Our Friend Across The Oceans

The India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high, and it is the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership that may potentially re-define the Indo-Pacific security paradigm

With Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe being feted as the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade this year, New Delhi has underlined its reciprocal interest in Tokyo’s initiative to bolster bilateral ties between the two countries. The Prime Minister’s visit comes just about a month after India had the honour of hosting the Emperor and Empress of Japan — a historic tour and perhaps the most potent gesture from Tokyo towards India’s new-found centrality in Japan’s foreign policy scheme. That in between these two visits, Japan’s Foreign Minister Itsunori Onodera also came calling not only reiterates the fact that the India-Japan bilateral is enjoying a new high but more specifically, underscores the convergence of strategic concerns between the two countries, upon which stands the framework for the new partnership.

Since his return to office in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe’s has sought to re-work Japan’s pacifist post-War Constitution, keeping in mind two factors: First, protect Japanese strategic interests against the backdrop of a changing security paradigm (read: increasing Chinese belligerence in the neighbourhood) and second, re-invigorate the moribund Japanese economy — which also serves as a response to China’s emergence as a global powerhouse — by expanding its highly advanced defence industry. The latter, of course, is just one part of Prime Minister Abe’s larger economic revival plan that includes fiscal stimulus, tightening monetary policy and re-structuring economic structures. Most of these efforts have been paying off. Now, they have all been smartly packaged within the nationalist narrative of putting Japan on the path to realising its destiny as the Land of the Rising Sun.

Japan’s global strategic policy under Prime Minister Abe has been carefully articulated in its National Security Strategy that was released in December 2013, alongside a National Defence Programme Guidelines and the establishment of a national security council (which, interestingly, coincided with the Chinese setting up a similar body). That Tokyo has gone so far as to the put out a security doctrine, not to mention constitute an NSC, is in itself a rare though welcome move.

From India’s perspective, it gets even better — a casual overview of the security doctrine makes clear that Japan views this country as one of the “primary drivers” of its “proactive contribution to peace” policy. Against this backdrop, it is to be expected that bilateral defence cooperation between the two countries that has increased significantly in recent years will now grow exponentially. Joint naval exercises, for instance, have already become a fairly regular affair. Even the coast guards of the two countries held their first joint exercise in the Arabian Sea on January 14. More cooperation in counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations is on the cards already.

Additionally, there is now a push for more cooperation between the Indian Air Force and the Japanese Air Self Defence Force. This will be a huge step forward and, in fact, was one of the most important issues discussed during the Japanese Defence Minister’s visit earlier this month.

Another issue that figured prominently on the agenda was the ShinMaywa US-2i aircraft. Japan has offered this multi-role amphibian aircraft to India, and India is seriously considering the offer. The US-2i will go a long way in strengthening the country’s naval aviation segment and also help with search and rescue operations, thereby extending our capabilities in providing humanitarian assistance. A joint working group was set up last year to work out the modalities of the deal. In fact, the plan was to sign the deal during Prime Minister Abe’s upcoming visit but unfortunately it has not worked out as such.

But nevertheless, Japan’s offer to sell this aircraft to India must be viewed against the backdrop of Tokyo now shedding it traditional reticence on defence trade. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the sale of any weapons and defence technology. It was initially designed to block any support to Communist countries but eventually evolved into a blanket ban. However, since the 1980s, successive Governments have been chipping it away — most notably in 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda allowed the transfer of defence technology, and recently Prime Minister Abe has sought to lift the export ban in its entirety.

For now, Japan can still sell the US-2i to India without the friend-or-foe detection system (which is what makes it a fighter aircraft). Some say that the missing part can be retroactively fitted possibly with Israeli systems that are supposedly superior anyway. Either way, the potential for cooperation in this field is immense especially as India seeks to modernise its armed forces. 

On the political front, Minister Onodera’s visit will be followed by the third 2+2 dialogue that brings together the foreign and defence ministers of both countries, the Fourth Defence Policy Dialogue that will be conducted at the Defence Secretary level, and finally a trip to Japan by the Indian Defence Minister. In general, there is a consensus favouring more high-level deliberations including annual exchanges between military personnel and the political leadership alike.

Almost all of this is in keeping with Prime Minister Abe’s past record of seeking strong ties with India, not just on a bilateral basis but also as part of multilateral arrangements. Back in 2007, when Mr Abe was serving his first term as Prime Minister, he had delivered a landmark speech to the Indian Parliament wherein he etched out a grand civilisational partnership between the two nations. At that time, he also laid the foundation of a ‘security quadrilateral’ between Japan, India, the US and Australia. In fact, this was followed by Operation Malabar in the same year that saw a bilateral naval exercise between India and the US extended to include Australia, Japan and also Singapore. China was understandably livid and issued strong demarches to everybody and that was the end of that. 

But when he returned to India in 2011, he made a conscious effort to firm up his 2007 strategy by calling for the “two great democracies to meet at sea — for a better and safer Asia”. His pointed references to China made it clear that he would not cower before the might of Beijing, as some others have in recent years.

