MODI’S FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE

The Prime Minister has spent a significant amount of time in his first year in office improving the quality of India's engagement with the world. He hasn't made any major policy turnarounds but his out-of-the-box approach to diplomacy has made all the difference

This time, last year, as India prepared for a Modi Government to take charge, few had imagined that the Prime Minister would emerge as an international showman in his first year in office. The man had no significant political experience at the national level, his election campaign had a negligible foreign policy component, and there were many in Lutyen’s Delhi wondering if the chaiwallah’s son, whose spoken English was supposedly below par, would be comfortable at the global high table. Even those who were expecting Mr Modi to prioritise foreign policy, like this columnist, had underestimated how significantly he’d seek to improve the quality of India’s engagement with the world.

In the 12 past months, Mr Modi has travelled to as many as 18 countries, participated in a bunch of multilateral summits and hosted several world leaders at home. He has energised a moribund foreign office, unshackled Indian diplomacy from stiff protocols, and talked up the India Story. He hasn’t really made any major policy turnarounds but his assertive and out-of-the-box approach to diplomacy has made all the difference. Let’s take a look at some of the defining features of his foreign policy, as they have emerged in this past year.

South Asia Focus: It all started with the grand inauguration that was attended by eight heads of Government from the neighbourhood, including the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The spectacle reiterated India’s position of influence in South Asia, and made clear that it is in the sub-continent that India’s global engagement will always be rooted. The star-studded show was followed by Mr Modi’s first foreign trip to Bhutan, and then Nepal, where the Prime Minister would go again, later in the year, for the SAARC summit. Next in the South Asia line-up was Sri Lanka. Soon after winning the presidential election, Mr Maithripala Sirisena came from Colombo with the promise of improving relations with Delhi, and, weeks later, Mr Modi paid a reciprocal visit. Then, in April, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made his first state visit to India. Though some of these tours were more high profile than the others, they were all considered to be reasonably successful.

But the real measure of how India’s South Asia policy has been shaping up under Mr Modi lies not so much in these incoming and outgoing visits but in his administration’s prompt and elaborate rescue, relief and re-building programme in Nepal and the ongoing ratification of the India-Bangladesh land border agreement. In both cases, Mr Modi showed how much of difference can be made by a decisive leader who doesn’t have to look over his shoulder and second-guess himself all the time.

Re-discovery of the Indian Ocean: There was a time when India was the dominant power in the Indian Ocean but that was more than 2,000 years ago. In the more recent past, the Indian Ocean has been Indian only in name because this country has had neither the political will nor the economic might to take on a greater role in the region. Also, India’s involvement in the Indian Ocean region has always been anchored in Sri Lanka, and as that island nation fought a bloody civil war, Delhi became stayed away from ocean politics. However, with China making forays into India’s maritime neighbourhood (and India’s own ability to be a regional security provider having somewhat improved), India seems to be keen on strengthening its position.

Hence, we had Mr Modi’s three-nation Indian Ocean tour of Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka earlier this year. In Mauritius, Mr Modi promised to upgrade sea and air links on the Agalega islands (which provide India a crucial foothold in the Indian Ocean) while, in Seychelles, he signed an agreement to develop infrastructure on Assumption island and also gifted a provided a Dornier aircraft for surveillance. The strategic implications are obvious. But while it is heartening to see India take a lead in the Indian Ocean region (which, by the way, has been largely welcomed by the island states), the fact is that China already has more than a toehold there and the smaller nations will seek to play the big powers against each other.

Strengthening cultural linkages: It is sometimes said that while other empires were built by soldiers who conquered land and took slaves, the Indian empire was built by saints and seers who found a place in people’s souls. Unfortunately, these civilisational linkages have been ignored by our policymakers and, to some extent, even the public at large. Mr Modi, who does not confuse secularism with irreligiosity or an irreverence for tradition, has sought to change this, so that India can finally leverage its soft power (which should go beyond Bollywood and chicken tikka masala) to the fullest. And so it is that he is scheduled to visit the Great Wild Goose pagoda in China which is dedicated to famous Buddhist pilgrim Huen Tsang. Similarly, when he was in Japan last year, he prayed at the Toji and Kinkakuji Buddhist temples while in Sri Lanka, he addressed Buddhist monks at the Mahabodhi Temple and prayed at the Mahabodhi tree in Anuradhapura. While these initiatives may not bring immediate political or economic benefits, it makes diplomacy more accessible to the people and goes a long way, forgive the cliché, in winning hearts and minds.

