BEING PIVOT IN NUCLEAR SECURITY

India has an opportunity to take on a global leadership role against the spread of nuclear weapons. For that, it has to be more transparent about its own nuclear security and safety, especially as nuclear power becomes a bigger part of the country’s energy basket

The fourth Nuclear Security Summit comes at an important time in India’s own nuclear history and diplomacy. At one level, India, now no longer a nuclear pariah state, is seeking to integrate itself into the global non-proliferation architecture. It is seeking memberships to four of the main global nuclear clubs  the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement — as well hoping to play a more prominent role in nuclear diplomacy. India’s has already streamlined its export control lists so that they are more or less in sync with the lists maintained by the global technology control regimes. However, there are political issues that need to be addressed before India can accede to these clubs.

At another level, India is now looking to leverage nuclear power in a big way to fuel its domestic needs in a sustainable manner. Currently, nuclear is just a small segment in India’s energy basket  just 4.8 GW of the total installed power generation capacity of 240 GW. The plan is to increase those figures to 60GW of 1200GW by 2035. That still won’t be even 10 per cent of the total basket but it will be an important element nonetheless. It is against this backdrop that India’s role at the NSS must be seen.

To be held on March 31 and April 1 in Washington, DC this is the fourth and in all probability the final in a series of summits that aimed to secure nuclear weapons, fissile material, and nuclear facilities so that terrorists couldn’t use them to wreak havoc. The NSS was US President Barack Obama’s initiative, which built on his predecessor’s legacy.  After 9/11, the Bush Administration brought out two important nuclear security pacts  a 2005 amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which requires states to physically protect nuclear materials on their territory, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism which facilitates judicial actions related to nuclear terrorism.

In 2009, President Obama while speaking in Prague, said that nuclear terrorism was “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” and announced “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.” In 2010, the first NSS was organised. Forty-seven nations, including India, and three international organisations participated. This was followed by another summit in 2012 in Seoul, and a third one in 2014 in The Hague. Except for the 2014 conference, India was represented by its Prime Minister at all others — an indication of the importance that New Delhi attaches to the NSS.

An interesting aspect of the NSS was that of the ‘house gift diplomacy’ wherein participants themselves bring to the table political commitments or national pledges on specific issues such as nuclear forensics or nuclear smuggling, instead of everybody having to sign on one master document. Since the Seoul summit, groups of participants have also come together with a bundle of pledges, making for some ‘gift basket diplomacy’.

At the first NSS in 2010, for example, India’s promised a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership. This Centre is being set up in Bahadurgarh, Haryana, and is expected to begin operations from April 2017, though it has already been doing off-campus programmes and workshops since 2011. In December 2010, India also placed in a safeguarded facility its enriched uranium-based fuel used in the Apsara reactor. The reactor no longer uses Highly Enriched Uranium. In 2012, India made a voluntary contribution of a million dollars to the Nuclear Security Fund. However, India has not just joined any of the ‘gift baskets’ though it may reportedly join at least three this year.

Overall, the NSS process has produced mixed results  bringing some tangible deliverables to the table but still falling short of its larger goal. Among its achievements, the NSS lists the following: Removal and/or disposition of over 3.2 metric tonnes of vulnerable HEU and plutonium material; completely removing HEU from 12 countries; verified shutdown or successful conversion to low enriched uranium fuel use of 24 HEU research reactors and isotope production facilities in 15 countries including India; completion of physical security upgrades at 32 buildings storing weapons-usable fissile materials; and installation of radiation detection equipment at 328 international border crossings, airports, and seaports. 

An important deliverable, or gift basket rather, was the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Initiative that was signed at 2014 summit by two-thirds of the participants, who pledged to meet follow the Atomic Energy Agency’s security recommendations and accept regular reviews of their nuclear security arrangements. Notably, India didn’t sign the initiative but that same year, it ratified an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency which had been in the works for five years. This Additional Protocol  which will surely be highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Washington this year  covers 20 facilities that include the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad, the Tarapur atomic power plant, the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station, and both units of the Kudankulam power plant.

