Between Bombing and Building

If plans to rebuild Gaza are to succeed, the Palestinian Authority has to sideline Hamas, take over power, implement the reconstruction plan under the watchful eyes of the international community and commit to demilitarisation of the strip

After the conflict in Gaza ended last month, many wondered which side had won and which side had lost. Others asked, and rightly so, if there were any winners or losers at all. On the one hand, exuberant leaders of Hamas, the internationally designated terror organisation that holds power in Gaza, suddenly appeared from their underground bunkers to rejoice that their resistance had succeeded. On the other hand, Israeli leaders, facing severe international criticism for responding in a supposedly disproportionate manner to rocket fire from Hamas, claimed that the group’s military capabilities had been dealt a severe blow, even as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself seemed unsure if deterrence had been re-established. Still, when the Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire came into effect on August 26, almost everybody heaved a sigh of relief.

The deal in itself was a modest one: While the Palestinians agreed to hold their fire, Israel agreed to open its border crossings into Gaza (which were open through much of the war anyway), permit a larger number of trucks to move in with goods and relief material everyday, reduce its security buffer from 300metres to 100metres, and allow Gazan fishermen to venture six miles off the coast instead of just three miles. None of these are major concessions; they are confidence building measures at best.

The big issues for both sides —for the Palestinians, building a sea port and an airport in Gaza and the release of security prisoners; and for the Israelis, the demilitarisation of Gaza — will come up for discussion, only if the current ceasefire arrangement holds for a month.

Three weeks in, the situation has been remained largely peaceful, allowing for discussions on the reconstruction of Gaza. The strip was effectively flattened during the 51 days of fighting this summer. According to UN and Palestinian estimates, 20,000 homes were destroyed and another 40,000 damaged; half of Gaza’s hospitals were damaged, nine are still closed; it’s sole power plant has only just started functioning again, 360 factories have been damaged and 126 completely destroyed; 22 schools destroyed and an estimated 188 damaged; and 35,000 dunams of agricultural land affected. Also,1,00,000 of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents are still internally displaced, 40 per cent lack access to running water, and 18 hour long power cuts are the norm.

On Tuesday, the UN announced that it had brokered an agreement to rebuild this tiny Mediterranean strip. The deal is designed to repair the damage caused during the conflict and also initiate the process of long-term development in Gaza. International donors are already lining up to contribute to the reconstruction plan and finalise its delivery mechanism. Two important meetings have been scheduled: The first in New York on September 22 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and the second in Cairo on October 12. If past experiences are anything to go by, there should be no shortage of funds. However, the question is who will put them to use and how.

The initial signs are ominous. The day the UN’s Middle East envoy Richard Serry announced the formalisation of the plan to the Security Council, there was mortar fire in to southern Israel for the first time since the war ended. While Hamas has denied any role in this, the firing is a grim reminder of how fragile the ceasefire agreement really is and how easily the situation can deteriorate. But even if the peace holds, implementing the reconstruction programme will be easier said than done.

The biggest roadblock here is Hamas’ control over Gaza. Because the group is a designated terrorist organisation, many donor nations cannot legally work with it. Also, as long as a group like Hamas that does not even recognise Israel’s right to exist holds power, there are few chances for an enduring peace deal. This makes donors rightfully sceptical of investing in the reconstruction of Gaza as it will quite possibly be reduced to rubble yet again. Finally, the international community cannot reward Hamas, which has provoked war and brought death and destruction upon its own people, with billions of dollars in aid that it can wilfully distribute among impoverished Gazans (or, more likely, use to buy missiles and rockets and build more terror tunnels into Israel).

The August ceasefire agreement, therefore, calls upon Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas to do the job, which will be monitored by the UN, but there is nothing to suggest that Hamas will relinquish control of the Gaza strip. Even though the rival factions joined hands earlier this year to form a Unity Government, they are hardly on the same page. President Abbas had publicly criticised Hamas’s rocket fire into Israel and more recently charged the Islamist group with running a “shadow Government”. Hamas, on the other hand, is reportedly enjoying a post-war high. Its ratings have soared and there is nothing to suggest that the PA is prepared to wrench control from it.

This takes us back to the situation in 2009. After the end of Operation Cast Lead, which played out on an identical template, a huge donor conference was held in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to raise funds for the re-construction of Gaza. Approximately $4.7 billion was pledged with Europe offering $1.25 billion (of which $220 million came from Denmark alone), Saudi Arabia one billion dollars and the US another $900 million. The conference raised almost double the funds than what the PA had expected but much of that money never came through due to political and security reasons.

Still, after Operation Cast Lead, the Gazan economy saw some growth and development as illicit tunnel trade through the Sinai flourished. This time, however, the Egyptian military has shut down the tunnels and effectively choked what was once Gaza’s lifeline.

Today, the strip is a cesspool of guns and weapons — the war saw rockets being fired from schools and hospitals — and unless, Gaza is demilitarised, effective reconstruction will remain a distant dream. Unfortunately, Hamas has consistently refused to lay down arms, and is unlikely to change its mind any time soon.

 (This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on September 18,2014)

Indian Diplomacy, Modi Style

In his first 100 days in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has put much focus on foreign policy. He has not changed anything dramatically but instead, with his personal charisma and political chutzpah, breathed new life into Indian diplomacy

The American stock-taking ritual associated with a new Government’s completion of a 100 days in office has been in and out of fashion in India. It gained currency in 1991 when the Government of PV Narasimha Rao set the course for the liberalisation of the Indian economy immediately after taking charge. The concept made a comeback in 2009 with the second Congress-led UPA regime which created a flurry of activity with its 100-day targets. This time, the BJP-led NDA Government itself has largely ignored the 100-day mark; instead, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has talked about a five-year deadline — or one term of Government. He is acutely aware that the enormous task of reform before him is time-taking one.

