Building an equal partnership

US must take India’s concerns into account if it wants the latter to be a security anchor against China

That there is a nice ring to lofty statements about the shared ideals and values between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s most powerful democracy is without a doubt, much like all the talk about deepening ties between these two countries allows for some solid diplomatic bonhomie. But rhetoric, no matter how pleasant and passionate, does not necessarily convert into good policy. It is against this backdrop that the Third India-US Strategic Dialogue that Union Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna co-chaired with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington, DC on June 13 must be viewed.

The high-level, capstone dialogue between the two countries was instituted in 2010 to promote greater cooperation between the two countries and broaden the scope of bilateral relations. In other words, it is here that the basic framework of India-US relations is defined and demarcated, and then re-defined. The current round of talks, however, has come at a particularly interesting time in the history of the India-US relations.

After a lukewarm start in the late 1990s, ties between India and the US were only strengthened in this past decade. Throughout the mid-2000s, the Bush Administration freely courted New Delhi — their alliance culminating in the groundbreaking India-US civil nuclear energy agreement — but by the time the Obama Administration came to power in 2008, the honeymoon was decidedly over. Washington’s continued pandering to Islamabad, for one, was beginning to take a toll on its relations with New Delhi.

Since then, however, the situation has changed significantly with the US now making it amply clear that it wishes for India to take on a greater role as an ‘ally’.  For instance, during his recent visit to India last week, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta talked at length about India’s importance in the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. More importantly, he also described India as the “linchpin” of the US’s new foreign strategy which envisions a “pivot to Asia”. Introduced earlier this year, the strategy is essentially America’s response to a changing world order — notably to China’s alarming growth as an economic and military powerhouse that has come at a time when its own influence is waning. Today, as Washington attempts to re-calibrate its relations with Beijing, it has decided to hedge its bet with New Delhi.

Now, the ball is in India’s court. If New Delhi indeed wishes to be part of this new gameplan, the chatter coming out of Washington’s power corridoors is that the former must do more to show greater commitment — it must prove that it is indeed willing to be US’s partner. India’s response in this situation is a definite policy challenge, and how exactly Mr Krishna and his delegation rise to the occasion is to be seen. Still, the team will do well to lay down some ground rules that delineate what exactly it is that New Delhi wants from the US.

Here are the top five non-negotiables that must feature on Mr Krishna’s agenda.

First: Don’t ask us to fight your war with China.

Although Washington will never say it in as many words, what it essentially wants from India is a positive affirmation that in case of a US-China military stand-off (or an outright war, which is of course quite unlikely), New Delhi will stand by its side. That is the crux of the whole “linchpin” narrative. But India has its own issues with China that range from long-festering border disputes to disagreements over sovereign rights in the South China Sea. These again have to be balanced with the fact that today China is India’s biggest trading partner — bigger than the US even. Plus, China is in India’s immediate neighbourhood and, simply put, New Delhi cannot afford to have a confrontational relationship with Beijing for it will be at the cost of our national interest. Washington must understand and acknowledge that.

Second: Stop bullying us over Iran

New Delhi is already doing as much as it possibly can in this situation — it has cut down on its Iranian oil imports as desired by Washington so as to squeeze Tehran over its controversial nuclear programme — but India has its limits too. We don’t like the idea of a bomb in the hands of the Ayatollah anymore than the Americans do, but the fact of the matter is that India needs Iran to meet its rapidly growing energy demands. As an emerging market economy, it is simply not possible for India to completely give up on cheap Iranian oil. Further, Tehran also provides New Delhi key access to the rest of Central Asia and finally, there is no denying that the two share a cultural relationship that goes back centuries. If Washington expects New Delhi to publicly censure Tehran, especially at a time when there is little proof that the former’s own policy of sanctions is working, it really is asking for too much.

Third: Please turn off the Pakistani aid tap, for a change.

If anything , the events of this past year — from the Raymond Davis episode and the unilateral raid that killed Osama bin Laden to the attack on Western targets in Afghanistan by Pakistani militants and the shutting of Nato supply routes — have made it crystal clear that billions of dollars in American aid have bought Washington absolutely no leverage, either in Islamabad or in Rawalpindi. Since the money is literally going down the drain to ultimately fund terror activities that hurt both US and Indian interests, New Delhi must insist that Washington turn off the aid tap. And that should serve as the first step in a long process of holding Pakistan accountable for its many crimes.

Fourth: Clean up the mess in Afghanistan before you leave from there.

There is also no denying that the locals are far from ready to protect their country from the Taliban. And it is not just the security forces but even Afghanistan’s political class is unprepared to resist a Taliban takeover that is sure to happen once Nato troops leave that country in 2014. Hence, it is imperative that India impress upon the US that a rushed exit from Afghanistan will only undo hard-earned gains in the region. If New Delhi fails to do, it will be the one left holding the can afterwards.

Fifth: Give us space and time.

Just like in a successful marriage both partners need adequate personal space and enough time to grow and eventually find their place in the relationship, the same rules apply here too. India has shown that it is committed to building a strong alliance with the US but it must be allowed to do so on its own terms. New Delhi must be an equal partner in its ties with Washington — and not a subordinate member of a group led by the US, Cold War-style.

Ultimately, the US must acknowledge that only an independent and empowered India can make for an effective partner.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 14.)