annual India-Russia summit, and all the heads of Government also had an opportunity to deliberate during the G20 summit in Australia last year.

Though it’s too early to present a full picture of India’s foreign policy under BJP-led NDA regime, some of the salient features of the Modi doctrine, at least with regard to Great Power engagement, are becoming clear. At the top of the list is the end of anti-Americanism which has been best symbolised by the presence of the US President as the Republic Day parade. Though the US has long since ceased to be a subject of suspicion in contemporary public discourse, especially among the youth who have been raised on a staple diet of Americana, within India’s encrusted political and bureaucratic circles, the residues of that reflexively anti-US posture have remained. 

Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had sought to change that discourse but could only do that much with just one term in office. Thankfully, his successor Manmohan Singh, much more pro-America than the average Congress politician, continued without his efforts. Mr Singh dragged the Left-leaning political class, kicking and screaming (and quite literally so), into the 21st century geo-political scene and forced them to accept that India stood to benefit from a partnership with America. This is what led to the signing of the historic nuclear deal that legitimised India’s status as a nuclear power and also paved the way for the country to do nuclear commerce globally. It was also during Mr Singh’s tenure that defence cooperation was incorporated into the bilateral, another hugely symbolic policy shift, that also opened up the market for billions of dollars of weapons and technology trade.

Unfortunately, Mr Singh had exhausted all his political capital in the early years of his first term, and could not take the India-US project to its logical conclusion. Americans, who had lobbied the world to make an exception (no matter how well-deserved) for India, saw the 2010 nuclear liability law as a betrayal of sorts for it shut out US suppliers from the Indian market. Meanwhile, Indian politicians like Mr AK Antony, who served as the Defence Minister in the UPA Government, actively scuttled American projects and repeatedly spurned Washington’s offers to upgrade the relationship.

It is against this backdrop that the Obama visit needs to be evaluated. As some commentators have pointed out, tangible deliverables from the summit have been few: For example, though the Modi Government has said that it has ironed out most of those problems with regard to the operationalisation of the nuclear deal, the agreements are yet to be signed. But that’s okay. Often, complex negotiations such as these get stuck at the bureaucratic level and high-level political exchanges help remove the blockages. This is what the Obama visit, and the Modi visit before that, achieved. Equally importantly, the overwhelmingly positive optics of the visit, which critics have sought to write-off as style statements without substance, were, in fact, necessary to send out a clear and unambiguous message that India and America are friends and partners, and they will be doing business together, irrespective of how that fits into your ideological leanings.

The second big take-away from the Obama tour was the revitalisation of the American rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific, with India at its strategic core. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region didn’t get as much attention as the extensive US-India Joint Statement but it was here that the strategic aspect of the relationship came into full bloom. The US has now made clear that it wants India to play a leading role as a ‘security provider’ in the Indo-Pacific region (to use a term that Ms Hillary Clinton had famously used). In  other words, it wants India to ‘balance’ China’s tendencies to become the neighbourhood bully. Now, this is technically an old policy, as anybody who remembers Washington’s ‘pivot to Asia’ will tell you.

But the latter never quite took off, especially from India’s perspective. The Obama Administration was seen as pandering to Beijing, and more so, after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 that damaged America’s credentials as the world’s only superpower. Also, a still instinctively anti-US and somewhat diffident India did not appreciate either being dragged into a potential US-China crossfire or being portrayed as bulwark against China. America’s pivot to Asia (which hinged on solid India-US ties) didn’t quite dovetail with its ‘pivot to India’. The latter came first, in the early 2000s, with the Bush Administration; but it was petering out by the time the Obama Administration introduced the Asia Pivot.

Now, it seems that the two are better aligned. Apart from India and the US being on a much stronger footing than before, the Obama Administration has also firmed its view on the India-China dynamic, while India, under the Modi Government, is willing to play a more assertive role in the region. Additionally, America’s efforts to bring in more regional actors (Vietnam, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, apart from Japan) into the equation go well with India’s own Look East policy and its overall idea of an Asian century.

