Reckless or feckless in Syria

The US is determined to punish the Assad regime for using chemical weapons and violating ‘red lines’ through a military intervention. Inadvisable as this may be, even a narrow targeted attack might be effective if well-planned. However, this does not seem to be the case

The debate on foreign military intervention in Syria is as complicated as the situation in Syria is itself, and it is difficult to do justice to the whole horde of issues — political, ideological, economic and strategic — that shape the conversation in this regard. So, let’s strip the discourse to its bare essentials and focus on two key issues here: First, why does President Barack Obama want to intervene in Syria? And second, what exactly does he plan to do?

The Assad regime has been at war with its own people since 2011 when it first used brutal police force to crackdown on peaceful protestors. Since then, President Bashar al-Assad has slowly but steadily intensified his campaign, using artillery fire and scud missiles even, and each time the West has responded with nothing more than a bland condemnatory statement. What changed in recent weeks is the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime — President Obama had designated this as a ‘red line’ — that reportedly killed  almost 1,500 people on August 21.

This flagrant breach of what the White House now likes to believe was an ‘international red line’ has to be punished, the Obama Administration has decided. The problem is that there is still no concrete proof that it was, in fact, the Assad regime that ordered the CW attack. The US intelligence assessment in this regard is flimsy; the UN is still investigating the attack; the French are the only ones with a detailed analysis of Mr Assad’s CW stockpile but still cannot pin the blame firmly on Damascus.

Also, the French and American estimates for the number of dead — 400 and 1,400+ respectively — do not match. The British peg the figure even lower at around 300. This is an important distinction because there were chemical attacks prior to August 21 but none elicited such a response, presumably because the body count was low. This brings us to the fallacy of using chemical weapons attacks as a ‘red line’ in the first place.

First, there is no evidence to suggest that chemical weapons kill more people than conventional weapons. In fact, the exact opposite is true. Second, there is an underlying assumption that there is something especially horrific about using a chemical agent as opposed to a conventional weapon. That does not make much sense. As the chemist James Conant, involved in the United States’ chemical weapons programme, wrote: “I did not see in 1917…  why tearing a man’s guts out by high explosive shell is to be preferred to maiming him by attacking his lungs.” In fact, some scholars have even argued that chemical weapons are more humane than conventional weapons but that is beside the point. The crux of the matter is that the international brouhaha over a CW attack is largely misplaced.

But still, let’s go with the flow and assume that President Assad who has been on a murderous spree for two years has now committed an exceptionally terrible crime by gassing his people, and therefore, deserves to be punished by the US (and the international community) or else it will be setting a dangerous precedent for other despots around the world. This brings us to the second aspect of how exactly President Obama intends to hand out this punishment — and it is here that the situation gets really murky. 

President Obama has proposed targeted, signature strikes — America fires a few missiles and bombs key military assets, thereby, weakening the regime and possibly forcing President Assad’s regime to the negotiating table. On the face of it, this seems like a quick, clean, surgical operation but dig below the surface and there lies a can of worms. First, what do these strikes hope to achieve? Is the US looking only to ‘deter’ further CW attacks or is it looking to significantly ‘degrade’ President Assad’s military capabilities?

If the elimination of chemical weapons-related targets is the only aim of US intervention, this is not a practical option. As military experts Chandler P Atwood and Michael Knights point out, the Assad regime is likely to be taking ‘defensive measures’ such as moving the stockpiles around, making it extremely difficult to target them unless the US can respond with persistent intelligence collection for which it will have to establish full control over Syrian airspace. Also, even after these stockpiles have been discovered, the US cannot bomb the chemical weapons. Boots on the ground will be needed. The US can choose to focus on CW delivery systems but even that will require rocket launchers, missiles and aircraft — in other words, a major military operation.

The other option, as Messers Atwood and Knight note, is to hit President Assad’s military assets such as the Damascus-based Fourth Armoured Division which was supposedly responsible for August 21 attack and the lethal 155th Brigade, led by the President’s brother. The US could also attack symbolic targets such as the Air Force intelligence headquarters and military bases in Dumair, Saiqal, Tiyas and Hama and ‘People’s Army’ units that are financed by Iran and trained by its militant Shia proxy Hezbollah. 

In fact, single targeted strikes can actually be quite effective, as Brigadier General Michael Herzog points out. For instance, this year Israel attacked two weapons shipments intended for Hezbollah and also the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Damascus that was reportedly involved in the development of biological and chemical weapons. All three were targeted strikes (of the kind that Mr Obama fancies) and they were all successful in achieving Israel’s narrow goal of preventing Hezbollah from receiving weapons. But, the key to that success was careful planning and the element of surprise.

