Miscalculation That Can Be Fatal

India appears to have bought hook, line and sinker the West-driven narrative of ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’. Salman Khurshid’s support to dialogue with the militant outfit, is shocking in the least

External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid’s recent exhortations in favour of opening a dialogue with the Taliban as part of the larger Afghan peace process marks a shocking reversal in New Delhi’s otherwise well-established policy towards the hardline group. Over the years, India has rightly resisted a role for those committed to a regressive ideology of violence and religious fanaticism, and also refused to buy into the essentially Western argument of the ‘good Taliban’ and the ‘bad Taliban’ — until now, that is.

At the 20th Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, Mr Khurshid announced that the Indian Government supports a “peaceful dialogue” that must “involve all sections of the Afghan society and armed opposition groups, including the Taliban”. Of course, he couched his statement within the standard clauses and pre-conditions — that to be included in the dialogue, the Taliban must be “willing to give up their arms” (and more specifically sever ties with Al Qaeda), “subscribe to the (Afghan) Constitution” and acknowledge “the legitimacy of the Afghan state and Government”. These are supposedly internationally accepted ‘red lines’, but in reality they are just lines drawn in shifting desert sand.

Two examples illustrate this: First, the Afghan Government, when it has been in the mood for talks with the Taliban, has itself often dilly-dallied on the issue of the Constitution and the renunciation of violence. Second, as long back as in February 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had already described these very same clauses as “necessary outcomes for any negotiation”. In other words, what should have been non-negotiable pre-conditions for talk was already being presented as a desired outcome of that talk — and this was more than two years ago when the US was that much less desperate to carve itself a face-saver peace deal before it could get out of Afghanistan.

The other issue that seems to be driving much of the ‘talk to Taliban’ brigade is that of the ‘good Taliban’ versus the ‘bad Taliban’, the ‘moderate Taliban’ versus the ‘hardline Taliban’, the ‘peace-wanting Taliban’ versus the ‘war-mongering Taliban’. The basic argument here is that reaching out and winning over the good Taliban might just be the key to securing that elusive peace in Afghanistan. Towards this end, some commentators have pointed out that the Taliban is not a homogeneously fanatical group, that a section of the Taliban leadership has offered to abandon their social conservatism for political reconciliation, that some Taliban leaders have pushed for local ceasefires and even advocated ending attacks on women, children and minorities.

But do not forget that the Taliban are political opportunists. Yes, there is a segment that is more pragmatic but to assume that they have bought into the idea of peaceful, democratic and stable Afghanistan is a bit rich. Also, there is the question of how strong is this supposedly soft section? Not very, from available evidence. Take for instance, Agha Jan Motasim, a former Taliban leader who in May 2012 had said that the hardliners form a minority while most of his colleagues want a peace deal. One year and an assassination attempt later, he lives in exile in Turkey. Others like him have not even been that lucky — Arsalan Rahman Daulat, who was working with the Karzai regime in fact to further the peace process, was killed in Kabul.

Unfortunately, facts seem to matter little in this situation. And so the ‘talk to Taliban’ faction continues to gain traction, particularly from the fact that the Taliban are a force to reckon with in Afghanistan. They still do control parts of that country and the world’s best military has failed to defeat this guerrilla force. In other words, just because the Taliban have proven to be an enemy that cannot be easily subdued (mostly because one has chosen their allies badly), one must capitulate before them and quit. This approach may work for those who have the option to leave the battlefield, but for those whom that same battlefield forms their own backyard, this is a confrontation they must fight to win.

And, if victory has to be secured in Afghanistan, the Taliban have to be militarily defeated, not politically appeased. Given that the US-led Nato forces are leaving in end-2014, much of that will depend on the Afghan National Security Forces who have actually proven themselves to be a strong and brave fighting force. India would have done well to have given them the military assistance that President Hamid Karzai had requested, but here too, New Delhi has held back. 

Viewed in conjunction with New Delhi’s recent policy turnaround on the Taliban issue, we wonder if India is working under US pressure or whether it is afraid of setting off alarm bells in Pakistan. Either way, there is no justification for this shameful pussyfooting in Afghanistan.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 11, 2013)