Era of the Educated Terrorist

Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Tayyeba has emerged as a trusted ally of both Islamabad and Rawalpindi, and is one of the lethal tools in the hands of its handlers to torment India. And, it’s only getting more informed by the day

With the impregnable American fortress having breached on Monday when two high-intensity bombs ripped through the finish line at the Boston Marathon, killing three and injuring several others, notice has been served that no one is ever really safe. While US federal authorities are yet to determine who caused the attack, there is no doubt that it was an incident of terrorism — the first on American soil since September 11, 2001.

In hindsight, the fact that the Boston Marathon was targeted makes complete sense. It is a major international event that marks an important patriotic holiday and conveniently brings together thousands of people into a relatively small place. Yet, it is safe to say that few would have realistically expected an attack to happen. In fact, there was no prior intelligence input even, at least from the information available at this point.

Clearly, in times such as these there is no scope for complacency; even when the situation seems to get better, when there is a feeling that one may have turned a corner; beware the shadowy figure that lurks in the corner.

There is a lesson in this for India too. While unlike the US, this country has suffered a series of terror attacks both before and after the Mumbai carnage of 2008, supposedly India’s ‘9/11’, the situation has been markedly different in Jammu & Kashmir. The past three years especially have brought peace dividends to the State and insurgency in Kashmir is no longer at the levels that it was in the late 90s. Many counter-terrorism and regional experts believe that this drop in insurgent activity in Kashmir has much to do with the war in Afghanistan. According to them, when the US-led Nato forces landed in Afghanistan, they hogged much of the attention of Pakistan-trained militants who were earlier pre-occupied with Kashmir.

More than a decade later, now that those forces are preparing to leave Afghanistan, there is good reason for the militants to re-focus on Kashmir. Add to this mix Pakistan’s deteriorating domestic situation and it becomes increasingly evident that Islamabad might turn up the heat in Kashmir, so as to re-direct attention from domestic problems. In fact, regional observers are still trying to decide if the flare-up along the Line of Control in January that saw Pakistani soldiers kill two Indian soldiers, one of whom was beheaded, could be a sign of things to come. If this is indeed the case, and the Pakistani establishment sees more value in re-igniting the conflict in Kashmir, then it is pretty much a given that Islamabad will turn to terror organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and others to do its bidding.

The LeT especially has emerged as a trusted ally of the Pakistani establishment, and is one of the lethal tools in the hands of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. It was only earlier this month that Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the US Pacific Command, told American lawmakers during a Congressional hearing that the “Lashkar-e-Tayyeba remains one, if not the most operationally capable, terrorist groups through all of South Asia.” This should be a matter of deep concern for India. Not only did the LeT mastermind the 26/11 attack, it has historically been the primary fighting force in Kashmir. Even today, LeT militants are trained to fight in Kashmir which is also where most eventually die, as a recent US military report has found.

In fact, there is now increasing consensus that the LeT is planning to go big and global. The spectacular manner in which it laid a three-day siege upon the city of Mumbai and co-ordinated from a safe distance a complex terror attack that included multiple high profile targets, is just one example of how the group is looking beyond the low-level war of attrition that it has been waging in Kashmir. In recent years, the LeT has also been linked to some international plots and is known to recruit Westerners to its campaign as well.

It is against this backdrop that the study conducted by Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, a US military think-tank, profiling LeT militants, makes compulsory reading for anyone trying to gain a more organic and intrinsic understanding of this militant organisation, and shape an appropriate response towards it. The study, titled, ‘The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death’, looks into the biographical profiles of killed LeT militants, as available in four Urdu-language publications brought out by the LeT between 1994 and 2007, alongside media reports.

For one, it demolishes the myth that it is the poor and the illiterate from Pakistani society who join the Lashkar and shows that the opposite is more true. In fact, the LeT has been attracting the brightest and best minds of Pakistan, and Lashkar recruits actually have higher educational levels than the average Pakistani male. For example, 44.3 per cent of militants entering the LeT had completed matriculation or studied up to Class 10, whereas, nationally, only 17 per cent of the Pakistani population reached that level of education, according to Government estimates. Clearly, the time has come to revisit the commonly-held equation between education and militancy.