Indeed, this very concept of a 100-day assessment has limited utility in a complex political set-up like India’s. It was popularised by US President Franklin D Roosevelt who took charge in the summer of 1933, the darkest hour of the Great Depression. Immediately after his inauguration, he set about the task of fixing America. In the 100 days between March 9 and June 17, 1933, Roosevelt’s Government passed a series of landmark legislations that helped the country get back on its feet. The President also regularly addressed the nation through the radio, in what came to be known as the fireside chats. During these chats, he shared his plans for reform and governance, and sought to talk up the national mood, very similar to what Prime Minister Modi did with his Independence Day speech.  It was during one such radio address in July 1933 that the 100-day term was first used. And contrary to popular perception, it did not refer to Roosevelt’s presidency per se (he was sworn in five days earlier on March 4, 1933), but to the working of the 73rd US Congress which commenced on March 9, 1933.

Few leaders today have kind of support that Roosevelt had in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Even Mr Modi, with his overwhelming mandate in the Lok Sabha, does not have the luxury of a majority in the Rajya Sabha. But what makes the 100-day measure almost irrelevant in India is that the parliamentary system of governance cannot be favourably compared to the presidential system. The executive is not as powerful in India as it is in the US — and it is rather absurd to expect any radical changes in the first 100 days of not just the Modi Government but any administration in New Delhi.

This is especially true for foreign policy which has always been more about continuity than change. Even when there are big ticket developments, such as the sale of guns and aircraft, or a nuclear trade agreement, or even a formalised dialogue mechanism, they are the result of months, sometimes years, of negotiations. Having said that, however, the 100-day concept (if one must employ it) can help generate a sense of the Government’s functioning and its priorities.

When Mr Modi was sworn into office, he was bit of a wild card on the foreign policy front. Yes, as Chief Minister, he had marketed Gujarat well to the world, but he had little experience in New Delhi. His heightened focus on foreign policy in the first 100 days of taking office has naturally taken many by surprise.

Strategically speaking, however, this focus makes perfect sense. The Modi Government came to power with the expectations of a billion people riding on it. There was no way it could have fulfilled all popular aspirations in a short time. Also, this Government is not one that seems to be comfortable with sudden, radical changes, as the Union Budget stands proof. It would not be delivering big bang reforms overnight, as some had expected. Disenchantment, therefore, was bound to set in; this may have also adversely affected the BJP’s performance in the upcoming Assembly elections, thereby dampening Mr Modi’s long-term plans for reform. An easy way to keep up the popular spirit was to focus on foreign policy initiatives. These are easy to play up and have high visibility but do not require major policy changes (think labour laws) or large-scale reform at the grassroots (think industry revival).

Mr Modi’s star-studded inauguration ceremony, attended by South Asian leaders, set the tone. It dazzled his audience at home and abroad alike. Soon after, he travelled to Bhutan for his first foreign trip and then to Nepal. Both were landmark tours. In the meantime, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Bangladesh for her maiden foreign tour and then to Nepal, to lay the ground for the Prime Minister’s visit. When viewed together, one does not have to be a foreign policy analyst to know that South Asia will be at the heart of the new Government’s foreign policy.

Yet, this is hardly a new policy direction. India has always been the predominant power in South Asia and its near neighbours have always had priority focus in New Delhi. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, often criticised for shutting out the neighbourhood, had a South Asia-focus. Sadly, his domestic political compulsions rendered him too weak to sustain regional leadership, as a result of which India lost ground across South Asia. This is where Mr Modi promises to be different.

The same can also be said of the Prime Minister’s performance at the BRICS summit, his first multilateral engagement. The grouping in itself had lost much sheen in recent years but Mr Modi seized the opportunity to revitalise India’s relationship with other emerging economies. His just-concluded five-day long trip to Japan has also been a roaring success, with promises of bullet trains and billions of dollars in infrastructure development. But let us not forget that the bilateral had received a booster shot earlier. Last year, the Manmohan Singh Government had the rare honour of hosting the Japanese Emperor and Empress. This, of course, does not take away from the fact that Mr Modi’s personal charishma and political chutzpah has taken the bilateral to an all new high. Perhaps the only disappointment from the trip was that the civil nuclear energy deal could not be signed — but a similar deal with Australia will probably be finalised as Prime Minister Tony Abbott comes calling on Thursday.

But beyond the deals and agreements, real progress will be measured in terms of deliverables. For example, while Japanese investment promises are much appreciated, Mr Modi will have to clean out the clogged pipelines at home before the money can actually flow in. That’s a long term process, which he has begun, but still has to be seen to its logical end

Mr Modi’s Government has also faced some unexpected foreign policy crises and done fairly well on most counts. First, was the evacuation of Indians trapped in Iraq which the Government managed admirably well, although one group still remains in captivity. The next challenge was shaping India’s response to the flare-up in Gaza. Here, the Government initially held its own in Parliament but fumbled in Geneva where it supported an anti-Israel resolution. This disappointed those who were hoping that Mr Modi would gradually steer away from India’s pro-Arab policy. But once he had signed the BRICS declaration (ostensibly prepared months before by bureaucrats following a fixed policy template) which contained strong language against Israel, India could not have broken ranks later on. Foreign-secretary level talks with Pakistan, even after Islamabad’s envoy here met Kashmiri separatists despite been warned against such daliances, was the third challenge. Mr Modi’s decision to call off the talks, especially as the domestic situation in Pakistan worsened, was a clear indication of his firm, no-nonsense attitude.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on September 4, 2014)