The Sri Lanka Attacks and the Threat Within

The Easter Sunday carnage in Sri Lanka that killed more than 250 people1 last month caught many by surprise2. The island nation had been enjoying a period of relative peace and stability since the civil war came to an end with the crushing defeat of the Tamil Tigers a decade ago3. Few had expected an obscure terror group that had no history of large-scale violence to launch a successful tri-city suicide bombing campaign. Moreover, social tensions in Sri Lanka had traditionally played out along ethnic lines, primarily between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, but not along religious cleavages4. And yet on April 21, members of the National Thowheed Jamath (TNJ), an Islamist group espousing Salafi-jihadi ideology, specifically attacked Christians and Western-tourists.

On April 23, the Islamic State (IS) officially took responsibility for the bloodbath and also released a video of the TNJ’s eight Sri Lankan bombers pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State’s chief5. This again was least expected. Sri Lanka had hardly been on the radar as an IS hotspot. Only a small number of 32 nationals from among Sri Lanka’s two million Muslims, had been radicalised enough to travel to join the IS in Syria. In contrast, neighbouring Maldives with a much smaller population of 4, 00,000 had sent as many as 200 fighters to the IS, according to a Soufan Center report6. And yet it was in Sri Lanka that the IS managed to carry out one of its biggest, most spectacular attacks outside of its base in Iraq and Syria.

One explanation for this is that even though Sri Lanka wasn’t a terror hotspot, it was a soft spot7. As the island nation enjoyed its decade of peace, security became lax and a sense of complacency set it. At the ground level, even the luxury hotels weren’t carrying out bag checks. At the top level, there was a lack of coordination within the security establishment and a bitter rivalry between the country’s top political leaders. The menace of Islamist radicalisation was also not taken seriously even though the Muslim community itself had raised multiple red flags. All these factors explain the government’s failure to foil the attacks in time even though the attackers were known to the law enforcement officials and the government in Colombo had received multiple warnings. However, they do not explain how a small organisation like the NTJ succeeded in pulling off a bombing campaign on this scale.

Initial reports suggested that the NTJ had some direct support from the IS. Yet, as more details emerge about the bombers and their operations, this assertion seems shaky. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks it was widely reported that at least one of the bombers, Abdul Latheef Mohammad Jamil, had travelled to and trained in Syria with IS fighters. However, on May 7, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe informed Parliament that though Jamil intended to travel to Syria and had contact with IS operatives, he only managed to go up to Turkey in 20148. The only person who was active in Syria was Mohamed Ibrahim Abdul Sadiq Haq9, reportedly an aide of the mastermind Zahran Hashim, but he wasn’t one of the bombers.

Sri Lankan investigators also believe that the attacks were self-financed (many of the plotters were wealthy) and locally planned and executed. According to a Wall Street Journal report10, the mastermind had claimed that he was receiving direct instructions from Syria but investigators believe he was exaggerating. The report also said that the men taught themselves how to build bombs from material posted online by the IS. The question then is: how much of their success can be credited to the Islamic State?

With the information available as of now, it seems like the IS’s direct involvement was minimal. It, of course, offered ideological inspiration but there was not much in terms of guidance on the ground - particularly when compared to previous incidents wherein IS operatives actively cultivated sympathisers through the internet and sought to turn them into deadly terror agents, such as in the case of India’s Yazdani brothers11. Instead, the attack shows how the IS is becoming a jihadi franchise. Local groups use the IS brand to grab easy attention at home and pin themselves on the map of global jihad. Meanwhile, the IS core group, which lost its last bit of territory in Syria in March, is happy to get credit for successful terror attacks around the world without having to make any significant investments itself. Herein, it is following the path of Al Qaeda - having failed locally, the IS is now going global.

As IS experts Charlie Winter and Aymen al-Tamimi note12, the Levantine group has been actively changing its identity to that of an international jihadi platform. Since 2017, it has bunched together its 19 ‘wilayats’ or provinces across Syria and Iraq into just two, while disparate groups in Africa, South and South-East Asia who had pledged allegiance to the IS have been promoted to ‘wilayat’ status. In fact, just weeks after the Sri Lanka attack, IS announced two new ‘provinces’ in India and in Pakistan (previously clubbed with Afghanistan in the Khorasan Province). The former was ‘established’, oddly, after an IS-affiliated militant was neutralised in Kashmir, while the latter came after two incidents in Balochistan. Neither indicate the emergence of a new threat, but they are tools to attract new recruits from places where jihadi militant pools already exist.

So, what does all this mean in terms of risk analysis?

