OF KNOWN AND UNKNOWN DEVILS

Mahinda Rajapaksa’s influence may be waning but the Sri Lankan Opposition is not yet a force to reckon with. Glued together by its common dislike for the President, it has no collective vision for the future and is hardly a credible political alternative

Given that even the wise men who study the stars and the planets cannot seem to agree on who will win the Sri Lankan presidential poll, it is best that ordinary mortals like this writer keep away from the business of predicting who Sri Lankans will elect to lead their country, as they head to the polling stations today. On the one hand, they have President Mahinda Rajapaksa who is seeking re-election for a third term, and on the other, they have Mr Mithripala Sirisena, the Opposition’s ‘common candidate’, who until recently was a Minister in the United People’s Freedom Alliance Government. Technically, there are 17 other ‘minor’ candidates to choose from but for all practical purposes, Thursday’s vote is a contest between Mr Rajapaksa and Mr Sirisena. 

When the election was announced on November 20, 2014, it was not expected to be much of a contest at all as there was no real Opposition in sight. Calculating that getting re-elected a third time after more than a decade in power would be difficult for him, Mr Rajapaksa had called for the election two years before the expiry of his Government’s six year term, hoping to maximise his time at the helm while he  riding the popularity wave.

However, what he had possibly not foreseen was an internal revolt. A day after he announced the election, Mr Sirisena jumped ship. A close colleague of the President, he was serving as the Health Minister at the time and was also the general secretary of Mr Rajapaksa’s own Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

Mr Sirisena’s split from the ruling coalition also opened the floodgates for several other disgruntled UPFA leaders to move to the Opposition camp. Within weeks, Mr Rajapaksa lost the support of more than two dozen leaders, including some high profile Ministers and important allies. The January 8 election quickly went from being a cakewalk for the President to, what some pundits are now dubbing, as one of the biggest challenges in Mr Rajapaksa’s political career.

Even within Sri Lanka’s deeply polarised political milieu, there is now a consensus that Mr Sirisena will put up a tough fight of the sort that Mr Rajapaksa had not expected; and that even if the latter manages to return to power, his mandate will be relatively smaller. Poll pundits say that the election will be a close call and may even lead to a second round of counting wherein the preferential votes are taken into consideration.

For now, let’s take a quick look at how the frontrunners stack up against each other. Mr Rajapaksa’s biggest plus point is that he is a more popular, grassroots leader than Mr Sirisena especially among the country’s Sinhala Buddhist majority. Though Mr Sirisena is also a veteran politician with reasonably strong Sinhala Buddhist credentials, he has a relatively low profile and is not exactly a match for Mr Rajapaksa who towers over the Sri Lankan political scene.

Moreover, since Mr Rajapaksa decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009 and ended a three decades long bloody insurgency, he has been regarded as a war hero in Sri Lanka. His overwhelming mandate in 2010 is proof of this. Sure, four years later, some of that public adulation has ebbed but it has not been extinguished. As for Mr Sirisena, even though he was acting Defence Minister in the final weeks of the war, he has not been able to spin any of the credit for himself. All that he has been able to do on this count is ask: Has Mr Rajapaksa equitably delivered the peace dividends that came from the end of war?

Mr Sirisena’s critics have also been quick to point out that that he is backed by two prominent leaders — Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe and Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga — who had failed to defeat the LTTE when they were in power. In fact, Mr Wickremasinghe, when he was Prime Minister (a position he expects to return to, if Mr Sirisena wins) had signed a controversial ceasefire with the LTTE which the Tamil Tigers used to hit back with a vengeance.

Another factor that will play mostly in Mr Rajapaksa’s favour is governance record. Under his rule, the Sri Lankan economy has grown at a healthy pace, unemployment is low and there has been a visible growth in infrastructure. On this count, again, Mr Sirisena has little to show. In fact, one of the Opposition’s weakest points is that it does not have a roadmap for economic development. And because of this, it will probably not be able to capitalise on whatever anti-Rajapaksa sentiment there is, as effectively as it could have.

For example, in recent years, the President’s economic model, which is heavy on foreign-funded, infrastructure projects, has come in for much criticism. The President, his family members (who hold several important portfolios) and his small coterie are believed to have primarily gained from foreign investments while the benefits have not quite trickled down to the people. Also, the rising cost of living has become a major issue but the Opposition has no real solution.

Instead, Mr Sirisena’s campaign has put the debate over the executive presidency system at the centre of the poll agenda. Through the 18th constitutional amendment, made possible because the ruling coalition has a two thirds majority in Parliament, Mr Rajapaksa had given to the President’s office additional powers (including the power to appoint the Chief Justice and the election commissioner) that has weakened other democratic institutions and given rise to fears of a soft dictatorship. Now, Mr Sirisena has promised to either amend or repeal that amendment but it’s difficult to believe him because it means he will be using his powerful position to make it less powerful. Moreover, this is an abstract issue that doesn’t have as much traction as bread-and-butter matters.

