A second look at no-first use

Thirteen years after Atal Bihari Vajpayee committed India to a no-first use nuclear strike policy, his Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh believes the time has come to revisit and revise this strategy. Referring to India’s increasingly multi-dimensional security concerns, especially Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal and deteriorating political situation, he has cautioned the Government against sitting in yesterday’s policy. He has a point.

The year was 1998. America was the undoubted global superpower and the tall Twin Towers graced the New York City skyline. China was growing but was far from being a global player. Pakistan had a popularly elected Prime Minister in Mr Nawaz Sharif. The Buddhas of Bamiyan from the sixth century stood tall and proud in central Afghanistan. India was still a developing nation, although the effects of economic liberalisation introduced under the earlier Union Minister for Finance Manmohan Singh were gradually becoming conspicuous. No one was yet talking of an Asian century. Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee was Prime Minister and it had been less than three months since India had test-exploded five nuclear weapons in a nondescript town in Rajasthan. 

During a debate on foreign policy in Parliament, Mr Vajpayee made a historic announcement that defined India's position as an emerging nuclear power -- he said that the country was committing itself to a distinct unilateral and global no-first-use nuclear strike policy. In other words, Mr Vajpayee promised that neither would India use its nuclear weapons against another state that does not possess nuclear weapons nor would it be the first to strike another nuclear power. Based on the principle of minimum deterrence, the policy went a long way in discrediting foreign criticism that the country was moving away from the principles of disarmament and setting the stage for another arms race. A no-first-use policy helped portray India as a responsible and non-aggressive nation, as was the need of the hour. 

Now, fast forward to 2011. A bearded old man who lives in remote mountain caves wields more power and influences more people than any world leader, business tycoon or matinee idol. America has lost its edge and the Twin Towers no longer exist. In a new global order that is now supposedly multi-polar, China has redefined the idea of an ‘Asian Tiger' while Pakistan is a malfunctioning state that is struggling with its democratic credentials. In other words, this is a new world which has presented before us a new set of realities, challenges and situations. Consequently, the policies and principles of 1998 may or may not be relevant any longer in 2011 and either way, deserve to be revisited. 

Little wonder then exactly 13 years after Prime Minister Vajpayee made his landmark announcement, his Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh, while participating in a similar Lok Sabha debate on foreign policy, pointed out that India's no-first-use policy is "greatly in need of revision" and cautioned the present Government against "sitting in yesterday's policy". Referring to India's increasingly multi-dimensional security concerns, the senior BJP leader has urged the Congress-led UPA regime to undertake a thorough review of India's strategic policy. 

Much to Mr Singh's credit, he has also specifically pointed fingers at Pakistan's fast growing nuclear arsenal -- a matter of grave concern that is often brushed under the carpet or simply ignored by the current regime. As Mr Singh mentioned, Pakistan possesses at least 100 to 110 nuclear warheads, which is double that of India's nuclear stockpile. But more than the sheer number of nuclear warheads, what is vastly more worrisome is the fact that these either remain in particularly unsafe hands or are at risk of falling into them. No matter how much we wish to sugar-coat the matter, we cannot, and indeed should not, undermine the fact that Pakistan is a dysfunctional state, run by a powerless Government that is a puppet in the hands of its huge military establishment and has absolutely no control over the extensive terror networks that have engulfed the country. It is, thus, imperative that the Government of India approach the possibly outdated no-first-use policy with an open mind and realistic expectations. 

Sadly, the present administration has shown little inclination towards either. Days after Mr Singh made his recommendations, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs SM Krishna categorically stated that there would be no reconsideration of the policy. It seems like Mr Krishna has decided to continue with a strategy that is obviously way past its expiry date only so that he can be seen as the bearer of India's commitment to "universal, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament". In itself, the aforementioned principle is praiseworthy but nonetheless unsuitable for present day circumstances. 

Let us not forget that a few days ago, former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf described India as an "existential threat" to its neighbour and the sole reason why his country possesses nuclear weapons. He also said that 90 per cent of Indian soldiers have an anti-Pakistan orientation. Irrespective of the degree of truth in his statement, it surely does point us to the mindset of every soldier on the other side of the border. Last time we checked, they were not big fans of India either. But what makes it worse is that the Pakistani military has access to power that is way beyond its means. In fact, it would not be wrong to assume that power in Pakistan is not in the hands of politicians in Islamabad but lies with the Generals in Rawalpindi. Thankfully for Pakistan, such is not the case in India where we at least have a functioning democracy, warts and all. 

It must also be mentioned that India's foreign policy towards Pakistan as it stands today is also one that needs to be revised. As Mr Singh pointed out during the debate, it is unclear if our bilateral ties are governed by the "spirit of the Shimla Agreement, the spirit of Sharm el-Sheikh or more recently the Thimphu spirit". This confusion has been sadly manifest in recent events during which India has tended to go soft on its neighbour in contrast to its earlier no-compromise stance. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's  invitation to President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minsiter Yousuf Raza Gilani to enjoy an afternoon of cricket at Mohali -- cricket diplomacy, they call it -- despite the fact that the two leaders have done nothing to assist with India's investigation into the 26/11 attack on Mumbai is a telling example of all that is wrong with our foreign policy.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on March 29, 2011.)