Adding another twist to this tale is the matter of religious versus non-religious education. The study shatters the myth that it is the madarsas in Pakistan that breed terrorists. Instead, it finds that most Lashkar recruits come from secular educational backgrounds. Of course, this doesn’t mean that they received no religious education at all. All Pakistani schools include some form of Islamic study in their curricula; also, many students receive religious education outside their schools.

However, even taking these factors into consideration, the study found that, while madarsa education may complement a young militant’s studies, it is not an effective substitution. In fact, in many cases it is only after the terror recruits have joined the Lashkar that they receive a high dose of religious education, which leads to their being brainwashed.

Additionally, the study has also found that often LeT recruits were even connected to the Pakistani Army. In fact, there is an intriguing overlap in the districts (mostly of Punjab) that contribute the most number of LeT militants and those that produce the maximum number of Army officers. Now, factor into this equation the fact that according to the study, family members play a crucial role in a young recruit’s decision to join the LeT, and the picture becomes increasingly dark and murky. What emerges before us is the shadow of an enduring terror organisation that attracts high-quality recruits, appeals to their families and enjoys the trust of an entire country.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 18, 2013.)

Let Them Reap What They Sowed

There is already legitimate fear that, as the besieged Jamaati leadership of Bangladesh seeks refuge in India, it will be welcomed with open arms by unscrupulous elements to foment communal trouble here. That must not be encouraged

The March 30 rally organised in support of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh by a group of Islamist parties in Kolkata was, unfortunately, largely overlooked by the national media. Yet, those who cared to scan through the news capsules have been rightly alarmed by this blatant display of support for a group of men responsible for the massacre of three million people. Between the months of March and December 1971, the Jamaatis’ razakar militia collaborated with the Pakistani Army to squash the nationalist Bengali movement in what was then East Pakistan. In the process, they raped, maimed and killed millions, burnt down entire villages and displaced millions more.

Four decades later, a handful of those razakars are finally being brought to book, thanks to the war crimes trial initiated by the Government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. However, if the coalition of Islamic organisations in Kolkata have their way, the likes of Jamaat-e-Islami vice-president Delware Hussain Sayeedi (whose crimes during 1971 earned him the nickname ‘Butcher of Mirpur’) and his brand of merry men will go scot free, never to be held accountable for their heinous actions.

Members of the Islamist coalition — that includes groups such as the All-Bengal Muslim Youth Federation, the Sunnat-ul-Jama’at, the Madrasa Student Union and the Welfare Party of India, among others — that gathered at the Shahid Minar grounds in central Kolkata this past weekend, believe that the trial against Sayeedi and other Jamaat leaders is unfair and politically motivated. Specifically, they remain opposed to the death sentence handed down to Sayeedi, the senior-most Jamaati in Bangladesh, who they argue is being persecuted for his religious and political beliefs.

Now, the Islamists in Kolkata are by no means the first or the only group of people to claim that the trial is unjust. Others have also said that Bangladesh’s international war crimes tribunal does not always meet global standards; but then again, the tribunal, for the most part, has credibly defended itself against these allegations. Even then, it is one thing to hold the legal processes of the tribunal to scrutiny and quite another to say that Sayeedi and his ilk committed no crimes at all, which is exactly what the Jamaat supporters would like you to believe. In fact, Syed Jalaluddin Umari, the chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, which is the Indian franchise of the Jamaati party, has even gone so far as to say that there were no war crimes at all during the 1971 war.

Such a perversion of the truth is, no doubt, both appalling and infuriating; yet, it is by no means illegal. In a democratic country such as ours, there is space — political, social and constitutional — for the peaceful expression of even the most virulent of opinions. To that extent, the protesters were well within their rights to hold a rally, even if it was to support mass murderers. But as galling as that may have been, it was perhaps still not as morally reprehensible as the deafening silence maintained by the political establishment of West Bengal on the issue. Indeed, in the several days that have passed since the March 30 rally, neither of the State’s two main political outfits — the Trinamool Congress or the Left Front — has thought it fit to offer a counter-response.

Interestingly, this is despite the fact that the average Bengali, including the vast majority of Bengali Muslims, remains vehemently opposed to the Jamaatis and their brand of politics. For instance, the chief of the one of the Islamist groups Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind, Maulana Siddiqullah Chowdhury, who has made no secret about his support for the likes of Sayeedi, was routed in the 2011 Assembly election. He was contesting from the Domkol constituency of Murshidabad district, which is almost 90 per cent Muslim, and yet he managed to secure less than three per cent of the votes. He had played the religion card to the fullest.