Wooing the Diaspora: An important element of Mr Modi’s strategy to increase India’s soft power abroad has been to tap into the vast Indian diaspora. This was evident in the huge community receptions that were organised in the US, Canada and Australia. While previous Governments have also sought to leverage the diaspora, there hasn’t really been a clear or sustained outreach plan. Mr Modi has sought to reinvigorate the official Indian connection with the diaspora, hope that the latter will emerge as a political force and not just remain a source of foreign remittance.

New buzzwords: Under Mr Modi, ‘climate change’ and ‘nuclear power’ have emerged as major talking points within the larger foreign policy narrative. This is an interesting development especially given India’s difficult positions and histories on both counts. The discourse on climate change is pegged to reduction in carbon emission levels but India has consistently refused to commit to any ceilings. Instead, it has based its arguments on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Mr Modi hasn’t changed this position but his emphasis on clean and renewable sources of energy has not gone unnoticed. Nuclear power is, of course, linked to the climate change issue because it is an important alternate power source that can fuel India’s growing economy in a clean and sustainable manner.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 14, 2015

DEALING WITH A NEW AFGHANISTAN

The incumbent Afghan President may be more pro-Pakistan than his predecessor, but even India acknowledges that there can be no peace in Afghanistan without Pakistani support. Also, where India cannot help militarily, it should make up with economic and political support

In the run-up to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s maiden trip to this country, which concluded on April 29, the big question was: Has India lost Afghanistan? President Ghani was coming to India a full six months after he had taken office, during which time he had already visited the US, China, Iran and, importantly, made not one but two trips to Pakistan. Also, unlike his predecessor Hamid Karzai or, for that matter, even his Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, Mr Ghani neither has close personal ties with India nor had he previously expressed any special interest in or support for India’s role in Afghanistan.

As such, a revision in Kabul’s foreign policy priorities was expected, and this was not just with regard to India. For example, the Ghani-Abdullah administration is nowhere close to being as anti-America, as Mr Karzai had been, particularly in the later years of his presidency. However, what came as somewhat of an unpleasant surprise for India was the extent to which Mr Ghani was tilting towards Pakistan.

Not only did he visit Pakistan twice, he broke protocol during his first trip to meet with Pakistani Army chief Raheel Sharif in Rawalpindi, and later dispatched his own Army chief to attend the graduation ceremony at the Pakistani military academy in Kabul. He also sent a handful of Afghan cadets to train in Pakistan for train and handed over a Pakistani Taliban leader to Islamabad. These were largely symbolic gestures but what caused real concern in India’s strategic circles was Mr Ghani’s effective cancellation of all of his predecessor’s military aid requests from India.

During the Karzai years, Afghanistan had repeatedly requested India for weapons, but India, not wanting to upset Pakistan, had turned down those requests. This flawed policy has now changed, thankfully, but even then, delivery from the Indian side has been excruciatingly slow. For example, the three helicopters given to Afghanistan, days before Mr Ghani’s visit, were promised almost a year ago.

Also, there have been reports that during his India visit, President Ghani and Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed a refurbished military aid pact. Although no official papers have been signed in this regard, this is welcome news, nonetheless.

It is important to understand that Mr Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan is driven by practical considerations. One of his biggest priorities at the moment is ensuring Afghan security and, simply put, this will not be possible without Pakistani cooperation. In its perennial quest for that elusive ‘strategic depth’ against India, Pakistan continues to foment trouble and terror in Afghanistan and, unless it changes this policy, it will be enormously difficult to secure a durable peace in Afghanistan.  There’s little that India can do in this  regard, given that it does not even share a land border with Afghanistan.

Specifically, Mr Ghani is looking to Pakistan for help with bringing the Afghan Taliban, officially led by Mullah Omar’s Quetta shura, to the negotiating table. Even after 13 years of war, the Afghan Taliban are very much a force to reckon with — and since it has not been defeated militarily, it will have to be integrated politically (although, in reality, a lasting solution will include a both elements).

Unfortunately, neither Mr Ghani nor Mr Karzai before him has had much success. Several factors have impeded the peace process. One, Pakistan has routinely put a spanner in the works; two, the Taliban see no reason to compromise and is just waiting out the withdrawal of foreign troops; three, the Taliban are not a homogenous group but an umbrella organisation that covers different outfits with similar ideologies and these outfits do not always agree with each other on how best to negotiate with Government forces. None of these factors will change overnight — in fact, the situation will become even more rigid after the few thousand US forces, currently in Afghanistan, leave by 2017, as US President Barack Obama has promised. 

