Between Bombing and Building

If plans to rebuild Gaza are to succeed, the Palestinian Authority has to sideline Hamas, take over power, implement the reconstruction plan under the watchful eyes of the international community and commit to demilitarisation of the strip

After the conflict in Gaza ended last month, many wondered which side had won and which side had lost. Others asked, and rightly so, if there were any winners or losers at all. On the one hand, exuberant leaders of Hamas, the internationally designated terror organisation that holds power in Gaza, suddenly appeared from their underground bunkers to rejoice that their resistance had succeeded. On the other hand, Israeli leaders, facing severe international criticism for responding in a supposedly disproportionate manner to rocket fire from Hamas, claimed that the group’s military capabilities had been dealt a severe blow, even as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself seemed unsure if deterrence had been re-established. Still, when the Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire came into effect on August 26, almost everybody heaved a sigh of relief.

The deal in itself was a modest one: While the Palestinians agreed to hold their fire, Israel agreed to open its border crossings into Gaza (which were open through much of the war anyway), permit a larger number of trucks to move in with goods and relief material everyday, reduce its security buffer from 300metres to 100metres, and allow Gazan fishermen to venture six miles off the coast instead of just three miles. None of these are major concessions; they are confidence building measures at best.

The big issues for both sides —for the Palestinians, building a sea port and an airport in Gaza and the release of security prisoners; and for the Israelis, the demilitarisation of Gaza — will come up for discussion, only if the current ceasefire arrangement holds for a month.

Three weeks in, the situation has been remained largely peaceful, allowing for discussions on the reconstruction of Gaza. The strip was effectively flattened during the 51 days of fighting this summer. According to UN and Palestinian estimates, 20,000 homes were destroyed and another 40,000 damaged; half of Gaza’s hospitals were damaged, nine are still closed; it’s sole power plant has only just started functioning again, 360 factories have been damaged and 126 completely destroyed; 22 schools destroyed and an estimated 188 damaged; and 35,000 dunams of agricultural land affected. Also,1,00,000 of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents are still internally displaced, 40 per cent lack access to running water, and 18 hour long power cuts are the norm.

On Tuesday, the UN announced that it had brokered an agreement to rebuild this tiny Mediterranean strip. The deal is designed to repair the damage caused during the conflict and also initiate the process of long-term development in Gaza. International donors are already lining up to contribute to the reconstruction plan and finalise its delivery mechanism. Two important meetings have been scheduled: The first in New York on September 22 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and the second in Cairo on October 12. If past experiences are anything to go by, there should be no shortage of funds. However, the question is who will put them to use and how.

The initial signs are ominous. The day the UN’s Middle East envoy Richard Serry announced the formalisation of the plan to the Security Council, there was mortar fire in to southern Israel for the first time since the war ended. While Hamas has denied any role in this, the firing is a grim reminder of how fragile the ceasefire agreement really is and how easily the situation can deteriorate. But even if the peace holds, implementing the reconstruction programme will be easier said than done.

The biggest roadblock here is Hamas’ control over Gaza. Because the group is a designated terrorist organisation, many donor nations cannot legally work with it. Also, as long as a group like Hamas that does not even recognise Israel’s right to exist holds power, there are few chances for an enduring peace deal. This makes donors rightfully sceptical of investing in the reconstruction of Gaza as it will quite possibly be reduced to rubble yet again. Finally, the international community cannot reward Hamas, which has provoked war and brought death and destruction upon its own people, with billions of dollars in aid that it can wilfully distribute among impoverished Gazans (or, more likely, use to buy missiles and rockets and build more terror tunnels into Israel).

The August ceasefire agreement, therefore, calls upon Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas to do the job, which will be monitored by the UN, but there is nothing to suggest that Hamas will relinquish control of the Gaza strip. Even though the rival factions joined hands earlier this year to form a Unity Government, they are hardly on the same page. President Abbas had publicly criticised Hamas’s rocket fire into Israel and more recently charged the Islamist group with running a “shadow Government”. Hamas, on the other hand, is reportedly enjoying a post-war high. Its ratings have soared and there is nothing to suggest that the PA is prepared to wrench control from it.

This takes us back to the situation in 2009. After the end of Operation Cast Lead, which played out on an identical template, a huge donor conference was held in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to raise funds for the re-construction of Gaza. Approximately $4.7 billion was pledged with Europe offering $1.25 billion (of which $220 million came from Denmark alone), Saudi Arabia one billion dollars and the US another $900 million. The conference raised almost double the funds than what the PA had expected but much of that money never came through due to political and security reasons.

Still, after Operation Cast Lead, the Gazan economy saw some growth and development as illicit tunnel trade through the Sinai flourished. This time, however, the Egyptian military has shut down the tunnels and effectively choked what was once Gaza’s lifeline.

Today, the strip is a cesspool of guns and weapons — the war saw rockets being fired from schools and hospitals — and unless, Gaza is demilitarised, effective reconstruction will remain a distant dream. Unfortunately, Hamas has consistently refused to lay down arms, and is unlikely to change its mind any time soon.