Moreover, mainstream Bengali society has come out in whole-hearted support of the Shahbagh protesters — as is evidenced by the many exhibitions, panel discussions and cultural events that have been organised in Kolkata and elsewhere to show solidarity for Bengalis across the border. So, why then are those who have been elected by this same society and claim to represent Bengal, so reluctant to rein in fringe elements and speak up for the majority of the people?

The answer, as expected, lies in the dirty details of vote-bank politics. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress rode to power on the back of minority votes. In fact, Islamist organisations played an important role in mobilising public support during the Singur protests which proved to be the game-changer in the 2011 Assembly election. Expectedly, therefore, Ms Banerjee has spent the past two years engaging in the worst kind of minority appeasement politics that there can be, and her Government’s silent support for the Jamaati supporters is only further proof of that.

As for the Left Front, do not forget that this Muslim vote-bank was traditionally its own, and that the Front will do nothing to further alienate this group, given that it already lost some part of the pie to the Trinamool. There is nothing new in this kind of cynical vote-bank politics — indeed, it is the routine in the country; yet, the moral bankruptcy of Bengal’s political establishment that has been reflected in its decision to maintain such a conspiracy of silence, is deeply disturbing.

Equally worrying also is the implications this might have on India’s national security. With the protests in Bangladesh only gaining in strength, the Jamaatis there have also notched up their game. Their ‘march to Dhaka’ that has been scheduled for later this week that is expected to unleash yet another round of violence and bloodshed is proof of this. The Government of Bangladesh, in response, has also intensified its crackdown on the Jamaatis, and there is enough evidence to suggest that the latter are already fleeing their country and moving into India. In fact, Indian troops along the porous Bangladesh border have already been put on high alert to tackle the crisis.

It in against this backdrop that a section of Muslim Bengalis’ support for the Jamaatis, and the tacit support they receive from the Government of West Bengal, becomes hugely problematic. There is already legitimate fear that, as the Jamaati leadership of Bangladesh seeks refuge in India, it will be welcomed with open arms only to foment communal tensions in the near future. Add to this mix, news reports that Bangladesh’s police believes that the terror group, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, is also being revived under the leadership of Jamaat leaders in coordination with some Afghan war veterans, and the situation seems definitively terrifying.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 4, 2013.)

From one blunder to another

India's foreign policy in the sub-continent has consistently suffered from an unacceptable degree of short-sightedness. New Delhi has exhibited a rare ignorance of its immediate surroundings,leading to repeated embarrassments in the region

That the plight of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority, which until recently was neither a burning issue in the island nation nor a matter of high priority for Tamils in India, has now taken on such proportions so as to threaten the collapse of the Union Government here, is absurd, to say the least. On Tuesday, the DMK pulled its support to the ruling coalition in order to protest against New Delhi’s support for what it perceived to be a weak resolution against Colombo’s treatment of its Tamil citizens, at the upcoming Geneva session of the United Nation’s top human rights body. Even though that did not bring down the Congress-led UPA Government, which continues to hang by a thread nevertheless, it compelled New Delhi to the propose amendments to the US-sponsored UN resolution.

It is interesting to note in this regard that the proposed amendments come after the original resolution, criticising the Sri Lankan Government of committing war crimes in the final phase of its war against the Tamil terrorist group LTTE, has been significantly watered down. The new resolution which was tabled at the UN Human Rights Council on Monday tones down the international community’s supposed concerns for regarding human rights violations in Sri Lanka — not just during the war which ended in May 2009 but also in the four years since then. Moreover, three new paragraphs have also been added that support Sri Lanka and welcomes the Government’s announcement to hold elections to the Provincial Council in the Tamil-majority Northern Province in September 2013. Finally, the revised draft also refers to rebuilding infrastructure in Northern Sri Lanka and how the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission report can serve as the basis of national reconciliation. Many believe that these revisions are the handiwork of Indian diplomats who on the international stage have struggled to shield Sri Lanka from undeserved Western ire.

