DEALING WITH A NEW AFGHANISTAN

The incumbent Afghan President may be more pro-Pakistan than his predecessor, but even India acknowledges that there can be no peace in Afghanistan without Pakistani support. Also, where India cannot help militarily, it should make up with economic and political support

In the run-up to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s maiden trip to this country, which concluded on April 29, the big question was: Has India lost Afghanistan? President Ghani was coming to India a full six months after he had taken office, during which time he had already visited the US, China, Iran and, importantly, made not one but two trips to Pakistan. Also, unlike his predecessor Hamid Karzai or, for that matter, even his Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, Mr Ghani neither has close personal ties with India nor had he previously expressed any special interest in or support for India’s role in Afghanistan.

As such, a revision in Kabul’s foreign policy priorities was expected, and this was not just with regard to India. For example, the Ghani-Abdullah administration is nowhere close to being as anti-America, as Mr Karzai had been, particularly in the later years of his presidency. However, what came as somewhat of an unpleasant surprise for India was the extent to which Mr Ghani was tilting towards Pakistan.

Not only did he visit Pakistan twice, he broke protocol during his first trip to meet with Pakistani Army chief Raheel Sharif in Rawalpindi, and later dispatched his own Army chief to attend the graduation ceremony at the Pakistani military academy in Kabul. He also sent a handful of Afghan cadets to train in Pakistan for train and handed over a Pakistani Taliban leader to Islamabad. These were largely symbolic gestures but what caused real concern in India’s strategic circles was Mr Ghani’s effective cancellation of all of his predecessor’s military aid requests from India.

During the Karzai years, Afghanistan had repeatedly requested India for weapons, but India, not wanting to upset Pakistan, had turned down those requests. This flawed policy has now changed, thankfully, but even then, delivery from the Indian side has been excruciatingly slow. For example, the three helicopters given to Afghanistan, days before Mr Ghani’s visit, were promised almost a year ago.

Also, there have been reports that during his India visit, President Ghani and Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed a refurbished military aid pact. Although no official papers have been signed in this regard, this is welcome news, nonetheless.

It is important to understand that Mr Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan is driven by practical considerations. One of his biggest priorities at the moment is ensuring Afghan security and, simply put, this will not be possible without Pakistani cooperation. In its perennial quest for that elusive ‘strategic depth’ against India, Pakistan continues to foment trouble and terror in Afghanistan and, unless it changes this policy, it will be enormously difficult to secure a durable peace in Afghanistan.  There’s little that India can do in this  regard, given that it does not even share a land border with Afghanistan.

Specifically, Mr Ghani is looking to Pakistan for help with bringing the Afghan Taliban, officially led by Mullah Omar’s Quetta shura, to the negotiating table. Even after 13 years of war, the Afghan Taliban are very much a force to reckon with — and since it has not been defeated militarily, it will have to be integrated politically (although, in reality, a lasting solution will include a both elements).

Unfortunately, neither Mr Ghani nor Mr Karzai before him has had much success. Several factors have impeded the peace process. One, Pakistan has routinely put a spanner in the works; two, the Taliban see no reason to compromise and is just waiting out the withdrawal of foreign troops; three, the Taliban are not a homogenous group but an umbrella organisation that covers different outfits with similar ideologies and these outfits do not always agree with each other on how best to negotiate with Government forces. None of these factors will change overnight — in fact, the situation will become even more rigid after the few thousand US forces, currently in Afghanistan, leave by 2017, as US President Barack Obama has promised. 

There is, however, a small window of opportunity between now and 2017. If the Afghan Army, with the help of US forces, can break the military stalemate (currently both parties are strong enough to hold on to their turfs but can’t take territory from the other) and change the power equation on the ground, then President Ghani can force the Taliban to the negotiating table. But, there are no indications yet of such a shift in position.