Unfortunately, President Obama does not seem to have planned targets and he has already frittered away the surprise advantage. In fact, he if really wanted to launch targeted strikes, he should have done it months ago when Mr Assad was losing ground and the rebels were advancing. A military intervention at that time could have actually tipped the balance in the Opposition’s favour (although, this is not to say that Syria’s Islamist infested, fractured rebel groups are a welcome alternative to the Assad regime). But the calculus has since changed, especially after Hezbollah threw in its weight in favour of the regime. Today, the Assad regime is in a stronger position and there is no reason for the President to willingly give up power.

There is also the matter of civilian casualties which cannot be ruled out, no matter how surgically precise the strikes, as most military experts acknowledge. Even Secretary of State John Kerry said on Tuesday that while the US can restrain its own actions, there are no guarantees for how the Assad regime (and its allies in the region) will retaliate.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on September 15, 2013)

Left to Fend for Itself in Asia

India remains an important player in the New Silk Road project which hopes to integrate the Afghan economy into that of Central and South Asia. But can it succeed without the US's help? America seems to have given up on the initiative

 From all available reports, there isn’t much to write home about the first India-China dialogue on Central Asia that happened in Beijing last week, apart from the fact that it happened. Still the two-day meet, which was similar in structure to the recent bilateral dialogues on Africa, West Asia, Afghanistan and counter-terrorism, managed to briefly move the spotlight to Central Asia — the newest theatre of Sino-Indian rivalry and the one where New Delhi is seemingly performing the worst.

The Dialogue may have been designed to bring both countries on the same page as they increase their engagement in Central Asia, but New Delhi knows well that Beijing has long since raced ahead of it. In fact, India lags behind not just China but all other major players in the region — definitely the US and Russia but also Iran and Turkey. This is despite the fact that India has civilisational ties with Central Asia that go back centuries; more recently, New Delhi has also made a conscious effort towards strengthening its presence in that region. The Government of India’s official Connect Central Asia policy was unveiled by Minister of State for External Affairs E Ahamed at the India-Central Asia Dialogue in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek in June 2012. More than a year later, the policy remains more aspirational than it is in the actual.

Yet, a strong presence in Central Asia is important for India for two key factors: Energy security and military security. In the first case, India currently receives almost all of its oil and gas from West Asia but given how volatile that region can be, it is a good idea to look for other suppliers. Moreover, as the country’s energy demands continue to grow, New Delhi has no choice but to tap into other sources. In this context, energy-rich and proximate Central Asia is best positioned to become India’s next big oil and gas supplier.

China faces much the same challenges (growing economy, growing population) — except that it seems to have responded to them much better, as is evident from the deep inroads that it has already made into the Central Asian energy market. Beijing’s two trillion-dollar-strong foreign exchange reserves and a ruthlessly efficient Government not encumbered by the demands of democracy, have meant it has consistently managed to out-bid New Delhi in oil deals not just in Central Asia but across the world. For example, just weeks before the dialogue in Beijing, India lost to China the world’s largest oil find in five decades — the giant Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan.

In November 2012, India’s state-run ONGC Videsh Limited had struck a deal with America’s ConocoPhillips to buy the latter’s 8.4 per cent stake in Kashagan for five billion dollars.  However, the deal fell through in July when the Kazakh Government itself stepped in and informed ConocoPhillips that its own national oil company, KazMunaiGaz, will buy the American company’s stake for the same amount. Kazakh law allows the Government certain pre-emption rights as a result of which it has the authority to buy any oil asset for sale in the country at the price agreed on by the buyer and seller. KazMunaiGaz will now sell that stake to China National Petroleum Corp for a reported $5.3-5.4 billion.

But China is only one of India’s problems in Central Asia. What has most significantly limited New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts in that region is a stubborn Pakistan which has wholly refused India overland access to Central Asia, through Afghanistan. Ideally this would have been the shortest route for India; however, that is not to be — one of the big reasons why the ambitious Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India oil pipeline project, for example, has been a non-starter.

Consequently, New Delhi has had to look for new routes that bypass Pakistan altogether. Towards that end, the North-South Transportation Corridor which connects India to the Central Asian region through Iran was envisaged as a game-changer. Initiated in 2003, this project aims to connect the port in Mumbai to the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas through maritime transport, and then develop road and rail networks linking these two ports with Afghanistan and other Central Asian republics. Some initial progress was made in this regard — India’s Border Road Organisation invested $136 million to set up a road link from Zaranj to Delaran which was inaugurated in 2009. This 215km long road is a crucial part of what is known as Afghanistan’s garland road network that goes around the country connecting Herat to Kabul via Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. But this road link apart, the North-South Transportation Corridor has mostly been gathering dust for a decade now.

