Trust Friends, Don't Doubt Them

As Bhutan seeks to increase its engagement with the world, India has no reason to resent it, especially if its relations with Thimphu remain strong. New Delhi had unilaterally amended the old treaty to allow Thimphu to follow its own foreign policy

With India deciding to restore the subsidy on cooking gas and kerosene to Bhutan, an unseemly episode in the relations between the two countries has thankfully ended. The subsidy was revoked on June 30, less than two weeks before the tiny Himalayan nation went to poll to elect its second democratic Government, and it understandably led to accusations that New Delhi was seeking to interfere in Bhutan’s internal matters. The country’s outgoing Prime Minister Jigme Thinley’s so-called ‘adventurism’ in foreign policy, that saw him meet with the Chinese Premier on the sidelines of the Rio summit last year, without prior consultation with New Delhi, had supposedly irked the mandarins in South Block, who then withdrew the subsidies to express their displeasure and ensure that the ‘pro-China leader’ did not come back to power.

In the weeks since then, however, it has become evident that much of the reaction to the ill-timed subsidy cut was blown out of proportion. Apart from the fact that the subsidy cut has since been reversed, the argument that it caused Mr Thinley to lose the election has also been debunked. In the first round of polling that was held in March (months before the subsidy controversy erupted) and saw four parties fight it out, the Prime Minister’s party, Druk Phuensum Tshogpa, won 44.52 per cent of votes. In the second and final round, where the DPT took on the People’s Democratic Party in a face-off, its vote-share fell by just one decimal point —indicating, that India’s subsidy cut did not have an impact on Mr Thinley’s political career even though it surely added some zing to the electoral discourse. If the PDP ultimately won the election, it was because in the final round the party managed to secure all the opposition, non-DPT votes. This was possible primarily because PDP chief and now Prime Minister-elect Tshering Tobgay, a former civil servant, had proven himself to be a strong and articulate Opposition leader in the past five years.

In effect, India’s decision to cut fuel subsidy was not a political one at all —it was a bureaucratic goof-up. The fuel subsidy lapsed on June 30 when Bhutan’s 10th Plan expired. Fresh terms for financial assistance could only be negotiated after the new Government was sworn in — and Bhutan’s Chief Election Commissioner, believed to be even more evangelical in these matters than TN Seshan, made sure that the rules were followed to the T. Add to this the miscommunication between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Petroleum in India, as a result of which the latter cancelled the subsidy without taking the former into confidence — and the situation was ripe for a diplomatic disaster.

Thankfully, both countries have now put the episode behind them but nevertheless, there are some important lessons to be learnt. Apart from the obvious one on better communication within the bureaucracy, the most important take-away from this episode, for New Delhi, is that Bhutan is a changing country and India must respond to those changes effectively.

In the past, India has done most of its business with Bhutan through the Bhutanese King in particular and that country’s elite in general. Now, with a parliamentary democracy in place in Thimphu, New Delhi will have to learn to work more carefully with a larger number of stakeholders, some of whom will have competing interests. The manner in which the PDP spun the subsidy cut decision, as the price Bhutan was paying for outgoing Prime Minister Thinley’s supposed mishandling of India-Bhutan’s relations (due to his ‘pro-China’ tendencies) speaks volumes. In fact, the whole thing was made to look so bad that Mr Thinley had to come on national television to explain himself and do damage control.

Outside of the power corridors of Thimphu, the popular reaction to subsidy cut was also telling. It reflected the changes that are currently underway in Bhutanese society especially its increasing willingness to question authority figures and demand greater accountability — which is quite possibly directly related to the installation of a parliamentary democracy and an increased engagement with the outside world. And so it is that in this general election Bhutan voted out the DPT, which ‘represented’ the monarchy and the elite and marked in the previous election a continuation of the royal tradition. Instead, the people have brought to power the PDP, which is a newer political group consisting of little known leaders. This is not to say that Bhutan has rejected its monarchy — far from it, the Bhutanese love their King — but the DPT’s loss is an important marker of societal change. In this context, the question that New Delhi must ask is this: Does Bhutan consider India to be an authority figure? To some extent, yes.

This was especially evident in how Bhutan’s new media responded to theories about Indian interference. Bloggers, many of them young and without a first-hand experience of the deep history that India and Bhutan share, wrote strongly against India trying to do ‘another Nepal’ in their country. Editorials in newspapers, almost all of which have come up in recent years, warned against external forces meddling in domestic politics. This again must not be viewed as an anti-India sentiment — again, far from it, India enjoys tremendous goodwill and genuine support among the people of Bhutan — but New Delhi should take note of this as it re-calibrates its diplomacy in Thimphu.