Unfortunately, it seems that even if India may have won the fight abroad, it is sure to lose at home — especially, if harsher amendments are re-introduced into the draft. And that is not all. The Government is also mulling over the DMK’s demand that India pass a parliamentary resolution condemning Sri Lanka. If such a resolution is indeed passed, little else could be more damaging to India’s national interests. Not only will such a resolution be in violation of principles that have formed the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy over the decades but it will also open the floodgates for other countries to pass similar resolutions against India. In fact, the manner in which the Pakistani National Assembly recently passed a resolution regarding Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru and how his hanging has adversely affected the law and order in Kashmir, already shows how vulnerable India is. At that time, India bristled at the thought of Pakistani intervention in its internal affairs, and rightly so.

But now, it must also understand that the treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka — though it may be a matter of enormous concern for India — is India’s business to only a limited extent. The matter is entirely for that country’s Government, its Sinhala majority population and its Tamil minority community to sort out. New Delhi may at best, cajole and coax Colombo to do the right thing, but it cannot meddle in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs.

Besides, if India really has the best interests of Sri Lankan Tamils at heart, it must know that the Sri Lankan Government alone can further their cause. Towards that end, the sensible thing to do is work with the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, not seek to isolate him — as this UN resolution seeks to do.

In fact, India should have strongly resisted the West’s efforts to humiliate Sri Lanka back in 2012 when a similar resolution was first passed in the UNHRC, especially at a time when that war-ravaged country was just about beginning to rebuild itself. Equally importantly, it should have called for a global acknowledgement of the fact that Sri Lanka is the only country in the world to have successfully defeated a terrorist organisation — a stellar achievement conspicuously ignored by the West that has been more keen to highlight the alleged war crimes committed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s men during the final phase of the war.

The decision to publicly censure Sri Lanka in 2012 was also a direct result of the Manmohan Singh Government giving in to the tantrums of the DMK, a powerful regional ally. Worse still, this was not the first time the Union Government had capitulated in a manner that would eventually hurt national interest. In September 2011, New Delhi caved before Kolkata as a result of which the Teesta water sharing agreement — supposed to be signed during Prime Minister Singh’s historic trip to Dhaka — fell through. This not only embarrassed the Prime Minister but also upset his counterpart in Dhaka, Sheikh Hasina.

The Bangladeshi Premier had already done more than her fair share to help the Indian Government when she handed over to New Delhi militants who had taken refuge in her country. But in turn she received next to nothing, even though she is facing a stiff re-election challenge and could well use the Teesta treaty to consolidate her position. Moreover, it is in India’s interest to support Prime Minister Hasina’s secular, democratic and strongly pro-India Government (as opposed to one that could potentially be led by her rival Khaleda Zia, who partners with Islamists and is not really a friend of New Delhi.)

Unfortunately, India’s foreign policy in the sub-continent has consistently suffered from an unacceptable degree of short-sightedness. In fact, even though India’s ties with almost all its neighbours go back several hundred years, New Delhi has exhibited a rare ignorance of its immediate surroundings, resulting in a sclerotic foreign policy in the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 21, 2013.)

Yes to tolerance, no to Islamists

President Pranab Mukherjee’s recent trip to Bangladesh came in the backdrop of the ongoing Shahbagh Square protests in Dhaka where people are demanding stringent punishment to the 1971 war criminals and a ban on fundamentalists. The visit is a message of support

Given the present situation in Bangladesh where Islamists are on a rampage and more than 70 people have already lost their lives, it comes as no surprise that President Pranab Mukherjee was advised against visiting Dhaka earlier this week. But by sticking to his schedule nevertheless and going ahead with the visit, which on hindsight can be termed as hugely successful, Mr Mukherjee did more to strengthen India’s relationship with Bangladesh than any other leader has possibly done in recent time.

For one, the visit was his first one abroad after taking over as President, and the soft diplomatic appeal of India’s first Bengali President choosing Bangladesh for his first foreign trip was simply irresistible. More importantly, the visit was the key to expressing India’s solidarity with the people of Bangladesh at a time when they are struggling to right historic wrongs and eventually redefine their future as a secular, democratic country.

From a political point of view, it was of course a huge show of support for Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League-led Government that have consistently been good friends to India. Indeed, by not cowering before the goons of the Jamaat-e-Islami who have unleashed mayhem in that country, Mr Mukherjee has sent out a strong message against fundamentalist elements in Bangladesh and for democratic movements.

Of course, some experts have criticised his trip for being ill-timed and partisan; they have argued that the President should have postponed the visit so that it would allow him to distance himself from the ongoing internal turmoil in Bangladesh as well as leave enough diplomatic space for New Delhi to work with a Government that could well be formed by today’s Opposition parties.