 (This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on September 18,2014)

Indian Diplomacy, Modi Style

In his first 100 days in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has put much focus on foreign policy. He has not changed anything dramatically but instead, with his personal charisma and political chutzpah, breathed new life into Indian diplomacy

The American stock-taking ritual associated with a new Government’s completion of a 100 days in office has been in and out of fashion in India. It gained currency in 1991 when the Government of PV Narasimha Rao set the course for the liberalisation of the Indian economy immediately after taking charge. The concept made a comeback in 2009 with the second Congress-led UPA regime which created a flurry of activity with its 100-day targets. This time, the BJP-led NDA Government itself has largely ignored the 100-day mark; instead, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has talked about a five-year deadline — or one term of Government. He is acutely aware that the enormous task of reform before him is time-taking one.

Indeed, this very concept of a 100-day assessment has limited utility in a complex political set-up like India’s. It was popularised by US President Franklin D Roosevelt who took charge in the summer of 1933, the darkest hour of the Great Depression. Immediately after his inauguration, he set about the task of fixing America. In the 100 days between March 9 and June 17, 1933, Roosevelt’s Government passed a series of landmark legislations that helped the country get back on its feet. The President also regularly addressed the nation through the radio, in what came to be known as the fireside chats. During these chats, he shared his plans for reform and governance, and sought to talk up the national mood, very similar to what Prime Minister Modi did with his Independence Day speech.  It was during one such radio address in July 1933 that the 100-day term was first used. And contrary to popular perception, it did not refer to Roosevelt’s presidency per se (he was sworn in five days earlier on March 4, 1933), but to the working of the 73rd US Congress which commenced on March 9, 1933.

Few leaders today have kind of support that Roosevelt had in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Even Mr Modi, with his overwhelming mandate in the Lok Sabha, does not have the luxury of a majority in the Rajya Sabha. But what makes the 100-day measure almost irrelevant in India is that the parliamentary system of governance cannot be favourably compared to the presidential system. The executive is not as powerful in India as it is in the US — and it is rather absurd to expect any radical changes in the first 100 days of not just the Modi Government but any administration in New Delhi.

This is especially true for foreign policy which has always been more about continuity than change. Even when there are big ticket developments, such as the sale of guns and aircraft, or a nuclear trade agreement, or even a formalised dialogue mechanism, they are the result of months, sometimes years, of negotiations. Having said that, however, the 100-day concept (if one must employ it) can help generate a sense of the Government’s functioning and its priorities.

When Mr Modi was sworn into office, he was bit of a wild card on the foreign policy front. Yes, as Chief Minister, he had marketed Gujarat well to the world, but he had little experience in New Delhi. His heightened focus on foreign policy in the first 100 days of taking office has naturally taken many by surprise.

Strategically speaking, however, this focus makes perfect sense. The Modi Government came to power with the expectations of a billion people riding on it. There was no way it could have fulfilled all popular aspirations in a short time. Also, this Government is not one that seems to be comfortable with sudden, radical changes, as the Union Budget stands proof. It would not be delivering big bang reforms overnight, as some had expected. Disenchantment, therefore, was bound to set in; this may have also adversely affected the BJP’s performance in the upcoming Assembly elections, thereby dampening Mr Modi’s long-term plans for reform. An easy way to keep up the popular spirit was to focus on foreign policy initiatives. These are easy to play up and have high visibility but do not require major policy changes (think labour laws) or large-scale reform at the grassroots (think industry revival).

Mr Modi’s star-studded inauguration ceremony, attended by South Asian leaders, set the tone. It dazzled his audience at home and abroad alike. Soon after, he travelled to Bhutan for his first foreign trip and then to Nepal. Both were landmark tours. In the meantime, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Bangladesh for her maiden foreign tour and then to Nepal, to lay the ground for the Prime Minister’s visit. When viewed together, one does not have to be a foreign policy analyst to know that South Asia will be at the heart of the new Government’s foreign policy.

Yet, this is hardly a new policy direction. India has always been the predominant power in South Asia and its near neighbours have always had priority focus in New Delhi. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, often criticised for shutting out the neighbourhood, had a South Asia-focus. Sadly, his domestic political compulsions rendered him too weak to sustain regional leadership, as a result of which India lost ground across South Asia. This is where Mr Modi promises to be different.

The same can also be said of the Prime Minister’s performance at the BRICS summit, his first multilateral engagement. The grouping in itself had lost much sheen in recent years but Mr Modi seized the opportunity to revitalise India’s relationship with other emerging economies. His just-concluded five-day long trip to Japan has also been a roaring success, with promises of bullet trains and billions of dollars in infrastructure development. But let us not forget that the bilateral had received a booster shot earlier. Last year, the Manmohan Singh Government had the rare honour of hosting the Japanese Emperor and Empress. This, of course, does not take away from the fact that Mr Modi’s personal charishma and political chutzpah has taken the bilateral to an all new high. Perhaps the only disappointment from the trip was that the civil nuclear energy deal could not be signed — but a similar deal with Australia will probably be finalised as Prime Minister Tony Abbott comes calling on Thursday.