In the meantime, the Chinese have aggressively built similar road and rail networks penetrating deep into the heart of Central Asian Region. The Karakoram Highway, which is under-construction in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and stands a direct threat to India’s security interests in that region, is also essentially an extension of this plan, and so is the Gwadar port in Pakistan that is being developed as a counter-balance to the Chabahar port in Iran, located less than 200km away.

This brings us to military-security aspect of India-Central Asia dynamic. As of now, India’s military footprint in that region is next to nothing. New Delhi had sought to shore up its prospects by taking over the Ayni air base in Tajikistan which would have given tremendous strategic depth in the region but its plans have most definitely been thwarted by Russia, the big brother in the region. India began renovating the Ayni air-field, located just outside the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, in 2004 and up until the end of 2010, Indian engineers were still working there. However, in the last three years, the Tajik Government which depends considerably on Moscow for financial aid, seems to have made clear that it will only let Russia use the air-base.

India’s other military assets in the region include a military hospital in Farkhor, also in Tajikistan. Set up in 2001 to treat Northern Alliance members fighting the Taliban, it was shut down after the US removed the militant group from power. But in recent years, there have been talks of re-opening that field hospital. 

The India-Tajik relationship is as far as India’s military presence goes in that region. And while there have been some positive indications of improving that footprint, it is unlikely to change significantly in the near future. Not only because China and Pakistan will do all that they can to limit India’s presence but also because Russia will probably not go all out to support India. The US is the only country which has unequivocally stated that it would like India to emerge as its regional partner (this explains Russia’s reluctance) especially post the 2014 Afghan pullout.

India remains an important player in its New Silk Road project that hopes to integrate the Afghan economy into that of Central and South Asia. But America’s diminished clout at this point (the NSR project has been all but discarded) it is unclear how far Washington, DC will be able to help on the ground. In other words, India is on its own.

(This article was published in the Op-ed sector of The Pioneer on August 22, 2013.)

Al Qaeda isn't going away soon

The ‘Syria problem' is playing out in other post-Arab Spring countries, from Libya to Tunisia and Egypt, where the space vacated by despotic regimes has been taken over by Islamic militants. Terror organisations have a ready platform

In May, US President Barack Obama said that he was hoping to “refine and repeal” the mandate that he got from the Congress to fight the war on terror against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, as the core group was on the “path to defeat” and “this war, like all wars, must end”. Less than three months later, he has evacuated the US embassy in Sana’a, Yemen, shuttered as many as 19 diplomatic missions across West Asia and North and East Africa and issued a month-long global travel advisory, fearing an attack by the terror outfit that was supposedly retreating.

The two don’t square up, not even if you take into consideration the Benghazi factor. Last year, the American Ambassador to Libya and three others were killed when the US mission in Benghazi came under attack. It was later revealed that the US Government had intelligence about the attack but had ignored it, causing much embarrassment, especially to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was accused of a cover-up.

Against this backdrop, it is understandable that the Obama Administration has this time around taken extraordinary measures to ensure the safety of its citizens. But this also proves that the Al Qaeda still has the ability to mount a major terror attack on even well-guarded Western targets. 

Of course, questions may be asked about the quality of the threat perception that prompted Washington, DC, to take these unusual steps. But given the limited information in this regard that is available — we only know that the alerts were issued after intercepted electronic communication between Al Qaeda top bosses showed that chief Ayman al-Zawahiri had ordered the group’s head in Yemen, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, to attack Western targets —such questions can only lead to speculation and conspiracy theories regarding Edward Snowden’s former bosses at the National Security Agency.

Assuming that the threat is as significant as the US authorities believe it to be, there can be no denying that Al Qaeda and its affiliates remain strong and lethal. What’s more, there is ample evidence that the group will quite possibly grow stronger and more resilient in the immediate future. Recent developments in South and West Asia show that Al Qaeda will secure for itself more physical sanctuaries around the world in the next few years.

Historically, it is this access to safe havens that has been the group’s lifeline. As long as its leaders and operatives have a place to hide, Al Qaeda has repeatedly shown that it has the ability to adapt itself to changing circumstances, regroup and hit back with a renewed vengeance.

We are already seeing it in the AfPak region. Despite the fact that it has been at the receiving end of an international military campaign and its leaders have been hounded and hunted for more than a decade now, Al Qaeda has managed to survive because it continues to enjoy the hospitality of the Pakistani establishment. The extent to which Islamabad has shielded the terror outfit and others of its ilk is well delineated in the Abbottabad Commission report which shows how the entire state machinery looked the other way as Osama bin Laden built himself a veritable fortress on the outskirts of the national capital. Not only did he live there for nine years with many members of his family without anybody being the wiser, he also managed hands-on his global terror network from the Abbottabad residence — as we know from documents that were seized following the May 2011 US raid that killed him.