First, the IS is nowhere and yet everywhere. The group’s core has been degraded but its depraved ideology continues to inspire jihadists around the world. This means that the IS flag will be seen not just in terror ‘hotspots’ like Yemen or Somalia but also in ‘soft spots’ like Sri Lanka. Indeed, as Scott Stewart notes for Stratfor, Sri Lanka was “the Islamic State’s surprise breakout theatre” 13this year - much like it was Indonesia (the Surabaya bombings14) in 2018, the Philippines (the siege of Marawi15) in 2017, and Bangladesh (the bombing of Dhaka’s Holey Artisan cafe16) in 2016. In each case, the local authorities were initially taken aback but afterwards clamped down on jihadi elements. Since then, the local terror franchisees have struggled to strike a second time with similar impact.

Second, a transnational threat calls for a transnational response. Even though Colombo failed to act on intelligence reports warning of an IS attack, it is noteworthy that almost all the Sri Lankan suspects were under scrutiny by Indian investigators. Similarly, India has also been working closely with Bangladesh where IS enjoys the allegiance of a rejuvenated Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 17. The JMB is suspected of being involved in the 2014 Burdwan blasts and the 2018 Bodh Gaya blasts in India. Earlier this year, three IS activists were arrested - two from Bangladesh18 and one from West Bengal’s Nadia district19, all linked to the JMB. This list can go on, but the point to be made is that while IS’s transnational jihadi lure is a challenge, it is still one that can be contained.

End notes

1. "Sri Lanka blasts: 250 dead in Colombo, Negombo and Batticaloa - CNN." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/21/asia/sri-lanka-explosions/index.html.
2. "Why no one expected an ISIS attack in Sri Lanka - The Washington Post." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/24/why-no-one-expected-an-isis-attack-sri-lanka/.
3. "Death of the Tiger | The New Yorker." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/death-of-the-tiger.
4. "Sri Lanka's long, tragic history of violence - The Washington Post." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/21/sri-lankas-long-tragic-history-violence/.
5. "Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Sri Lanka Bombings - WSJ." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/sri-lanka-bombings-linked-to-new-zealand-mosque-shootings-government-says-11556009023.
6. "Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the ... - The Soufan Center." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf.
7. "Sri Lanka's Perfect Storm of Failure – Foreign Policy." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/23/sri-lankas-perfect-storm-of-failure-bombings-government-mistakes-terrorism/.
8. "Daily Mirror - SL still under threat from global terrorists: Ranil." Accessed May 6, 2019. http://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking_news/SL-still-under-threat-from-global-terrorists:-Ranil/108-166637.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. "Not 'Lone Wolves' After All: How ISIS Guides World's Terror Plots From ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html.
12. "The Sri Lanka Bombings Were a Preview of ISIS's Future - The Atlantic." https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/the-sri-lanka-bombings-were-a-preview-of-isiss-future/588175/. Accessed 17 May. 2019.
13. "What the Easter Attacks in Sri Lanka Tell Us About the Islamic State." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/easter-suicide-bomb-attacks-sri-lanka-islamic-state.
14. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://ctc.usma.edu/surabaya-bombings-evolution-jihadi-threat-indonesia/.
15. "Philippines: Addressing Islamist Militancy after the Battle for Marawi ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-addressing-islamist-militancy-after-battle-marawi.
16. "Bangladesh siege: Twenty killed at Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36692613.
17. "How Bangladesh Became Fertile Ground for al-Qa`ida and the Islamic ...." Accessed May 8, 2019. https://ctc.usma.edu/how-bangladesh-became-fertile-ground-for-al-qaida-and-the-islamic-state/.
18. "Bihar Police arrested two Bangladeshi nationals - DNA India." Accessed May 8, 2019. https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-bihar-police-arrested-two-bangladeshi-nationals-2733246.
19. "ATS nabs West Bengal youth with terror links | Pune News - Times of ...." Accessed May 8, 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/ats-nabs-west-bengal-youth-with-terror-links/articleshow/68621364.cms.

(Mayuri Mukherjee is an international security analyst and a consultant with the VIF. The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct).

This article was published by Vivekananda International Foundation, a Delhi-based think-tank

NETANYAHU's ISRAEL STORY CONTINUES

When Israel went to the polls last week, it was as much to vote in a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu as it was to find a successor to the prime minister who is now in his fourth term. In this, Election 2019 was similar to Election 2015. And like in 2015, this year too, the electorate re-endorsed Netanyahu who will be forming the next government with the support of other right-wing and religious parties, but rejected almost all this potential successors.

The Blue and White (Kachol Levan), formed just weeks before the election, did well for itself but evidently not well enough. Led by former chief of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Benjamin Gantz, who joined hands with Yair Lapid and his Yesh Atid party, and brought on board two other former IDF chiefs, one of whom was also Netanyahu’s defence minister, the new party won an impressive 35 seats (and tied with the Likud) in the Knesset. However, the Blue and White’s road to coalition-building was always a whole lot longer than the Likud’s because it did not have the necessary alliances with smaller parties to get past the half-way mark in Israel’s 120-seat Knesset.