This line of argument gained traction particularly after Opposition leader and chief of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party Khaleda Zia cancelled her meeting with Mr Mukherjee, prompting some to wrongly suggest that the President was unnecessarily polarising the situation for New Delhi. There was absolutely no reason why Mr Mukherjee should have played safe and chickened out just because Begum Zia was too petty a politician to rise above partisan politics and honour her commitment to a visiting head of state.

But then again, perhaps it is a bit too much to expect any better from someone like Begum Zia who, less than a week ago, had publicly supported the rioting Jamaatis that unsurprisingly form her most important electoral ally. Instead of trying to rein them in, the two-time former Prime Minister of Bangladesh accused the Awami League Government of running a hate campaign against the Jamaat-e-Islami whose top leaders are currently on trial for committing crimes against humanity during the 1971 War of Liberation. At that time, the Jamaatis colluded with the Pakistani Army to perpetrate the genocide of Bengalis, in which three million were killed and 10 million became refugees. It was the Army-Jamaatis’ desperate bid to suppress the nationalist movement that would eventually lead to the birth of sovereign Bangladesh.

Yet, even if they failed in their efforts to keep the Bengali people chained to their masters in Pakistan at that time, the Jamaatis never really gave up on their ways or their old agenda. In the four decades since the War of Liberation, the Jamaat-e-Islami has effectively functioned as a front organisation for its Pakistani patrons, while the party’s leaders have persisted with their efforts to inject into the Bangladeshi mainstream the most retrograde version of political Islam.

It comes as no surprise then that in the days since the International War Crimes Tribunal sentenced to death the most senior of Jamaati leaders Delwar Hossein Sayeedi, the Islamists have not only clashed with protesters and police but also attacked Hindu minorities. Temples have been razed to the ground and Hindu villages targeted — much like they were four decades ago by the razakars of those days. Clearly, things have not really changed in the intervening years, and even as Bangladesh tries to heal the wounds of its bloody past, it seems like the ghosts of 1971 may return to haunt the nation again.

Against this backdrop, it is imperative that India plays a more active role in ensuring that the situation in Bangladesh does not boil over onto its own borders. It must urge the Sheikh Hasina Government to deal with the Jamaatis with a firm hand so that they do not rear their ugly head again, especially in the event of a pro-Islamist Government coming to power.

In fact, the ongoing protests at Dhaka’s Shahbagh Square are essentially a response to this fear. Of course, the central theme of the protests is still about bringing to justice the 1971 war criminals and ensuring they get the punishment they deserve, but let us not forget that one of the other key demands of the protesters is a ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami and its brand of virile Islamist politics.

What is happening in Bangladesh is a historic development, as it marks the first time since Turkey decided to go secular that a Muslim-majority nation has chosen a secular identity for itself over its allegiance to a universal ummah. That India must support the right-thinking Bangladeshi people in securing these aspirations goes without saying, especially since they remain threatened by the devious designs of the Jamaatis.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 7, 2013.)

This isn’t terrorists’ playground

Hemmed in by their operational limitations that prevent them from attacking a heavily fortified West, Iran’s frustrated terror proxies are now targeting their subjects elsewhere. The attack on the Israeli diplomat in New Delhi last year was just one example of that

Given how little progress has been made with regard to the attack on Israeli diplomat Tal Yehoshua Koren a year after her car was bombed in New Delhi, the recent efforts of Delhi Police to revive the investigation into that terror case are welcome. This past Tuesday, Delhi Police sent a reminder to five countries, including Iran, seeking their cooperation in the case. It is commonly believed that the investigation hit a roadblock when Tehran refused to cooperate with New Delhi and execute the four Interpol Red Corner arrest warrants issued against Iranian nationals including the main suspected bomber Houshang Afshar — all of whom are suspected members of the Quds Force, the elite unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The fifth accused in the case is an Urdu journalist Syed Mohammed Ahmed Kazmi, who was arrested in March last year and released on bail by the Supreme Court in October.

It goes without saying that India’s law enforcement agencies must see this case to its logical conclusion — after all, February 13, 2012, was the first time that a foreign diplomat was attacked within this country by a suspected terrorist group of another country. It is imperative for India to make clear that it will not tolerate such activities on its soil. And this is a message that must be sent out loud and clear so as to ensure that India is not viewed as a soft target by groups such as the Quds Force and its primary terrorist proxy Hezbollah that are looking to implement their devious agendas in countries they perceive to be as ‘low security’.

