Not The Old Superpower. Still...

The crisis in Ukraine, which has culminated in the ‘accession’ of its Crimean Province to the Russian Federation, is not just a victory for Vladimir Putin. It marks the return of a resurgent Great Power to the international stage

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, following a controversial referendum in the peninsula that has been deemed illegitimate by the United States, the European Union and the incumbent Government of Ukraine, has expectedly stoked fears of another Cold War. While some of these concerns maybe over-stated, there is no looking away from the fact that the political crisis in Ukraine, which has culminated in the accession of its Crimean Province to the Russian Federation, marks the return of a resurgent Great Power to the international stage in a manner that it has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. On the other end, it also highlights the limits of Western powers which have struggled to respond to the crisis in an effective and cohesive manner, and have found themselves on the backfoot every step of the way. The crisis should perhaps also force a re-think on Nato’s mandate and purpose.

That the US-EU-Nato combine clearly failed to assess Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response to the ouster of Mr Viktor Yanukovich, the democratically elected President of Ukraine ,who was also Kremlin’s man in Kiev, goes without saying. This, at least partly, seems to be because the West never cared to put itself in President Putin’s position — as is evidenced from the international community’s entirely anti-Russia rhetoric on the issue. The entire blame is being laid at President Putin’s doorstep for ‘invading’ Ukraine and ‘violating its territorial integrity’, when, in fact, the West is just as much responsible. After all, aggressive Nato expansionism was bound to rankle Moscow. Yet, successive regimes in Washington, DC, continued with its eastward movement in a manner that has only served to incite Russia.

As Mr Malcolm Fraser, the former Prime Minister of Australia, notes in The Guardian: “The then (Soviet Union) President, (Mikhail Sergeyevich) Gorbachev , in negotiating with US Secretary of State, James Baker, had insisted that Nato should not move one foot east — this was an area of traditional Russian influence. President (Bill) Clinton pushed to expand the Nato alliance to the very borders of Russia. There was talk of Ukraine and Georgia being included.” True, Ukraine eventually turned down offers to join Nato but as Mr Fraser explains, “The move east... was provocative, unwise and a very clear signal to Russia: We are not willing to make you a co-operative partner in the management of European or world affairs; we will exercise the power available to us and you will have to put up with it.” And that is not all: “The message was re-emphasised years later, when President Bush sought to place elements of the anti-ballistic missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic. America said this was aimed at Iran. Russia would not have believed that. The West was acting as though the Cold War still persisted”.

Similarly, the secession of Kosovo from Serbia, which happened in Russia’s backyard and despite Moscow’s reservations, is yet another example of Western high-handness. That President Putin used the example set in Kosovo to justify his annexation of Crimea shows how things are now coming full circle. In his victory speech at the Kremlin on Tuesday, Mr Putin said: “The Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent — a precedent our Western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country’s central authorities.” 

In response, some Western experts have sought to distinguish the Kosovo case from Crimea on the ground that the secession of the former was necessitated by enormous bloodshed. While a high death toll may make for a compelling argument for it, secession is still very much a violation of the principal of territorial integrity that the West now seeks to uphold against Russia — a fact that Mr Putin has also underlined. 

For now, it seems like there is little to stop Mr Putin, who is possibly looking to flesh out his dream of the Eurasian Union, essentially a vast trade block to rival the EU, which up until now had received little international attention. The West, on its part, has begun imposing sanctions on individual Russian leaders and threatened additional ‘costs’ amidst loud protestations of “land grab” and “theft on an international scale”. But none of these seem to have perturbed President Putin much.

Russia does only limited business with the US; its main trading partner is the EU which buys Russian gas. It is unlikely that Europe, hamstrung by its own financial troubles, will be willing to bear a high cost. Indeed, as we decide to what extent the West will be willing to convert its high-pitched talk against an ‘aggressive’ Russia into punitive action, it is important to remember that neither the EU nor definitely the US has the kind of interests which Russia has in Crimea. Not only does Russia have historical ties with the penninsula that goes back centuries, Crimea has also been the base for its Black Sea Fleet for 200 years at Sevastopol. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a lease agreement valid till 2042 allows the Russian fleet to continue operating in Sevastopol in exchange for discounted natural gas. This lease also allows Russia to station 161 aircraft, 388 warships and 25,000 armed men in Crimea (which Mr Putin used to justify the presence of his armed forces during March 16 referendum).