The other big drawback for Mr Sirisena is, ironically, also his primary source of strength: The large section of Sri Lankan polity which has rallied around him. Thirty six parties make up the Opposition coalition and, while they might just able to pull together their votebanks and collectively push Mr Sirisena to victory, they definitely send out mixed signals. The parties have disparate, if not conflicting, ideologies, interests and agendas and come across as opportunistic. The dynamics of the minority votebank is a good example of this.

With the support of the Tamil National Alliance and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (a former UPFA member), the Opposition hopes to capture the minority votebank which is supposedly alienated from the Rajapaksa camp that has been accused of Sinhala majoritarianism. However, since the Sinhala ultra-nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (another former UPFA member) is also a member of the Opposition coalition, it is unclear how many of the minority votes will actually come through. The JHU is the parent organisation of the Bodu Bala Sena which has been held responsible for last year’s anti-Muslim riots, and the party is also not in favour of greater Tamil autonomy. In fact, with regard to the latter, Mr Sirisena’s positions are almost identical to that of Mr Rajapaksa, thereby giving the Tamils no reason to see him as an alternative political force.

Also, though Mr Sirisena is the face of the opposition, he isn’t always viewed as its driving force. Ms Kumaratunga and Mr Wickremasinghe are seen as the real power centres. This is bound to hurt the Opposition as both leaders are considered to be past their political prime. Mr Sirisena’s only real advantage over Mr Rajapaksa is that he is viewed as a clean politician, as opposed to the incumbent who is perceived as corrupt and dictatorial. Finally, despite the hype around the Sirisena campaign, the fact that apart from opposing Mr Rajapaksa, it has no positive agenda of its own. This is a problem that is sure to blow up if the Opposition actually comes to power.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 8, 2015

In 2015, Focus on Central Asia

Narendra Modi deserves full credit for re-invigorating Indian diplomacy in the seven months he has been in power. However, Central Asia, crucial for India’s energy security, has missed his attention. In the new year, his Government must improve India’s standing in that region

While only time will tell the kind of influence the Modi Government will have on Indian foreign policy, there is no denying that this year has been a turning point. The Prime Minister has infused life into India diplomacy and his foreign trips, especially have  helped reinvigorate Brand India. In the seven months that Mr Modi has been Prime Minister, he has placed a surprisingly significant amount of emphasis on his foreign policy. He has re-focussed our efforts in South Asia, earned plaudits for India at multilateral forums and hosted several world leaders.

However, the one area that is yet to catch his attention is Central Asia. While this is not surprising as the region has hardly ever been a foreign policy priority, it should not be relegated to inconsequence for long. India’s application for membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a powerful regional forum, is a step in the right direction but a lot more needs to be done.

India lags behind not just China but all other major players in the region — definitely the US and Russia but also Iran and Turkey. This is despite the fact that India has civilisational ties with central Asia that go back centuries; more recently, New Delhi has also made a conscious effort towards strengthening its presence in that region.

The Government of India’s official Connect Central Asia policy was unveiled by former Minister of State for External Affairs E Ahamed at the India-Central Asia Dialogue in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek in June 2012. More than two year later, the policy remains more aspirational than it is in the actual.

Yet, a strong presence in central Asia is important for India for two key factors: Energy security and military security. In the first case, India currently receives almost all of its oil and gas from West Asia but given how volatile that region can be, it is a good idea to look for other suppliers. Moreover, as the country’s energy demands continue to grow, New Delhi has no choice but to tap into other sources. In this context, energy-rich and proximate Central Asia is best positioned to become India’s next big oil and gas supplier.

China faces much the same challenges (growing economy, growing population) — except that it seems to have responded to them much better, as is evident from the deep inroads that it has already made into the Central Asian energy market. Beijing’s two trillion-dollar-strong foreign exchange reserves and a ruthlessly efficient Government not encumbered by the demands of democracy, have meant it has consistently managed to out-bid New Delhi in oil deals not just in Central Asia but across the world. For example, just weeks before the dialogue in Beijing, India lost to China the world’s largest oil find in five decades — the giant Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan.

In November 2012, India’s state-run ONGC Videsh Limited had struck a deal with America’s ConocoPhillips to buy the latter’s 8.4 per cent stake in Kashagan for five billion dollars.  However, the deal fell through in July 2013 when the Kazakh Government itself stepped in and informed ConocoPhillips that its own national oil company, KazMunaiGaz, will buy the American company’s stake for the same amount. Kazakh law allows the Government certain pre-emption rights as a result of which it has the authority to buy any oil asset for sale in the country at the price agreed on by the buyer and seller. KazMunaiGaz will now sell that stake to China National Petroleum Corp for a reported $5.3-5.4 billion.

But China is only one of India’s problems in Central Asia. What has most significantly limited New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts in that region is a stubborn Pakistan which has wholly refused India overland access to Central Asia, through Afghanistan. Ideally this would have been the shortest route for India; however, that is not to be — one of the big reasons why the ambitious Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India oil pipeline project, for example, has been a non-starter.

Consequently, New Delhi has had to look for new routes that bypass Pakistan altogether. Towards that end, the North-South Transportation Corridor which connects India to the Central Asian region through Iran was envisaged as a game-changer. Initiated in 2003, this project aims to connect the port in Mumbai to the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas through maritime transport, and then develop road and rail networks linking these two ports with Afghanistan and other Central Asian Republics.