But beyond the deals and agreements, real progress will be measured in terms of deliverables. For example, while Japanese investment promises are much appreciated, Mr Modi will have to clean out the clogged pipelines at home before the money can actually flow in. That’s a long term process, which he has begun, but still has to be seen to its logical end

Mr Modi’s Government has also faced some unexpected foreign policy crises and done fairly well on most counts. First, was the evacuation of Indians trapped in Iraq which the Government managed admirably well, although one group still remains in captivity. The next challenge was shaping India’s response to the flare-up in Gaza. Here, the Government initially held its own in Parliament but fumbled in Geneva where it supported an anti-Israel resolution. This disappointed those who were hoping that Mr Modi would gradually steer away from India’s pro-Arab policy. But once he had signed the BRICS declaration (ostensibly prepared months before by bureaucrats following a fixed policy template) which contained strong language against Israel, India could not have broken ranks later on. Foreign-secretary level talks with Pakistan, even after Islamabad’s envoy here met Kashmiri separatists despite been warned against such daliances, was the third challenge. Mr Modi’s decision to call off the talks, especially as the domestic situation in Pakistan worsened, was a clear indication of his firm, no-nonsense attitude.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on September 4, 2014)

Not an India-Pakistan Problem

The cancellation of Foreign Secretary-level talks has little to with the peace process between the two countries and everything to do with the domestic compulsions and calculations of Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad and Narendra Modi in New Delhi

India’s cancellation of Foreign Secretary level talks with Pakistan, after Islamabad’s envoy in New Delhi met with Kashmiri separatists despite Government opposition, has led to much concern over how the larger peace process between the two countries will now unravel. Some commentators have cheered the move as a strong step taken by a purposeful Government — they say it’s a welcome break from the spineless foreign policy pursued by the UPA in particular and past regimes in general. After all, which legitimate state power will tolerate a foreign Government courting separatist leaders on its territory?

Besides, in the present case, Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh had personally conveyed to the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi, Abdul Basit, the Government of India’s opposition to his meeting with separatist leaders. She had given him a clear choice: Either you talk to us or you to talk to them. Once the High Commissioner hosted Shabir Shah on Monday (he also held talks with Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yasin Malik and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq on Tuesday), the Government had no choice but to call off the August 25 meeting. Had it not done so, Pakistan would have assumed that it was bluffing, which this Government clearly wasn’t .

On the other side of the debate are commentators who believe that the decision to call off the talks exposes Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s diplomatic inexperience. Meetings between Kashmiri separatists and Pakistani diplomats and politicians have been the norm for several years now but, while some administrations in New Delhi facilitated such interactions and others merely tolerated it, none has thrown such a tantrum. The nay-sayers also point out that New Delhi’s reaction has once again brought Kashmir to the forefront of the India-Pakistan bilateral, thereby damaging the peace process template that has been in use since 1997. They fear that letting irritants play up in this fashion, will take both countries back to a time when there were no talks at all because New Delhi and Islamabad couldn't get past Kashmir. 

And then there are others who have opined that in the larger scale of things, one cancelled meeting between Foreign Secretaries is no big deal, and this episode should push the Modi Government to re-imagine India’s Pakistan policy, which, for all practical purposes is non-existent. Ask yourself: Does New Delhi have a plan of action with regard to Pakistan that will lead to some sort of a convergence of interests for both parties? Agreed, Pakistan will have to contribute its fair share but what is India’s gameplan anyway? As of now, not a whole lot.

Each of the above narratives has its own pros and con; however, they all have one thing in common — viewing the recent developments through a foreign policy prism. Now, while there are, of course, key foreign policy elements in this, this latest crisis is, first and foremost, of a domestic nature. This is true for both India and Pakistan and their respective responses to the situation.

The Pakistani side of the story should be fairly obvious to just about anyone watching the news that’s coming in from Islamabad. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Government is effectively under siege. Opposition leader Imran Khan and the maverick Canadian cleric Tahirul Qadri have led thousands of their supporters onto the national capital, where they have been parked for days, demanding the resignation of Mr Sharif. Mr Khan has charged the Prime Minister with electoral fraud and claimed, a whole year after Mr Sharif was sworn into office with an overwhelming majority, that he does not have the mandate to govern.

Irrespective of the substance in Mr Khan’s charges, his so-called protest movement, fuelled by a romanticised idea of a revolution, is by far the most significant political challenge to the Sharif Government. While it is unlikely that Mr Khan will bring about a regime change on his own, the situation may take a turn for the worse if the military, which up until now has been watching the show from the sidelines, steps into the fray. Against this backdrop, Mr Sharif naturally wants the Army on his side. In other words, he will not pick a fight with the Army on a foreign policy issue at this time, least of all on one that is as close to the hearts of the generals in Rawalpindi as the Kashmir dispute. If anything, now is when he allows the Army even more leeway on such issues — as the provocative cross-border firing along the Line of Control (which, incidentally, became fewer since the talks were called off) stands proof. 

