With its structured, top-down reform process, Burma has a far better chance at democracy than West Asia
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If, on April 23 as scheduled, Burma’s best known dissident Aung San Suu Kyi is indeed sworn in as a newly-elected Member of Parliament, it will undoubtedly be a watershed moment in that country’s history. Ms Suu Kyi has been a glorious icon of democracy. For her to finally occupy a seat in her country’s Parliament is by far the most potent symbol of democratic reform that could have possibly come from Burma which, after five decades of military rule, has now launched a process of top-down political transition.
Burma’s move towards democracy began last year when the country’s long serving Commander-in-Chief Senior General Than Shwe resigned from his position as head of state and handed over the reins to General U Thein Sein. By all accounts, it was a carefully guided and tightly controlled change-of-guard that went so far as to manipulate the general election of November 2010 as well as handpick the successor. No wonder then, when Mr Thein Sein was sworn as President in March 2011, Burma and the rest of the world were suspicious, if not outright dismissive, of his bold assurances of political and economic reform. The mild mannered President was after all a career soldier who had only recently shed his military uniform to take up position in the country’s new semi-civilian Government. Democracy in Burma was still a long way off, critics had argued.
That was March 2011. Around the same time, large-scale popular protests by disgruntled masses had brought down deeply entrenched regimes in Arabia and were threatening to dismantle more in the region. Tunisia’s Ben Ali had already fled to Saudi Arabia, while Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak had left office after his presidency was besieged by an 18-day long protest movement beginning at Tahrir Square. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi was facing the biggest challenge ever to his 40-year-long leadership stint; in Yemen, then President Abdullah Saleh’s presidency was tottering, while in Syria the supposedly reformist President Bashar al-Assad was coming under increasing pressure to allow for a more open and inclusive society. The popular narrative of 2011 was that democracy was finally coming to Arabia. Once the Libyan despot was deposed, the Yemeni President forced in the footsteps of his Egyptian counterpart and the Syrian leader persuaded to accelerate his reform process, large parts of West Asia which had for so long resisted political change, would finally embark on the path to democracy.
Unarguably, the big story of democratic transition — made almost irresistible by its fable-like moral framework of how the good guys triumphed over the bad — was supposed to be playing out in Arabian desert, not in the distance hinterland of Burma.
In reality, however, that has far from been the case. Today, a little more than a year after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ came to West Asia, democracy is still elusive in the region. Autocrats there have been replaced by Islamists or entire countries have been pushed the brink of civil war and anarchy. Talk of a long and bitter Arab Winter now dominates all narative.
In Burma, however, a definite whiff of optimism is in the air. The new President had promised to overhaul the country’s dilapidated political structure, its decrepit economy and its decaying social fabric and has actually managed to walk the talk. Mr Thein Sein’s nominally civilian Government has indeed put in place a wide-ranging reform process, as the International Crisis Group detailed in a recent report.
For instance, in his March 2011 speech, the President had promised to reach out to political dissidents. Weeks later, he made good on that promise by offering the olive branch to Ms Suu Kyi, his establishment’s biggest critic. Indeed, Ms Suu Kyi’s agreeing to return to mainstream Burmese politics that she had long since boycotted, not only signalled a huge step towards political reconciliation but was also the strongest affirmation of Mr Thein Sein’s commitment to democracy.
Between March 2011 and 2012, the Burmese Government released almost all its political prisoners. In fact, some 300 of them were freed in January this year to allow them to participate in the April by-election. Also, unlike in the past, when released political prisoners continued to be under strict Government scrutiny, this time they have been able to easily resume their political activities freely and even travel abroad.
Under Mr Thein Sein’s watch, the Burmese legislatures have also emerged as key drivers of reform, taking tremendous initiatives to legislate on democratic rights and economic reforms. Most heartening perhaps is the fact that the country’s Parliament has shown a remarkably bipartisan spirit. The Opposition still has only a small share of seats there, but its motions have received overwhelming support from the military-backed ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, and vice-versa.
Furthermore, the new Government has also expanded several basic freedoms. Blocks on the internet have been removed and media censorship has been largely done away with. Business, entertainment and sports related news can now be published without being pre-screened; political articles still have to be sent to the censor board although there is talk that the board will abolished by the end of the year and replaced by a self-regulatory Press Council.
That apart, a largely successful attempt has also been made to reconcile with nearly all ethnic armed groups with at least 11 ceasefire agreements having been put in place. The Kanchin Independence Organ-isation is the only major group with which an agreement is yet to be reached, but community leaders agree that they have had fruitful talks with the Government. On the economic front too, there have been changes in the right direction such as a series of tax reforms and other measures to strengthen the Burmese currency, the kyat. Indeed, a managed float of the kyat at the start of this fiscal year was perhaps the most important step taken towards restructuring the Burmese economy.
Finally, the much talked-about threat from hardliners within the party has also proved to be a false alarm. Of course, there are individuals from the old guard whose interests will be hurt as the reforms get underway, and they may even succeed in scuttling some of these measures. But these people do not form a well-defined group. Overall, it is highly unlikely that these elements will ever coalesce in a manner that could possibly threaten Burma’s transition to democracy. After all, the process was internally initiated, not externally imposed upon the country.