In fact, one of the reasons why Japan is seeking new partners is because it is reportedly displeased with its traditional ally, the US’s refusal to take a harder line against China. The fact remains that for all the talk about a rebalance to Asia, Washington, DC, has more or less accepted China’s recent imposition of an Air Defence Identification Zone which covers the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands administered by Japan and claimed by Beijing. In India, however, the situation strikes a far more sympathetic note.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 23, 2014)

Standing Up for Sheikh Hasina

Amid fears that the West may not recognise the new Awami League regime in Dhaka, which came to power unopposed after the Opposition boycotted the January 5 election, India has done well to offer a strong counter-narrative in favour of Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s 10th Jatiya Sangsad election has produced a diplomatic challenge for India which, if handled effectively, can be converted into an opportunity for New Delhi to re-establish its credentials as a regional leader. Boycotted by the Opposition, the vote was held this past Sunday in the shadow of violence, leading to a low turnout. Bangladesh’s deadliest national election ever, it expectedly produced an overwhelming, though hollow, victory for the incumbent Awami League regime which was voted into office for the next five years even before the first ballot had been cast.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is expected to form the next Government before the current Parliament expires on January 24, but there are fears that the new regime may not be recognised by the West. The US and EU had indicated as much when they refused to send their election observers and have since taken a strong stance against Prime Minister Hasina for failing to get the Opposition on board. Australia, Canada, the UK, the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations have all expressed varying degrees of disapproval as well. In contrast, India has acknowledged it as a “constitutional requirement”, and has been working with its international partners to ensure that Dhaka is not unfairly censured. This is a step in the right direction.

Over the years, Prime Minister Hasina has proven to be one of India’s most reliable friends in the region — she has cracked down on anti-India terror camps in her country and handed over rebels leaders in the North-East — but New Delhi has done little to hold up its side of the relationship. For instance, it has not been able to deliver on either the land border agreement or the Teesta water arrangement, making Ms Hasina vulnerable to much criticism at home. South Block’s efforts now to stand up for a friend it has somewhat disregarded in recent years, therefore, are important corrective measures. 

In December 2013, for instance, Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh, during her visit to the US, offered a strong counter-narrative to Washington, DC’s sharp criticism of the situation in Bangladesh. Previously, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had also discussed the matter with his counterpart in the UK and according to reports in the Bangladeshi media, the meeting went better than expected. This may explain the British foreign office’s more ‘accommodating’ position on the issue — it has not yet recognised the new regime per se, having only taken note of the election result, but at least has accepted that the vote was held in accordance with Bangladesh’s Constitution.

Additionally, New Delhi is also lobbying with the Commonwealth grouping to shield Dhaka from unwarranted criticism. Here, India’s has an upper-hand thanks to its membership to the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group. Overall, it is in the international arena that New Delhi will have to do most of the work because within Bangladesh, the political scenario is so charged and polarised, there is not much space for it to manoeuvre.

Prime Minister Hasina has been urged by New Delhi to resolve the problem through dialogue, and on her part, she has even offered to hold a fresh election if the Opposition discards its campaign of violence. But for now, it doesn’t seem like the latter is in the mood for reconciliation unless its key demand for a non-party caretaker Government is met.

This is unlikely given that the system was abolished in 2011 — with the approval of the courts — and, therefore, Prime Minister Hasina has no compelling reason to give up her ground. Besides, she had offered to meet the Opposition half-way with an all-party caretaker Government before the January 5 election but was rebuffed by an obstinate Khaleda Zia, who, as chief of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, heads the 18-party Opposition alliance.

Some analysts have suggested that India engage the Opposition in Dhaka — a fine thought, if only New Delhi had more leverage with Ms Zia. Unfortunately, the two-time former Prime Minister has kept herself at a distance. Over the past two years, in an attempt to appear even-handed in its dealings with Bangladesh, South Block has made several high-profile attempts to establish a better working relationship with Ms Zia even at the cost of upsetting Ms Hasina. These included a meeting with Vice President Hamid Ansari in Dhaka in 2011, an exclusive lunch with the Prime Minister in New Delhi in 2012 and  the offer for a tête-à-tête with President Pranab Mukherjee in Dhaka in 2013 (that she turned down) — but to no avail.

In fact, not only has Ms Zia refused to reciprocate Delhi’s goodwill gestures, she has heightened her anti-India sloganeering. This is not just a continuation of her traditional political strategies but also reflective of the increased political influence of her extremist ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which maintains a vitriolic opposition to India, not to mention collaborates with jihadi terror networks in the region. Once a fringe party, whose role was limited to providing the mainstream BNP with political muscle, the Jamaat has now emerged as the dominant partner in the relationship.

It seems like Ms Zia herself is still working out the changing dynamics of the partnership. For instance, after Jamaati leader Abdul Qader Mollah was executed for committing war crimes, the Islamists demanded that she take a strong stance on the matter. However, given the wave of popular support in favour of Mollah’s death sentence — this is what sparked the Shahbag protests in the first place — Ms Zia skirted the issue. In retaliation, the Jamaati cadre offered only a lukewarm response to her call to the country to march upon Dhaka in protest against the Hasina Government. Consequently, the much-touted December 29 mega protest march failed to take off.

Ultimately, Ms Zia will have to reconsider her alliance with the Jamaatis but in the foreseeable future, the political logjam in Dhaka will probably get worse before it gets better. Social unrest, in the form of hartals, blockades and nation-wide shutdowns will also continue, as the Opposition can be expected to turn up the heat. It is under these circumstances of political instability and uncertainty in Dhaka, fuelled by violence and anarchy on the streets across Bangladesh, that Prime Minister Hasina will take oath for her third consecutive term in office — and she will require the wholehearted support of her friends and allies.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 9, 2014)