 Some initial progress was made in this regard — India’s Border Road Organisation invested $136 million to set up a road link from Zaranj to Delaran which was inaugurated in 2009. This 215km long road is a crucial part of what is known as Afghanistan’s garland road network that goes around the country connecting Herat to Kabulvia Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. But this road link apart, the North-South Transportation Corridor has mostly been gathering dust for a decade now.

In the meantime, the Chinese have aggressively built similar road and rail networks penetrating deep into the heart of Central Asian Region. The Karakoram Highway, which is under-construction in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and stands a direct threat to India’s security interests in that region, is also essentially an extension of this plan, and so is the Gwadar port in Pakistan that is being developed as a counter-balance to the Chabahar port in Iran, located less than 200km away.

This brings us to military-security aspect of India-Central Asia dynamic. As of now, India’s military footprint in that region is next to nothing. New Delhi had sought to shore up its prospects by taking over the Ayni air base in Tajikistan which would have given tremendous strategic depth in the region but its plans have most definitely been thwarted by Russia, the big brother in the region. India began renovating the Ayni air-field, located just outside the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, in 2004 and up until the end of 2010, Indian engineers were still working there. However, since then the Tajik Government which depends considerably on Moscow for financial aid, seems to have made clear that it will only let Russia use the air-base.

India’s other military assets in the region include a military hospital in Farkhor, also in Tajikistan. Set up in 2001 to treat Northern Alliance members fighting the Taliban, it was shut down after the US removed the militant group from power. But in recent years, there have been talks of re-opening that field hospital.

The India-Tajik relationship is as far as India’s military presence goes in that region. And while there have been some positive indications of improving that footprint, it is unlikely to change significantly in the near future. Not only because China and Pakistan will do all that they can to limit India’s presence but also because Russia will probably not go all out to support India. The US is the only country which has unequivocally stated that it would like India to emerge as its regional partner (this explains Russia’s reluctance) especially post the 2014 Afghan pullout.

India remains an important player in its New Silk Road project that hopes to integrate the Afghan economy into that of Central and South Asia. But with America’s diminished clout at this point (the NSR project has been all but discarded), it is unclear how far Washington, DC will be able to help. In other words, India is on its own.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on December 25, 2014)

Taking Responsibility for SAARC

India fancies itself as a global power. However, its claims to leadership have always been undercut by the fact that it has failed to deliver on its home turf in South Asia. Prime Minister Modi has promised to change that by leading Saarc from the front

The big question at the 18th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is this: Will India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, finally step up and take leadership responsibility for the forum? For the eight member grouping that includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, this is an existential question. For Prime Minister Modi, who has sought to establish a strong foreign credential in his first six months in office, this will be his biggest, diplomatic test — and he knows it.

The South Asian forum which turns 30 next year has largely been a disappointment, if not an entirely failed project. Look at it any which way you want but there is no denying that Saarc has been unable to deliver on two of its basic promises: Prevent war between its member states and encourage greater economic cooperation among them. Some of this failure is the result of geography — except for Afghanistan and Pakistan which share a border with each other, all the others only share a border with India, thereby making Saarc a rather India-centric project; some of the others causes can be attributed to history — while under the British Raj, the region functioned as a cohesive trading unit, it split up into rather inward-looking nations that were wary of free enterprise, and defined by bitterly contested borders, in the post-colonial period.

The difficult bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan, inarguably one of the biggest roadblocks for Saarc, is a product of both history and geography. Moreover, as recent reports about Pakistan playing spoilsport in signing the important rail transport network treaty shows, this is a problem that is not going away anytime soon. Having said that, however, it is also important to underline that Pakistan is not the only one responsible for the sad state of affairs at Saarc. India, its Pakistan problems notwithstanding, has also failed to in its role as the group’s natural leader.

In the early years of Saarc, India routinely gave preference to developing its relations with its neighbours on a bilateral basis, rather than strengthening the multilateral forum. It was only after the economic liberalisation of the 1990s that New Delhi’s approach began to change. As the country grew stronger, and indeed more confident of itself, it also became more willing to assert itself on regional and international forums.

Very quickly, India went from a country that wanted no part of any pie (think Non-Aligned Movement) to demanding a finger in every pie. As India’s international profile grew stronger, and Saarc continued to wither away, many wondered if this country had outgrown its neighbourhood.  Having been found access to the global high table, was India now disinterested in its home turf?

The narrative changed again with Prime Minister IK Gujral’s foreign policy doctrine which said that India’s welfare was intrinsically linked to the fortunes of its neighbours, and focussed New Delhi’s efforts on South Asia. Successive Governments led by Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, carried forward this policy — at least in spirit, even if implementation was often patchy.