Also, the Blue and White didn’t take away very many votes from the Likud (which grew from 30 to 35 seats). Instead, it mostly replaced the previous centre-left coalition from 2015--the Zionist Union--and expanded that space by adding the seat share of its constituent Yesh Atid party. Hence, it damaged the Left but didn’t carve a niche for itself on the Right against Likud.

The party also needs to build its own political identity--its motto, “Israel First”, sounds nice but doesn’t mean much. On social issues, it campaigned for some progressive legislation like civil marriages and public transport on shabbat but that’s been on the agenda of other Centre-left parties as well and would even have the Likud’s support if the Jewish orthodox Haredi parties weren’t a factor. On economic issues, it had little to offer even though at least the Lapid has always focused on economic issues, his lacklustre tenure as finance minister notwithstanding. On security issues, the so-called General’s party didn’t have anything new to say--not even during the flare-up in Gaza just before the election.

The Blue and White’s campaign focussed on getting rid of Netanyahu who is facing corruption charges. But that strategy didn’t work for the Zionist Union in 2015 and failed again for Blue and White in 2019. In contrast, Netanyahu’s response to run a gevalt campaign -- go into panic mode and urge supporters to vote him to ‘safety’--worked well in 2015 and even better in 2019. If the Blue and White even stays together for the next election, it will have to become more than just Likud-lite and present a real alternative to Netanyahu.

New Right: crash and burn

Among prominent politicians from the outgoing Knesset, Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked, the education and justice ministers, were seen as heir apparents. Both served in elite IDF units, both had successful careers in hi-tech, and both offered a tantalising mix of a liberal values with conservative policy priorities. Bennett emerged as the Right’s blue-eyed boy when, under his leadership, the Jewish Home party (Habayit Hayehudi) soared from three to 12 seats in the Knesset in 2013. Shaked, meanwhile, was praised for being the only secular woman to represent a religious party in the Knesset. It was widely believed that first Bennett and then Shaked would eventually get the top job.

However, their electoral fortunes dipped in 2015 -- when the Jewish Home lost a third of its seats. Both still got ministerial portfolios but, after this election, they are not even in the Knesset. Bennett’s decision to quit Jewish Home and Shaked’s decision to follow him, and set up a new party backfired. Their New Right (HaYamin HeHadash) party did not even get past the electoral threshold. The Israeli Right’s power couple crashed and burnt -- but Shaked might still rise from the ashes. She is reportedly parting ways with Bennett, and might join the Likud.

Kulanu: Cut to size

Finance minister Moshe Kahlon had hoped to position his Kulanu party as a crucial swing factor. Though he has now placed himself in Netanyahu’s tent, he could have very well gone with Gantz. In fact, Kahlon had public stated that he would not sit in government with a prime minister who had been indicted on corruption charges. This would have been a deal breaker for Netanyahu. However, Kahlon’s party lost six of its 10 seats this time, barely making it past the electoral threshold. Fearing a complete washout in the next election, Kahlon has not only abandoned his anti-Netanyahu line but is merging Kulanu with the Likud; much like the Lapid, who joined Gantz, fearing electoral irrelevance.

Yisrael Beiteinu: Kingmaker, but not the King

In September 2018, Avigdor Liberman, then defence minister, resigned from the government and withdrew his Yisrael Beiteinu party from the ruling coalition over disagreements with Netanyahu on how to respond to Hamas’ provocative rocket fire from the Gaza strip. He was already being criticised for his sub-par performance; and calculated that by taking a hardline on Gaza against Netanyahu, he might be able to strengthen his hand. That strategy has brought only limited benefits.

Yes, Liberman has emerged as the king-maker. His party’s five seats are needed to put a Likud-led coalition past the 60-seat mark. And if those seats were to be taken to Blue and White, hypothetically, Gantz could have also built the winning coalition -- with external support from the Arab parties. But this was more of an academic exercise. In reality, Liberman would have had to return to Netanyahu -- though now he has the luxury of doing so on his own terms. These terms include return of the defence minister’s portfolio and ending the exemption from military service given to Haredi men. The former is do-able, the latter could bring down the government.

But while Liberman remains an important player and has done better than the younger lot of Lapid, Bennett, and Kahlon, the fact remains he hasn’t been able to measure up to Netanyahu’s towering figure on the Israeli political scene. Indeed, while Netanyahu has gone from strength to strength, Liberman’s block has consistently become smaller -- from 15 seats at its peak in 2009 to 13 in 2013, six in 2015, and now five.

In this election, Netanyahu fought a rising anti-incumbency sentiment, brought his challengers to their knees, and now has a coalition that is least likely to demand his resignation if he is, as is widely expected, indicted on corruption charges in a few months’ time. Clearly, he hasn’t lost his magician’s touch and remains the undefeated Melech Yisrael, the King of Israel. Only the question of who will inherit his kingdom remains a mystery.