Make no mistake: If Burma is walking the path of reform today, it is because the country’s ruling elite — not just one or two reform-minded leaders — collectively believe that it is time to restructure and rebuild. It is precisely because such a broad-based buy-in into the reform process exists that its reversal is highly improbable.
This does not mean that Burma will face no challenges in the years ahead. It most definitely will, but for now, that country has a far better chance at democracy than any other nation which has been hit by the ‘Arab Spring’ wave.
(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 19, 2012.)
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Burma’s move towards democracy began last year when the country’s long serving Commander-in-Chief Senior General Than Shwe resigned from his position as head of state and handed over the reins to General U Thein Sein. By all accounts, it was a carefully guided and tightly controlled change-of-guard that went so far as to manipulate the general election of November 2010 as well as handpick the successor. No wonder then, when Mr Thein Sein was sworn as President in March 2011, Burma and the rest of the world were suspicious, if not outright dismissive, of his bold assurances of political and economic reform. The mild mannered President was after all a career soldier who had only recently shed his military uniform to take up position in the country’s new semi-civilian Government. Democracy in Burma was still a long way off, critics had argued.
That was March 2011. Around the same time, large-scale popular protests by disgruntled masses had brought down deeply entrenched regimes in Arabia and were threatening to dismantle more in the region. Tunisia’s Ben Ali had already fled to Saudi Arabia, while Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak had left office after his presidency was besieged by an 18-day long protest movement beginning at Tahrir Square. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi was facing the biggest challenge ever to his 40-year-long leadership stint; in Yemen, then President Abdullah Saleh’s presidency was tottering, while in Syria the supposedly reformist President Bashar al-Assad was coming under increasing pressure to allow for a more open and inclusive society. The popular narrative of 2011 was that democracy was finally coming to Arabia. Once the Libyan despot was deposed, the Yemeni President forced in the footsteps of his Egyptian counterpart and the Syrian leader persuaded to accelerate his reform process, large parts of West Asia which had for so long resisted political change, would finally embark on the path to democracy.
Unarguably, the big story of democratic transition — made almost irresistible by its fable-like moral framework of how the good guys triumphed over the bad — was supposed to be playing out in Arabian desert, not in the distance hinterland of Burma.
In reality, however, that has far from been the case. Today, a little more than a year after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ came to West Asia, democracy is still elusive in the region. Autocrats there have been replaced by Islamists or entire countries have been pushed the brink of civil war and anarchy. Talk of a long and bitter Arab Winter now dominates all narative.
In Burma, however, a definite whiff of optimism is in the air. The new President had promised to overhaul the country’s dilapidated political structure, its decrepit economy and its decaying social fabric and has actually managed to walk the talk. Mr Thein Sein’s nominally civilian Government has indeed put in place a wide-ranging reform process, as the International Crisis Group detailed in a recent report.
Between March 2011 and 2012, the Burmese Government released almost all its political prisoners. In fact, some 300 of them were freed in January this year to allow them to participate in the April by-election. Also, unlike in the past, when released political prisoners continued to be under strict Government scrutiny, this time they have been able to easily resume their political activities freely and even travel abroad.
Under Mr Thein Sein’s watch, the Burmese legislatures have also emerged as key drivers of reform, taking tremendous initiatives to legislate on democratic rights and economic reforms. Most heartening perhaps is the fact that the country’s Parliament has shown a remarkably bipartisan spirit. The Opposition still has only a small share of seats there, but its motions have received overwhelming support from the military-backed ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, and vice-versa.
Furthermore, the new Government has also expanded several basic freedoms. Blocks on the internet have been removed and media censorship has been largely done away with. Business, entertainment and sports related news can now be published without being pre-screened; political articles still have to be sent to the censor board although there is talk that the board will abolished by the end of the year and replaced by a self-regulatory Press Council.
That apart, a largely successful attempt has also been made to reconcile with nearly all ethnic armed groups with at least 11 ceasefire agreements having been put in place. The Kanchin Independence Organ-isation is the only major group with which an agreement is yet to be reached, but community leaders agree that they have had fruitful talks with the Government. On the economic front too, there have been changes in the right direction such as a series of tax reforms and other measures to strengthen the Burmese currency, the kyat. Indeed, a managed float of the kyat at the start of this fiscal year was perhaps the most important step taken towards restructuring the Burmese economy.
Finally, the much talked-about threat from hardliners within the party has also proved to be a false alarm. Of course, there are individuals from the old guard whose interests will be hurt as the reforms get underway, and they may even succeed in scuttling some of these measures. But these people do not form a well-defined group. Overall, it is highly unlikely that these elements will ever coalesce in a manner that could possibly threaten Burma’s transition to democracy. After all, the process was internally initiated, not externally imposed upon the country.
Make no mistake: If Burma is walking the path of reform today, it is because the country’s ruling elite — not just one or two reform-minded leaders — collectively believe that it is time to restructure and rebuild. It is precisely because such a broad-based buy-in into the reform process exists that its reversal is highly improbable.
This does not mean that Burma will face no challenges in the years ahead. It most definitely will, but for now, that country has a far better chance at democracy than any other nation which has been hit by the ‘Arab Spring’ wave.
(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 19, 2012.)
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