The attack in New Delhi came at a time when there is ample evidence to suggest that the Quds Force and the Hezbollah have embarked on a new, global campaign of violence particularly against American, Israeli and Jewish targets but also against Western interests in general. It is important, therefore, to view the February 13, 2012, attack in New Delhi as part of a wider, international terror campaign which even though does not target Indian citizens or Indian interests specifically but could still be played out within the territorial borders of India.

Of course, this is not the first time that Iranian terror proxies have wanted to bring down Western targets. The Hezbollah, for instance, has a long history of such attacks that go back to the early 80s. At the time, the group operated mostly in its home country of Lebanon but quickly expanded its activities abroad. Consequently, in 1992, Hezbollah operatives used a car bomb driven by a suicide bomber to attack the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 civilians. Two years later, the group used the same method to blow up the Jewish community centre in the Argentinian capital and killed 85 people. Two years later in 1996, the Hezbollah joined forced with the Quds Force to bomb Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.

Things changed, however, at the turn of the century when Al Qaeda grabbed headlines with its spectacular attack on the Twin Towers of New York in September 2001. In response, as America led the Western world in its global war on terror, the Hezbollah was reluctant to be trapped in the crosshairs. And so, the group, then led by Imad Mughniyah, consciously rolled back its activities, particularly its global operations. It was also around this time that Hezbollah actively worked to gain a certain sense of autonomy from Iran which had always been the “senior partner” in the relationship, in the words of a senior US intelligence officer.

But this period of relative quiet lasted only a short while. In February 2008, Imad Mughniyah was assassinated leading to the rejuvenation of Hezbollah’s international operations arm, the Islamic Jihad Organisation, under the leadership of Mustafa Badreddine and Talal Hamiyeh. The primary aim of the IJO at that time was to avenge the death of Mughniya. In his  paper, Mr Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy describes the “three-tiered shadow war” that Iran and the Hezbollah planned to take down American and Israeli and Jewish targets. According to Mr Levitt, the targets were divided into three categories — tourists, diplomats and Jewish centres. While the Hezbollah was to carry out attacks on tourists, considered to be easy targets, the more skilled Quds Force was to focus on the high-profile targets.

But as Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah declared an “open war”, Israeli and American security officials were immediately put on guard, allowing them to disrupt a series of terror attacks planned by Hezbollah and the Quds Force. It started with the fiasco in Baku in May 2008 when planned bombings of US and Israeli Embassies were exposed. Then in September 2009, a Hezbollah terror attack in Turkey was foiled despite the tremendous logistical support from the Quds Force. Finally after yet another failed attack in Jordan in January 2010, “a massive operational revaluation” of the IJO was undertaken, says Mr Levitt based on his interviews with Israeli intelligence officials.

Following the overhaul of 2010, the Hezbollah-Quds combine came up with three major goals: Apart from the avenging the death of Imad Mughniya and terrorising Western targets, protecting Iran’s nuclear interests was added to the list. It was also around this time that the Quds Force created a special external operations unit — Unit 400 — that would later engineer the New Delhi attack.

Throughout 2010 and 2011, terror attacks were planned but foiled across the world from Cyprus to Azerbaijan and Turkey. In October 2011, the most brazen of attacks come to the fore with the bungled assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador to the US in Washington, DC. This was to be followed by the arrest of a Lebanese national, Hussein Artris, in Bangkok in January 2012 who eventually led Thai police to the 8,800 pound of chemicals he and his associate had stockpiled to attack Israeli diplomats. Then came the serial attacks of February 2012 around the death anniversary of Mughniya. On February 12, an attack on the American Ambassador to Baku was foiled but followed by the car explosion in New Delhi. Then, a similar bomb was discovered in Tbilisi in Georgia hours later. On February 14, an explosion was reported in Bangkok in a home rented by the Iranians.

Eventually, investigators would tie the three attacks as part of one major conspiracy. And even though all the attacks were operational failures, they would do little to dissuade the terrorists who would venture even into Africa before eventually tasting success with the July 18, 2012 bombing of Burgas airport in Bulgaria.