(This article was published by the Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation on April 17, 2019)

INDIAN ELECTIONS 2019: WILL MODI’S “STRONGMAN” IMAGE BRING ELECTORAL SUCCESS?

On February 26, when India struck a terror camp inside Pakistan in response to the February 14 suicide bombing that killed 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) troopers in Pulwama in Indian-administered Kashmir, political pundits opined that the rare air strike would boost Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s electoral fortunes. They argued that his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government was being pilloried with charges of having mismanaged the economy, of being unable to create adequate new jobs, and of bungling the Rafale deal but the strike against Pakistan had helped distract public attention. Six weeks later, as the country prepares for the 2019 general elections, the question is: do Pulwama and Balakot still matter? And is this India’s national security election?

In a country as large and diverse as India, it is nearly impossible to predict the salience of any one election issue over others.  However, historically, the electoral impact of security and foreign policy issues has been limited, as several scholars and analysts have pointed out. For example, Roshan Kishore has analyzed the electoral fate of ruling parties in India in the immediate aftermath of military conflicts and found a mixed bag. Neelanjan Sircar specifically looked at the 1999 general election, which was held soon after India secured a decisive win in the Kargil War, and found that even though the BJP returned to power, the military confrontation against Pakistan was not an electoral game-changer. Other analysts like Aditya Menon and Soroor Ahmed have also come to the same conclusion.

To a certain extent, Pulwama/Balakot has been no different. After the predictable jump in nationalist sentiment in the immediate aftermath of the February 14 attack in Pulwama and the February 26 retaliatory airstrike in Balakot, several polls show that the issue has since subsided from the public agenda. However, it is interesting to note that even though national security is not on the people’s electoral priority list, the approval rating of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has continued to soar on the back of his security credentials.

For example, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies(CSDS)-Lokniti survey done in the last week of March found that 43 percent preferred Modi as the next prime minister (compared to 34 percent in May last year) though only 2 percent saw national security as the single most important issue for the election. In contrast, nearly 21 percent consider unemployment while 17 percent pointed to development as the key electoral issue. India Today’s Political Stock Exchange poll also showed that while Modi was able to leverage the Balakot air strikes and his popularity steadily rose from 46 percent in October last year to 48 percent in January to 53 percent in April, it is unemployment, and not national security, that voters see as the most important electoral issue followed by water and cleanliness.

Yet, Modi and his team have continued to place national security at the heart of their election strategy. There are three reasons for this: first, even Modi’s hardest critics acknowledge that it is in this area that the government’s credentials are the strongest. In the public’s assessment too, it is here that Modi has broken new ground and gone where few others have tread before him (whereas the popular response to the prime minister’s other big bang initiatives such as demonetization or the Goods and Services Tax have been more checkered). Hence, the BJP’s effort to keep the focus on national security.

Second, the opposition has done a shoddy job of puncturing Modi’s security narrative. India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, has struggled to make any of its criticisms of the BJP’s security policies–be it with regard to Kashmir, China, or Pakistan–resonate with the public, even though scholars and analysts have found flaws aplenty in the ruling party’s policies. It was only on the Rafale deal that the Congress was making some progress with regard to challenging Modi. But that too didn’t go very far due to the Congress party’s own history of corruption, particularly in defense deals (think Bofors), as well as Modi’s reputation as a clean politician.

In 2016, Modi upped the ante by carrying out a similar “surgical strike” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, in response to the attack in Uri that killed 19 soldiers. The operation further reinvigorated his security credentials, and since then, Team Modi has sought to ensure that the ‘legacy,’ for want of a better word, of the surgical strikes does not fade from popular memory. For example, in 2018, the government organized an official celebration to mark the second anniversary of the “surgical strikes” (though it had let the first one pass quietly). Unlike staid government events, this one had a carnival-esque feel with a three-day exhibition featuring actual footage from the strikes, a selfie zone, and performances by Bollywood singers who even wrote an anthem to the mark the occasion. The Bollywood film based on the strikes was released in January and has done well at the box office. Notably, the rallying cry of the film– “How is the josh?”, which loosely translates to “how is the (national) spirit?” was picked up and reiterated by several political figures including the prime minister. The post-Uri operation was no longer just a daring cross-border raid—it had transcended conversations among the strategic community about deterrence and counterterrorism to become a part of India’s popular cultural.Third and most importantly, Modi and his team have made a concerted effort to take discussion and debate of national security issues beyond the Delhi-based security elite and make it accessible to the masses. This has been possible in part because, as Ashutosh Varshney notes, a large part of the population is now firmly middle class and connected to the Internet, and therefore, receptive to issues that are not traditionally part of “mass politics.” But that’s not all. The government on its part has also carefully built up a national security narrative from the very beginning of its term. For example, within a year of taking office, after Naga militants operating along the India-Myanmar border killed 18 Indian soldiers in Manipur in 2015, Modi authorized a rare cross-border retaliatory raid. The operation was well-publicized and earned the government high praise for undertaking the sort of counterinsurgency action for which there had only been limited political appetite in the past.