Indeed, India’s National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had also mentioned “legitimate Russian interests” in Crimea — and his statement did raise some eyebrows around the world. The statement, even if carefully couched in diplomatese, showed Indian support for Russia, a long-standing friend, at a time when the latter has been virtually isolated. This must also be viewed alongside the official statement from the Ministry of External Affairs, which not only refrained from condemning Moscow’s actions but also kept out the routine mention of “respect for territorial integrity” etc. It is no surprise then that President Putin has not only thanked India for “showing restraint” but also later telephoned Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to apprise him of the developments.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 20, 2014)

A Taste of Your Own Medicine

The terror attack in Islamabad has hit the Pakistani Establishment in its home turf, and raised questions over how long the Government will be able retain control over its own backyard even. Still, course correction seems unlikely

Terror attacks in Pakistan these days hardly grab headlines elsewhere, as they happen on a near daily basis across that country. Nevertheless, the bloodbath in Islamabad on Monday deserves attention. For one, it was a rare incident even by Pakistan’s standards. Though other urban centres, such as Karachi and Peshawar, have come under attack and repeatedly so, the capital city has been largely insulated from the onslaught of terrorists in recent years. Indeed, this was the first major attack since June 2011 and the deadliest since 2008 when the Marriott Hotel was bombed.

On Monday morning, gunmen ran into a district courthouse complex, located in the posh F8 Sector of Islamabad, firing indiscriminately at bystanders. After about 45 minutes of utter mayhem, two of them blew themselves up inside a courtroom while others reportedly fled. Eleven people, including a judge, were killed in the attack that bore a striking resemblance to the 26/11 carnage in Mumbai.

The attack has hit the Pakistani elite on its home turf, and raised questions over how long the Government will be able retain control over its own backyard even. Many believe that Islamabad, specifically the Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, has struck a devil’s deal with terror groups: Keep your hands off Islamabad and the surrounding Punjab Province (by far, Pakistan’s most prosperous region and Mr Sharif’s stronghold) — and, in return, the state machinery will look the other way as you wreak havoc in other parts of the country. Monday’s attack shows that any such deal which may have been in place is now unravelling.

According to the Pakistani Government, the attack also shattered the ceasefire agreement that it had entered into with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan less than 24 hours ago. On Sunday, Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan had announced that the Government would halt ongoing airstrikes against the militants in response to the latter’s offer to hold fire for a month, that came the day before. On Saturday, the military had targeted the hideouts of Taliban leader Hazrat Nabi, also known as Mullah Tamanche, who Government officials hold responsible for a March 1 attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province that claimed the lives of 11 policemen guarding polio workers. The state’s retaliatory response resulted in the killing of least five militants and, although it remains unclear if Mullah Tamanche was one of them, it seemed to have forced the TTP to call for truce.

Given the Taliban’s long history of violating ceasefire promises, it was assumed that the peace would not hold for long but few could have predicted a massacre the very next day — and this seemingly includes the TTP itself. On Tuesday, the group’s spokesperson Shahidullah Shahid washed their hands off the attack, while making vague accusations about foreign involvement to derail peace negotiations with the Government that could have been re-started. The talks had been suspended weeks ago after militants killed 23 Frontier Corps soldiers it had been holding in its custody since 2010, despite promises of ceasefire during negotiations.

Instead, a little known group, Ahrar-ul Hind, has taken responsibility for the attack. Now, few in Pakistan seem to believe that the TTP was not involved in the attack. By most accounts, it is using the new group to give itself the advantage of plausible deniability. Interestingly, it is precisely this that has been the Pakistani Government’s strategy with regard to anti-India attacks and activities emanating from its soil. But that is a different story altogether. For now, there is reason to believe that the TTP may not have actually been directly involved in courthouse attack.

The Ahrar-ul Hind claims to have separated from the Pakistani Taliban network in February, after the latter began peace talks with the Government which were supposed to be premised on two pre-conditions: First, that the Taliban accept and honour the Constitution of Pakistan and second, that any potential peace deal cover only ‘violence-hit areas’ (code for restive tribal areas that are safe havens for militants). The Ahrar-ul Hind is opposed to both and has made clear it will accept nothing less than the implementation of sharia’h law across Pakistan.

Another interesting aspect of the group is that while its spokesman has claimed that it is led by one Maulana Omar Qasmi, Pakistani media has reported that security agencies believe the ‘Kashmiri fighter’ Mast Gul, is probably its driving force. The former commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen led the 1995 siege of the Charar-e-Sharif shrine in Jammu & Kashmir. After a two month long standoff that gutted the  14th century shrine, the Indian Army eventually flushed out the militants but Mast Gul escaped. According to Former Union Minister Jaswant Singh, he received a hero’s welcome across the border as he drove to Muzaffarabad from Chakothi on August 2, three months after the arson. For a while, Gul was supposedly the ISI’s blue-eyed boy but later went off the radar. Then, this February, he resurfaced in Northern Waziristan with a TTP commander claiming responsibility for the hotel bombing in Peshawar.