From the Indian point of view, the ongoing turbulence in Pakistan is, of course, reason enough to be sceptical of the possibility for any meaningful dialogue. But the Government’s strong stance on the separatist issue is a message primarily aimed at the domestic constituency in Jammu & Kashmir. The State goes to the poll in about three months time, and Mr Modi has to ensure a free and fair election. Polls in the State are a contentious affair, given the separatists’ vociferous and violent opposition to the democratic exercise which they see as an ‘imposition’ of Indian statehood. However, since former Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Atal Bihari Vajpayee had managed to conduct the elections without an ensuing bloodbath, Mr Modi cannot allow the separatists to disrupt the election (as they surely will try, doubly hard) under his watch.

Moreover, Mr Modi also has his eyes on the State Legislature. The Bharatiya Janata Party did remarkably well in Jammu & Kashmir in the Lok Sabha election early this year — it won three of the State’s six parliamentary seats in Udhampur, Ladakh and Jammu (where a relatively junior BJP leader, Mr Jitendra Singh, defeated veteran Congress leader, UPA Union Minister and former State Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad by a veritable margin of 60,000 votes).

Together, these Lok Sabha seats add up to 41 Assembly seats. If the BJP can add three more seats to its kitty, it will have a simple majority in the State Legislature and will be able to form the Government in Jammu & Kashmir for the first time in its history. Named ‘Mission 44+’, the BJP’s electoral strategy was launched with much fanfare last month by president Amit Shah who himself is on a winning high having delivered Uttar Pradesh, where the party had almost no presence for decades, during the Lok Sabha election. There is a solid chance that he will win Jammu & Kashmir for the BJP as well (more so, since the other traditional political players in the State, such as the Congress and the National Conference are in tatters). For now, it makes complete sense for Mr Modi to focus on this project, which is a low hanging fruit.

As for the peace talks, they can always be resumed at a later date when both parties agree to the ground rules of the game, and when, in general, the political environment is more conducive for play. Anyway, not a whole lot was expected from the August 25 meeting.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on August 21, 2014) 

Delhi's Pragmatic Policy-Making

The Modi Government has done well to refuse to pass a parliamentary resolution criticising Israel for the ongoing conflict in Gaza. Israel is a friend and, like India, it too is also threatened by Islamist terror

 By refusing to censure Israel for its ongoing military campaign in the Gaza Strip, the BJP-led NDA Government has taken a firm and decisive steps towards correcting a historical anomaly in India’s foreign policy. Traditionally, New Delhi has been driven by a strong pro-Arab sentiment, which is what translates into its ‘full support for the Palestinian cause’ stand, even though this has hardly ever helped further our national interest. This policy-tilt can be traced as far back as the Khilafat Movement of the early 20th century which opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in the former Ottoman lands. Later, the Congress also adopted a negative approach towards Jewish nationalism, partly to offset the rising popularity of the staunchly anti-Zionist Muslim League which was then championing the cause of a Muslim homeland. But these appeasement efforts failed as India was eventually partitioned in 1947. By then, the pro-Arab/anti-Israel stance had been hardwired into Indian foreign policy thinking.This was not just a matter of political expediency but also the result of an ideological bias furthered in no small measure by the Mahatma himself. For the Indian leadership, which had just drawn the curtains on 200 years of British rule, Israel was (falsely) seen as a ‘colonial power’, an ‘occupying force’ — labels that still resonate with the old guard here.

Meanwhile, India’s radical support for Arab causes which continued at least till the 1980s brought it almost no rewards. For instance, the Arab nations never favoured India on the Kashmir issue, and till date, their support for Pakistan has not wavered. In fact, one of the reasons why Jawaharlal Nehru accorded official recognition to Israel in the late 1950s (full diplomatic relations were established much later), having opposed the Jewish nation’s membership to the UN in 1949, was because he was upset with Egypt for not supporting India on the Hyderabad issue at the global forum.

Over time, there were several such disappointments — including India’s exclusion from the 1969 Rabat conference which paved the way for the establishment of the powerful Organization of the Islamic Conference, whose doors are still shut for India. There is little merit in listing all such instances but it suffices to say that India’s Arab appeasement foreign policy, mostly an extension of the Congress’s Muslim appeasement on the domestic front, was a lonely, one-way street.

The situation changed gradually after the fall of the Soviet Union as well as India’s own economic liberalisation in 1990s. Though the pro-Arab rhetoric has remained, New Delhi’s policy towards Israel has changed dramatically. Following the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992, relations between the two countries have evolved rapidly — the extent and scope of which is not always acknowledged in public. Proof of this is the fact that Israel’s crucial support to India during the Kargil war is hardly ever publicised.

On the other end of the spectrum, India’s Arab appeasement tendencies have also dried up significantly. For instance, though India still allocates 20 million dollars for the Palestinian cause, it has toned down its official language on the Arab-Israeli conflict and taken a largely neutral stand in recent years, occasional deviations (such as the anti-Israel parliamentary resolution passed during the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon) notwithstanding.