Now, with the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, the physical sanctuary that Al Qaeda has in Pakistan will quite possibly extend in full to Afghanistan again — and before you know it, the group’s central command, or what President Obama refers to as the ‘Al Qaeda Core’, will be back to its original strength.

Interestingly, the weakening of the Al Qaeda Core has been one of the biggest achievements of President Obama’s otherwise tepid counter-terrorism policy, and indeed it was this that led him to proclaim that the group had been virtually defeated.

But now it seems that even that one significant gain might be reversed and soon, especially if the new Government that will replace Hamid Karzai’s administration in 2014 in Afghanistan, is unable to keep the militants at bay. In this context, the nature and number of US troops that will stay back in Afghanistan (and we know for sure that there will be some kind of a residual force) will be crucial.

Outside of the AfPak region, events in West Asia have been equally disconcerting. Syria, particularly, seems to have been run over by Al Qaeda operatives who have captured the popular revolt against President Bashar al-Assad. In fact, the Syrian civil war has played an important role in energising the group in the Levant, much like how the latter received a boost from the war in Iraq in the previous decade, as security analyst Bruce Hoffman notes in his latest article.

Not only is Syria yet another safe-haven in-the-making for Al Qaeda, it is also in the heart of the Arab world (and, therefore, closer to the group’s financiers in the region). Equally importantly, it places the terror group at the doorsteps of its sworn enemy, Israel, and another enemy, though to a lesser extent, Jordan. The recently created Al Nusr front, Al Qaeda’s flag bearer in Syria, has already established its credentials as a deadly sectarian force in the country and can no longer be ignored as a “bunch of guys” that owe allegiance to the black banner. That, instead of helping crush this force, the Obama Administration is planning to arm the Syrian rebels, is deeply distressing.

The ‘Syria problem’ is playing out in other post-Arab Spring countries as well, from Libya to Tunisia and Egypt where the space vacated by despotic regimes has been taken over by Islamic militants. Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the region have taken advantage of the weak and unstable Governments that have come to power recently to expand their toehold in the Sinai and the Sahel (think of the Al Qaeda flags that have become a regular at Muslim Brotherhood rallies in Egypt).

In effect then, more than a decade after the war on terror was launched, Al Qaeda is stronger today than it was before, having expanded and strengthened its footprint around the world.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on August 8, 2013)

Trust Friends, Don't Doubt Them

As Bhutan seeks to increase its engagement with the world, India has no reason to resent it, especially if its relations with Thimphu remain strong. New Delhi had unilaterally amended the old treaty to allow Thimphu to follow its own foreign policy

With India deciding to restore the subsidy on cooking gas and kerosene to Bhutan, an unseemly episode in the relations between the two countries has thankfully ended. The subsidy was revoked on June 30, less than two weeks before the tiny Himalayan nation went to poll to elect its second democratic Government, and it understandably led to accusations that New Delhi was seeking to interfere in Bhutan’s internal matters. The country’s outgoing Prime Minister Jigme Thinley’s so-called ‘adventurism’ in foreign policy, that saw him meet with the Chinese Premier on the sidelines of the Rio summit last year, without prior consultation with New Delhi, had supposedly irked the mandarins in South Block, who then withdrew the subsidies to express their displeasure and ensure that the ‘pro-China leader’ did not come back to power.

In the weeks since then, however, it has become evident that much of the reaction to the ill-timed subsidy cut was blown out of proportion. Apart from the fact that the subsidy cut has since been reversed, the argument that it caused Mr Thinley to lose the election has also been debunked. In the first round of polling that was held in March (months before the subsidy controversy erupted) and saw four parties fight it out, the Prime Minister’s party, Druk Phuensum Tshogpa, won 44.52 per cent of votes. In the second and final round, where the DPT took on the People’s Democratic Party in a face-off, its vote-share fell by just one decimal point —indicating, that India’s subsidy cut did not have an impact on Mr Thinley’s political career even though it surely added some zing to the electoral discourse. If the PDP ultimately won the election, it was because in the final round the party managed to secure all the opposition, non-DPT votes. This was possible primarily because PDP chief and now Prime Minister-elect Tshering Tobgay, a former civil servant, had proven himself to be a strong and articulate Opposition leader in the past five years.