At the NSS this year, the focus will  understandably be on the big picture: The  deliberations haven’t produced a treaty and many of the commitments are vague with much wriggle room. There are also many areas like cyber threats to nuclear security that remain unresolved. Still, there is no doubt that the NSS process gave high-level political momentum to the issue of nuclear security.

Now, the question is: How to take the process forward? Five institutions are expected to take up the task — The IAEA; the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (a group focused on exercising existing capabilities and sharing best practices); the UN (specifically a committee that enforces UNSC resolutions calling on states to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction); the international law enforcement organisation Interpol; and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (a funding group). 

Additionally, a Nuclear Security Contact Group comprising of the Sherpas -- the senior officials who developed the summit outcomes and prepped their leaders -- will also be formed. They’ll ensure that past promises are effectively implemented. India will be in this group, which will also be open to those countries that weren’t part of NSS process.

India has an opportunity to take on a leadership role at this stage. However, for that, it has to be more transparent about its own nuclear security and safety. This is not to suggest that the security situation here is bad (although some international experts are of that opinion) but that the Government should allow for more transparency  not just to boost international confidence but also to allay concerns at home, especially now that nuclear power will be a bigger part of India’s energy basket.

 The shutdown at the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station in Surat, after the heavy water used to cool the nuclear reactor leaked, earlier this month, highlights the urgency of the situation. Indeed, in 2012, the Central Information Commission had directed the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited to release two reports on the safety assessment systems at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant. The nuclear operator responded with a court order staying the CIC’s directive and arguing that making the report public would hurt strategic interests. This was odd given that, after 2011 Fukushima accident, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board had already uploaded on its website a comprehensive report on the safety of our reactors.

(This article was published in The Pioneer on March 31, 2016)

NEW POLITICAL ORDER IN NAYPIDAW

Htin Kyaw is the first civilian to become President of Myanmar since 1962. But his office will be undercut by his party chief, who said that she will rule above the President, and by the continued presence of the military in the legislative and executive wings of Government

Four months after the National League for Democracy won the parliamentary election and several weeks since the new Parliament, comprised mostly of civilian lawmakers brought to power through free and fair election, was sworn in, Myanmar finally has a new President: U Htin Kyaw. He is a confidant of NLD chief and Myanmar’s icon of democracy Aung San Suu Kyi who, ideally, should have occupied the top post but couldn’t because of a constitutional clause that prohibits those with foreign nationals in their immediate family from the presidential palace. Suu Kyi’s two sons are British citizens as was her late husband. Several rounds of negotiations, including three between Suu Kyi and Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in recent weeks, to either amend the Constitution or at least find a way around it, failed to bear fruit. It is still possible that a compromise may be worked out later in the term for Suu Kyi to become President but for now, all that’s in the realm of speculation.

This brings us back to Htin Kyaw who will be sworn into office on April 1. The 69-year-old hasn’t held any major public office and is a little known political figure. However, he has been close to Suu Kyi for many years — the two even went to grade school together. An economist by training, Htin Kyaw also studied computer programming in England and then served as a bureaucrat for some years. He quit his Government job in the early 1990s and then committed himself to party work. In the past three decades, he has worked closely with Suu Kyi, advising her on party and policy matters, particularly on foreign affairs. He also heads the Daw Khi Kyi Foundation, a charitable organisation run by the NLD and named after Suu Kyi’s mother. 

Notably, though Htin Kyaw himself may not have been a prominent figure until his presidential nomination, he definitely has political pedigree and is, of course, part of the NLD inner circle. His father, Min Thu Win, was a literary giant in Myanmar as well as a member of the NLD. In 1990, he was elected to Parliament but resigned eight years later. Htin Kyaw’s wife Su Su Lwin is also a Member of Parliament from the NLD and is on the Foreign Affairs committee. Her father, U Lwin, was one of the founding members of the NLD, working alongside Suu Kyi’s father and Burmese independence hero Major General Aung San. A decorated soldier, he had served as Minister of Finance, Deputy Prime Minister and Member of the State Council before resigning from Government in 1980.