Now, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also reiterated the neighbours-come-first policy. And it is hoped that, unlike his predecessor, he will be able to convert policy formulations into practicable solutions. His invitation to all the Saarc leaders for this inauguration ceremony earlier this year, reminiscent of an emperor’s coronation where the kings come calling, was, a diplomatic masterstroke. Not only was it befitting the landmark mandate that he had been given but, more importantly in this context, it was a powerful signal to the rest of the neighbourhood that India, under Prime Minister Modi, will no longer shy away from its leadership responsibilities in South Asia. But strong signals apart, what about the substance? After all, even with the best of intentions, Mr Modi can’t turn things around single-handedly. 

For one, there are certain issues, like Pakistan, that lie beyond his control. Given the current situation in Pakistan, there is no space for a peace deal on matters related to Kashmir and other boundary disputes. Also, on the issue of terrorism, there is little that India can do, except for strengthening its fences, if Pakistani deliberately rears snakes at home, hoping to let them loose them this country. Outside of the Pakistan problem, India also has little control on political developments in other countries (for example, coups and rigged elections) which tend to fuel instability in the region. Sure, India can, and should, play a supportive role (as it did in Nepal with reconciliation of the Maoists) but it cannot force wholesale political changes (like keeping Islamists out of power).

But while the challenges facing Mr Modi in the region are myriad, there is also ample scope for him to bring about changes that can impact and improve the lives of more than a billion citizens.  A good place to start with the Saarc reform process is at home. Economically, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world —intra-regional trade is abysmally low at just five per cent of the total official trade; intra-regional investments are equally paltry. And India, by far the biggest economic entity in the region, is also embarrassingly the least open to intra-regional trade.

Talk of reversing this situation has been going on for quite a few years now. For example, in 2007, when India was leading the Saarc summit, President Pranab Mukherjee, then serving as External Affairs Minister under the UPA regime, had said at a conference of Saarc parliamentarians that this country, as the largest nation in the region, was willing to “to accept asymmetrical responsibilities, including opening up her markets to her South Asian neighbours without insisting on reciprocity.” Unfortunately, there was little change on the ground.

Economic cooperation apart, Mr Modi could also look at enhancing collaboration in some of the other areas where joint challenges exist. For example, climate change is a major concern for all members particularly the Maldives. Similarly, energy security is a pressing matter for all South Asian countries, with the exception of Bhutan to some extent.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on November 27, 2014)

 

Rawalpindi is the Real Villain

Peace in Afghanistan is a difficult project but it’s possible if Pakistan cooperates. Unfortunately, it is still plotting ways to ensure all of us in the region remain in hell and no one gets to go to heaven alone. It will only change its ways once the costs it incurs shoot up

In Afghanistan’s long drawn out transition process to peace and stability, this year has been particularly crucial. Western troops who have held the country together over the past decade and a half are now wrapping up their combat missions. Only about 21,000 will remain to assist the Afghan forces, and it is still unclear how well the latter will be able to hold fort. Already, there have been reports of the Taliban taking back villages in the south from where they had been ousted. A new Government has taken charge in Kabul but it stands on a precarious power-sharing deal between two bitter rivals. In a wide-ranging interview to The Pioneer, former chief of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security Amrullah Saleh acknowledges the challenges ahead but also expresses optimism that Afghanistan’s political establishment will not betray the people’s aspirations. Excerpts from the interview:

Do you believe the new National Unity Government will be stable?

We have passed more difficult times than this in the past 40 years, so I am optimistic. First, the people of Afghanistan want both leaders to work together, so there is popular pressure demanding convergence. Second, the pressure from international community to make this Government work is also massive. Each world leader who calls on the President also calls on the CEO who’s powers are akin to that of a Prime Minister. Regional powers, minus Pakistan, are also supportive. This is unlike in the 1980s and 1990s when the region was divided on the kind of Government that Afghanistan should have. Third, the two leaders know that if they don’t work together, they’ll open the gates for the Taliban to stage a comeback.

How do you think the arrangement will work, in terms of sharing of portfolios etc, given that both leaders have competing interests?

The NUG has not yet taken off. It still has to be assembled. This won’t be an easy task because interest groups will inevitably play tricks. There will be diverse dynamics, and lot of pulling and pushing by vested interests. It is up to the two men at the top to show more statesmanship. So, yes, there all ingredients of instability but the opportunities (for stability) are greater than the challenges.

How is the personal relationship between between President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah?

Since they signed the deal, both sides have taken a more humble approach. They understand they have about five years together — two years until the launch of the loya jirga and another three after that. You know, human beings who claim that they have forgotten the past are saying utter lies. But good leaders suppress past feelings and move on.

Also, the past here is not just the past six months. The leaders should remember the past four decades. They should remember the fate of Afghan leaders who didn’t work together. Afghan history is full of instances wherein the people have given a mandate and the leaders haven’t to work together and they have all lost.

The international community seems optimistic about the NUG. Do the Afghan voters share its optimism or do they feel cheated out of their mandate?

For the masses, ‘hope’ is a commodity. For the people at the top, hope is neither a commodity nor a policy. The only measurable factor is the document outlining the NUG. Moreover, there is little room for violation of the deal. If either side violates the provisions, the people will see that, given the role of media.

What is your assessment of the Afghan security issue?