Against this backdrop, the new Government’s refusal to pass a parliamentary resolution criticising Israel essentially builds on processes that have been quietly underway for two decades now. The difference is that the incumbent BJP-led Government is not squeamish about India’s ties with Israel, and has no qualms in acknowledging that the Jewish nation has been a long-standing friend of India’s. Also, given its tremendous popular mandate, the Modi Government is neither beholden to the whims of coalition partners (such as the Left parties under UPAI which still romanticise the Palestinian cause, ground realities be damned) nor does it have reason to play vote-bank politics with the Muslim community. This, in turn, allows the Modi Government to take a clear-eyed view of the situation: First, India has no business meddling in the larger Arab-Israeli conflict; second, as far as the current crisis is concerned, it is a case of self defence which Israel, as a sovereign nation under threat, has the right to exercise.

The larger geo-politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict notwithstanding, there can be no two ways about the fact that this latest of fighting has been provoked by Hamas, the globally-designated terrorist group that has been controlling the Gaza Strip since 2006. It hoped that Israel would eventually retaliate and cynically strategised that it could use the assault to regain public support.

Hamas has been at its weakest — politically and economically — in recent times. Gazans are disillusioned with the group which has failed to govern entirely. Moreover, the group’s support bases in Syria have been destroyed and its patrons in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, is once again being driven underground by the military which has come back to power in Cairo. In fact, this was precisely why Hamas, after seven years of bitter rivalry, joined hands with Fatah to form a Unity Government in early June. The arrangement breathed life into the terror outfit which focused on doing what it does best: Street-level resistance. Hamas began firing rockets — first into southern Israel and then all over that country including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv — after Israel arrested many of the group’s supporters in the aftermath of the kidnapping and murder of three Jewish teenagers in West Bank, which in turn led to the retaliatory murder of a Palestinian boy.

After days of incessant rocket fire from Hamas, which could claim only one Israeli life, thanks to the enormously successful Iron Dome which intercepts such missiles, Israel retaliated with airstrikes on Gaza on July 8. Despite the rising Palestinian death toll as a result of Israeli bombing (not to mention Hamas’s use of civilians as human shields), Hamas did not stop its rocket fire and, in fact, spurned ceasefire offers. The situation took a turn for the worse on July 17 when 13 Hamas militants penetrated Israel through underground tunnels and killed two Israeli soldiers near Sufa kibbutz close to the border. The ‘discovery’ of these tunnels prompted an Israeli ground incursion, bringing back memories of the bloody 2008 Operation Cast Lead.

Essentially, Hamas has sought to attack Israel from the ground below, having failed to inflict any serious damage through airstrikes. This is not a new strategy (Hamas has similar tunnels on the Egypt border that are used to smuggle goods and weapons) but it has enormous security implications for Israel as the case of Gilad Shalit stands proof. In 2006, the Israeli soldier was taken from his border outpost by Hamas militants who had burrowed underground. He was released five years later in exchange for a 1,027 Palestinian militants, many of whom have since returned to their terrorist activities.

Still, the extent and sophistication of the tunnel network, worth millions of dollars (ostensibly Western aid that has been misused), seems to have taken the Israeli military by surprise. Dismantling these (and Hamas’s overall terror infrastructure in Gaza) requires a major on-the-ground offensive which is bound to take a heavy toll on Palestinian as well as Israeli lives. A UN-monitored demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip is the only way to break this cycle of violence, but it is unlikely without serious concessions from both sides.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 24, 2014)

BRICS: Getting Back to Business

The group's annual summits have been low on substance in recent years. Still, the upcoming gathering in Brazil has piqued some interest. It is Narendra Modi's first engagement at a multilateral forum and will probably see the finalisation of the BRICS development bank

Over the past few years, the six-country grouping of emerging market economies BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has lost much of its sheen. Home to 40 per cent of the world’s population and accountable for a quarter of the global output, BRICS was trumpeted to be the next big thing on the global stage — both economically and politically — but it seems to have been unable to live up to the hype in either case.

Economically, growth rates in all these emerging markets, except China, have dropped considerably. When Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs came up with the acronym in 2001, it was expected that, by 2050, the BRIC economies (South Africa was added to the group much later in 2010) could rival the G7 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan) in terms of global growth. However, in August 2013, Mr O’Neill conceded that the group’s performance had been below par, that he was most disappointed with India’s record and the only country that deserved BRICS status was China.

Politically, the group was supposed to mark the turning point from a unipolar to multipolar global order. But here too BRICS had failed to consolidate its position primarily due to internal disagreements stemming from the group’s inherent dichotomies.
Consequently, the group’s annual summits that bring together the heads of all five member states, though high on style and show, have been low on substance in recent years. Nevertheless, the upcoming BRICS annual summit in Brazil has piqued some interest. This is not to say that there has been a drastic change in course for BRICS but recent developments in India and abroad give enough reason to keep an eye on the happenings in Fortaleza.

For India, the summit is of particular interest because it is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first foreign engagement at a multilateral forum. He has been in office for less than two months during which foreign policy initiatives have received much attention. Mr Modi has made clear that his administration will focus on South Asia but outside of that there is little clarity on how he will script India’s engagement with the rest of the world. The BRICS summit is, therefore, his opportunity to add more substance to his foreign policy.
Much attention will also be on Mr Modi’s meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping — he has met neither leader since taking over as Prime Minister, so this will be a power-packed first. It will be interesting to see how the meetings play out because they will serve as a precursor to state visits scheduled for later in the year. President Xi is expected to visit India in September and President Putin in the coming months.