The point here is that, while both the Quds Force and the Hezbollah have been sloppy and inefficient in their activities all this while, they are sure to learn from their mistakes. They will eventually get better and then, it is countries like India (and Bulgaria and Azerbaijan) that have relatively low level security measures as compared to countries like the United States and Israel, for instance, that will be their early targets.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 21, 2013.)

Razakars must now pay for their sins

The International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh has sentenced to death one person for his role in the genocide of Bengalis preceding the 1971 war

More than 41 years after he and his team of razakars went on the rampage — looting, abducting, torturing, raping and killing members largely of the Hindu minority community of what was then East Pakistan, Abdul Kalam Azad's murderous past has finally caught up with him. This past Monday the 66-year-old former leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami was sentenced to death by the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh, which convicted him of committing crimes against humanity.

Set up almost three years ago, the Tribunal has been trying those responsible for the genocide of Bengalis that preceded the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, and the verdict against Abdul Kalam Azad is the first that it has delivered, marking a defining moment in the history of Bangladesh. The verdict is a huge victory for the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League Government which initiated the legal proceedings. Even though critics of the Tribunal say that it does not meet all the international standards of jurisprudence, the panel still has tremendous popular support in Bangladesh. Also, the verdict against Azad puts the Bangladesh National Party-led Opposition in a spot, given its long time alliance with the Jamaatis.

Azad, better known as Bacchu Razakar, was a junior leader of the student wing of the Jamaat in 1971 and a member of the Razakar Bahini — the auxiliary para-militia that was raised by the Pakistani Army and its Islamist allies to eliminate the Bengali nationalist resistance movement. For the past four decades, the people of Bangladesh have sought justice for the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by the razakars and their Pakistani patrons in uniforms in the nine long months between March and December of 1971 when they killed more than three million Bengalis even as millions more fled to their homes to seek refuge primarily in the Indian State of West Bengal. In some ways then, this landmark verdict against Bacchu Razakar helps an entire nation take a step towards closure.

It might still be a while, though, before this razakar is actually, if ever, hanged by the neck, as ordered by the Tribunal, for the former Jamaati-turned-television evangelist is absconding. He went underground hours before the Tribunal issued an arrest warrant against him in April 2012, and it is widely believed that he is hiding in the port city of Karachi in Pakistan. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to hope that this first verdict will lay the ground for more such landmark judgements as several others continue to stand trial for the heinous crimes they committed in 1971.

Primary among these would be the firebrand Delwar Hossein Saeedi. The first person to be indicted by the Tribunal back in 2011, Saeedi has been charged on 19 counts including rape and murder, and has also been accused of ethnic cleansing. While working with the notorious Al Badr group, Saeedi is believed to have forcibly converted several Hindus to Islam, apart from having raised a small cohort that specialised in looting the wealth and capturing the property left behind by displaced Hindus. Worse still, during those tortuous nine months of 1971, Saeedi routinely led Pakistani soldiers to secret meetings of freedom-fighters and Hindu family hideouts where the men were shot at sight and women picked up and taken away to be ravaged in Army camps.

Today, Saeedi, like many of the other razakars, fancies himself to be a leading Islamic intellectual, but that does nothing to wash away the blood on his hands. And, this applies in equal measure to the likes of Ghulam Azam, the 90-year-old who led the Jamaat-e-Islami until 2000, to Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid who is currently the secretary-general of that party, and to Motiur Rahman Nizami who in 1971 was the president of that party's Islami Chattra Sangha (students wing) and has been accused of, among other things, setting up Al Badr.

It is important to mention here that almost every one of these men has either held or continues to hold important positions within Bangladesh's political class. And, as the Tribunal noted in its judgement on Monday, it is exactly because these “perpetrators of the crimes could not be brought to book” and “the impunity they enjoyed held back political stability”, that Bangladesh “saw the ascend of militancy and the developments “destroyed the nation's Constitution.” Thankfully, the time has now come to reverse that process.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 23, 2013.)

Cricket as desperate diplomacy

Pakistan continues to stonewall New Delhi’s repeated requests to make the masterminds of 26/11 terror attacks accountable. It still has to grant India the MFN status despite promising to do so. In return, India resumes cricketing ties with that country. It’s a pathetic situation

Sure, this is the season for fresh starts and best wishes, but taking it to a whole new level of mush and gooey-gooey goodness is the ongoing cricket series between India and Pakistan that marks the resumption of sporting love between the two countries. India had rightfully called off all ties with Pakistan after terrorists operating from the latter’s soil launched a heinous attack on Mumbai in November of 2008. But in an inexplicable surge of magnanimity, New Delhi chose to reverse its decision last July. And so it was on this past Christmas Day, that India’s men in blue faced on home ground their arch rivals in green after more than four years of a break.