There is a new player in the mix: China, which has recently offered to facilitate talks with the Taliban. Though China has traditionally stayed away from such diplomacy, this time, it has stepped in because of the growing unrest in it Xinjiang Province, which has a large Muslim Uyghur population. Militants from Pakistan are stirring the pot in Xinjiang and China, understandably, would like to nip the problem in the bud. However, it is unclear how much direct access China has to the Taliban. If it hopes to pressure Pakistan into bringing the Taliban on board, even then it is a weak plan, because Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban is not full and complete either.

So, where does India fit into all this?

India can help the Afghan forces militarily — and this is where we should hope to see more cooperation. Up until now, military help has been mostly about training Afghan soldiers and some intelligence sharing. These are important but not enough. There is now talk of more weapons support, although having Indian boots on the ground is out of the picture.

Still, there is reason to hope that under the Modi Government, there will be a more forceful and determined Indian policy in Afghanistan, not just with regard to military aid but also on the economic front. India is Afghanistan’s largest regional donor and has made significant investment in its infrastructure and capacity-building sectors. These connections need to be furthered, also through the Chabahar port project in Iran, which will give us unfettered access to Afghanistan.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 30, 2015

EUROPE LEFT OUT OF MODI’S EURO-TOUR

The European Union bloc is one of India's largest trading partners. Yet, the Prime Minister did not travel to Brussels

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recently concluded his three-nation tour of Europe and Canada has been pegged a huge success. The refurbished Rafale deal that he signed in France, India’s stunning presence at the Hannover Messe trade fair, which he inaugurated, in Germany, and the Prime Minister’s now trademarked outreach to the diaspora in Canada, where he also formalised a key agreement for the supply of uranium that will fuel India’s nuclear power plants, have all been much appreciated. However, if there was one thing missing from the European segment of the Prime Minister’s tour, it was Europe itself.

As a bloc, the 28-member European Union is India’s single largest regional trading partner and one of the largest sources for Foreign Direct Investment in India. The EU also receives a significant amount of outward investment from India . Yet, neither did the Prime Minister travel to Brussels nor did he engage with the leadership of the European Union. Why?

The official reason is one scheduling problem. The Ministry of External Affairs had proposed an India-EU summit (now postponed forsometime later in the year) but the response from Brussels was less than enthusiastic. The latter dragged its feet, as it struggled to decide how best to respond to India’s continued detention of the two Italian Marines who killed two Indian fishermen in 2012. Earlier, the case was on the verge of becoming a major diplomatic debacle, as it moved at a glacial pace through the Indian judicial system, but both sides had since worked together to avoid a showdown.

However, in January this year, the European Parliament, which had just brought in a new set of leaders including Italian politician Feredica Mogherini as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, turned up the heat. It issued a strong resolution accusing India of “a serious breach of human rights”, which rightly irked New Delhi.

After all, it was not like the two men were doing hard labour at Tihar. While one of the Marines, Salvatore Girone, is currently living in the Italian Embassy in Delhi, under a special court-ordered arrangement, the other, Massimiliano Latorre, is in Italy. After suffering a stroke in Delhi in August 2014, Mr Latorre was allowed to go home for four months for treatment. Moreover, in January, three days before the EU accused India of human rights violations, the Supreme Court had given permission to the recuperating Marine to stay back in Italy for another three months, on medical grounds.

Many believe that the EU’s hardline stance can be attributed to Ms Mogherini, who had earlier told the European Parliament that, “It’s good for everyone to be fully aware of how much of an impact the unresolved dispute of the two Italian Navy officials can have on relations between the EU and India.”

At the same time, some European diplomats have also pointed out that it’s unlikely for an individual leader to hold policy hostage in this manner. In fact, according to a report in a leading national daily, some European diplomats believe that the big boys in the club, France and Germany, let the EU mishandle the summit planning process, so that they themselves could deal with India on a one-to-one basis.

 Now, these statements need not be taken at face value but certain ground realities are hard to ignore. For example, the India-EU free trade agreement is almost done but, ostensibly due to a lack of political will, it is yet to be finalised.