Then came the Balakot strikes, still hotly being debated in security circles. Here too, while analysts were scrutinizing satellite imagery, counting fighter jets, and searching for missing pilots, the public focused on Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, who had been taken into Pakistani custody. Upon his return, he was feted as a national hero. Newborns were named after him, his iconic moustache became an instant hit, and soon enough he even appeared on the ruling party’s election posters.

Then on March 27, India conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, which generally may not have generated much public excitement but Modi went the extra mile, announcing the test in a direct address to the nation. Though an important development, the test didn’t merit a prime ministerial speech in the way that, say, demonetization did in 2016, directly impacting the lives of every person in the country. And yet Modi announced the test himself, ensuring that the news gets full attention; he carefully framed the test as a technological breakthrough that benefits all of society and labeled it “Mission Shakti” to establish equivalence with the 1998 nuclear tests of the same name that marked India’s entry into the club of nuclear-armed nations. Later, at an election rally, he also referred to the ASAT test as a “surgical strike in space”—which fits in neatly with the idea of the surgical strike on land (post-Uri) and in the sky (Balakot)—effectively tying together the government’s main security achievements in one neat, catchy phrase.

Whether the electorate will respond to Modi and the BJP’s messaging on national security by way of voting remains to be seen. Traditionally, security has not had a direct electoral impact in India because these issues generally have low salience for a population that is still trying to fulfill its basic needs of food, clean water, housing, and education/jobs. However, there is little doubt that this time around, large sections of the public have participated wholeheartedly in the national security conversation–and to that extent, this has indeed been India’s national security election.

Image 1: Indian Air Force (cropped)

(This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform)

HOW HAMAS LAUNCHED ISRAEL'S NEXT ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Israel is back from the brink. But the situation could still boil over any time

Israel is now back from the brink after a tumultuous fortnight, first on the edge of war and then with its government on the verge of collapse. The controversial ceasefire agreement with Hamas, the armed group that controls Gaza, is holding up while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has managed to stay together even after losing a coalition partner. However, the situation could boil over yet again.

For one, the rocket fire from Gaza this month -- 500 missiles poured in on border communities, resulting in Israel bombing 160 Hamas targets -- was only the most recent in a series of such firefights that have repeatedly pushed Israel and Gaza close towards a full scale military confrontation. Also, since 30 March this year, Gazans have been regularly, and often violently, amassing at the border fence with Israel to demand that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be allowed to return and that Israel lift the blockade. The campaign was supposed to be six weeks long--from March 30 to May 15--but has continued to simmer over these past months.

In fact, thousands demonstrated in Gaza even during these past two Fridays--however, this time, Hamas kept them away from the fence as part of the Egypt-mediated ceasefire agreement. The agreement also allowed for Qatari cash to be delivered into the coastal enclave and other economic concessions. These are expected to ease the pressure on Gazans in return for a more durable quiet on Israel’s southern border but the agreement stands on fragile ground.

The Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority (PA), which is the internationally recognised representative of all Palestinians but only controls the West Bank, has also criticised the agreement because it undercuts its own dwindling authority. The PA is led by the Fatah party which was violently ousted from the Gaza strip a decade ago--since then, several reconciliation efforts have failed and the two remain at loggerheads. In fact, it was the PA that recently stopped paying for civil servants’ salaries, electricity and fuel subsidies for Gaza so as to turn up the public pressure on Hamas. It hoped that Hamas would eventually accede to PA’s authority and agree to the reconciliation plan from last year. But the firefight with Israel, the subsequent resignation of the Israeli defence minister, and the brief respite brought by the ceasefire deal only boosted Hamas’ credentials in Gaza; leaving the PA further isolated.

In Israel too, the ceasefire agreement has many critics, particularly in the southern border communities. These critics would like to see a tougher response to Hamas, though that’s hardly a long-term solution. Past military campaigns have taken a toll on civilian life and property without eroding Hamas’ ability to re-build its terror infrastructure. Israel has struggled to establish credible deterrence against Hamas. And now, it has other security concerns, such as Iranian presence on its northern border with Syria. A risk-averse Netanyahu would rather have the situation in Gaza ‘managed’ than erupt in a regional flare-up. This explains his support for the ceasefire agreement which has since become a political hot potato in Israel.