We are suffering. We are in pain. We wake to headlines of bomb blasts, casualties and tears. I am not hiding that. But the legitimacy of the constitutional democratic space is so strong that the people are willing to defend it.

As for the Taliban, the Afghan system has not been dogmatic in its approach by insisting on the use of force. It has kept the negotiation gate open. But the Taliban are not ready to negotiate because they want to dictate certain terms.

But they can’t continue forever as, compared to the 1980s and 1990s, they are getting support from a much weaker Pakistan. There is a civil-military divide in Pakistan over the Afghan policy, and also over how to tackle extremism within that country and re-brand Pakistan.

Remember even up to the 1990s, Pakistan had a good brand. It was an ally, a front line ally ready to help the free world; it had its own challenges but was not ready to say goodbye to democratic values forever. But what is the Pakistani brand today? It is a hub for extremism and sectarianism; it has a dirty record of nuclear proliferation and the shadow of the army is bigger than physics of democracy. Still, there is one Pakistani side which is constantly reaching out to the Afghan people but the other half, which is the military, is playing a dirty power game. This can’t go on. They will have to realise this or they’ll be forced to realise this.

How are talks with the Taliban progressing under the new Government?

A breakthrough in this regard will come only when Rawalpindi creates one. But Rawalpindi is not interested in peace. Taliban leaders showing some interest in peace have been killed in covert attacks. It is only if Pakistan’s cost of war goes up that that it will force the Taliban to lay their arms. Currently, Pakistan pays too little and gains too much. It gives maybe $30 million to $40 million to the Taliban, and in return, it get billions of dollars in aid from the US (to fight the Taliban). Ironically, the US is financing both sides of the war.

To what extent is Pakistan still cultivating Afghanistan as its ‘strategic depth’ depth against India?

The question should be will it ever get away from this nostalgic idea? Will Pakistan ever realise that it is punching far above their weight? Also, Pakistan should realise that no one has ever been able to dominate Afghanistan. As I told a Western friend recently, “You are subsidising Afghanistan today, for which we are grateful, but can you say we are a pro-West nation with confidence?” Finally, Afghanistan is now a changed country. The new population has different aspirations and is no longer the bearded country that Pakistan wanted it to be.

Some Westerners say Afghanistan is being victimised by India-Pakistan rivalry. What’s your take?

India works with the Afghan Government and doesn’t sponsor non-state actors. India is associated in my country with electricity, education and entertainment. If Pakistan wants to jump into these spheres, we welcome that. But the problem is everything good that India builds in Afghanistan, Pakistan wants to destroy it. That is an evil effort of ‘either we all remain in hell or you alone cannot go to heaven.’ In Afghanistan, Pakistan is trying to put itself at parity with India using wrong means.

Also, India has never looked down upon Afghanistan but Pakistan does not show us respect. We get hurt when we are not respected and our culture is ridiculed. This is what the Pakistani elite used to do. They’d brief Western officials in London and Washington, DC, that, “The Afghans are a bunch of tribes; they are disassociated; you help us, we manage them”. India has never said that.

How will Kabul’s India policy shape up under the new Government? Will the Karzai consensus hold?

I am not in Government, so I can’t speak with authority. But as an informed commentator, I’d like to say that there are realities that politicians cannot change. The reality of our region is that India is a force for stability. With Nato reducing its presence, there has to be another power filling that void. Who else, if not India? Who else has the same amount of interest in maintaining constitutional order in Afghanistan? If the new leaders say ‘no’ to India, then who do they say ‘yes’ to?

(This interview was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on October 30, 2014)

No Hiding From This Relationship

The Narendra Modi Government must seize this moment to ‘normalise' the India-Israel bilateral, so that Israel gets the respect and support that India accords to its friends, irrespective of the political party in power in New Delhi

The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu this Sunday in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly was undoubtedly a landmark one. It was the first official engagement between the top leaders of the two countries in more than a decade, and marked a unique coming-out-of-the-closet moment for the India-Israel bilateral. While the two countries have quietly worked with each other since independence, formal diplomatic relations were  established only 1992; and even in the two decades since then, the relationship has been underplayed. This has been despite Israel’s steadfast support to India, and increased cooperation between the two countries in fields as diverse as agriculture and outer space. In this context, some have noted that the little attention given to Sunday's meeting does not do justice to its high significance. While this is a valid point, the fact that there wasn’t much of a hullabaloo about the meeting tells another story of how far the bilateral has progressed in these past two decades.

The last time an Indian Prime Minister met with the Israeli Prime Minister was in 2003, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee hosted Ariel Sharon. The tour,  though successful, was also marked by staunch opposition from large sections of the Indian Left, which condemned the Government for hobnobbing with the man who had been dubbed as “the killer of Muslims” and portrayed the meeting as a grave insult to India’s Muslim population in particular. Much water has flowed under the bridge since then, but Palestinian issues remain somewhat of a tender point in India — even if only in some university campuses and newspaper Op-ed pages. That there was not even a pipsqueak of protest even from these quarters shows that there is broad political consensus on the India-Israel bilateral. The Modi Government must now seize this moment to ‘normalise’ (for want of a better word) the bilateral, so that Israel gets the attention, respect and support that India accords to its friends — irrespective of the political party in power.