From India’s point of view, it is important to understand that while our overall trade figures with the EU are impressive, they can also be deceptive. A lion’s share of that trade pie is captured the UK; bring Germany and France to the table and there’s precious little left for the smaller European nations. Moreover, India has always been more comfortable with bilateral dealings rather than multilateral engagements. In other words, India doesn’t have enough incentive to go the extra mile for the EU.

And this is just on the economic side. On the political and diplomatic side, with regard to issues like the conflict in Ukraine and climate change, there is even lesser common ground. No wonder Europe got only two-pages in the Modi Government’s foreign policy booklet, released in January this year. In comparison, Africa got 14.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 24, 2015)

LOOKING BEYOND ECONOMIC TIES

The Prime Minister’s trip to Germany focussed on boosting trade and technology ties. But the gifts that he exchanged with his host, Chancellor Angela Merkel, offer a sneak peak into the deeper civilisation connect between India and Germany 

The importance of the relationship between India, one of the world’s largest emerging powers, and Germany, the economic anchor of continental Europe, hardly needs to be reiterated. Neither does one have to underscore the fact that the India-Germany bilateral, robust as it may be, is not exactly functioning at its optimal level.

Despite their complimentary national traits and requirements  — if Germany can benefit from access to Indian skilled labour and a large market here, India’s growth story can be fuelled by cutting-edge German technology — and equally importantly, a shared commitment to the universal values of freedom, democracy and equality, the two countries are somehow indifferent to each other. Sure, there has been increasing cooperation at the Government-to-Government and business-to-business levels, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recently concluded trip to Germany shows, but at the people-to-people level, there is still precious little to talk about, beyond Bollywood and Bayern Munich.

This is especially disappointing because the two countries do, in fact, share a deeper civilisational connect that somehow seems to have snapped in the modern age. A re-discovery of this civilisational connect has the potential to truly re-invigorate the India-Germany bilateral and offer young Germans and Indians alike a fresh perspective, as they both seek to re-define their place within a new world order.

The gifts that Mr Modi and German Chancellor Angela Merkel exchanged earlier this week offer a sneak peak into the historical ties that the two nations share. Mr Modi gifted his host, who holds a doctorate in quantum chemistry, reproductions of manuscripts and papers written by Indian Nobel Laureate CV Raman who is known to have been inspired by the famous German scientist Hermann von Helmholtz to pursue a career in science On her part, Ms Merkel on Tuesday gifted Mr Modi an original first edition print of German Indologist Friedrich Max Müller’s book on the Indian spiritual leader, Sri Ramakrishna Paramhansa.

Today, Max Müller is, arguably, the most recognisable German in India. This is as it should be for few other foreigners have contributed so significantly to India’s understanding of its past and its philosophy as he. Best known for editing The Sacred Books of the East, his monumental 50-volume set of English translations of Asian religious text that was published by the Oxford University Press between 1879 and 1910, Max Müller also translated the Upanishads and the Rig Veda.

His other well-known book, that seems to have been largely forgotten in this country today, is titledIndia —What It Can Teach Us. The book is based on his lectures to candidates of the Indian Civil Service examination, on whom he wished to impress the importance of ancient Indian culture and tradition. His last major work, published a year before his death in 1900, was The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. This was the major first publication to discuss all the philosophical systems of India.

But while there is still a reasonable amount of recognition of Max Müller and his work in India, few today remember his contemporary Indologists. For example, Arthur Schopenhauer, who worked around the same time as Max Müller and is considered to be the first Western thinker who incorporated thoughts of the Upanishads in his own philosophy, hardly rings a bell.

Schopenhauer believed that called the availability of Sanskrit literature to the West was “the greatest gift of our century”, and even predicted that ancient Indian philosophy, which he considered to be the “highest human wisdom”, would become the “cherished faith of the West”. In the preface to his best known work, The World As Will And Representation, Schopenhauer writes that one who “has also received and assimilated the sacred primitive Indian wisdom, then he is the best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him”. Interestingly, Schopenhauer was introduced to Indian philosophy through his friend Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, a lesser known philosopher, who had mastered the Sanskrit language.