There is, however, a small window of opportunity between now and 2017. If the Afghan Army, with the help of US forces, can break the military stalemate (currently both parties are strong enough to hold on to their turfs but can’t take territory from the other) and change the power equation on the ground, then President Ghani can force the Taliban to the negotiating table. But, there are no indications yet of such a shift in position.

There is a new player in the mix: China, which has recently offered to facilitate talks with the Taliban. Though China has traditionally stayed away from such diplomacy, this time, it has stepped in because of the growing unrest in it Xinjiang Province, which has a large Muslim Uyghur population. Militants from Pakistan are stirring the pot in Xinjiang and China, understandably, would like to nip the problem in the bud. However, it is unclear how much direct access China has to the Taliban. If it hopes to pressure Pakistan into bringing the Taliban on board, even then it is a weak plan, because Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban is not full and complete either.

So, where does India fit into all this?

India can help the Afghan forces militarily — and this is where we should hope to see more cooperation. Up until now, military help has been mostly about training Afghan soldiers and some intelligence sharing. These are important but not enough. There is now talk of more weapons support, although having Indian boots on the ground is out of the picture.

Still, there is reason to hope that under the Modi Government, there will be a more forceful and determined Indian policy in Afghanistan, not just with regard to military aid but also on the economic front. India is Afghanistan’s largest regional donor and has made significant investment in its infrastructure and capacity-building sectors. These connections need to be furthered, also through the Chabahar port project in Iran, which will give us unfettered access to Afghanistan.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 30, 2015

EUROPE LEFT OUT OF MODI’S EURO-TOUR

The European Union bloc is one of India's largest trading partners. Yet, the Prime Minister did not travel to Brussels

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recently concluded his three-nation tour of Europe and Canada has been pegged a huge success. The refurbished Rafale deal that he signed in France, India’s stunning presence at the Hannover Messe trade fair, which he inaugurated, in Germany, and the Prime Minister’s now trademarked outreach to the diaspora in Canada, where he also formalised a key agreement for the supply of uranium that will fuel India’s nuclear power plants, have all been much appreciated. However, if there was one thing missing from the European segment of the Prime Minister’s tour, it was Europe itself.

As a bloc, the 28-member European Union is India’s single largest regional trading partner and one of the largest sources for Foreign Direct Investment in India. The EU also receives a significant amount of outward investment from India . Yet, neither did the Prime Minister travel to Brussels nor did he engage with the leadership of the European Union. Why?

The official reason is one scheduling problem. The Ministry of External Affairs had proposed an India-EU summit (now postponed forsometime later in the year) but the response from Brussels was less than enthusiastic. The latter dragged its feet, as it struggled to decide how best to respond to India’s continued detention of the two Italian Marines who killed two Indian fishermen in 2012. Earlier, the case was on the verge of becoming a major diplomatic debacle, as it moved at a glacial pace through the Indian judicial system, but both sides had since worked together to avoid a showdown.

However, in January this year, the European Parliament, which had just brought in a new set of leaders including Italian politician Feredica Mogherini as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, turned up the heat. It issued a strong resolution accusing India of “a serious breach of human rights”, which rightly irked New Delhi.

After all, it was not like the two men were doing hard labour at Tihar. While one of the Marines, Salvatore Girone, is currently living in the Italian Embassy in Delhi, under a special court-ordered arrangement, the other, Massimiliano Latorre, is in Italy. After suffering a stroke in Delhi in August 2014, Mr Latorre was allowed to go home for four months for treatment. Moreover, in January, three days before the EU accused India of human rights violations, the Supreme Court had given permission to the recuperating Marine to stay back in Italy for another three months, on medical grounds.

Many believe that the EU’s hardline stance can be attributed to Ms Mogherini, who had earlier told the European Parliament that, “It’s good for everyone to be fully aware of how much of an impact the unresolved dispute of the two Italian Navy officials can have on relations between the EU and India.”

At the same time, some European diplomats have also pointed out that it’s unlikely for an individual leader to hold policy hostage in this manner. In fact, according to a report in a leading national daily, some European diplomats believe that the big boys in the club, France and Germany, let the EU mishandle the summit planning process, so that they themselves could deal with India on a one-to-one basis.