But irrespective of the nature of the TTP’s ties with the Ahrar-ul Hind, the fact remains that this is not the first time that it has distanced itself from a terror attack. For example, last year the group refrained from taking responsibility for two high-profile incidents — the Nanga Parbat shooting in June and the Peshawar church attack in September, both of which were claimed by lesser known groups. Viewed along with the TTP’s refusal to take ownership of the Islamabad courthouse attack, it highlights the highly amorphous nature of the Pakistani Taliban and is indicative of the fact that the top leadership of the network does not have direct charge of every jihadi foot soldier.

This effectively dooms any peace dialogue that the Pakistani Government undertakes with the TTP. Unfortunately, Islamabad has chosen to persist with the talks. On Wednesday, Government negotiators met TTP representatives at a seminary in the northwestern city of Akora Khattak where the Afghan Taliban chief, Mullah Omar, and several of his top commanders are said to have studied. This was inspite of the fact that earlier in the day, a roadside bomb in Hangu had killed six soldiers.

The only way to contain terror, at least in the short term, is to use military action and purge terrorist safe havens from that country. And in this effort, Pakistan cannot afford to cherry-pick its targets — cracking down on those who are detrimental to Pakistani interests while protecting ‘assets’ it hopes to use against India or Afghanistan.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on March 6, 2014)

Syrian Peace Deal Is Unravelling

Not only has the West’s chemical weapons agreement with Damascus done nothing to stem the humanitarian disaster in Syria, it has made matters significantly worse by strengthening the Assad regime and perpetuating a deadlock

Less than five months after the US and Russia claimed an unprecedented diplomatic victory in pressuring President Bashar al-Assad to give up his chemical weapons stock, the deal that was touted as a breakthrough in the Syrian crisis is already unravelling. Not only has it done nothing to stem the humanitarian disaster in the country where a 1,30,00 have been butchered by regime and rebel forces alike, it has, in fact, made matters significantly worse by perpetuating a deadlock.

On Tuesday, this is precisely what the Director of National Intelligence, Mr James Clapper, testified at a US House of Representatives Intelligence Committee hearing. He said: “I foresee kind of more of the same, sort of a perpetual state of a stalemate where... neither the regime nor the opposition can prevail”. In a scathing indictment of the chemical weapons deal, Mr Clapper also said that “(Assad) is actually in a strengthened position than when we discussed this last year, by virtue of his agreement to remove the chemical weapons”.

The US State Department has expectedly downplayed Mr Clapper’s testimony and sought to deflect focus by pointing to the external assistance that the Assad regime continues to receive, primarily from Iran. Now, while there is no doubt that Tehran has propped up its ally in Damascus with men, money and more, to argue that that Iranian support has somehow nullified the West’s peace bargain is downright disingenuous. The deal is falling apart because it was never meant to hold together, as had been argued in this column earlier. 

From a purely logistical point of view, it was premised on the ridiculous assumption that President Assad would lead UN weapons inspectors to his chemical weapons stockpiles (which until then he had not even acknowledged existed) and then stand aside while they take over his weapons — while a civil war rages in the backdrop. It is no wonder then that four months after the deal came into force, and with only another four months to go before the June 30 deadline for destruction of all chemical weapons expires, Syria has given up less than five percent of its chemical weapons arsenal.

The programme made a good start last year, when the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons destroyed equipment and ammunitions that could be used to launch another CW attack like the August 2013 incident in Ghouta. But now it “has reached a kind of a stasis”, according to OPCW spokesperson Michael Luhan. These views were also echoed by Mr Clapper in Washington, DC, who noted before Congress that the project was moving at a “slow pace”.

So far only 53 metric tonnes of chemical have left the Syrian port of Latakia to be destroyed abroad. This is just a fraction of the most lethal elements in Mr Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal that include sarin and mustard gases, which were supposed to have been handed over by December 31, 2013. On Wednesday, the regime also missed a second deadline for handing over other industrial chemical components. On behalf of the Syrian regime, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov has assured the international community that the former is planning a move another in shipment this month and will, in fact, complete the entire process by March. But most experts agree that this is unlikely.

On their part, Syrian officials have cited “safety concerns” — rather legitimately, it would seem, in the backdrop of a civil war — for the delay, and put out a laundry list of things they need for transporting the material across the country. Unsurprisingly, this list is heavy on items such as armoured troop carriers and armoured sleeves for containers loaded with chemicals which can also be used to beef up the regime's military might. For now, Washington has refused to fulfil the request — “The regime has every tool they need in order to deliver on their promise of moving the chemical weapons to the port at Latakia,” said State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki — and instead accused the regime of dragging its feet.

This might well be the case. President Assad has a long and successful record of pushing the West’s tolerance limits, then backing off a bit with false promises, to buy time, gather his troops, and push forth again. Against this backdrop, news reports that his regime is actually stockpiling chemical weapons gains significance. The Times of London quoted unnamed Russian and Israeli sources as saying that Syria is working with Iran and North Korea to upgrade its arsenal so that it can be used as an “insurance policy” of sorts to protect President Assad’s rump state, extending across his Alawaite turf in the north-western part of the country, in case Syria is partitioned.