This is just a small list of a few thinkers from the 19 century. The first German to study Sanskrit can be traced to back to the 17th century to the missionary Heinrich Roth, who lived in India and is believed to have written on Sanskirt grammar but his works were never published. Later, August Wilhelm Schlegel, the first professor of Indology at Bonn University, published his famous book, On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians while poet Friedrich Rückert gained prominence with his translation of the Mahabharat.

At this point, one may rightly question how exactly the study of what obscure German philosophers had to say about India or Indian philosophy would be of any interest to contemporary Indians (or Germans, for that matter). The answer to that is simple: If young Indians (and Germans) are looking to rewrite their terms of engagement with each other and indeed with the world, they will have to find their own unique narrative. Besides, a nation that is ignorant of its past cannot hope to build a strong and secure future — and this is particularly relevant for an emerging power like India that has an otherwise robust  civilisational identity.

Two good examples of how ancient knowledge can be or is being leveraged in the contemporary world is the growing popularity of traditional Indian medicines and therapeutic practices in this country and that of Sanskrit studies in Germany. Unfortunately, the Indian perspectives on these issues have oscillated from completely ignoring the matter on the one hand to romanticizing it on the other. Since Germany has made huge progress in researching ancient India, and Sanskrit classes there are so popular today that universities can’t find enough teachers to cater to the growing demand, these ties have the potential to be leveraged further.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 16, 2015)

SAUDI MUSCLE-FLEXING IN YEMEN

The crisis in Yemen is neither a predominantly Shia-Sunni conflict nor just another proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is a civil war in which a foolhardy Riyadh is intervening to show off its geo-political might. For this, the average Yemeni will pay the price in blood

With approximately 3,500 Indian citizens trapped in Yemen, the latest child of the Arab Spring to collapse, reportage here about the war in that country has, understandably, been focused on the Government’s ongoing evacuation efforts. In the process, the geo-strategic implications of the conflict, wherein a Iran-backed Shiite Houthi rebellion has toppled the West-backed Yemeni Government, prompting a military intervention by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Sunni Arab states, have been largely ignored. However, with the Houthis taking charge of the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait, it is now imperative to look at the larger picture.

The Bab-el-Mandeb strait is a chokepoint, just about 30kms at its widest, located between Yemen in the Arabian Penninsula, and Eritrea and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. It connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and is a crucial linkage in the international waterway that connects Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal. This is the route that has traditionally been taken by Indian merchant ships to reach European markets (and vice versa), and is of immense importance to India’s sea-borne trade interests.

Now, there have been some reports and suggestions that the Houthis may shut down the strait and actually choke the shipping lane. This — particularly a long-term shutdown — seems far-fetched. Neither do the Houthis seem to have the maritime capability to enforce such a blockade nor will regional and world powers allow it. Because of previous threats from Somali piracy, the strait is fairly well-guarded with the navies of Russia, Ukraine, the US, UK, France and India routinely patrolling the waters. The immediate concern about Bab-el-Mandeb, therefore, is not a complete shutdown by the Houthis, but greater disruption in an already fragile region.

Yemen, one of the poorest Arab states, is home to Al Qaeda’s most resilient franchise — Al Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula. Years of American drone strikes and other targeted counter-terror strategies have had some success in containing the group but it is entirely possible that the AQAP will return with a vengeance on the back of a protracted regional war, much like the Islamic State came of age in the political and military chaos of Syria and Iraq. If that happens, piracy and terror attacks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, of the sort we saw in 2008, when Somali pirates seized Saudi Arabia’s Sirius Star oil tanker, or in 2000, when Al Qaeda attacked US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole, will increase. At the very least, such incidents will push up insurance costs for commercial ships; if the strait becomes too risky, the ships will have to take a much longer route.