But even as Dhoni’s boys face their Pakistani counterparts in Kolkata on Thursday, after being routed by them first in Bangalore and later in Chennai, one is forced to ask: What exactly is the occasion for this new-found love? Have all the perpetrators of 26/11 terror attack been brought to justice? Or, has the Pakistani establishment taken even a single step towards accelerating that process of justice, therefore, giving India the opportunity to close old wounds and have a sporting fiesta to celebrate the supposed ‘normalisation’ of relations?

Far from it. Pakistan continues to rub salt in our wounds, when not inflicting new ones. The disastrous visit by that country’s motormouth Interior Minister early last December is still fresh in public memory. During the course of his visit, Mr Rehman Malik not only reiterated his Government’s strategy of stonewalling the investigation into 26/11 — he dismissed Ajmal Kasab’s testimony to Indian agencies and fudged facts about the arrests of Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind of that terror attack — but also had the gall to suggest that the Mumbai carnage was orchestrated by a member of an elite Indian intelligence unit.

So again, what does India stand to gain by resuming cricketing ties with Pakistan? Nothing significant, actually, apart from the Board of Control for Cricket in India getting another opportunity to make  another pile of money while the ruling political class gets to pretend that it has engineered some kind of a progress in bilateral relations. Interestingly, though, the scenario is not half as bleak on the other side of the border.

For one, the series is god-sent for the Pakistan Cricket Board and its empty coffers. Ever since the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Pakistan back in 2009, few countries have been willing to tour that country. In such a situation, an India-Pakistan series is exactly what the PCB needed to set its cash registers ringing. No wonder then that it has been “very persistent”, as BCCI spokesperson Rajiv Shukla put it, in resuming cricketing ties with India.

But there is more to the cricket story than mere commerce. A series such as this, particularly when framed within the narrative of friendship and goodwill, plays a huge part in deflecting popular and even political attention from the key issues that plague bilateral ties — for instance, the alleged involvement of Pakistani state actors in the planning and the execution of the 26/11 terror attacks and the Pakistani establishment’s refusal to investigate or even acknowledge them. Islamabad wants the people to forget that it had any role to play in the Mumbai attack that not only led to the loss of 166 innocent lives but also held this entire country hostage for three whole days. And from all available evidence, it seems to be working quite well, with both the domestic and the international Press gushing over the supposed thaw in bilateral relations.

In fact, it seems to have become a matter of state policy for Islamabad to actively seek such avenues of ‘cooperation’, for want of a better term. And, it is against this backdrop that the recent push for a significant increase in trade between India and Pakistan must be viewed.

In a recent article detailing key developments in the last year across the world that could affect global politics in this new year, the reputed Foreign Policy magazine puts “India and Pakistan trade away” right at the top of its list. According to the magazine, “The perennially feuding neighbours finally notched several key positive developments that had nothing to do with borders, nukes or terrorism. In short, both sides may be realising that political tension is bad for business.”

A quick reality check is in order here. Let us start with India and the Attari-Wagah check-point. As it had promised, New Delhi has already opened a huge customs depot and warehouse that can, according to the Associated Press, handle more than 600 trucks a day from Pakistan. Additionally, it has also liberalised the visa regime for Pakistan and even though the changes are not drastic, they are a definite political concession.

Moving on to Pakistan: First, the negative list that it was supposed to cancel in India’s favour. The deadline for that was December 15, 2012, but Islamabad has not moved an inch regarding that list. Second, the most favoured nation status. This is an old story, but still the deadline for Pakistan according India MFN status was December 31, 2012. That date has also come and gone, and nobody has cared to ask why India still has no MFN status from Pakistan.

Now, compare this to the fact that India accorded Pakistan MFN status back in 1996, and then add to the equation Pakistan’s obligation as a World Trade Organisation member to reciprocate the status on to India. Finally, also take into account the fact that Pakistan stands to gain far more from trade with India than the other way around. The writing is on the wall for our policy-makers here, but it seems that a certain segment of India has to be repeatedly poked in the eye before it can read it. 

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 3, 2013)