Htin Kyaw is the first civilian to hold the post of President of Myanmar since 1962 but his position will still be undercut by two factors: First, his party chief’s statement, incidentally to an Indian news outlet late last year, that she will rule from above the President; and second, the continued presence of the military in both the legislative and executive wings of the Government. In the first case, there is no telling how the working relationship between the Htin Kyaw and Suu Kyi will play out in matters of day-to-day governance — and whether this arrangement may cause unnecessary friction or even factionalism in the days to come. In the second case, the military can be expected to hold onto its core interests but if the trends that we have seen since 2010 hold strong, then there should also be a continued, even if slow, devolution of power from the military to civilian authorities.

Currently, representatives appointed by the Tatmadaw (military) hold 25 per cent of the seats in Parliament which are not open for election. The Tatmadaw also retains direct control of the Ministries of Defence, Home and Border Affairs. Importantly, it also controls the powerful National Defence and Security Council. The 11-member body that comprises the President, the two Vice Presidents, the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament, the Ministers for Defence, Home, Border Affairs and Foreign Affairs, the Commander-in-Chief and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, is dominated by the military and has expansive powers including calling of diplomatic ties and declaring an emergency. It will be interesting to see if Suu Kyi secures a seat on this council, possibly through the Foreign Minister’s chair.

Additionally, the Tatmadaw also has one of its own in the Office of the Vice President as well. In Myanmar’s political system, both Houses of Parliament nominate one presidential candidate each while the military nominates a third. The nominee with the highest number of votes becomes President while the next two candidates become First and Second Vice President respectively.

In this case, Htin Kyaw, nominated by Lower House of Parliament, won 360 of the 652 votes while the Tatmadaw’s candidate, General Myint Swe, came second with 213 votes, while Upper House candidate (also nominated by the NLD) Henry Van Theo came in third with 79 votes. Van Theo is an ethnic Chin and a Christian and his candidacy adds the much needed minority representation to the executive. However,  Gen Myint Swe, who will serve as First Vice President, may be a possible trouble-spot. He is considered to be a military hardliner and has an unfavourable reputation. Even though NLD leaders didn’t oppose his nomination in public, it is believed that in private they were dismayed. The General led the crackdown on pro-democracy students and monks in 2007 which hasn’t been forgotten and neither has his inability to deliver good governance as the Chief Minister of Yangon gone unnoticed.

In short, the Tatmadaw will retain considerable executive powers, and the success of Myanmar’s first civilian Government in 50 years will depend on its close cooperation with the military. For example, if the Government has to secure a lasting peace with the various armed ethnic groups, it will need the support of the military. Similarly, if the military is in a position where it can at least share credit for economic and political reforms, it will be more willing to the support those reforms. In other words, this current arrangement, though a compromise, is not necessarily a bad thing. In the very least, it factors in the socio-political realities of Myanmar, where the military is an all-pervading force with deeply-entrenched interests that will not go away overnight. This may not make for a picture perfect new democracy but in the long term might prove to be a more stable and resilient model for political transition.

(This article was published in oped section of The Pioneer on March 17, 2016)

BREAKTHROUGHS ON THE BORDER

Small-scale border trade, which is different from the industry-scale bilateral trade, contributes only a fraction to the overall economic relationship between nations. But it does have a significant impact at the people-to-people level, as the India-Bangladesh haats show

Generally, political freedom better economic opportunities. However, there are rare cases when newly independent regions find themselves worse off because of the red lines on their maps. This is what happened to India’s North-East in 1947. On the one hand the country gained independence from British rule and awoke to “life and freedom”, to use the words of India’s first Prime Minister; but on the other hand, partition and the consequent establishment of East Pakistan, which was liberated in 1971 to become modern-day Bangladesh, meant that a large part of the new nation found itself cut-off from the ‘mainland’, almost overnight.

The erstwhile Kingdom of Tripuri, for example, received a particularly raw deal. That part of the ancient kingdom which was directly under the British Crown, became East Pakistan (and is now Bangladesh) in 1947, while the rest of it, the autonomous Princely State, joined the Union of India in 1949. Consequently, Tripura, as we know it today, is land-locked on three sides by Bangladesh while the other North-Eastern States are left with a tenuous geographical connect to the rest of the country, through the ‘chicken’s neck’.