Another area of interest during Mr  Modi’s Brazil tour will be his meetings with a host of South American leaders. On the invitation of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who is seeking to reiterate her country’s position as the regional leader, all BRICS heads of state will be travelling to Brasilia after the summit to meet with their counterparts from Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Suriname.

It is unclear whether Mr Modi will have bilateral meetings with some or all South American leaders but his interactions will be closely monitored for clues on how India’s relationship with that region may evolve under the new regime in Delhi. Traditionally, India has not had close ties with South America but this has been changing, and in some cases rather rapidly so.

Across the world, the one announcement that has created much excitement about BRICS is that of the development bank. There has been talk of such an institution for a while now but given the many differences between the BRICS member states on key issues, including who would fund the bank and by how much, few had expected that the project would have a real presence outside the communiqués.
However, earlier this month, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong announced that all five countries had reached a broad consensus on their $100 billion development bank. They have reportedly agreed to fund the bank equally — $10 billion each — to create a $50 billion corpus. Other details, such as the location of the bank (Mumbai, Shanghai and Moscow are all in the running although China’s commercial capital seems to be ahead in the race), however, are yet to be finalised.

Once established, the BRICS bank will serve as the developing world’s response to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which are dominated by the US and Europe. For long, emerging economies, who have to take out huge loans from these established institutions to fund their national infrastructure projects, have complained that such financial assistance often comes at a high cost — needless meddling in their sovereign affairs by Western powers. A BRICS bank may then allow emerging economies to sidestep these institutions altogether and, eventually, build their own global governance structures.
Providing an alternative to the existing Western-led political and economic international architecture has always been an important motif for BRICS. However, rarely has the mood of individual BRICS member states been so definitively anti-West. Brazil is upset about the snooping scandal, so is India. China does not appreciate Western interference in South China Sea while Russia is bristling about the sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis.
President Putin, for one, has made a clear shift to the East. Apart from good relations with India, he has now sought to strengthen ties with Beijing in the hope that together they can take on an imposing West. Indeed, there is no denying that the Obama Administration is inadvertently pushing Russia into China’s arms. The landmark $400 billion gas deal signed between the China National Petroleum Corporation and Russia’s Gazprom is just one example. A decade in the making, it was finalised in May and paves the way for Russia to deliver about 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year to China’s burgeoning economy, starting around 2018 — thereby reducing Moscow’s dependence of the European market as well as diversifying China’s energy source basket. Similarly, a cash-strapped Russia’s decision to sell weapons to Pakistan, a friend of China’s may also be seen in this context.

Yet, not all is hunky dory in the blossoming China-Russia relationship. Moscow fears that it may be relegated to the position of a junior partner. In fact, China’s economic might is very much a matter of concern for all other BRICS countries, who worry that the grouping might become China’s fiefdom. In fact, this was one of the reasons why Russia, Brazil and India strongly opposed China’s offer to fund a larger share of the BRICS development bank corpus.

There are several currents and counter-currents at work here. The sixth annual BRICS summit will offer an interesting view into how they play out.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 10, 2014)

Sari Diplomacy in South Asia

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s ongoing Bangladesh visit is crucial to rejuvenate bilateral ties, as Sheikh Hasina, discriminated by the West, now looks at other Asian powers, particularly China, for support

 It was in the late 1990s that the term ‘sari diplomacy’ became rather fashionable after Ms Cherie Blair, as Britain’s First Lady, did more for India-UK relations with her red-and-green silk sari, which she wore to the British Indian Golden Jubilee Banquet, than official talks between her husband and the then Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral, had achieved a few weeks earlier. In the years since then, Ms Blair has continued with the trend and is often seen sashaying in six yards of silk at various South Asian events.

Ms Samantha Cameron, wife of the current British Prime Minister, has also followed in her footsteps with much grace and aplomb. Across the pond, the Americans have usually found themselves on the other end of the (un)diplomatic spectrum — notoriously for having subjected one sari-clad Indian envoy to Washington, DC to a pat down at the airport.

Closer home, the men have also taken to some fabulous sari diplomacy (and given it a typically desi twist by bringing their mothers into the fold) as the recent exchange of gifts between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif show.

But as External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj tours Bangladesh on her first solo trip abroad, meeting with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina among others, together they can prove that there’s little to match the charm, versatility and power of sari diplomacy, when it is done by women leaders from South Asia.

Ms Swaraj and Ms Hasina reportedly share a close rapport. The last time they had met was in January 2010 —Ms Swaraj had then just taken over from veteran BJP leader LK Advani as the Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha, and had hosted Prime Minister Hasina, who was on a state visit to New Delhi, in her official capacity. Sure, they talked about politics and education and women’s empowerment but as Ms Swaraj later said in a media interview, “Our baatcheet (as women) could not be complete without the talk of saris”.