In effect, India’s decision to cut fuel subsidy was not a political one at all —it was a bureaucratic goof-up. The fuel subsidy lapsed on June 30 when Bhutan’s 10th Plan expired. Fresh terms for financial assistance could only be negotiated after the new Government was sworn in — and Bhutan’s Chief Election Commissioner, believed to be even more evangelical in these matters than TN Seshan, made sure that the rules were followed to the T. Add to this the miscommunication between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Petroleum in India, as a result of which the latter cancelled the subsidy without taking the former into confidence — and the situation was ripe for a diplomatic disaster.

Thankfully, both countries have now put the episode behind them but nevertheless, there are some important lessons to be learnt. Apart from the obvious one on better communication within the bureaucracy, the most important take-away from this episode, for New Delhi, is that Bhutan is a changing country and India must respond to those changes effectively.

In the past, India has done most of its business with Bhutan through the Bhutanese King in particular and that country’s elite in general. Now, with a parliamentary democracy in place in Thimphu, New Delhi will have to learn to work more carefully with a larger number of stakeholders, some of whom will have competing interests. The manner in which the PDP spun the subsidy cut decision, as the price Bhutan was paying for outgoing Prime Minister Thinley’s supposed mishandling of India-Bhutan’s relations (due to his ‘pro-China’ tendencies) speaks volumes. In fact, the whole thing was made to look so bad that Mr Thinley had to come on national television to explain himself and do damage control.

Outside of the power corridors of Thimphu, the popular reaction to subsidy cut was also telling. It reflected the changes that are currently underway in Bhutanese society especially its increasing willingness to question authority figures and demand greater accountability — which is quite possibly directly related to the installation of a parliamentary democracy and an increased engagement with the outside world. And so it is that in this general election Bhutan voted out the DPT, which ‘represented’ the monarchy and the elite and marked in the previous election a continuation of the royal tradition. Instead, the people have brought to power the PDP, which is a newer political group consisting of little known leaders. This is not to say that Bhutan has rejected its monarchy — far from it, the Bhutanese love their King — but the DPT’s loss is an important marker of societal change. In this context, the question that New Delhi must ask is this: Does Bhutan consider India to be an authority figure? To some extent, yes.

This was especially evident in how Bhutan’s new media responded to theories about Indian interference. Bloggers, many of them young and without a first-hand experience of the deep history that India and Bhutan share, wrote strongly against India trying to do ‘another Nepal’ in their country. Editorials in newspapers, almost all of which have come up in recent years, warned against external forces meddling in domestic politics. This again must not be viewed as an anti-India sentiment — again, far from it, India enjoys tremendous goodwill and genuine support among the people of Bhutan — but New Delhi should take note of this as it re-calibrates its diplomacy in Thimphu.

The Big Brother approach, not that New Delhi ever dealt with Thimphu unfairly, must not be allowed to creep into bilateral relations. While Bhutan surely needs India for its growth, development and security, India also gains significantly by having Bhutan’s wholehearted, no-holds-barred support. This, of course, is particularly crucial vis-à-vis the China factor. Towards that end, Bhutan’s contribution to India’s security framework (not just strategic but also energy; think of the hydro-electric power projects) is just as important as India’s role in securing Bhutan.

Finally, as Bhutan seeks to increase its engagement with the world, India has no reason to resent it especially as long as its own relations with Thimphu remain strong. After all, it was New Delhi that unilaterally amended the old treaty to allow Thimphu to follow its own foreign policy. Now, if the Bhutanese Prime Minister meets with his Chinese counterpart, what is so wrong with that?

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 25, 2013)

Miscalculation That Can Be Fatal

India appears to have bought hook, line and sinker the West-driven narrative of ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’. Salman Khurshid’s support to dialogue with the militant outfit, is shocking in the least

External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid’s recent exhortations in favour of opening a dialogue with the Taliban as part of the larger Afghan peace process marks a shocking reversal in New Delhi’s otherwise well-established policy towards the hardline group. Over the years, India has rightly resisted a role for those committed to a regressive ideology of violence and religious fanaticism, and also refused to buy into the essentially Western argument of the ‘good Taliban’ and the ‘bad Taliban’ — until now, that is.

At the 20th Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, Mr Khurshid announced that the Indian Government supports a “peaceful dialogue” that must “involve all sections of the Afghan society and armed opposition groups, including the Taliban”. Of course, he couched his statement within the standard clauses and pre-conditions — that to be included in the dialogue, the Taliban must be “willing to give up their arms” (and more specifically sever ties with Al Qaeda), “subscribe to the (Afghan) Constitution” and acknowledge “the legitimacy of the Afghan state and Government”. These are supposedly internationally accepted ‘red lines’, but in reality they are just lines drawn in shifting desert sand.