If true, this will not be the first time that a rogue leader has taken the West for a ride. Even Muammar Gaddafi, who voluntarily gave up his chemical weapons to end Libya’s international isolation, had put away a secret stash that was discovered unguarded in the middle of the desert after his death in 2011. Indeed, the deal’s overt dependence on the Assad regime, which has proven itself to be unreliable, has always been one of its biggest pitfalls.

Even before the deal was finalised in September 2013, this author had labelled it as one that was for everybody and yet belonged to nobody. It was a diplomatic victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin who “resurrected Russia’s image from a Cold War relic to a 21st century superpower” and reiterated “Moscow’s influence in West Asia”, a face-saver for US President Barack Obama who “needed to extricate himself from the ‘Red Line’ narrative in which he had foolishly entwined himself” and finally, and perhaps most worryingly, it allowed President Assad to “breathe easy” as the possibility of a Western military intervention in Syria was drastically reduced. The deal, which is narrowly focussed on chemical weapons, turned the spotlight away from the Assad regime’s killings by conventional weapons — most recently, deadly barrel bombs were used by the Syrian Air Force in the rebel stronghold of Aleppo — even as the death toll in Syria continues to rise. 

On a concluding note, it is interesting to note that on Monday the United Nations announced that the deputy to Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations special envoy for Syria, was resigning. While no official reason was given, it is well-known that President Assad had objected to the deputy’s presence at the Geneva II talks as he was a nephew Yasser Arafat. This is possibly because Mr Assad’s father despised the Palestinian leader. Some view this UN move to be a conciliatory gesture towards the Assad regime. If true, it points to the possibility of a some sort of a political settlement which is the only way out of this mess.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 6, 2014)

Our Friend Across The Oceans

The India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high, and it is the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership that may potentially re-define the Indo-Pacific security paradigm

With Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe being feted as the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade this year, New Delhi has underlined its reciprocal interest in Tokyo’s initiative to bolster bilateral ties between the two countries. The Prime Minister’s visit comes just about a month after India had the honour of hosting the Emperor and Empress of Japan — a historic tour and perhaps the most potent gesture from Tokyo towards India’s new-found centrality in Japan’s foreign policy scheme. That in between these two visits, Japan’s Foreign Minister Itsunori Onodera also came calling not only reiterates the fact that the India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high but more specifically, underscores the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership.

Since his return to office in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe’s has sought to re-work Japan’s pacifist post-War Constitution, keeping in mind two factors: First, protect Japanese strategic interests against the backdrop of a changing security paradigm (read: increasing Chinese belligerence in the neighbourhood) and second, re-invigorate the moribund Japanese economy — which also serves as a response to China’s emergence as a global powerhouse — by expanding its highly advanced defence industry. The latter, of course, is just one part of Prime Minister Abe’s larger economic revival plan that includes fiscal stimulus, tightening monetary policy and re-structuring economic structures. Most of these efforts have been paying off. Now, they have all been smartly packaged within the nationalist narrative of putting Japan on the path to realising its destiny as the Land of the Rising Sun.

Japan’s global strategic policy under Prime Minister Abe has been carefully articulated in its National Security Strategy that was released in December 2013, alongside a National Defence Programme Guidelines and the establishment of a national security council (which, interestingly, coincided with the Chinese setting up a similar body). That Tokyo has gone so far as to the put out a security doctrine, not to mention constitute an NSC, is in itself a rare though welcome move.

From India’s perspective, it gets even better — a casual overview of the security doctrine makes clear that Japan views this country as one of the “primary drivers” of its “proactive contribution to peace” policy. Against this backdrop, it is to be expected that bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries that has increased significantly in recent years will now grow exponentially. Joint naval exercises, for instance, have already become a fairly regular affair. Even the coast guards of the two countries held their first joint exercise in the Arabian Sea on January 14. More cooperation in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations is on the cards already.

Additionally, there is now a push for more cooperation between the Indian Air Force and the Japanese Air Self Defence Force. This will be a huge step forward and, in fact, was one of the most important issues discussed during the Japanese Defence Minister’s visit earlier this month.

Another issue that figured prominently on the agenda was the ShinMaywa US-2i aircraft. Japan has offered this multi-role amphibian aircraft to India, and India is seriously considering the offer. The US-2i will go a long way in strengthening the country’s naval aviation segment and also help with search and rescue operations, thereby extending our capabilities in providing humanitarian assistance. A joint working group was set up last year to work out the modalities of the deal. In fact, the plan was to sign the deal during Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming visit but unfortunately it has not worked out as such.