 Now, these statements need not be taken at face value but certain ground realities are hard to ignore. For example, the India-EU free trade agreement is almost done but, ostensibly due to a lack of political will, it is yet to be finalised.

From India’s point of view, it is important to understand that while our overall trade figures with the EU are impressive, they can also be deceptive. A lion’s share of that trade pie is captured the UK; bring Germany and France to the table and there’s precious little left for the smaller European nations. Moreover, India has always been more comfortable with bilateral dealings rather than multilateral engagements. In other words, India doesn’t have enough incentive to go the extra mile for the EU.

And this is just on the economic side. On the political and diplomatic side, with regard to issues like the conflict in Ukraine and climate change, there is even lesser common ground. No wonder Europe got only two-pages in the Modi Government’s foreign policy booklet, released in January this year. In comparison, Africa got 14.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 24, 2015)

LOOKING BEYOND ECONOMIC TIES

The Prime Minister’s trip to Germany focussed on boosting trade and technology ties. But the gifts that he exchanged with his host, Chancellor Angela Merkel, offer a sneak peak into the deeper civilisation connect between India and Germany 

The importance of the relationship between India, one of the world’s largest emerging powers, and Germany, the economic anchor of continental Europe, hardly needs to be reiterated. Neither does one have to underscore the fact that the India-Germany bilateral, robust as it may be, is not exactly functioning at its optimal level.

Despite their complimentary national traits and requirements  — if Germany can benefit from access to Indian skilled labour and a large market here, India’s growth story can be fuelled by cutting-edge German technology — and equally importantly, a shared commitment to the universal values of freedom, democracy and equality, the two countries are somehow indifferent to each other. Sure, there has been increasing cooperation at the Government-to-Government and business-to-business levels, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recently concluded trip to Germany shows, but at the people-to-people level, there is still precious little to talk about, beyond Bollywood and Bayern Munich.

This is especially disappointing because the two countries do, in fact, share a deeper civilisational connect that somehow seems to have snapped in the modern age. A re-discovery of this civilisational connect has the potential to truly re-invigorate the India-Germany bilateral and offer young Germans and Indians alike a fresh perspective, as they both seek to re-define their place within a new world order.

The gifts that Mr Modi and German Chancellor Angela Merkel exchanged earlier this week offer a sneak peak into the historical ties that the two nations share. Mr Modi gifted his host, who holds a doctorate in quantum chemistry, reproductions of manuscripts and papers written by Indian Nobel Laureate CV Raman who is known to have been inspired by the famous German scientist Hermann von Helmholtz to pursue a career in science On her part, Ms Merkel on Tuesday gifted Mr Modi an original first edition print of German Indologist Friedrich Max Müller’s book on the Indian spiritual leader, Sri Ramakrishna Paramhansa.

Today, Max Müller is, arguably, the most recognisable German in India. This is as it should be for few other foreigners have contributed so significantly to India’s understanding of its past and its philosophy as he. Best known for editing The Sacred Books of the East, his monumental 50-volume set of English translations of Asian religious text that was published by the Oxford University Press between 1879 and 1910, Max Müller also translated the Upanishads and the Rig Veda.

His other well-known book, that seems to have been largely forgotten in this country today, is titledIndia —What It Can Teach Us. The book is based on his lectures to candidates of the Indian Civil Service examination, on whom he wished to impress the importance of ancient Indian culture and tradition. His last major work, published a year before his death in 1900, was The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. This was the major first publication to discuss all the philosophical systems of India.

But while there is still a reasonable amount of recognition of Max Müller and his work in India, few today remember his contemporary Indologists. For example, Arthur Schopenhauer, who worked around the same time as Max Müller and is considered to be the first Western thinker who incorporated thoughts of the Upanishads in his own philosophy, hardly rings a bell.

Schopenhauer believed that called the availability of Sanskrit literature to the West was “the greatest gift of our century”, and even predicted that ancient Indian philosophy, which he considered to be the “highest human wisdom”, would become the “cherished faith of the West”. In the preface to his best known work, The World As Will And Representation, Schopenhauer writes that one who “has also received and assimilated the sacred primitive Indian wisdom, then he is the best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him”. Interestingly, Schopenhauer was introduced to Indian philosophy through his friend Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, a lesser known philosopher, who had mastered the Sanskrit language.