Up until now, the India-Israel bilateral has remained as some sort of a ‘BJP project’ as it is leaders of the BJP who have most often advocated better relations with Israel. At the top of the list is the indomitable Subramanian Swamy, who was the first senior Indian politician to visit Israel. Prime Minister Vajpayee also deserves full credit for being the only Indian head of Government to have hosted an Israeli Prime Minister. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj is a self-declared fan of Israel and has also served as chief of the India-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Committee. When the Gaza crisis erupted this summer, she put up a strong defence for India’s pro-Israel stance in the Lok Sabha.

As for Prime Minister Modi, he has a long-standing relationship with the Israelis. Like all the aforementioned leaders, he too has travelled to Israel and is well aware of how much the Jewish nation can offer India. During his tenure as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, he successfully brought Israeli technology, investment, innovation to his State — and it is widely believed that few diplomats had the kind of access to him as the Israeli Ambassador to New Delhi. Against this backdrop, it is in the fitness of things that after one Prime Minister from the BJP welcomed his Israeli counterpart home, another has proudly acknowledged the India-Israel partnership on the global stage.

This, however, is not to suggest that the Congress did nothing for the India-Israel bilateral. Even if one does not count in Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao who established diplomatic ties with Israel, given his strained relationship with the Congress high command, there can be no two ways about the fact that the India-Israel bilateral grew rapidly and robustly under the UPA regime of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Israel quickly became one of India’s biggest defence suppliers, second only to Russia, and bilateral trade has boomed from a $20 million in 1992 to six billion dollars now. There was even a high-level visit during the UPA years by former External Affairs Minister SM Krishna. 

Also, the pro-Arab ideological tendencies (which resulted in anti-Israel gestures) that the Congress had inherited from its previous generation of leaders seeking to win over Muslim voters and minimise the influence of the Muslim League during Independence, had lost currency. For example, while some may have been reading much into the fact that Prime Minister Modi did not bring up the Gaza issue during his meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the fact is that this has been the template for years now. Palestinian/Arab issues are almost never brought up by Indian leaders in their meetings with Israeli leaders and diplomats, who, however, often get an earful from the Europeans and Americans.

In effect, the Congress’s ‘anti-Israel’ policy of the past had, in recent years, been reduced to supporting largely meaningless resolutions against the Jewish nation at the UN. Its so-called support for the Palestinian cause was also limited to a small budgetary allowance and a big handshake with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the UNGA. Notably, Mr Modi did not meet Mr Abbas in New York this time — this was reportedly because of scheduling issues, but either way, it comes as no surprise, given the Prime Minister’s strong dislike for meaningless photo-ops.

That said, some parts of the old template still remain — and even the Modi Government hasn’t been able clear them out. India’s vote in favour of the anti-Israel resolution at the UN Human Rights Council, is one example. But the consequent public backlash it generated shows that the Government needs to catch up with popular sentiment. For years, Israel has been viewed more favourably in India than in most other countries.

Apart from the fact that Jews in India have never faced religious persecution, Indians today have a special admiration for Israel — a tiny country that has not just survived, but thrived, even amidst relentless hostility. Though it is unfair to compare Israel’s relationship with its Arab neighbours and India’s with its South Asian neighbours, the point is that Indians understand what it is like to live in a difficult neighbourhood.

With political and popular support aligned, now is the time to complete the ‘normalisation’ process of the India-Israel bilateral. Even those who are critical of Israel’s policies and would perhaps like to lobby New Delhi on these matters should support this move — ‘normalisation’ of relations will create space for a more honest conversation; it will mean that those in India who support Israel do not have to be constantly defensive about the bilateral; and finally, it will allow the mainstream Right in India to effectively rein in fringe elements, who have been using the ‘support Israel’ platform to gain easy publicity for their extremist campaigns.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on October 2, 2014)

Between Bombing and Building

If plans to rebuild Gaza are to succeed, the Palestinian Authority has to sideline Hamas, take over power, implement the reconstruction plan under the watchful eyes of the international community and commit to demilitarisation of the strip

After the conflict in Gaza ended last month, many wondered which side had won and which side had lost. Others asked, and rightly so, if there were any winners or losers at all. On the one hand, exuberant leaders of Hamas, the internationally designated terror organisation that holds power in Gaza, suddenly appeared from their underground bunkers to rejoice that their resistance had succeeded. On the other hand, Israeli leaders, facing severe international criticism for responding in a supposedly disproportionate manner to rocket fire from Hamas, claimed that the group’s military capabilities had been dealt a severe blow, even as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself seemed unsure if deterrence had been re-established. Still, when the Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire came into effect on August 26, almost everybody heaved a sigh of relief.

The deal in itself was a modest one: While the Palestinians agreed to hold their fire, Israel agreed to open its border crossings into Gaza (which were open through much of the war anyway), permit a larger number of trucks to move in with goods and relief material everyday, reduce its security buffer from 300metres to 100metres, and allow Gazan fishermen to venture six miles off the coast instead of just three miles. None of these are major concessions; they are confidence building measures at best.