But nevertheless, Japan’s offer to sell this aircraft to India must be viewed against the backdrop of Tokyo now shedding it traditional reticence on defence trade. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the sale of any weapons and defence technology. It was initially designed to block any support to Communist countries but eventually evolved into a blanket ban. However, since the 1980s, successive Governments have been chipping it away — most notably in 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda allowed the transfer of defence technology, and recently Prime Minister Abe has sought to lift the export ban in its entirety.

For now, Japan can still sell the US-2i to India without the friend-or-foe detection system (which is what makes it a fighter aircraft). Some say that the missing part can be retroactively fitted possibly with Israeli systems that are supposedly superior anyway. Either way, the potential for cooperation in this field is immense especially as India seeks to modernise its armed forces. 

On the political front, Minister Onodera’s visit will be followed by the third 2+2 dialogue that brings together the foreign and defence ministers of both countries, the Fourth Defence Policy Dialogue that will be conducted at the Defence Secretary level, and finally a trip to Japan by the Indian Defence Minister. In general, there is a consensus favouring more high-level deliberations including annual exchanges between military personnel and the political leadership alike.

Almost all of this is in keeping with Prime Minister Abe’s past record of seeking strong ties with India, not just on a bilateral basis but also as part of multilateral arrangements. Back in 2007, when Mr Abe was serving his first term as Prime Minister, he had delivered a landmark speech to the Indian Parliament wherein he etched out a grand civilisational partnership between the two nations. At that time, he also laid the foundation of a ‘security quadrilateral’ between Japan, India, the US and Australia. In fact, this was followed by Operation Malabar in the same year that saw a bilateral naval exercise between India and the US extended to include Australia, Japan and also Singapore. China was understandably livid and issued strong demarches to everybody and that was the end of that. 

But when he returned to India in 2011, he made a conscious effort to firm up his 2007 strategy by calling for the “two great democracies to meet at sea — for a better and safer Asia”. His pointed references to China made it clear that he would not cower before the might of Beijing, as some others have in recent years.

In fact, one of the reasons why Japan is seeking new partners is because it is reportedly displeased with its traditional ally, the US’s refusal to take a harder line against China. The fact remains that for all the talk about a rebalance to Asia, Washington, DC, has more or less accepted China’s recent imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone which covers the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands administered by Japan and claimed by Beijing. In India, however, the situation strikes a far more sympathetic note.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 23, 2014)

Standing Up for Sheikh Hasina

Amid fears that the West may not recognise the new Awami League regime in Dhaka, which came to power unopposed after the Opposition boycotted the January 5 election, India has done well to offer a strong counter-narrative in favour of Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s 10th Jatiya Sangsad election has produced a diplomatic challenge for India which, if handled effectively, can be converted into an opportunity for New Delhi to re-establish its credentials as a regional leader. Boycotted by the Opposition, the vote was held this past Sunday in the shadow of violence, leading to a low turnout. Bangladesh’s deadliest national election ever, it expectedly produced an overwhelming, though hollow, victory for the incumbent Awami League regime which was voted into office for the next five years even before the first ballot had been cast.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is expected to form the next Government before the current Parliament expires on January 24, but there are fears that the new regime may not be recognised by the West. The US and EU had indicated as much when they refused to send their election observers and have since taken a strong stance against Prime Minister Hasina for failing to get the Opposition on board. Australia, Canada, the UK, the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations have all expressed varying degrees of disapproval as well. In contrast, India has acknowledged it as a “constitutional requirement”, and has been working with its international partners to ensure that Dhaka is not unfairly censured. This is a step in the right direction.

Over the years, Prime Minister Hasina has proven to be one of India’s most reliable friends in the region — she has cracked down on anti-India terror camps in her country and handed over rebels leaders in the North-East — but New Delhi has done little to hold up its side of the relationship. For instance, it has not been able to deliver on either the land border agreement or the Teesta water arrangement, making Ms Hasina vulnerable to much criticism at home. South Block’s efforts now to stand up for a friend it has somewhat disregarded in recent years, therefore, are important corrective measures. 

In December 2013, for instance, Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh, during her visit to the US, offered a strong counter-narrative to Washington, DC’s sharp criticism of the situation in Bangladesh. Previously, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had also discussed the matter with his counterpart in the UK and according to reports in the Bangladeshi media, the meeting went better than expected. This may explain the British foreign office’s more ‘accommodating’ position on the issue — it has not yet recognised the new regime per se, having only taken note of the election result, but at least has accepted that the vote was held in accordance with Bangladesh’s Constitution.

Additionally, New Delhi is also lobbying with the Commonwealth grouping to shield Dhaka from unwarranted criticism. Here, India’s has an upper-hand thanks to its membership to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group. Overall, it is in the international arena that New Delhi will have to do most of the work because within Bangladesh, the political scenario is so charged and polarised, there is not much space for it to manoeuvre.