On 14 November, Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned and pulled his hard-right Yisrael Beiteinu party from the Likud-led ruling coalition to protest the ceasefire which he viewed as a capitulation to terror. Soon after, Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked of the right-religious Habayit Hayehudi party also threatened to follow suit. Netanyahu reined them in but the ruling coalition now stands on a paper-thin majority. It has only 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. The tenure of the current government ends in November next year and the Prime Minister can call for elections any time before that (but the vote can only be held at least three months after the election is announced). What Lieberman sought to do with his resignation was to force an early election.

The timing here is important. First, Netanyahu is in a weak spot -- facing criticism for the rocket fire from Gaza and the ceasefire agreement. Second, Lieberman’s own tenure as defence minister has been below par, and his supporters feel he hasn’t delivered on his hardline credentials. By resigning on account of the ceasefire, he distanced himself from what his voters see as the government’s capitulation in Gaza and also positioned himself as a challenger to the right of Bibi. His numbers have since improved though he is hardly a serious contender for the post of prime minister.

Lieberman isn’t alone in favouring an early election. Bennett also made the same calculation. That’s why he publicly blackmailed the Prime Minister and demanded the defence minister’s post -- in a bid to position himself as the next leader of the Right. However, his electoral stunt flopped when Netanyahu called his bluff, and he had to backtrack.

Also wanting an early election (but reluctant to trigger one just yet) is Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon and his centre-right Kulanu party which made a stellar debut in 2015. Polls show that if elections were held now, it wouldn’t do as well; but Kulanu might glean away some Likudniks while Netanyahu’s chips are down.

Netanyahu has responded to all of this by presenting himself as the adult in the room: the statesman who negotiated for peace and quiet while the politicians pushed for war and sought to bring down the government during a national crisis. And now that his government has lived to see another day, Netanyahu’s focus will be on delaying the election as much as possible.

This may seem odd given that he was desperate to have early elections only a few months ago --when his poll numbers were high and before his corruption cases caught up. But now, the situation has changed. Netanyahu needs for some time to pass so that the public can move on from the Gaza crisis. He also needs to buy time to recover from the fallout of the three corruption cases.

In the first quarter of 2019, the attorney general is expected to decide on whether to indict the prime minister in these cases. Even if he decides against an indictment, Netanyahu would not like to go to polls around that time. But he would also not want an election campaign that’s drawn out over a year till next November with a fragile coalition at the helm.

Either way, the polls suggest that he has a good chance of winning, but given his personal and political troubles, he will need more than just the winning votes. He will need the numbers to build a strong coalition that will ultimately protect his four-term legacy that matches only with that of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Meanwhile, his opponents will be preparing for the day after Netanyahu is no longer the prime minister. They would want to make sure they are at the right place at the right time.

What does all of this mean for India? The upheaval in Israeli domestic politics is unlikely to impact India-Israel ties in any significant way. The relationship enjoys bipartisan support in Jerusalem and can be expected to continue along the present path even in a post-Netanyahu era. However, internal political equations as well as the nature of the new coalition government will of course impact how Israeli leaders deal with the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu, for example, doesn’t like large military confrontations; he prefers smaller targeted operations that can be controlled. His successor may have a different approach. The latter may also have to deal with the possibility of the PA collapsing altogether. This will upend Israel’s security equation with the West Bank. For now, India has successfully de-hyphenated its Israel-Palestine policy but this might be challenged in case domestic instability -- both within Israeli and Palestinian political circles -- leads to another regional conflagration.

(Mayuri Mukherjee is a security studies scholar at the Tel Aviv University, Israel)

This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think tank.

INDIA IN THE NEW NUCLEAR AGE

America’s withdrawal from one of the most important arms control treaties of our time is the result of a changing nuclear landscape that challenges policymakers in New Delhi as well.

US president Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia may have received scant attention in India, but in the West, it has already fueled concerns about a third world war involving nuclear weapons. This may seem alarmist but the fact is that Washington’s decision to walk away from one of its most significant arms control agreements with Moscow has important implications for global security--which India cannot ignore, especially as it deals with a changing nuclear landscape in its own backyard.

Signed during the Cold War, the 1987 INF treaty prohibited the US and the former Soviet Union from developing and deploying ground-based intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the treaty did not cover sea-based and air-launched missiles and was only applicable to the US and Russia. This wasn’t a problem at the time, and the treaty was in effective in bringing the two superpowers back from the brink of nuclear war.

Three decades later, however, the situation has changed--with China, North Korea, Pakistan and India all having intermediate-range land missiles. For the US, China’s arsenal is as much a matter of concern as that of Russia who it has accused of cheating on the treaty. US officials including national security adviser John Bolton argue that China’s arsenal poses a threat to US assets and allies in the region--and needs to be brought under an INF-like treaty. China, of course, has little reason to join such a treaty--and, for that matter, so does India.