No surprise then that the two leaders also exchanged saris at that meeting. While Ms Swaraj gifted Ms Hasina a cream coloured ‘South Indian’ sari with grey border — “I knew cream is her favourite colour”, she said — the Prime Minister gave her a bhalo green Jamdani, which according to then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Dipu Moni, she had handpicked herself.

As Ms Swaraj now travels around Bangladesh, ably aided by Ms Sujatha Singh, the Foreign Secretary, and Ms Sripriya Ranganathan, the Joint Secretary who heads the Bangladesh-Myanmar division at the Ministry of External Affairs, the sari diplomacy motif on the Minister’s entourage is quite unmistakable.

Indeed, earlier this year when Prime Minister Hasina faced harsh criticism from the West for holding a general election that had been boycotted by a cussed Opposition and marred by large scale violence, it was Ms Singh who led India’s efforts in favour of Bangladesh. Not only did she travel to Dhaka to negotiate with the political leadership there and break the deadlock, she also resisted pressures in Washington to toe the Western line and de-legitimise the election. In doing so, she helped reiterate New Delhi’s support for one of its most important and friendly neighbours.

Much of the Western world still doesn’t recognise the Sheikh Hasina regime’s electoral mandate — no, it prefers to support Ms Khaleda Zia’s irresponsible Opposition, allied to Islamist parties whose ability to wreak havoc on the streets far exceeds the percentage of votes they can secure in a free and fair election.

But such dichotomy is typical of the West’s foreign policy. Little else explains why military strongmen in West Asia who have conducted coups that, of course, shall never be labelled as such are rewarded with billions of dollars in aid while Ms Hasina gets the rap for an election that was not exactly up to international standards even as the West drones on about the values of democracy. 

Predictably, such discriminatory attitudes have now compelled the Sheikh Hasina regime to seek closer relations with Great Powers other than the West — primarily China and Japan. These countries do not share the West’s hollow concerns vis-à-vis Bangladesh and have no qualms about working with the incumbent regime.

In fact, the reason why Prime Minister Hasina could not join other South Asian leaders at Mr Modi’s inauguration ceremony in May was because she was on an official visit to Japan at that time. Then, earlier this month, she also travelled to China where she met with the top leadership in Beijing including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Yang and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Yu Zhengsheng.

Now, Bangladesh has always had close commercial ties with China but this trip is believed to have been more than just about business with Prime Minister Hasina reportedly seeking political reassurances as well.

Overall, the trip was quite successful. Five agreements were signed at the Government-to-Government level: First, China promised to give 300 million renminbi every year to Bangladesh for economic and technical cooperation. Second, an agreement to set up 1,320 megawatt coal fired power plant in Bangladesh as a joint venture between China’s National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and Bangladesh’s North-West Power Generation Company Limited. Third, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed for the creation of a Chinese Economic and Investment Zone in Chittagong. Fourth, two Exchanges of Letters were issued on regarding greater cooperation in the field of disaster management and flood management. And fifth, another MoU was also inked with respect to the construction of a multi-lane tunnel under Karnaphuli River. Notably, there were also some agreements in the private sector.

Plans to construct a deep-water port at Sonadia in Cox Bazaar also came up but reportedly made little progress. China is willing to finance the project at a cost of $14 billion but also wants the right to design and operate which Dhaka is reluctant to offer. Most experts are of the opinion that this is a problem that will be resolved sooner than later, eventually allowing China a toe-hold in the Bay of Bengal.

None of this should cause alarm bells to ring in South Block, at least not right away, but they are an important reminder that New Delhi cannot just assume the position of a disinterested big brother in the region and ignore its neighbours at any cost.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 26, 2014)

No Looking Back on Robust India-Israel Ties

The Modi-led Government is expected to further strengthen the deep relations that Jerusalem and New Delhi enjoy. The latter has been by India’s side on many critical occasions in recent years, even though New Delhi could not openly acknowledge the fact for various, misplaced, geo-political reasons

On March 26, 1949, KL Panjabi, Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, wrote to H Cynozicz, the representative of the Jewish Agency in India: “As discussed personally, we [Government of India] are particularly in need of experts in the following matters: 1. Expert in Cooperative Farming 2. Expert in Intensive Cultivation  3. Two or three experts in drilling tubewells both with percussion rigs as well as as rotary rigs”. The letter curiously requested Cynozicz to take up the matter “with your people in Palestine”. It was a sign of the times — India was yet to recognise Israel and would not do so until late 1950. Full diplomatic ties were to be established only in 1992.

In the meantime, India offered vociferous support to Arab causes for just about nothing in return, while relations with Israel went on the downward spiral. So much so that New Delhi even refused humanitarian aid during 1967 famine. Yet, in a parallel world of sorts, successive Indian Governments not only maintained ties with Israel but also sought Israeli assistance — for instance, military aid came from Israel during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh (which, ironically, still does not recognise the Jewish nation).

The situation turned around gradually after 1984 when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met his Israeli counterpart at the UN General Assembly. Three years earlier, Mr Subramanian Swamy, then a member of the Janata Party, had undertaken the first publicised tour of Israel by an Indian leader, which contributed in no small measure towards the normalising of ties.