China, expectedly, is not happy with the developments. Yes, it can play Pakistan if it feels India is getting out of hand but that card is fast becoming a double-edged sword. Nonetheless, as Minister Swaraj’s recently concluded Beijing trip shows, China is not making a big deal about any of this — at least, not right away. We’ll know more when Mr Modi visits China. Remember, President Xi’s visit was dampened by Chinese transgressions along the Line of Actual Control. Either way, the focus of the Modi Government’s China policy is on economic issues. The Chinese tend to let these move at their own pace, without linking them to strategic issues.

Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see how India projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums. For example, the Russia-India-China joint communiqué, signed in Beijing by Ms Swaraj, had the usual anti-US tone, similar to many a BRICS declaration. Talk about India joining the SCO also includes concern over how much Delhi will be able gain from joining forums that are considered to be China-dominated. Finally, despite all the promised cooperation between the US and India on clean energy and climate change issues, there are still no guarantees that the two will find common ground in Paris later this year.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 5, 2015

OF KNOWN AND UNKNOWN DEVILS

Mahinda Rajapaksa’s influence may be waning but the Sri Lankan Opposition is not yet a force to reckon with. Glued together by its common dislike for the President, it has no collective vision for the future and is hardly a credible political alternative

Given that even the wise men who study the stars and the planets cannot seem to agree on who will win the Sri Lankan presidential poll, it is best that ordinary mortals like this writer keep away from the business of predicting who Sri Lankans will elect to lead their country, as they head to the polling stations today. On the one hand, they have President Mahinda Rajapaksa who is seeking re-election for a third term, and on the other, they have Mr Mithripala Sirisena, the Opposition’s ‘common candidate’, who until recently was a Minister in the United People’s Freedom Alliance Government. Technically, there are 17 other ‘minor’ candidates to choose from but for all practical purposes, Thursday’s vote is a contest between Mr Rajapaksa and Mr Sirisena. 

When the election was announced on November 20, 2014, it was not expected to be much of a contest at all as there was no real Opposition in sight. Calculating that getting re-elected a third time after more than a decade in power would be difficult for him, Mr Rajapaksa had called for the election two years before the expiry of his Government’s six year term, hoping to maximise his time at the helm while he  riding the popularity wave.

However, what he had possibly not foreseen was an internal revolt. A day after he announced the election, Mr Sirisena jumped ship. A close colleague of the President, he was serving as the Health Minister at the time and was also the general secretary of Mr Rajapaksa’s own Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

Mr Sirisena’s split from the ruling coalition also opened the floodgates for several other disgruntled UPFA leaders to move to the Opposition camp. Within weeks, Mr Rajapaksa lost the support of more than two dozen leaders, including some high profile Ministers and important allies. The January 8 election quickly went from being a cakewalk for the President to, what some pundits are now dubbing, as one of the biggest challenges in Mr Rajapaksa’s political career.

Even within Sri Lanka’s deeply polarised political milieu, there is now a consensus that Mr Sirisena will put up a tough fight of the sort that Mr Rajapaksa had not expected; and that even if the latter manages to return to power, his mandate will be relatively smaller. Poll pundits say that the election will be a close call and may even lead to a second round of counting wherein the preferential votes are taken into consideration.

For now, let’s take a quick look at how the frontrunners stack up against each other. Mr Rajapaksa’s biggest plus point is that he is a more popular, grassroots leader than Mr Sirisena especially among the country’s Sinhala Buddhist majority. Though Mr Sirisena is also a veteran politician with reasonably strong Sinhala Buddhist credentials, he has a relatively low profile and is not exactly a match for Mr Rajapaksa who towers over the Sri Lankan political scene.