Two examples illustrate this: First, the Afghan Government, when it has been in the mood for talks with the Taliban, has itself often dilly-dallied on the issue of the Constitution and the renunciation of violence. Second, as long back as in February 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had already described these very same clauses as “necessary outcomes for any negotiation”. In other words, what should have been non-negotiable pre-conditions for talk was already being presented as a desired outcome of that talk — and this was more than two years ago when the US was that much less desperate to carve itself a face-saver peace deal before it could get out of Afghanistan.

The other issue that seems to be driving much of the ‘talk to Taliban’ brigade is that of the ‘good Taliban’ versus the ‘bad Taliban’, the ‘moderate Taliban’ versus the ‘hardline Taliban’, the ‘peace-wanting Taliban’ versus the ‘war-mongering Taliban’. The basic argument here is that reaching out and winning over the good Taliban might just be the key to securing that elusive peace in Afghanistan. Towards this end, some commentators have pointed out that the Taliban is not a homogeneously fanatical group, that a section of the Taliban leadership has offered to abandon their social conservatism for political reconciliation, that some Taliban leaders have pushed for local ceasefires and even advocated ending attacks on women, children and minorities.

But do not forget that the Taliban are political opportunists. Yes, there is a segment that is more pragmatic but to assume that they have bought into the idea of peaceful, democratic and stable Afghanistan is a bit rich. Also, there is the question of how strong is this supposedly soft section? Not very, from available evidence. Take for instance, Agha Jan Motasim, a former Taliban leader who in May 2012 had said that the hardliners form a minority while most of his colleagues want a peace deal. One year and an assassination attempt later, he lives in exile in Turkey. Others like him have not even been that lucky — Arsalan Rahman Daulat, who was working with the Karzai regime in fact to further the peace process, was killed in Kabul.

Unfortunately, facts seem to matter little in this situation. And so the ‘talk to Taliban’ faction continues to gain traction, particularly from the fact that the Taliban are a force to reckon with in Afghanistan. They still do control parts of that country and the world’s best military has failed to defeat this guerrilla force. In other words, just because the Taliban have proven to be an enemy that cannot be easily subdued (mostly because one has chosen their allies badly), one must capitulate before them and quit. This approach may work for those who have the option to leave the battlefield, but for those whom that same battlefield forms their own backyard, this is a confrontation they must fight to win.

And, if victory has to be secured in Afghanistan, the Taliban have to be militarily defeated, not politically appeased. Given that the US-led Nato forces are leaving in end-2014, much of that will depend on the Afghan National Security Forces who have actually proven themselves to be a strong and brave fighting force. India would have done well to have given them the military assistance that President Hamid Karzai had requested, but here too, New Delhi has held back. 

Viewed in conjunction with New Delhi’s recent policy turnaround on the Taliban issue, we wonder if India is working under US pressure or whether it is afraid of setting off alarm bells in Pakistan. Either way, there is no justification for this shameful pussyfooting in Afghanistan.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 11, 2013)

Wrong People to Talk Peace With

Both the Obama Administration and the Afghan Government favour talks with the Taliban for their own reasons. But their eagerness for dialogue is not matched by the other side, which continues to wreak violence and cock a snook at the peaceniks

Given how desperate the Obama Administration is to talk its way out of the unwinnable war in Afghanistan, it is highly unlikely that even the audacious Talibani attack on the presidential compound in Kabul will make Washington, DC realise the futility of seeking peace with those who espouse an ideology of hate. But to most others, the writing is on the wall.

On Tuesday, the Taliban infiltrated the high-security zone that houses the headquarters of the CIA in Afghanistan, the country’s Defence Ministry and the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force alongside the presidential palace. Two hours of gun-fighting later, all four attackers had been neutralised, but not before they made clear that the Taliban still had the power to strike in the heart of Afghanistan.

This high-profile attack came less than a week after the Taliban inaugurated, with much fanfare, their new office in the Qatari capital of Doha.The office was only supposed to serve as a location for talks between the Taliban, US and Afghan officials. But banners put up at the ribbon-cutting ceremony, attended by the likes of the Qatari Foreign Minister himself, called it the ‘Political Office’ of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” — the name that the Taliban used when they ruled from Kabul. The Taliban’s efforts to present the new office as some sort of a parallel Afghan embassy in Qatar was a PR disaster for the Americans who were seen as sidelining their ally in Kabul, the democratically elected Government of Afghanistan, so as to cut a fast deal with the Taliban in Doha. A rightfully livid President Hamid Karzai retaliated not just by withdrawing his delegation to the Doha talks but also calling off separate security negotiations with the US regarding American military presence in Afghanistan after 2014. 