The big issues for both sides —for the Palestinians, building a sea port and an airport in Gaza and the release of security prisoners; and for the Israelis, the demilitarisation of Gaza — will come up for discussion, only if the current ceasefire arrangement holds for a month.

Three weeks in, the situation has been remained largely peaceful, allowing for discussions on the reconstruction of Gaza. The strip was effectively flattened during the 51 days of fighting this summer. According to UN and Palestinian estimates, 20,000 homes were destroyed and another 40,000 damaged; half of Gaza’s hospitals were damaged, nine are still closed; it’s sole power plant has only just started functioning again, 360 factories have been damaged and 126 completely destroyed; 22 schools destroyed and an estimated 188 damaged; and 35,000 dunams of agricultural land affected. Also,1,00,000 of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents are still internally displaced, 40 per cent lack access to running water, and 18 hour long power cuts are the norm.

On Tuesday, the UN announced that it had brokered an agreement to rebuild this tiny Mediterranean strip. The deal is designed to repair the damage caused during the conflict and also initiate the process of long-term development in Gaza. International donors are already lining up to contribute to the reconstruction plan and finalise its delivery mechanism. Two important meetings have been scheduled: The first in New York on September 22 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and the second in Cairo on October 12. If past experiences are anything to go by, there should be no shortage of funds. However, the question is who will put them to use and how.

The initial signs are ominous. The day the UN’s Middle East envoy Richard Serry announced the formalisation of the plan to the Security Council, there was mortar fire in to southern Israel for the first time since the war ended. While Hamas has denied any role in this, the firing is a grim reminder of how fragile the ceasefire agreement really is and how easily the situation can deteriorate. But even if the peace holds, implementing the reconstruction programme will be easier said than done.

The biggest roadblock here is Hamas’ control over Gaza. Because the group is a designated terrorist organisation, many donor nations cannot legally work with it. Also, as long as a group like Hamas that does not even recognise Israel’s right to exist holds power, there are few chances for an enduring peace deal. This makes donors rightfully sceptical of investing in the reconstruction of Gaza as it will quite possibly be reduced to rubble yet again. Finally, the international community cannot reward Hamas, which has provoked war and brought death and destruction upon its own people, with billions of dollars in aid that it can wilfully distribute among impoverished Gazans (or, more likely, use to buy missiles and rockets and build more terror tunnels into Israel).

The August ceasefire agreement, therefore, calls upon Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas to do the job, which will be monitored by the UN, but there is nothing to suggest that Hamas will relinquish control of the Gaza strip. Even though the rival factions joined hands earlier this year to form a Unity Government, they are hardly on the same page. President Abbas had publicly criticised Hamas’s rocket fire into Israel and more recently charged the Islamist group with running a “shadow Government”. Hamas, on the other hand, is reportedly enjoying a post-war high. Its ratings have soared and there is nothing to suggest that the PA is prepared to wrench control from it.

This takes us back to the situation in 2009. After the end of Operation Cast Lead, which played out on an identical template, a huge donor conference was held in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to raise funds for the re-construction of Gaza. Approximately $4.7 billion was pledged with Europe offering $1.25 billion (of which $220 million came from Denmark alone), Saudi Arabia one billion dollars and the US another $900 million. The conference raised almost double the funds than what the PA had expected but much of that money never came through due to political and security reasons.

Still, after Operation Cast Lead, the Gazan economy saw some growth and development as illicit tunnel trade through the Sinai flourished. This time, however, the Egyptian military has shut down the tunnels and effectively choked what was once Gaza’s lifeline.

Today, the strip is a cesspool of guns and weapons — the war saw rockets being fired from schools and hospitals — and unless, Gaza is demilitarised, effective reconstruction will remain a distant dream. Unfortunately, Hamas has consistently refused to lay down arms, and is unlikely to change its mind any time soon.

 (This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on September 18,2014)

Indian Diplomacy, Modi Style

In his first 100 days in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has put much focus on foreign policy. He has not changed anything dramatically but instead, with his personal charisma and political chutzpah, breathed new life into Indian diplomacy

The American stock-taking ritual associated with a new Government’s completion of a 100 days in office has been in and out of fashion in India. It gained currency in 1991 when the Government of PV Narasimha Rao set the course for the liberalisation of the Indian economy immediately after taking charge. The concept made a comeback in 2009 with the second Congress-led UPA regime which created a flurry of activity with its 100-day targets. This time, the BJP-led NDA Government itself has largely ignored the 100-day mark; instead, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has talked about a five-year deadline — or one term of Government. He is acutely aware that the enormous task of reform before him is time-taking one.