But that being said, China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific is a matter of concern for India, which also finds reflection in Pakistan’s threat perceptions; thereby, creating a new set of concerns and conditions that could destabilise the region. Indeed, this problem is already taking shape as Pakistan follows India’s quest for sea-based nuclear deterrence.

Earlier this year, Pakistan conducted a second round of tests for the Babur-3 nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), following the first one in January 2017. It is expected that the Babur-3 will be mated with the Agosta 90B diesel-electric submarine. This should give Pakistan an assured second-strike capability--while land-based and air-borne systems can be destroyed in a first attack, nuclear submarines are considered to be much less vulnerable.   

India already has a small sea-based deterrent force. In April 2016, the K-4 nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile was successfully test-fired from aboard the INS Arihant, India’s indigenously built nuclear submarine, which was inducted into service in August that year; thereby, completing India’s nuclear triad. This was in keeping with India’s nuclear doctrine which enumerates a no-first-use policy but also makes clear that a nuclear attack on India will result in massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. For India, to secure such second strike capability, survivability of its nuclear weapons arsenal is key and hence the need for a sea-based force.

In other words, India’s naval nuclearisation--aimed at China, not Pakistan--buttresses New Delhi’s NFU policy and brings strategic stability. Pakistan’s naval nuclearisation, on the other hand, stems from its lack of trust in Indian NFU and is an effort to play catch-up. This is understandable but still destabilizing--both from a strategic as well as tactical point of view.

This may seem counterintuitive: if having nuclear weapons at sea enhances the survivability of Pakistan’s strategic forces, then that should add to strategic stability because Pakistan would have less of a use-it-or-lose-it dilemma. However, unlike India, Pakistan maintains an ambiguous nuclear policy for the use of nuclear weapons. This is meant to deter India, but it also implies that India would have to consider and prepare for a Pakistani first attack.

Almost every scenario involving a Pakistani first use begins with a Pakistan-sponsored spectacular terror attack on Indian soil like the 2001 Parliament attack or the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India sought to respond to the former with a show of force along the international border but Pakistan wasn’t perturbed. This led Indian strategists to propose a more pro-active response--a shallow-thrust offensive into Pakistan to seize a small piece of land to be used as a post-conflict bargaining chip. This strategy, known as Cold Start, isn’t official but it was acknowledged by the Army chief last year and the 2017 Indian military doctrine allows ample space for a similar proactive policy.

Pakistan responded to Cold Start by fielding tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or low-yield short-range nukes which could be used on the battlefield. These seek to lower the nuclear threshold and allow Islamabad greater control of the escalatory ladder (which, otherwise, is in favour of the conventionally bigger power). Moreover, Pakistan justified its TNWs within the framework of full spectrum deterrence, moving away from credible minimum deterrence. Add to this the nukes at sea, and the intended effect, as Abhijnan Rej describes it, is to tie India’s hands in a nuclear bind: If India activates Cold Start, Pakistan can use its TNWs to repel the attack, while its nuclear-tipped missiles at sea would deter an Indian retaliatory attack.

On paper, this seems like a water-tight strategy but it isn’t. For one, TNWs only make the situation even more precarious, as Sylvia Mishra explains. And even with TNWs in the field, there is still strategic space for India to explore pro-active conventional military options against Pakistan as the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ showed. Second, with regard to nuclear submarines, there is ample reason to doubt their survivability, as Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang point out.

Third, putting nuclear weapons on conventional vessels is extremely dangerous for any country and could lead to accidents at sea--for example, if its adversaries are unable to distinguish between conventional and non-conventional submarines or if there is a break in the command-and-control system. At some point, Pakistan will have to choose between submarine-based weapons that are ‘totally secure’ or ‘readily usable’ in a real crisis, and Christopher Clary and Ankit Panda suggest that it will in all probability go with the latter--making both the country and its nuclear weapons less safe.

But Pakistan isn’t the only state moving in the direction of ‘easy nukes’. In recent years, Russia has been toying with the idea of using TNWs in a conventional war in a “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy . And the US has responded, in  the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, by advocating for “useable” nuclear weapons and full spectrum deterrence. These pose a challenge to policymakers across the world as they seek to manage old hostilities while responding to new developments in technology and geo-politics.

HOW ISRAEL MADE FRIENDS IN INDIA

Israel’s bottom-up diplomacy has paid off.

The recent award of a $777-million contract to Israel Aerospace Industries for the supply of air and missile defense systems to the Indian Navy has re-emphasized how India-Israel relations have evolved in the last two and a half decades. From outright hostility at the time of independence seven decades ago to a strategic partnership today, the bilateral has come a long way.