The Big Brother approach, not that New Delhi ever dealt with Thimphu unfairly, must not be allowed to creep into bilateral relations. While Bhutan surely needs India for its growth, development and security, India also gains significantly by having Bhutan’s wholehearted, no-holds-barred support. This, of course, is particularly crucial vis-à-vis the China factor. Towards that end, Bhutan’s contribution to India’s security framework (not just strategic but also energy; think of the hydro-electric power projects) is just as important as India’s role in securing Bhutan.

Finally, as Bhutan seeks to increase its engagement with the world, India has no reason to resent it especially as long as its own relations with Thimphu remain strong. After all, it was New Delhi that unilaterally amended the old treaty to allow Thimphu to follow its own foreign policy. Now, if the Bhutanese Prime Minister meets with his Chinese counterpart, what is so wrong with that?

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 25, 2013)

Miscalculation That Can Be Fatal

India appears to have bought hook, line and sinker the West-driven narrative of ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’. Salman Khurshid’s support to dialogue with the militant outfit, is shocking in the least

External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid’s recent exhortations in favour of opening a dialogue with the Taliban as part of the larger Afghan peace process marks a shocking reversal in New Delhi’s otherwise well-established policy towards the hardline group. Over the years, India has rightly resisted a role for those committed to a regressive ideology of violence and religious fanaticism, and also refused to buy into the essentially Western argument of the ‘good Taliban’ and the ‘bad Taliban’ — until now, that is.

At the 20th Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Regional Forum meeting in Brunei, Mr Khurshid announced that the Indian Government supports a “peaceful dialogue” that must “involve all sections of the Afghan society and armed opposition groups, including the Taliban”. Of course, he couched his statement within the standard clauses and pre-conditions — that to be included in the dialogue, the Taliban must be “willing to give up their arms” (and more specifically sever ties with Al Qaeda), “subscribe to the (Afghan) Constitution” and acknowledge “the legitimacy of the Afghan state and Government”. These are supposedly internationally accepted ‘red lines’, but in reality they are just lines drawn in shifting desert sand.

Two examples illustrate this: First, the Afghan Government, when it has been in the mood for talks with the Taliban, has itself often dilly-dallied on the issue of the Constitution and the renunciation of violence. Second, as long back as in February 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had already described these very same clauses as “necessary outcomes for any negotiation”. In other words, what should have been non-negotiable pre-conditions for talk was already being presented as a desired outcome of that talk — and this was more than two years ago when the US was that much less desperate to carve itself a face-saver peace deal before it could get out of Afghanistan.

The other issue that seems to be driving much of the ‘talk to Taliban’ brigade is that of the ‘good Taliban’ versus the ‘bad Taliban’, the ‘moderate Taliban’ versus the ‘hardline Taliban’, the ‘peace-wanting Taliban’ versus the ‘war-mongering Taliban’. The basic argument here is that reaching out and winning over the good Taliban might just be the key to securing that elusive peace in Afghanistan. Towards this end, some commentators have pointed out that the Taliban is not a homogeneously fanatical group, that a section of the Taliban leadership has offered to abandon their social conservatism for political reconciliation, that some Taliban leaders have pushed for local ceasefires and even advocated ending attacks on women, children and minorities.

But do not forget that the Taliban are political opportunists. Yes, there is a segment that is more pragmatic but to assume that they have bought into the idea of peaceful, democratic and stable Afghanistan is a bit rich. Also, there is the question of how strong is this supposedly soft section? Not very, from available evidence. Take for instance, Agha Jan Motasim, a former Taliban leader who in May 2012 had said that the hardliners form a minority while most of his colleagues want a peace deal. One year and an assassination attempt later, he lives in exile in Turkey. Others like him have not even been that lucky — Arsalan Rahman Daulat, who was working with the Karzai regime in fact to further the peace process, was killed in Kabul.

Unfortunately, facts seem to matter little in this situation. And so the ‘talk to Taliban’ faction continues to gain traction, particularly from the fact that the Taliban are a force to reckon with in Afghanistan. They still do control parts of that country and the world’s best military has failed to defeat this guerrilla force. In other words, just because the Taliban have proven to be an enemy that cannot be easily subdued (mostly because one has chosen their allies badly), one must capitulate before them and quit. This approach may work for those who have the option to leave the battlefield, but for those whom that same battlefield forms their own backyard, this is a confrontation they must fight to win.

And, if victory has to be secured in Afghanistan, the Taliban have to be militarily defeated, not politically appeased. Given that the US-led Nato forces are leaving in end-2014, much of that will depend on the Afghan National Security Forces who have actually proven themselves to be a strong and brave fighting force. India would have done well to have given them the military assistance that President Hamid Karzai had requested, but here too, New Delhi has held back. 

Viewed in conjunction with New Delhi’s recent policy turnaround on the Taliban issue, we wonder if India is working under US pressure or whether it is afraid of setting off alarm bells in Pakistan. Either way, there is no justification for this shameful pussyfooting in Afghanistan.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 11, 2013)