SAUDI MUSCLE-FLEXING IN YEMEN

The crisis in Yemen is neither a predominantly Shia-Sunni conflict nor just another proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is a civil war in which a foolhardy Riyadh is intervening to show off its geo-political might. For this, the average Yemeni will pay the price in blood

With approximately 3,500 Indian citizens trapped in Yemen, the latest child of the Arab Spring to collapse, reportage here about the war in that country has, understandably, been focused on the Government’s ongoing evacuation efforts. In the process, the geo-strategic implications of the conflict, wherein a Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebellion has toppled the West-backed Yemeni Government, prompting a military intervention by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Sunni Arab states, have been largely ignored. However, with the Houthis taking charge of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait, it is now imperative to look at the larger picture.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait is a chokepoint, just about 30kms at its widest, located between Yemen in the Arabian Penninsula, and Eritrea and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. It connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and is a crucial linkage in the international waterway that connects Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. This is the route that has traditionally been taken by Indian merchant ships to reach European markets (and vice versa), and is of immense importance to India’s sea-borne trade interests.

Now, there have been some reports and suggestions that the Houthis may shut down the strait and actually choke the shipping lane. This — particularly a long-term shutdown — seems far-fetched. Neither do the Houthis seem to have the maritime capability to enforce such a blockade nor will regional and world powers allow it. Because of previous threats from Somali piracy, the strait is fairly well-guarded with the navies of Russia, Ukraine, the US, UK, France and India routinely patrolling the waters. The immediate concern about Bab-el-Mandeb, therefore, is not a complete shutdown by the Houthis, but greater disruption in an already fragile region.

Yemen, one of the poorest Arab states, is home to Al Qaeda’s most resilient franchise — Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula. Years of American drone strikes and other targeted counter-terror strategies have had some success in containing the group but it is entirely possible that the AQAP will return with a vengeance on the back of a protracted regional war, much like the Islamic State came of age in the political and military chaos of Syria and Iraq. If that happens, piracy and terror attacks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, of the sort we saw in 2008, when Somali pirates seized Saudi Arabia’s Sirius Star oil tanker, or in 2000, when Al Qaeda attacked US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole, will increase. At the very least, such incidents will push up insurance costs for commercial ships; if the strait becomes too risky, the ships will have to take a much longer route.

Unfortunately, a long-drawn out conflict is exactly where we are heading towards, with the ill-advised Saudi-led Sunni Arab coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm. Officially, this operation is being carried out on the request of ousted Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to dislodge the Houthis from power and bring back stability to the country. However, apart from aerial bombing of Houthi targets, there seems to be no larger gameplan for how to achieve this target — either militarily or politically.

It is important to understand that the Houthis, though an anti-Government force, are not terrorists of the Islamic State-type. They are a political force, rooted in Yemen and driven by local causes. Their group was formed in 1992 in the Saada Governorate to protect and promote the interests of the minority Zaidi (a Shia offshoot) community. Found almost exclusively in this northern mountainous region of Yemen, on the border with Saudi Arabia, this community had been ignored by the Sunni Government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh who ruled for 33 years until he had to quit office at the height of the Arab Spring. The Houthi movement criticised the Saleh Government for not just marginalising the minority group but also for being corrupt and inefficient.

Later, when the Saleh Government allowed the US to use Yemeni territory for counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda, the Houthis opposed American intervention. Their voice grew louder with the Iraq war, and after they took their opposition from Saada to the capital city of Sanaa, President Saleh sought to shut them down. This led to six brutal wars between 2004 and 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring came to Yemen and the Houthis were at the forefront of the protest movement. A year later, following an agreement brokered by Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr Saleh was eased out of office but the Houthis were sidelined. A transitional regime, supported by the international community, was put in place while the Houthis positioned themselves as the opposition force.

Mr Hadi, also Mr Saleh’s long time Vice President, was at the helm but failed spectacularly in guiding Yemen’s political transition and the Houthis upped their ante against him. In this, Mr Saleh also played a part (it is no coincidence that Bab-el-Mandeb was handed to the Houthis by a section of the Yemeni Army loyal to Mr Saleh). Soon, Mr Hadi lost the plot. The Houthis advanced from their Saada stronghold and and captured Sanaa on September 21, 2014.

There was a period of political reconciliation when a new Cabinet with a new Prime Minister was formed. But tensions grew over the drafting of Yemen’s Constitution and eventually the Houthis besieged the homes of the Prime Minister and the President. On January 21, Mr Hadi and his Cabinet resigned. The embattled President moved to his hometown of Aden where he rescinded his resignation and announced that the port city was the new capital of Yemen. But on March 25, Mr Hadi fled Yemen and appeared in Riyadh on March 26, the day that Saudi Arabia announced its military campaign in Yemen.

Now, this campaign is being portrayed as a Saudi-Iran proxy war fought on sectarian lines. To a certain extent, it is — as the Houthis receive support from Tehran. However, the quantum and quality of this support has been vastly exaggerated. Also, as described earlier, the Houthis are not merely an Iranian proxy force or a mercenary Shiite army. They are a local political group fighting, what is essentially, a civil war. And there’s only one sensible course of action here for foreign powers: Stay away from the mess.

Saudi Arabia’s intervention, and that too on behalf of the weaker party, will only lead to a protracted conflict of the sort we are seeing in Syria and Iraq. There may have been a sliver of hope had the coalition produced some political action plan but there is none. Even the coalition’s military prowess is in doubt — the Saudi military has a bunch of fancy toys but it’s a largely untested force. The Egyptians are slightly better but it should be remembered that Cairo and Riyadh have historically been on opposing sides in Yemeni matters (remember the 1960s North Yemen civil war). Besides, neither of these two big players have the resources to sustain a long-term military operation especially if it involves ground troops. 

So, why is Riyadh getting into this mess? The answer is simple: It has always been paranoid about Yemen and has a history of meddling in its internal affairs. The Arab Spring and the Houthi advance had disrupted its carefully orchestrated political equations and now its seeking a reset. Also, after its successful 2011 intervention to save the Sunni-minority Government of Bahrain, it seems like Saudi Arabia is taking its position as the big brother in the Sunni world a little too seriously — unfortunately, it’s doing so in a manner that’ll only bring about more death and bloodshed to the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 2, 2015)