Prime Minister Hasina has been urged by New Delhi to resolve the problem through dialogue, and on her part, she has even offered to hold a fresh election if the Opposition discards its campaign of violence. But for now, it doesn’t seem like the latter is in the mood for reconciliation unless its key demand for a non-party caretaker Government is met.

This is unlikely given that the system was abolished in 2011 — with the approval of the courts — and, therefore, Prime Minister Hasina has no compelling reason to give up her ground. Besides, she had offered to meet the Opposition half-way with an all-party caretaker Government before the January 5 election but was rebuffed by an obstinate Khaleda Zia, who, as chief of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, heads the 18-party Opposition alliance.

Some analysts have suggested that India engage the Opposition in Dhaka — a fine thought, if only New Delhi had more leverage with Ms Zia. Unfortunately, the two-time former Prime Minister has kept herself at a distance. Over the past two years, in an attempt to appear even-handed in its dealings with Bangladesh, South Block has made several high-profile attempts to establish a better working relationship with Ms Zia even at the cost of upsetting Ms Hasina. These included a meeting with Vice President Hamid Ansari in Dhaka in 2011, an exclusive lunch with the Prime Minister in New Delhi in 2012 and  the offer for a tête-à-tête with President Pranab Mukherjee in Dhaka in 2013 (that she turned down) — but to no avail.

In fact, not only has Ms Zia refused to reciprocate Delhi’s goodwill gestures, she has heightened her anti-India sloganeering. This is not just a continuation of her traditional political strategies but also reflective of the increased political influence of her extremist ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which maintains a vitriolic opposition to India, not to mention collaborates with jihadi terror networks in the region. Once a fringe party, whose role was limited to providing the mainstream BNP with political muscle, the Jamaat has now emerged as the dominant partner in the relationship.

It seems like Ms Zia herself is still working out the changing dynamics of the partnership. For instance, after Jamaati leader Abdul Qader Mollah was executed for committing war crimes, the Islamists demanded that she take a strong stance on the matter. However, given the wave of popular support in favour of Mollah’s death sentence — this is what sparked the Shahbag protests in the first place — Ms Zia skirted the issue. In retaliation, the Jamaati cadre offered only a lukewarm response to her call to the country to march upon Dhaka in protest against the Hasina Government. Consequently, the much-touted December 29 mega protest march failed to take off.

Ultimately, Ms Zia will have to reconsider her alliance with the Jamaatis but in the foreseeable future, the political logjam in Dhaka will probably get worse before it gets better. Social unrest, in the form of hartals, blockades and nation-wide shutdowns will also continue, as the Opposition can be expected to turn up the heat. It is under these circumstances of political instability and uncertainty in Dhaka, fuelled by violence and anarchy on the streets across Bangladesh, that Prime Minister Hasina will take oath for her third consecutive term in office — and she will require the wholehearted support of her friends and allies.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 9, 2014)

An Unnecessary Public Fracas

New Delhi has been credited with taking a strong stance on the Devyani Khobragade case. But there are discomfiting questions about why the Ministry of External Affairs allowed the matter to blow out of proportion in the first place

Even though the dust is yet to settle on the recent India-US diplomatic face-off, it is perhaps safe to assume that the storm has passed. Ms Devyani Khobragade, the Indian diplomat accused of visa fraud, has been moved from her position at the consulate in New York to India’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations — with the tacit approval of the US State Department — where she now enjoys full immunity from criminal prosecution. Washington, DC, has also exempt her from personal appearances in court and if everything goes according to plan, she will not have to deal with any more pesky law enforcement officials while in New York. Eventually, the Ministry of External Affairs will bring her home ostensibly with her “dignity restored”, as Mr Salman Khurshid promised Parliament last week.

As and when that happens, be prepared for yet another round of vacuous nationalism that can be matched in fervour only by the pointless patriotism that was once the staple at India-Pakistan cricket matches. Worse still, be prepared for a smug Ministry of External Affairs as it pats itself on the back for a job well done.

Indeed, South Block has mostly been praised by the media and the public at large for taking a strong stand on the Khobragade case which, as many commentators have rightly argued, stands on flimsy legal ground and violates diplomatic conventions. The diplomat’s arrest and incarceration, the primary bone of contention between India and the US, was a disastrous move on the part of the Americans, and even Washington has now sought to distance itself from the act by trying to pin the blame on the one Diplomatic Security Services agent who was responsible for apprehending Ms Khobragade. As for the charges against Ms Khobragade, any good lawyer worth his day in court will rip them to shreds — especially if he follows the same line of argument that the US itself has used on earlier occasions to invoke the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations so as to protect its own people in foreign shores.

Finally, as Mr Ashok Malik and Mr Abhijit Iyer-Mitra have explained in this newspaper over the past few days, the US State Department and India’s Ministry of External Affairs had an unwritten understanding regarding the employment of domestic staff. This was based on pragmatic considerations and diplomatic courtesies that went both ways. When the US cracked down on Ms Khobragade, India rightly viewed it as the latter reneging on its side of the deal.