This is just a small list of a few thinkers from the 19 century. The first German to study Sanskrit can be traced to back to the 17th century to the missionary Heinrich Roth, who lived in India and is believed to have written on Sanskirt grammar but his works were never published. Later, August Wilhelm Schlegel, the first professor of Indology at Bonn University, published his famous book, On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians while poet Friedrich Rückert gained prominence with his translation of the Mahabharat.

At this point, one may rightly question how exactly the study of what obscure German philosophers had to say about India or Indian philosophy would be of any interest to contemporary Indians (or Germans, for that matter). The answer to that is simple: If young Indians (and Germans) are looking to rewrite their terms of engagement with each other and indeed with the world, they will have to find their own unique narrative. Besides, a nation that is ignorant of its past cannot hope to build a strong and secure future — and this is particularly relevant for an emerging power like India that has an otherwise robust  civilisational identity.

Two good examples of how ancient knowledge can be or is being leveraged in the contemporary world is the growing popularity of traditional Indian medicines and therapeutic practices in this country and that of Sanskrit studies in Germany. Unfortunately, the Indian perspectives on these issues have oscillated from completely ignoring the matter on the one hand to romanticizing it on the other. Since Germany has made huge progress in researching ancient India, and Sanskrit classes there are so popular today that universities can’t find enough teachers to cater to the growing demand, these ties have the potential to be leveraged further.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 16, 2015)

SAUDI MUSCLE-FLEXING IN YEMEN

The crisis in Yemen is neither a predominantly Shia-Sunni conflict nor just another proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is a civil war in which a foolhardy Riyadh is intervening to show off its geo-political might. For this, the average Yemeni will pay the price in blood

With approximately 3,500 Indian citizens trapped in Yemen, the latest child of the Arab Spring to collapse, reportage here about the war in that country has, understandably, been focused on the Government’s ongoing evacuation efforts. In the process, the geo-strategic implications of the conflict, wherein a Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebellion has toppled the West-backed Yemeni Government, prompting a military intervention by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Sunni Arab states, have been largely ignored. However, with the Houthis taking charge of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait, it is now imperative to look at the larger picture.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait is a chokepoint, just about 30kms at its widest, located between Yemen in the Arabian Penninsula, and Eritrea and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. It connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and is a crucial linkage in the international waterway that connects Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. This is the route that has traditionally been taken by Indian merchant ships to reach European markets (and vice versa), and is of immense importance to India’s sea-borne trade interests.

Now, there have been some reports and suggestions that the Houthis may shut down the strait and actually choke the shipping lane. This — particularly a long-term shutdown — seems far-fetched. Neither do the Houthis seem to have the maritime capability to enforce such a blockade nor will regional and world powers allow it. Because of previous threats from Somali piracy, the strait is fairly well-guarded with the navies of Russia, Ukraine, the US, UK, France and India routinely patrolling the waters. The immediate concern about Bab-el-Mandeb, therefore, is not a complete shutdown by the Houthis, but greater disruption in an already fragile region.

Yemen, one of the poorest Arab states, is home to Al Qaeda’s most resilient franchise — Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula. Years of American drone strikes and other targeted counter-terror strategies have had some success in containing the group but it is entirely possible that the AQAP will return with a vengeance on the back of a protracted regional war, much like the Islamic State came of age in the political and military chaos of Syria and Iraq. If that happens, piracy and terror attacks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, of the sort we saw in 2008, when Somali pirates seized Saudi Arabia’s Sirius Star oil tanker, or in 2000, when Al Qaeda attacked US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole, will increase. At the very least, such incidents will push up insurance costs for commercial ships; if the strait becomes too risky, the ships will have to take a much longer route.

Unfortunately, a long-drawn out conflict is exactly where we are heading towards, with the ill-advised Saudi-led Sunni Arab coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm. Officially, this operation is being carried out on the request of ousted Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to dislodge the Houthis from power and bring back stability to the country. However, apart from aerial bombing of Houthi targets, there seems to be no larger gameplan for how to achieve this target — either militarily or politically.

It is important to understand that the Houthis, though an anti-Government force, are not terrorists of the Islamic State-type. They are a political force, rooted in Yemen and driven by local causes. Their group was formed in 1992 in the Saada Governorate to protect and promote the interests of the minority Zaidi (a Shia offshoot) community. Found almost exclusively in this northern mountainous region of Yemen, on the border with Saudi Arabia, this community had been ignored by the Sunni Government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh who ruled for 33 years until he had to quit office at the height of the Arab Spring. The Houthi movement criticised the Saleh Government for not just marginalising the minority group but also for being corrupt and inefficient.