Moreover, since Mr Rajapaksa decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009 and ended a three decades long bloody insurgency, he has been regarded as a war hero in Sri Lanka. His overwhelming mandate in 2010 is proof of this. Sure, four years later, some of that public adulation has ebbed but it has not been extinguished. As for Mr Sirisena, even though he was acting Defence Minister in the final weeks of the war, he has not been able to spin any of the credit for himself. All that he has been able to do on this count is ask: Has Mr Rajapaksa equitably delivered the peace dividends that came from the end of war?

Mr Sirisena’s critics have also been quick to point out that that he is backed by two prominent leaders — Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe and Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga — who had failed to defeat the LTTE when they were in power. In fact, Mr Wickremasinghe, when he was Prime Minister (a position he expects to return to, if Mr Sirisena wins) had signed a controversial ceasefire with the LTTE which the Tamil Tigers used to hit back with a vengeance.

Another factor that will play mostly in Mr Rajapaksa’s favour is governance record. Under his rule, the Sri Lankan economy has grown at a healthy pace, unemployment is low and there has been a visible growth in infrastructure. On this count, again, Mr Sirisena has little to show. In fact, one of the Opposition’s weakest points is that it does not have a roadmap for economic development. And because of this, it will probably not be able to capitalise on whatever anti-Rajapaksa sentiment there is, as effectively as it could have.

For example, in recent years, the President’s economic model, which is heavy on foreign-funded, infrastructure projects, has come in for much criticism. The President, his family members (who hold several important portfolios) and his small coterie are believed to have primarily gained from foreign investments while the benefits have not quite trickled down to the people. Also, the rising cost of living has become a major issue but the Opposition has no real solution.

Instead, Mr Sirisena’s campaign has put the debate over the executive presidency system at the centre of the poll agenda. Through the 18th constitutional amendment, made possible because the ruling coalition has a two thirds majority in Parliament, Mr Rajapaksa had given to the President’s office additional powers (including the power to appoint the Chief Justice and the election commissioner) that has weakened other democratic institutions and given rise to fears of a soft dictatorship. Now, Mr Sirisena has promised to either amend or repeal that amendment but it’s difficult to believe him because it means he will be using his powerful position to make it less powerful. Moreover, this is an abstract issue that doesn’t have as much traction as bread-and-butter matters.

The other big drawback for Mr Sirisena is, ironically, also his primary source of strength: The large section of Sri Lankan polity which has rallied around him. Thirty six parties make up the Opposition coalition and, while they might just able to pull together their votebanks and collectively push Mr Sirisena to victory, they definitely send out mixed signals. The parties have disparate, if not conflicting, ideologies, interests and agendas and come across as opportunistic. The dynamics of the minority votebank is a good example of this.

With the support of the Tamil National Alliance and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (a former UPFA member), the Opposition hopes to capture the minority votebank which is supposedly alienated from the Rajapaksa camp that has been accused of Sinhala majoritarianism. However, since the Sinhala ultra-nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (another former UPFA member) is also a member of the Opposition coalition, it is unclear how many of the minority votes will actually come through. The JHU is the parent organisation of the Bodu Bala Sena which has been held responsible for last year’s anti-Muslim riots, and the party is also not in favour of greater Tamil autonomy. In fact, with regard to the latter, Mr Sirisena’s positions are almost identical to that of Mr Rajapaksa, thereby giving the Tamils no reason to see him as an alternative political force.

Also, though Mr Sirisena is the face of the opposition, he isn’t always viewed as its driving force. Ms Kumaratunga and Mr Wickremasinghe are seen as the real power centres. This is bound to hurt the Opposition as both leaders are considered to be past their political prime. Mr Sirisena’s only real advantage over Mr Rajapaksa is that he is viewed as a clean politician, as opposed to the incumbent who is perceived as corrupt and dictatorial. Finally, despite the hype around the Sirisena campaign, the fact that apart from opposing Mr Rajapaksa, it has no positive agenda of its own. This is a problem that is sure to blow up if the Opposition actually comes to power.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 8, 2015