Indeed, this very concept of a 100-day assessment has limited utility in a complex political set-up like India’s. It was popularised by US President Franklin D Roosevelt who took charge in the summer of 1933, the darkest hour of the Great Depression. Immediately after his inauguration, he set about the task of fixing America. In the 100 days between March 9 and June 17, 1933, Roosevelt’s Government passed a series of landmark legislations that helped the country get back on its feet. The President also regularly addressed the nation through the radio, in what came to be known as the fireside chats. During these chats, he shared his plans for reform and governance, and sought to talk up the national mood, very similar to what Prime Minister Modi did with his Independence Day speech.  It was during one such radio address in July 1933 that the 100-day term was first used. And contrary to popular perception, it did not refer to Roosevelt’s presidency per se (he was sworn in five days earlier on March 4, 1933), but to the working of the 73rd US Congress which commenced on March 9, 1933.

Few leaders today have kind of support that Roosevelt had in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Even Mr Modi, with his overwhelming mandate in the Lok Sabha, does not have the luxury of a majority in the Rajya Sabha. But what makes the 100-day measure almost irrelevant in India is that the parliamentary system of governance cannot be favourably compared to the presidential system. The executive is not as powerful in India as it is in the US — and it is rather absurd to expect any radical changes in the first 100 days of not just the Modi Government but any administration in New Delhi.

This is especially true for foreign policy which has always been more about continuity than change. Even when there are big ticket developments, such as the sale of guns and aircraft, or a nuclear trade agreement, or even a formalised dialogue mechanism, they are the result of months, sometimes years, of negotiations. Having said that, however, the 100-day concept (if one must employ it) can help generate a sense of the Government’s functioning and its priorities.

When Mr Modi was sworn into office, he was bit of a wild card on the foreign policy front. Yes, as Chief Minister, he had marketed Gujarat well to the world, but he had little experience in New Delhi. His heightened focus on foreign policy in the first 100 days of taking office has naturally taken many by surprise.

Strategically speaking, however, this focus makes perfect sense. The Modi Government came to power with the expectations of a billion people riding on it. There was no way it could have fulfilled all popular aspirations in a short time. Also, this Government is not one that seems to be comfortable with sudden, radical changes, as the Union Budget stands proof. It would not be delivering big bang reforms overnight, as some had expected. Disenchantment, therefore, was bound to set in; this may have also adversely affected the BJP’s performance in the upcoming Assembly elections, thereby dampening Mr Modi’s long-term plans for reform. An easy way to keep up the popular spirit was to focus on foreign policy initiatives. These are easy to play up and have high visibility but do not require major policy changes (think labour laws) or large-scale reform at the grassroots (think industry revival).

Mr Modi’s star-studded inauguration ceremony, attended by South Asian leaders, set the tone. It dazzled his audience at home and abroad alike. Soon after, he travelled to Bhutan for his first foreign trip and then to Nepal. Both were landmark tours. In the meantime, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Bangladesh for her maiden foreign tour and then to Nepal, to lay the ground for the Prime Minister’s visit. When viewed together, one does not have to be a foreign policy analyst to know that South Asia will be at the heart of the new Government’s foreign policy.

Yet, this is hardly a new policy direction. India has always been the predominant power in South Asia and its near neighbours have always had priority focus in New Delhi. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, often criticised for shutting out the neighbourhood, had a South Asia-focus. Sadly, his domestic political compulsions rendered him too weak to sustain regional leadership, as a result of which India lost ground across South Asia. This is where Mr Modi promises to be different.

The same can also be said of the Prime Minister’s performance at the BRICS summit, his first multilateral engagement. The grouping in itself had lost much sheen in recent years but Mr Modi seized the opportunity to revitalise India’s relationship with other emerging economies. His just-concluded five-day long trip to Japan has also been a roaring success, with promises of bullet trains and billions of dollars in infrastructure development. But let us not forget that the bilateral had received a booster shot earlier. Last year, the Manmohan Singh Government had the rare honour of hosting the Japanese Emperor and Empress. This, of course, does not take away from the fact that Mr Modi’s personal charishma and political chutzpah has taken the bilateral to an all new high. Perhaps the only disappointment from the trip was that the civil nuclear energy deal could not be signed — but a similar deal with Australia will probably be finalised as Prime Minister Tony Abbott comes calling on Thursday.

But beyond the deals and agreements, real progress will be measured in terms of deliverables. For example, while Japanese investment promises are much appreciated, Mr Modi will have to clean out the clogged pipelines at home before the money can actually flow in. That’s a long term process, which he has begun, but still has to be seen to its logical end

Mr Modi’s Government has also faced some unexpected foreign policy crises and done fairly well on most counts. First, was the evacuation of Indians trapped in Iraq which the Government managed admirably well, although one group still remains in captivity. The next challenge was shaping India’s response to the flare-up in Gaza. Here, the Government initially held its own in Parliament but fumbled in Geneva where it supported an anti-Israel resolution. This disappointed those who were hoping that Mr Modi would gradually steer away from India’s pro-Arab policy. But once he had signed the BRICS declaration (ostensibly prepared months before by bureaucrats following a fixed policy template) which contained strong language against Israel, India could not have broken ranks later on. Foreign-secretary level talks with Pakistan, even after Islamabad’s envoy here met Kashmiri separatists despite been warned against such daliances, was the third challenge. Mr Modi’s decision to call off the talks, especially as the domestic situation in Pakistan worsened, was a clear indication of his firm, no-nonsense attitude.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on September 4, 2014)