Later, when the Saleh Government allowed the US to use Yemeni territory for counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda, the Houthis opposed American intervention. Their voice grew louder with the Iraq war, and after they took their opposition from Saada to the capital city of Sanaa, President Saleh sought to shut them down. This led to six brutal wars between 2004 and 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring came to Yemen and the Houthis were at the forefront of the protest movement. A year later, following an agreement brokered by Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr Saleh was eased out of office but the Houthis were sidelined. A transitional regime, supported by the international community, was put in place while the Houthis positioned themselves as the opposition force.

Mr Hadi, also Mr Saleh’s long time Vice President, was at the helm but failed spectacularly in guiding Yemen’s political transition and the Houthis upped their ante against him. In this, Mr Saleh also played a part (it is no coincidence that Bab-el-Mandeb was handed to the Houthis by a section of the Yemeni Army loyal to Mr Saleh). Soon, Mr Hadi lost the plot. The Houthis advanced from their Saada stronghold and and captured Sanaa on September 21, 2014.

There was a period of political reconciliation when a new Cabinet with a new Prime Minister was formed. But tensions grew over the drafting of Yemen’s Constitution and eventually the Houthis besieged the homes of the Prime Minister and the President. On January 21, Mr Hadi and his Cabinet resigned. The embattled President moved to his hometown of Aden where he rescinded his resignation and announced that the port city was the new capital of Yemen. But on March 25, Mr Hadi fled Yemen and appeared in Riyadh on March 26, the day that Saudi Arabia announced its military campaign in Yemen.

Now, this campaign is being portrayed as a Saudi-Iran proxy war fought on sectarian lines. To a certain extent, it is — as the Houthis receive support from Tehran. However, the quantum and quality of this support has been vastly exaggerated. Also, as described earlier, the Houthis are not merely an Iranian proxy force or a mercenary Shiite army. They are a local political group fighting, what is essentially, a civil war. And there’s only one sensible course of action here for foreign powers: Stay away from the mess.

Saudi Arabia’s intervention, and that too on behalf of the weaker party, will only lead to a protracted conflict of the sort we are seeing in Syria and Iraq. There may have been a sliver of hope had the coalition produced some political action plan but there is none. Even the coalition’s military prowess is in doubt — the Saudi military has a bunch of fancy toys but it’s a largely untested force. The Egyptians are slightly better but it should be remembered that Cairo and Riyadh have historically been on opposing sides in Yemeni matters (remember the 1960s North Yemen civil war). Besides, neither of these two big players have the resources to sustain a long-term military operation especially if it involves ground troops. 

So, why is Riyadh getting into this mess? The answer is simple: It has always been paranoid about Yemen and has a history of meddling in its internal affairs. The Arab Spring and the Houthi advance had disrupted its carefully orchestrated political equations and now its seeking a reset. Also, after its successful 2011 intervention to save the Sunni-minority Government of Bahrain, it seems like Saudi Arabia is taking its position as the big brother in the Sunni world a little too seriously — unfortunately, it’s doing so in a manner that’ll only bring about more death and bloodshed to the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 2, 2015)

MALDIVES STUMBLES YET AGAIN

The renewed political persecution of Opposition leader and former President Mohamed Nasheed is an important diplomatic challenge for the Modi Government. India must help Maldives stay the democratic course

The political crisis in the Maldives, stemming from the controversial arrest of former President Mohamed Nasheed, is one of the most significant diplomatic tests for the Government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Mr Nasheed was the archipelago’s first democratically elected head of state and remains one of the most pro-India leaders in the sub-continent.

How India responds to what is clearly a case of political persecution in this context will answer four questions. First, how does India treat its friends and is it willing to go the extra mile for them? Second, does India have the diplomatic (as opposed to the economic, geographic or even historic) clout to maintain its position as the foremost power in the sub-continent? Third, especially with another regional power — China — pushing into India’s near abroad, does New Delhi have the ability protect its interests? Fourth, is India, as the world’s largest democracy, willing to walk the talk on securing democratic ideals in its neighbourhood? 

Let’s start with the Government of India’s official response to the crisis: On February 23, a day after Mr Nasheed was arrested and roughed up by police on his way to court, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement expressing concern at the “recent developments in Maldives” including the “manhandling” of the former President.

