Indian Diplomacy, Modi Style

In his first 100 days in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has put much focus on foreign policy. He has not changed anything dramatically but instead, with his personal charisma and political chutzpah, breathed new life into Indian diplomacy

The American stock-taking ritual associated with a new Government’s completion of a 100 days in office has been in and out of fashion in India. It gained currency in 1991 when the Government of PV Narasimha Rao set the course for the liberalisation of the Indian economy immediately after taking charge. The concept made a comeback in 2009 with the second Congress-led UPA regime which created a flurry of activity with its 100-day targets. This time, the BJP-led NDA Government itself has largely ignored the 100-day mark; instead, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has talked about a five-year deadline — or one term of Government. He is acutely aware that the enormous task of reform before him is time-taking one.

Indeed, this very concept of a 100-day assessment has limited utility in a complex political set-up like India’s. It was popularised by US President Franklin D Roosevelt who took charge in the summer of 1933, the darkest hour of the Great Depression. Immediately after his inauguration, he set about the task of fixing America. In the 100 days between March 9 and June 17, 1933, Roosevelt’s Government passed a series of landmark legislations that helped the country get back on its feet. The President also regularly addressed the nation through the radio, in what came to be known as the fireside chats. During these chats, he shared his plans for reform and governance, and sought to talk up the national mood, very similar to what Prime Minister Modi did with his Independence Day speech.  It was during one such radio address in July 1933 that the 100-day term was first used. And contrary to popular perception, it did not refer to Roosevelt’s presidency per se (he was sworn in five days earlier on March 4, 1933), but to the working of the 73rd US Congress which commenced on March 9, 1933.

Few leaders today have kind of support that Roosevelt had in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Even Mr Modi, with his overwhelming mandate in the Lok Sabha, does not have the luxury of a majority in the Rajya Sabha. But what makes the 100-day measure almost irrelevant in India is that the parliamentary system of governance cannot be favourably compared to the presidential system. The executive is not as powerful in India as it is in the US — and it is rather absurd to expect any radical changes in the first 100 days of not just the Modi Government but any administration in New Delhi.

This is especially true for foreign policy which has always been more about continuity than change. Even when there are big ticket developments, such as the sale of guns and aircraft, or a nuclear trade agreement, or even a formalised dialogue mechanism, they are the result of months, sometimes years, of negotiations. Having said that, however, the 100-day concept (if one must employ it) can help generate a sense of the Government’s functioning and its priorities.

When Mr Modi was sworn into office, he was bit of a wild card on the foreign policy front. Yes, as Chief Minister, he had marketed Gujarat well to the world, but he had little experience in New Delhi. His heightened focus on foreign policy in the first 100 days of taking office has naturally taken many by surprise.

Strategically speaking, however, this focus makes perfect sense. The Modi Government came to power with the expectations of a billion people riding on it. There was no way it could have fulfilled all popular aspirations in a short time. Also, this Government is not one that seems to be comfortable with sudden, radical changes, as the Union Budget stands proof. It would not be delivering big bang reforms overnight, as some had expected. Disenchantment, therefore, was bound to set in; this may have also adversely affected the BJP’s performance in the upcoming Assembly elections, thereby dampening Mr Modi’s long-term plans for reform. An easy way to keep up the popular spirit was to focus on foreign policy initiatives. These are easy to play up and have high visibility but do not require major policy changes (think labour laws) or large-scale reform at the grassroots (think industry revival).

Mr Modi’s star-studded inauguration ceremony, attended by South Asian leaders, set the tone. It dazzled his audience at home and abroad alike. Soon after, he travelled to Bhutan for his first foreign trip and then to Nepal. Both were landmark tours. In the meantime, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Bangladesh for her maiden foreign tour and then to Nepal, to lay the ground for the Prime Minister’s visit. When viewed together, one does not have to be a foreign policy analyst to know that South Asia will be at the heart of the new Government’s foreign policy.

Yet, this is hardly a new policy direction. India has always been the predominant power in South Asia and its near neighbours have always had priority focus in New Delhi. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, often criticised for shutting out the neighbourhood, had a South Asia-focus. Sadly, his domestic political compulsions rendered him too weak to sustain regional leadership, as a result of which India lost ground across South Asia. This is where Mr Modi promises to be different.

The same can also be said of the Prime Minister’s performance at the BRICS summit, his first multilateral engagement. The grouping in itself had lost much sheen in recent years but Mr Modi seized the opportunity to revitalise India’s relationship with other emerging economies. His just-concluded five-day long trip to Japan has also been a roaring success, with promises of bullet trains and billions of dollars in infrastructure development. But let us not forget that the bilateral had received a booster shot earlier. Last year, the Manmohan Singh Government had the rare honour of hosting the Japanese Emperor and Empress. This, of course, does not take away from the fact that Mr Modi’s personal charishma and political chutzpah has taken the bilateral to an all new high. Perhaps the only disappointment from the trip was that the civil nuclear energy deal could not be signed — but a similar deal with Australia will probably be finalised as Prime Minister Tony Abbott comes calling on Thursday.

But beyond the deals and agreements, real progress will be measured in terms of deliverables. For example, while Japanese investment promises are much appreciated, Mr Modi will have to clean out the clogged pipelines at home before the money can actually flow in. That’s a long term process, which he has begun, but still has to be seen to its logical end

Mr Modi’s Government has also faced some unexpected foreign policy crises and done fairly well on most counts. First, was the evacuation of Indians trapped in Iraq which the Government managed admirably well, although one group still remains in captivity. The next challenge was shaping India’s response to the flare-up in Gaza. Here, the Government initially held its own in Parliament but fumbled in Geneva where it supported an anti-Israel resolution. This disappointed those who were hoping that Mr Modi would gradually steer away from India’s pro-Arab policy. But once he had signed the BRICS declaration (ostensibly prepared months before by bureaucrats following a fixed policy template) which contained strong language against Israel, India could not have broken ranks later on. Foreign-secretary level talks with Pakistan, even after Islamabad’s envoy here met Kashmiri separatists despite been warned against such daliances, was the third challenge. Mr Modi’s decision to call off the talks, especially as the domestic situation in Pakistan worsened, was a clear indication of his firm, no-nonsense attitude.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on September 4, 2014)