The economical implications of these changes have been devastating. The new lines disrupted the old business patterns and nearly destroyed the region’s commercial eco-systems. Road links from the North-East, which passed through East Pakistan, were severed; the Assam Railway segment was cut-off from Indian Railways; Bengal’s jute industry was decapitated; the loss of Chittagong port meant that Indian tea and timber industries had to take a circuitous route to the Calcutta port.

It is only when one understands the scale of disruption that was inflicted during partition can one appreciate the importance of border haats that are being set up on the Indian-Bangladesh border (such haats also exist on the India’s border with Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, China and Pakistan). Defined by the Government of India as over-land trade by way of exchange of commodities from a bilaterally agreed list by people living along both sides of the international border, this arrangement is different from the large-scale trade that happens through land, air or sea ports, requiring customs clearances etc. Border trade happens on a much smaller scale and contributes only a fraction to the overall bilateral trade.

However, it does have a significant impact at the people-to-people level. There are two reasons for this: First, border areas are almost always also remote areas, and residents (be they buyers or sellers) do not have easy access to commercial centres in the heartlands. Hence, border haats are seen as a good alternative. Second, the socio-cultural ties of cross-border residents also provide an impetus for greater economic engagement. Border trade encourages familiarity and trust between communities. Notably, much of the border trade happens through the barter system  without mutual understanding and good faith, this system would not have worked. Also, it has been noticed that as border trade improves, border smuggling usually diminishes as well.

Border haats between India and Bangladesh were common before 1971, when locals exchanged surpluses at their weekly haats. These traditional markets, however, were shut down during the War of Liberation. After the war ended and Bangladesh became a sovereign nation, there was an attempt to restart the trade  in fact, a trade agreement was in the works in 1972 which specifically provided for trading opportunity to people living within 16 kms on either side of the border. to dispose off their goods which were mutually agreed upon. However, the pact wasn’t formalised due to apprehensions from Bangladesh. And when a trade agreement was eventually signed, it did not include border haats.

More than four decades later, the situation has changed dramatically and border haats are back with a bang (especially with regard to Bangladesh, and to some extent, Myanmar). These haats usually open once a week and nationals from both countries living within a four to five kilometer radius can trade locally produced goods and crops. Currencies of both countries are accepted and no taxes are imposed on the sale of designated items which mostly include crops, spices, minor forest products, fish, dairy and poultry products and cottage industry items.

Currently, there are four functional India-Bangladesh haats  Two were set up in 2012 on the Meghalaya-Bangladesh border at Kalaichar (India)-Baliamari (Bangladesh) and Balat (India)-Dalora (Bangladesh). The other two were set up last year in Tripura: The first was in January 2015 at Sabroom in the Southern Tripura district on the Indian side and Feni district on the Bangladeshi side. Then in June 2015, Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina inaugurated via a video link, the Kamala Sagar border haat, located 35km south of Agartala.

At least four other border haats are being planned in Tripura alone  at Kamalpur in Dhalai district, Dharmanagar in North Tripura district and in the subdivisional towns of Khowai and Kailasahar. Overall, India aims to set up 70 markets in the north-eastern States, along its 4,096km border with Bangladesh, which includes a 1,116km riverine boundary.

Of course, border haats alone will not be enough. Political stability (in the Indian States and the neighbouring country) will be key and so will infrastructure development. Thankfully, there is good news on both accounts. While India-Bangladesh ties have become strong and robust, the Modi Administration has prioritised infrastructure development, particularly communication and transport facilities, in the North East. In fact, it was only early last month that the Union Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region sanctioned Rs580 crore for the construction of a railway corridor connecting India’s Agartala with Bangladesh’s Akhaura. The project has been in the works since 2010 and should be completed by 2017. Overall, while there has been significant progress, there is still a whole lot more than needs to be done before the full potential of border trade can be leveraged in a manner that benefits not only border residents but also neighbouring countries and the region at large.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer. A shorter version of this article was earlier published in India Perspectives magazine)