Unfortunately, a long-drawn out conflict is exactly where we are heading towards, with the ill-advised Saudi-led Sunni Arab coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm. Officially, this operation is being carried out on the request of ousted Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to dislodge the Houthis from power and bring back stability to the country. However, apart from aerial bombing of Houthi targets, there seems to be no larger gameplan for how to achieve this target — either militarily or politically.

It is important to understand that the Houthis, though an anti-Government force, are not terrorists of the Islamic State-type. They are a political force, rooted in Yemen and driven by local causes. Their group was formed in 1992 in the Saada Governorate to protect and promote the interests of the minority Zaidi (a Shia offshoot) community. Found almost exclusively in this northern mountainous region of Yemen, on the border with Saudi Arabia, this community had been ignored by the Sunni Government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh who ruled for 33 years until he had to quit office at the height of the Arab Spring. The Houthi movement criticised the Saleh Government for not just marginalising the minority group but also for being corrupt and inefficient.

Later, when the Saleh Government allowed the US to use Yemeni territory for counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda, the Houthis opposed American intervention. Their voice grew louder with the Iraq war, and after they took their opposition from Saada to the capital city of Sanaa, President Saleh sought to shut them down. This led to six brutal wars between 2004 and 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring came to Yemen and the Houthis were at the forefront of the protest movement. A year later, following an agreement brokered by Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr Saleh was eased out of office but the Houthis were sidelined. A transitional regime, supported by the international community, was put in place while the Houthis positioned themselves as the opposition force.

Mr Hadi, also Mr Saleh’s long time Vice President, was at the helm but failed spectacularly in guiding Yemen’s political transition and the Houthis upped their ante against him. In this, Mr Saleh also played a part (it is no coincidence that Bab-el-Mandeb was handed to the Houthis by a section of the Yemeni Army loyal to Mr Saleh). Soon, Mr Hadi lost the plot. The Houthis advanced from their Saada stronghold and and captured Sanaa on September 21, 2014.

There was a period of political reconciliation when a new Cabinet with a new Prime Minister was formed. But tensions grew over the drafting of Yemen’s Constitution and eventually the Houthis besieged the homes of the Prime Minister and the President. On January 21, Mr Hadi and his Cabinet resigned. The embattled President moved to his hometown of Aden where he rescinded his resignation and announced that the port city was the new capital of Yemen. But on March 25, Mr Hadi fled Yemen and appeared in Riyadh on March 26, the day that Saudi Arabia announced its military campaign in Yemen.

Now, this campaign is being portrayed as a Saudi-Iran proxy war fought on sectarian lines. To a certain extent, it is — as the Houthis receive support from Tehran. However, the quantum and quality of this support has been vastly exaggerated. Also, as described earlier, the Houthis are not merely an Iranian proxy force or a mercenary Shiite army. They are a local political group fighting, what is essentially, a civil war. And there’s only one sensible course of action here for foreign powers: Stay away from the mess.

Saudi Arabia’s intervention, and that too on behalf of the weaker party, will only lead to a protracted conflict of the sort we are seeing in Syria and Iraq. There may have been a sliver of hope had the coalition produced some political action plan but there is none. Even the coalition’s military prowess is in doubt — the Saudi military has a bunch of fancy toys but it’s a largely untested force. The Egyptians are slightly better but it should be remembered that Cairo and Riyadh have historically been on opposing sides in Yemeni matters (remember the 1960s North Yemen civil war). Besides, neither of these two big players have the resources to sustain a long-term military operation especially if it involves ground troops. 

So, why is Riyadh getting into this mess? The answer is simple: It has always been paranoid about Yemen and has a history of meddling in its internal affairs. The Arab Spring and the Houthi advance had disrupted its carefully orchestrated political equations and now its seeking a reset. Also, after its successful 2011 intervention to save the Sunni-minority Government of Bahrain, it seems like Saudi Arabia is taking its position as the big brother in the Sunni world a little too seriously — unfortunately, it’s doing so in a manner that’ll only bring about more death and bloodshed to the region.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 2, 2015)