Unacceptable as this breach in diplomatic code has been, New Delhi should have seen it coming. Twice before, our diplomats in New York have been pulled up by US authorities on this exact issue, and even though neither case was allowed to escalate, New Delhi should have been on guard. But clearly, South Block didn’t move fast enough to change the status quo, thereby putting our diplomats in a precarious position. This was the first mistake.

The second and far more damaging mistake has been the manner in which the Ministry of External Affairs allowed the matter to blow up in the public domain. Especially since much of this case is in the gray zone — a nudge-nudge-wink-wink agreement gone wrong is not exactly a compelling defence — it ideally should have been resolved away from the public eye. By allowing it to escalate into a full scale diplomatic crisis, New Delhi compounded Washington’s callousness and brought the crucial India-US bilateral under enormous strain. That this happened at a time when relations between the two countries had already hit a plateau of sorts — with the much-touted nuclear deal failing to take-off, the economic partnership seeming less attractive etc — has only made matters worse. Especially at the bureaucratic level, such an episode reinforces old notions of the two countries being in the different camps etc, and threatens the hard-won gains made in the bilateral over the past decade or so.

Also, New Delhi’s defence narrative of respect and dignity publicly pushed both parties onto the high moral ground. While on the one hand this exposed American double standards (the privileges they demand for their diplomats but do not care to accord to others is just one example), it also opened India to unnecessary criticism (no matter how flawed, prejudiced and ill-informed) about ‘slave labour’ and ‘class culture’. Sure, Indian society has its problems but so does every other society and nobody needs to be lectured on how to wash their dirty laundry.

So, why did the Ministry of External Affairs allow this case to blow up? Well, technically, it was Ms Khobragade’s father, a former IAS officer, who orchestrated the tamasha in India but it is highly unlikely that he did it all without the Ministry of External Affairs’s blessings. Yes, there were other factors too, such as a resentful foreign service cadre which played its part, but still the episode could not have so escalated without the express consent of the Ministry of External Affairs — which, of course, has now craftily presented this foreign policy fiasco as a foreign policy success!

Given the UPA’s poor track record in diplomacy and the Congress’s history of playing cynical politics, this begs the question: Under the garb of protecting national prestige, did the Ministry of External Affairs actually sacrifice our national interests so that the Congress-led regime could gain some easy brownie points in the run-up to the 2014 general election? Did the Congress seek to make up with cheap demagoguery what it has failed to offer in terms of good governance? Increasingly, this seems to be the case given how the Ministry of External Affairs is suddenly being hero-worshipped for baring its fangs and standing up to US bullying.

On a concluding note, however, it must be clarified that it is no one’s case that the Ministry of External Affairs should not have retaliated. To the contrary, it absolutely should have (more so, since the Richard family evacuation segment of this story is an insult to the India’s judicial system) — but not under the public glare. For instance, just like the common man knew nothing when American consular officials were given full diplomatic privileges over and above what was specified in the rule books, they didn’t have to be told when those measures were withdrawn. This would not have in any way blunted the Ministry of External Affairs’s diplomatic offensive but it would have saved the already strained India-US relationship from unnecessary pressure. But now, the whole thing just looks like a cheap pre-poll gimmick.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on December 26, 2013)

For Want Of Better Options

Drones remain the most effective weapon in the US’s counter-terror arsenal. Critics of the remote-controlled missile will do well to reconsider their contention the attacks lead to high civilian casualties and violate Pakistan’s sovereignty

On November 21, a US drone strike in the Hangu district of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province killed six people including a senior leader of the Haqqani network and at least one more militant from the Al Qaeda-affiliated group. The strike came exactly 20 days after a similar drone attack took down another high-profile terror target, Pakistani Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud, in Miranshah, North Waziristan. In the intervening days, the Haqqani network’s main financier Nasiruddin Haqqani was shot dead by unidentified assailants in Islamabad. His brother, Sirajuddin, currently heads the network and was reportedly the target of the November 21 attack in Hangu, since he was seen at the seminary where the drones struck thrice last week. Also, the senior Haqqani leader who was killed in the strike, Maulvi Ahmed Jan, was Sirajuddin Haqqani’s trusted right-hand man.

Apart from the obvious observation that the attacks have put both the Haqqani network, and to a lesser extent the Pakistani Taliban (the two are affiliated but work independently) “on notice”, as a US official said recently, their relative success in eliminating high-profile targets has underlined the fact that America’s remote-controlled predator drones remain one of the most potent weapons in its counter-terrorism arsenal — their reputation as ‘joysticks’ used to play ‘video-game wars’ notwithstanding.