As such, the statement was fairly routine, if not downright insipid. At least a section of the commentariat here would have liked a stronger response but these are still early days and one needn’t always fire the big guns in the opening salvo itself. A measured response in public is fine for now, as long as a firm message is being sent across in private.

The Government of India cannot be seen as meddling in the internal affairs of another sovereign nation but neither can it perceived as sitting idly as its friend and ally is given the short shrift. In other words, India will be in the crossfire between the Maldives’s ruling coalition and its opposition parties — but not for the first time.

In the run-up to the 2014 general election that brought the incumbent regime, led by President Abdullah Yameen, to power, there was a similar political crisis in 2013 wherein the interim Government of the time, had sought to keep Mr Nasheed out of the electoral race. Notably, this interim Government had taken over after Mr Nasheed was controversially ousted from office in February 2012, following a mutiny by the Maldivian police and the Army.

The removal marked the return of the old guard in Male and the process came a full circle with the presidency of Mr Yameen, the half-brother of Mr Maumoon Gayoom who had ruled Maldives with an iron hand for three decades.

In 2012, as Male slipped into political turmoil, the Indian Government was caught napping. It was unable to protect Mr Nasheed even though the latter had reportedly asked for Indian assistance. In 2013, however, the Manmohan Singh administration did a far better job: After Mr Nasheed took refuge in the Indian High Commission in Male, Indian diplomats secured a peace deal of sorts that allowed Mr Nasheed to fight the election in 2014. Whether the Modi Government will be able to do something similar now and extricate Mr Nasheed again, will be closely watched.

For now, there has been little movement in the public domain but it may be pertinent to note that when a high-level delegation from Mr Nasheed’s party, the Maldivian Democratic Party, visited New Delhi between 19 and 22 February, at a time when the crisis was just building up, not a single member of the Modi Government met with the Maldivian leaders.

Four days earlier, on February 15, Maldivian Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon (she is Mr Gayoom’s daughter) had called on External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in New Delhi and reportedly reiterated Male’s commitment that there would be no political witch-hunt.

Delhi seems to have taken these words at face value and gone ahead with planning the Prime Minister’s Indian Ocean tour which was to include Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius and Maldives later this month. Now, it seems that Maldives leg has been put on hold. The MEA has not announced any dates for Maldives even though Ms Maumoon has already said that her Government will be welcoming Mr Modi soon.

A prime ministerial trip to Maldives at this point will be a de facto (and ill-advised) endorsement of the policies of the Yameen Government while a refusal to make the trip is sure to annoy the regime, which is already on the defensive. Note that even before Delhi had put out an official statement on the Nasheed crisis, Ms Maumoon publicly called upon India to abide by the Panchsheel principles and steer clear of domestic politics. 

Generally speaking, the Indian establishment has strong ties with the Gayoom/Yameen camp as well, but those linkages haven’t prevented the latter from seeking closer relations with China, occasionally even at the cost of upsetting India. The GMR controversy is, of course, well-known in this context but there are also more recent, instances. For example, in December 2014, the Yameen Government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese on the Maritime Silk Route project; Male and Beijing are already negotiating a free trade agreement; the two have also set up a joint commission to monitor large infrastructure projects.

China is already building housing units on Hulhumale island, and a link road at Laamu Atoll which has been identified as a potential special economic zone; it is also doing a feasibility report on constructing a bridge connecting the Maldives’ only international airport on Hulhule island to Male city and has expressed interest in developing the airport as well. The Maldives is also looking to collaborate with China in oil and gas exploration projects.

The Yameen Government’s overtures to China have been so blatant that its own Ministers have expressed concern. It is assumed that this is why Mr Mohamed Nazim, who was serving as Defence Minister until January 20, was removed from office, following a midnight raid on his house on January 18. He was arrested on February 10. Aware of how closely the Maldivian Defence Forces work with India, Mr Nazim had red-flagged his Government’s “exponentially growing” security ties with China, to use the words of the Chinese Ambassador in Male. For example, China recently gifted 150 motorbikes to Maldivian Police.

Incidentally, Mr Nazim was at the forefront of the protest against Mr Nasheed in 2012 but has since been pushed off the regime ship. Within the Maldivian political establishment, there seems to be growing unease about the Yameen Government’s high-handedness. The Jumhooree Party recently quit the ruling coalition and joined hands with the MDP, while the Adhaalath Party has also been making some noises. India should take advantage of these developments to ensure that the country stays the democratic course.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 5, 2015

COMING CLOSER, OFFICIALLY

Since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The BJP took the lead in normalising ties, but it was a Congress Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations

It may have taken more than two decades, but if Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon’s India visit is any indication, it seems like India is finally and firmly committed to correcting the historical anomalies of its relationship with Israel.