Once the ball was set rolling, India-Israel relations grew rapidly. Apart from Israel’s steadfast pro-India stance on Kashmir, its diplomatic support during the 1998 nuclear tests, followed by military assistance during the 1999 Kargil conflict, firmly established the Jewish state as a reliable friend. By the dawn of the new millennium, New Delhi had quietly but firmly corrected its course.

So, while it continues to make noises on the Arab/Palestinian causes, particularly in international forums — think  Mr Manmohan Singh’s UN address calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital or Ms Pratibha Patil’s obscure demand in Damascus that the Golan Heights be returned to Syria — behind the scenes, New Delhi and Jerusalem have forged a solid alliance.

Defence cooperation is, of course, one of the most important anchors of the India-Israel bilateral. Israel is one of India’s largest arms supplier, second only to Russia. The bilateral arms trade over the last decade is estimated at $10 billion. Several Israeli systems and software now power Indian defence systems. For example, Israel’s Phalcon airborne warning and control system serves as India’s eyes in the skies while the latest range of Mig-21 Bisons and Su-30 MKI aircraft also boast of high-end Israeli technology.

India and Israel have also signed a homeland security deal which establishes a framework for institutionalised cooperation in counter-terrorism, border protection and intelligence sharing. Homeland security is an area wherein both Israel and India face similar challenges but the former, because of its history and location, has far greater expertise and superior technology. For example, years before India faced 26/11, five PLO members travelling from Lebanon, came to Tel Aviv on a boat and spread mayhem across that city. They took over Savoy Hotel and held guests and staff hostage overnight until Israeli special forces flushed them out. The year was 1973.

Another area of cooperation that has gained tremendous strength in recent years is agriculture — marking the completion of a full circle since the 1940s. With the signing of an Action Plan in 2008 which now extends upto 2015, between India’s National Horticulture Mission and Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation, Israel has been sharing its best-practices and helping build capacity in the Indian agriculture sector. Across India, 28 Centres of Excellence have been set up for rapid transfer of technology, such as drip irrigation and ‘fertigation’.

The Centre in Gharaunda, Karnal, for instance, produces hybrid plug seedlings of tomatoes, cherry-tomatoes, coloured capsicum and cucumbers which have dramatically increased crop yields while also reducing water use and cutting down on pesticides and fertilisers. Similarly, in the Dapoli centre in Maharashtra, mango trees have been rejuvenated to produce better quality and more quantity fruit. If scaled up, it can revolutionise the mango industry in the Konkan. Similar success stories have also emerged in  the fields water treatment and desalination. There are also plans of incorporating Israeli technology in the cleaning up of the Ganga. In fact, Gujarat, under Mr Narendra Modi, was one of the States to partner with Israel in the field of agriculture. Now, with Mr Modi at the helm, relations between the two countries are expected to scale greater heights.

Re-imagining diplomacy in the 21st century

Israel’s outgoing Ambassador to India Alon Ushpiz offers his assessment of the emerging bilateral

On his three-year tenure: It's impossible to put three years in India in a nutshell but you don't leave India the way you came here.

As one of your Foreign Secretaries  told me, diplomacy is about creating options for your Government. And the Israel-India relation is a good example of what diplomacy should look like in the 21st century — a combination of classic diplomacy and one that creates tangible things together that impact the daily lives of Indians and Israelis.

On the big takeaways from his tenure: The anchoring of the agricultural centres of excellence; Industrial R&D supplemented by academic research; and the public security agreement, which can be a strategic gamechanger.

On deliverables in the near future: In agriculture, we hope to finalise the second three-year working plan. I'm also hopeful about brining in Israeli water technology mainly with re-cycling in mind. Israel recycles 80 per cent of its sewage. India can too. We are natural water friends.

On the free trade agreement: Another round of negotiations is coming up in July. This will be the ninth round since 2010. The economic engine of the relationship is an indispensable one. We have moved from $180 million to five billion dollars in trade and can easily double or triple the number. But for that we need an FTA.

The FTA will also shift the focus to more high tech fields of interaction. This is what we are good at and this is what our economies demand.

On investment in infrastructure projects: Much of the investment, worth millions of dollars, is in the hands of private Israeli companies. Also, the Israeli Port Authority is building a port in Gujarat. Renewable energy projects in north India have shown great results too. The desalination project in Tamil Nadu is impressive. When the gate opens and you walk into the plant, it looks exactly like the one on the shores of the Mediterranean — except that everybody is Indian.

On the 2012 attack on the Embassy: You have very few cases of a foreign Government — Iran — sending its assassins to kill a hosted diplomat in the heart of the capital. Your people cracked the case and they have provided us with security that enables us to do our work.

On his love for Calcutta: Calcutta has a special place in my heart. It's exploding with energy and there's a lot of culture and tremendouly interesting people. I have always enjoyed my interactions with the Chief Minister and am grateful for her friendship and support. I am also a big fan of Bengali cuisine.  

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 12, 2014)