While both sets of negotiations will quite possibly resume sooner than later, the Taliban’s ‘Qatar moment’ and America’s garbled response to it, is proof that the talks, even before they have begun, are bound to fail. Apart from the absurdity of trying to negotiate peace with those who have made clear they want no part of it, the fact is that the entire ‘Talk to Taliban’ plan is ill-thought out, badly-timed and poorly-managed.

As The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at the New America Foundation points out in a recent study, “The strategic rationale for the talks has never been clear… those who have advocated talks with the Taliban have done so for different reasons at different times. This has clouded and confused official policy. Some hoped to ‘peel off’ low-level insurgents, whereas others preferred to encourage the development of a Taliban political party; some hoped to divide the movement, whereas others hoped to massage it in such a way that Taliban ‘doves’ were strengthened over ‘hawks’; some hoped to deal directly with the movement’s leaders while others saw them as the chief obstacles to progress. Many of these strands were in operation at the same time, contributing to a sense that talks were conducted in a strategic vacuum.”

Equally worrying is how the ‘Talk to Taliban’ strategy, which is fast becoming the crux of the American withdrawal plan, resembles the disastrous Soviet experience in Afghanistan — and clearly, how no lesson has been learnt from history. Primary among these is that both with the Soviet invasion and the American military intervention, the penchant for talk seems inversely proportional to the possibility of a military victory.

In the case of the Soviets, it became clear fairly early in the game that the Red Army was being unable to script itself a conventional victory on the battlefield. Therefore, by the early eighties there was already growing acceptance of the fact that some sort of a ‘diplomatic/political solution’ would be needed to end the fighting. And so, between 1980 and 1985, the Soviets followed a two-pronged approach of seeking a UN-sponsored solution on the one hand and trying to convince the Pakistanis on the other, to stop supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The plan was ineffective, mostly because Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq was suspicious of Moscow, which he perceived to be close to New Delhi. Eventually, the Soviets also reached out to their rival Americans, but the latter refused flat out and instead, stepped up their funding for the insurgents.

Then, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the communist party and decided to revamp the Soviet policy in Afghanistan. A year later, he sent in 26,000 additional troops, hoping to inflict a final military defeat that would close what he famously described as a “bleeding wound”, but the military surge bore limited results.

In the years ahead, there was a distinct change in Moscow’s policy towards counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, as Russian historian Artemy Kalinovsky notes: “Previously, the emphasis had been on winning over the population through economic incentives and establishing party and governance influence in the cities and countryside. The new initiative continued that policy but placed a much greater emphasis on pacification through winning over rebel commanders.” 

Moscow’s new policy also found reflection in the efforts of President Najibullah (who had taken over in 1986) to reach out to the mujahideen. He announced an unilateral ceasefire, released thousands of mujahideens from prison and even offered ministerial positions to insurgent leaders. Yet, none of these appeasement tactics worked as the insurgents saw no reason to accept concessions offered by an already weak regime. The turning point came with Mr Gorbachev’s February 1988 announcement of a troop withdraw timetable. This weakened the Soviets leverage as they went in to deliberate on the Geneva Accords — the results of which only laid the foundation for an even bloodier civil war.

The comparisons with the US invasion here are unmistakeable. Even though the Americans registered an early military victory in 2001 by removing the Taliban from power — which explains why the insurgents had no role to play in the Bonn Conference that established the interim Karzai regime — they failed to consolidate those early gains. Consequently, while the US got busy fighting another war in Iraq, the Taliban re-grouped and returned with a vengeance. For them, there has been no looking back since then, even as both the Afghan Government and the Americans have sought to reach out to the Taliban to cobble together some sort of a peace package. But the Taliban have refused to talk to the Afghan Government, which they do not even recognise, thereby torpedoing any effort towards an Afghan-led peace process.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 27, 2013)

A Politician's Coming of Age

Aung San Suu Kyi's public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum meet, completes her transformation from being a mere political dissident to an Opposition leader who desires to lead Myanmar in the near future

Aung San Suu Kyi's public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum meet, completes her transformation from being a mere political dissident to an Opposition leader who desires to lead Myanmar in the near future The latest edition of the World Economic Forum on East Asia that concluded in Naypidaw last Friday was arguably the most vocal acknowledgment from the international community of one the biggest developments in South Asia in recent years: Political reform in Myanmar. 

World leaders, industry titans and civil society activists from around the globe had gathered in the newly-built capital city to celebrate what the Forum called the ‘courageous transformation’ of Myanmar and to chart that country’s way forward. It was against this backdrop that Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s best known pro-democracy icon, announced to the world her desire to take on her country’s top job.