That this has been possible in part because of robust defense cooperation between New Delhi and Jerusalem is well-know but what is less acknowledged is the importance of cooperation with Indian States, in fields such as agriculture and water-management. So while the IAI deal made international headlines, the Israel tour of the chief minister of one of India’s most prosperous States, Punjab, went under the radar. During his five-day visit from October 21-25, Capt. Amarinder Singh toured the NaanDanJain agricultural facility, the Dan Region wastewater treatment plant, the Afikim dairy farm, and met with President Reuven Rivlin. Earlier in the year, his counterparts from the States of Gujarat and Haryana also visited Israel, and agriculture featured prominently on both their agendas. 

This decentralized strategy of partnering with different political and private players including State governments, through cooperation in agriculture and allied fields, has long been an integral part of Israeli diplomacy in India – especially in the early years when Jerusalem had few friends in New Delhi.

For example, in 1949, Israel favorably considered India’s request for assistance in agriculture even as India refused to recognize the Jewish State and opposed its UN membership. Israel’s Histadrut maintained ties with India’s labor leaders, many of whom visited the Jewish State. In 1960, two large Indian delegations – one comprising land reforms activists from the Bhoodan movement, and another comprising young farmers – visited Israel. In 1970, India’s leading agriculturist Appasaheb Pawar lived in Israel for months, studying new agro-tech. His brother, Sharad Pawar – who would later serve three terms as Maharashtra chief minister and two as Union Minister – also played an important role in building agri-ties between the two countries.

This decentralized approach to diplomacy continued even after India and Israel established diplomatic ties in 1992. A significant development in itself, it, however, did not translate into policy shifts on the ground. Delhi issued a curt official statement and kept the new bilateral on a low profile. Left-wing parties opposed diplomatic ties and argued that India should have waited till Palestinian statehood had been achieved.

However, the normalization of India-Israel ties coincided with the liberalization of the Indian economy – and States were now empowered to work with foreign governments to bring in economic investment. Israeli diplomats seized the opportunity. Often ignored in the power corridors of Delhi, they sought to build durable partnerships in state capitals.

A slew of chief ministerial visits to Israel, from across party lines, followed--starting with Gujarat’s Chimanbhai Patel (Congress) in 1992, then Maharashtra’s Sharad Pawar (Nationalist Congress Party), who led an 800-member strong delegation to the agritech conference in 1993, then Rajasthan’s Bhairon Singh Shekhawat (Bharatiya Janata Party) in 1994, and Karnataka’s Deve Gowda (Janata Dal-Secular) in 1995.

In 1996, Deve Gowda became Prime Minister and, within six months, hosted President Ezer Weizman in Delhi – even though his own party had opposed normalization. Gowda and Weizman signed four agreements, including one to set up a model farm at India’s premier agriculture research institute near Delhi. By this time, Israeli firms had also begun to build a profile in India – Tahal was working on water management in Gujarat and Rajasthan while Netafim had a joint venture with an Indian firm that it had been doing business with even before 1992. Both Israeli companies now have a pan-India presence.

The bilateral grew stronger with the pro-Israel BJP coming to the helm in Delhi in 1998. In 2000, West Bengal’s Jyoti Basu, a Communist party veteran, broke taboo and visited Israel with a large business delegation. This was a big win but it was derailed by the Second Intifada. Still, Prime Minister AB Vajpayee hosted Ariel Sharon in 2003, indicating a qualitative improvement in bilateral ties.

This was again taken down a notch when the Congress party returned to power in 2004 and rolled back public engagement. However, bilateral trade in general and cooperation in agriculture in particular continued to grow. In 2007, Israel’s NaanDan joined with India’s Jain Irrigation Systems to form NaanDanJain which now provides irrigation solutions across 100 countries. In 2008, the flagship Indo-Israel Agriculture Project was established. Jointly implemented by the India’s horticulture mission and Israel’s MASHAV, it now has more than 15 agricultural centers across nine Indians states.

When the BJP returned to power in 2014, the pro-Israel Prime Minister Narendra Modi was able to build on decades of quiet but effective diplomacy that had already delivered tangible benefits. Modi himself was chief minister of Gujarat for 14 years, during which time his state developed a close partnership with Israel. When he became Prime Minister, few other diplomats had the kind of access to him as the Israeli Ambassador in New Delhi.

Israel’s bottom-up diplomacy has paid off. By focusing on agriculture and water management, instead of, say, lobbying to change India’s foreign policy perspectives, Israel had shifted the core of its India’s policy from a politically-charged single issue (the Palestinian cause) to a much wider non-political grassroots platform. This is not to suggest that cooperation in other areas, particularly defense, was not important – it was and is. But defense cooperation is also inherently susceptible to secrecy and negative opinion, which can be challenging for public diplomacy. In contrast, agricultural cooperation at the state level, allowed Israel to accrue the goodwill of the people, make friends across the ideological spectrum, and shield the bilateral from political upheavals.

(This article was published in the Jerusalem Post on September 30, 2018)