Mr Ya’alon’s visit comes less than three months after Union Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singh visited Israel and only four months after Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2014.

Mr Ya’alon is the first serving Israeli Defence Minister to visit India, and his presence at a platform like Aero India is an unapologetic acknowledgement of not just the strong relationship between India and Israel, but more specifically, of the close defence ties as well.

Israel is India’s second largest military supplier after Russia and India is reportedly Israel’s biggest defence customer. In 2014 alone, defence trade between the two countries stood at about $2.5 billion. Last year, India also picked the Israeli state-owned anti-tank guided missile over the American Javelin offer in a deal that’s worth $525 million. This year, at Aero India, media reports suggest, India and Israel are expected to sign deals worth $1.5 billion.

It’s not just the weapons’ sales, per se, that are driving the defence relationship ; there’s a strong strategic component as well. Let us not forget that the big turning point here was the Israeli military assistance to India during the Kargil war. India had only limited experience with this kind of sub-conventional warfare (which, notably, has almost become the norm now) while Israel’s expertise in this field remains unparalleled.

Yet, despite such close collaboration, which, in fact, can be traced back to the 1950s (when India had sought Israeli expertise in agriculture, for example), there has always been a reluctance at the political level to acknowledge the scale of the relationship. In fact, the last time an Israeli leader who had served as Defence Minister, visited India, it was a closely-guarded state secret.

In 1977, Moshe Dayan — he was Foreign Minister at that time but had previously held the defence portfolio — was invited by Prime Minister Morarji Desai. According to US diplomatic cables, released by Wikileaks, the leaders spoke for over an hour and Moshe Dayan believed that “(Egypt’s President Anwar) Sadat had asked Desai to use his influence with Israelis in seeking a Middle East peace settlement”. 

During the meeting, the leaders also discussed establishing diplomatic ties, but Desai said it would not be possible at that time. This was in keeping with the Indian Government’s anti-Israel policy of the time — the result of several factors, from India’s colonial baggage to Mahatma Gandhi’s personal views of the Zionist movement to the Congress’s misguided Muslim appeasement policies. Put together, they produced a strong anti-Israel bias that penetrated deep within India’s foreign policy establishment and have remained to some extent even after full diplomatic relations were formally established in 1992.

That said, it is also equally true that in the two decades since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The Bharatiya Janata Party took the lead in normalising ties but it was a Prime Minister from the Congress, PV Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations.

 His successor from the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Delhi while the Congress-led UPA Government that came next allowed the relationship to flourish — so much so that bilateral trade, which spans across sectors as diverse as education and outer space, is now pegged at six billion dollars from just about $20 million in 1992.

What remains today from the policy baggage of the past is some anti-Israel posturing at international forums and the occasional impediment or irritant caused by individual leaders or bureaucrats within the system. For example, though India steers clear of criticising Israel on Palestinian issues, it continues to support resolutions against Israel at the UNHRC.

 Similarly, as recently as 2013, a senior Congress leader like Mr AK Antony, under whose watch as Defence Minister, India bought millions of dollars of weapons from Israel, reportedly backed out from a scheduled Israel trip at the last minute after he was told of reservations from the Muslim League. A third example here is of India’s odd reluctance to invest in Israel’s off-shore gas field, ostensibly because this might upset Arab states.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is hoped that abnormalities such as these will be ironed out. Mr Modi is known to be a strong supporter of Israel, and so are many of his top team members including Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Home Affairs Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.

It is no coincidence that the $659 million of Israeli arms purchases that have happened since Mr Modi came to power (even though many of the deals were put in place by the UPA regime) are more than Israel’s total defence exports to India in the last three years.

Clichéd as it may sound, the India-Israel bilateral is an idea whose time has come. From India’s point of view, Israel can be a great partner in the Modi Government’s flagship Make in India project. Much of the long-term success of this project hinges on the willingness of foreign Governments and private companies to transfer technology to India.

From Israel’s point of view, a resurgent India presents a lucrative market, especially as Europe, Israel’s traditional buyer, struggles to get back on its feet. Israel’s support for India syncs well with its own Look East policy, which includes other Asian powers such as China, Japan and South Korea.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 20, 2015