“I want to run for President, and I’m quite frank about it”, said the 67-year-old at the Forum, where she was the undisputed star of the show. While this was not the first time that Ms Suu Kyi had spoken of her presidential ambitions, her forthright approach combined with the timing and the venue amplified the impact of her statement which made headlines around the world. Be that as it may, the fact remains that Ms Suu Kyi cannot run for election, and she knows that. Under the present Constitution, anyone who is married to a foreign citizen or whose children hold foreign passports is prohibited from running for either President or the Vice President’s office. Ms Suu Kyi’s deceased husband was British and her sons also hold British passports. A Constitutional amendment is of course the most obvious solution to this problem but it is easier said than done, as several procedural difficulties stand in the way.

First, such an amendment to the Constitution would require a 75 per cent parliamentary approval which will be hard to come by, since 25 per cent of the seats in Parliament are reserved for the military while the bulk of the remaining is occupied by military loyalists. Second, even if Parliament were to somehow pass the amendment, the proposed change would then have to be approved by the majority in a national referendum before it could come into effect. Organising such a referendum is laborious and time-consuming, and offers a perfectly legitimate excuse for the Generals looking to prevent Ms Suu Kyi from running for President.

In other words, a long and arduous path lies ahead before Ms Suu Kyi’s desire to lead her country can turn into reality. And through much of that journey she will have to manoeuvre and out-manoeuvre the men in uniform who, while they may have grudgingly warmed up to her, somewhat, in recent times, they are by no means willing to concede any real political space or power yet. Let us not forget that the rule regarding relatives with foreign citizenship was introduced by the junta only in 2008 —just two years before the landmark general election of 2010 that paved the way for a semi-civilian Government to take over the reins from the military — with the sole intention of keeping Ms Suu Kyi away from the presidency.

And if that isn’t enough, sample this: According to the Wall Street Journal, immediately after Ms Suu Kyi announced her presidential ambitions at the World Economic Forum, President Thein Sein (a former Army General who shed his fatigues to take charge as a civilian ruler in 2010) cancelled her invitation to the gala dinner that he was hosting later that evening. And this is despite reports that the two leaders share a strong, personal bond that many observers believe played an important role in facilitating Ms Suu Kyi’s return to the political mainstream in Myanmar.

But either way, there is no denying that with Ms Suu Kyi’s public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum, her transformation from a political dissident to an Opposition leader is now complete. And while there is little by way to predict how it will shape her career as a politician in the years ahead — especially since much of it will also be determined by how the military responds to her political rise — this is a good time to look back at the past two years that she has spent in active politics after being released from decades of house arrest.

Three events stand out: First, Ms Suu Kyi’s cleansweep victory in the by-elections held in April 2012 that saw her National League for Democracy win 43 of the 44 seats it had contested. Not that there was ever any doubt about how much support she commandeered among her people, but still, the electoral victory was an important indicator of the power she could wield within a democratically-elected Government — something that must have made the Generals cringe.

Second, Ms Suu Kyi’s support for the Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Division was both a huge risk and a political game-changer. The mine is currently being developed by a Chinese firm and has been met with severe opposition from locals who accuse the Government-run Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited of land grab. Ms Suu Kyi headed the commission that investigated the matter and reported in favour of the regime, as she believed that commitments made by the previous Government to foreign investors had to be honoured — or else, potential investors will be reluctant to invest in the country. This is something that Myanmar simply cannot afford. While this bought her the Generals’ confidence as someone who was a ‘fair player’, it also led to much criticism from certain segments of the public which felt that she had sold out to the military; others pointed fingers at her for supporting crony capitalism.

Third, Ms Suu Kyi’s studied silence on the issue of Rohingya Muslims who violently clashed with the country’s Buddhist majority, also disappointed many who expected her, as a proponent of democratic values, to take a stronger position. But as a politician, Ms Suu Kyi saw no merit in polarising an already difficult and historically complex situation. Also, by highlighting the issue she would have played into the hands of the military, which would like nothing better than a ‘national security’ crisis that could shore up its image and importance  at a time such as this. 

That, as an opposition leader, Ms Suu Kyi faces a tough challenge, is without a doubt. One only has to look at how the regime has ensnared her — while losing no political capital itself — in both the cases described above, to understand the gravity of the situation. And there will be more of these double-edged swords in the future too. For instance, there have been reports that after the 2015 election, the regime may offer her the position of Foreign Minister. Not only will such a move make the Generals look good, it will effectively allow them to enlist Ms Suu Kyi as their official spokesperson. For Ms Suu Kyi, of course, this would just be more of the tightrope situation that she is already having to navigate.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 13, 2013.)