As expected, the Hangu strike has been usurped by the Government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as yet another opportunity to play to the gallery and whip up oodles of anti-American sentiment. Ruling party chief Imran Khan, always the showman, has kicked up a huge fuss about the strikes and blocked Nato supply routes into Afghanistan that run through the Province. Given Pakistan’s previous experience with this pressure tactic — remember, the routes were also shut after a US-Nato attack on the Salala outpost killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in November 2011 but re-opened later without Islamabad being able to squeeze so much as an apology from Washington, DC — it is clear that Mr Khan’s passionate outbursts on the matter are, well, just that. He had responded in exactly the same manner when Mehsud was killed, no matter that the Pakistani Taliban has not only been responsible for the death of an estimated 43,000 Pakistanis but also does not recognise the democratically-elected, Government structure of which Mr Khan himself is a part!

But Mr Khan is not alone in his opposition to US drone strikes. There are many within Pakistan and outside who share his views, and criticise drone strikes based on a whole host of issues — legal, moral, political and strategic. It is difficult to do justice to the whole debate here but essentially, the anti-drone club puts forth two major arguments: First, drones strikes cause enormous civilian casualties without promising enough returns; second, they are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. Both arguments are problematic.

In the first case, the number of civilian casualties caused by drone strikes is unclear and varies widely between a few hundred to several thousands. This is because of the covert nature of the drone strikes programme which makes it extremely difficult to put together verifiable data on the matter. The US Government does not officially release information on drone strikes while the Pakistani Government sometimes denies it, sometimes acknowledges it.

That leaves us with reports from external agencies such as the UN, think-tanks and advocacy groups, and the media — almost all of them are usually just as vague and unreliable, as foreigners have no direct access to the tribal areas of Pakistan where these attacks take place. Special permission is required from the Government, and even after such access is granted, journalists can only travel with official escorts. In fact, even Pakistani citizens cannot travel to these areas without permission and unless they have proven families ties to the region. This leads to a veritable information black hole, and ultimately a debate that is based on half-baked facts and mostly just fiction.

Occasionally, though, this black hole has been penetrated with reporters being able to conduct first-hand interviews of villagers in these remote areas. But even then they have found it near impossible to ascertain the exact number of civilians, when any, who are killed in a drone strike. There are two reasons for this. One, after such a strike occurs, the militants seal the area, remove the bodies and secretly bury them. Then, they slap the label of ‘martyr’ on all the deceased. Two, the locals live in an environment of constant and violent intimidation. Therefore, their testimonies, on the rare occasion that they are available, are often tainted.

Mr Guillaume Lavallee of the Agence France-Presse reported earlier this month that any local who dares to speak in support of drone strikes is abducted, tortured and murdered by the militants — their last moments caught on tape and distributed in the area. The news report quotes Gul Wali Wazir (not his real name) from South Waziristan tribal area who says: “They (the militants) will cut his throat or shoot him, they will film his false confession, kill him and leave the body on the road with a DVD and a note saying that anybody who supports America and drones will face the same fate. I have seen a dozen such dead bodies.”

That despite these circumstances, Mr Lavallee’s interviews have led him to conclude that “a sizeable number of people in the country’s tribal areas support them (drone strikes)” must be noted. The report quotes Safdar Hayat Khan Dawar, former head of the Tribal Union of Journalists, from the militant-infested North Waziristan who says that the missiles were the preferred solution to the problem of militancy, as opposed to Pakistani Army’s operations. “The military option, people hate it because the army don’t kill militants but civilians”, says Mr Dawar. His opinions are echoed by Nizam Dawar, director of the Tribal Development Network, who asks: “Those people who became internally displaced persons due to the military operation, those people who are victimised by the Taliban and the militants, all the families whose family members are beheaded because they were accused of spying for America — why would they oppose drone attacks?” A recent Pakistani Government report has also noted that only a small percentage of those killed are civilians.

If the civilian casualty argument stands on thin ice, the one on Pakistani sovereignty holds no water at all. We now have enough evidence to say with certainty that Pakistan’s military and political establishment bartered away the country’s sovereignty years ago when it gave the US explicit permission to carry out these attacks. Former President Pervez Musharraf had said at that time that the drone strikes would be no big deal “as things fall out of the sky in Pakistan all the time”. In fact, his Government even took credit for some of the early drone strikes,  pretending that they had been carried out by the Pakistani Air Force.

Over the years, as relations between Washington and Islamabad have become relatively tenuous, the degree to which Pakistani support now extends to the US drone programme may have dipped. But it has not diminished entirely. The drones do not just sneak into Pakistani airspace, point and shoot, and then flee. They study their targets for hours, sometimes days, before they attack; in the November 21 case, locals said that they knew about the hovering drones for days. This cannot be done without insider support. The Pakistani establishment may feign ignorance and even froth at the mouth over the drone strikes for domestic consumption, but that does not change the facts.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on November 28, 2013)