Wrong People to Talk Peace With

Both the Obama Administration and the Afghan Government favour talks with the Taliban for their own reasons. But their eagerness for dialogue is not matched by the other side, which continues to wreak violence and cock a snook at the peaceniks

Given how desperate the Obama Administration is to talk its way out of the unwinnable war in Afghanistan, it is highly unlikely that even the audacious Talibani attack on the presidential compound in Kabul will make Washington, DC realise the futility of seeking peace with those who espouse an ideology of hate. But to most others, the writing is on the wall.

On Tuesday, the Taliban infiltrated the high-security zone that houses the headquarters of the CIA in Afghanistan, the country’s Defence Ministry and the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force alongside the presidential palace. Two hours of gun-fighting later, all four attackers had been neutralised, but not before they made clear that the Taliban still had the power to strike in the heart of Afghanistan.

This high-profile attack came less than a week after the Taliban inaugurated, with much fanfare, their new office in the Qatari capital of Doha.The office was only supposed to serve as a location for talks between the Taliban, US and Afghan officials. But banners put up at the ribbon-cutting ceremony, attended by the likes of the Qatari Foreign Minister himself, called it the ‘Political Office’ of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” — the name that the Taliban used when they ruled from Kabul. The Taliban’s efforts to present the new office as some sort of a parallel Afghan embassy in Qatar was a PR disaster for the Americans who were seen as sidelining their ally in Kabul, the democratically elected Government of Afghanistan, so as to cut a fast deal with the Taliban in Doha. A rightfully livid President Hamid Karzai retaliated not just by withdrawing his delegation to the Doha talks but also calling off separate security negotiations with the US regarding American military presence in Afghanistan after 2014. 

While both sets of negotiations will quite possibly resume sooner than later, the Taliban’s ‘Qatar moment’ and America’s garbled response to it, is proof that the talks, even before they have begun, are bound to fail. Apart from the absurdity of trying to negotiate peace with those who have made clear they want no part of it, the fact is that the entire ‘Talk to Taliban’ plan is ill-thought out, badly-timed and poorly-managed.

As The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at the New America Foundation points out in a recent study, “The strategic rationale for the talks has never been clear… those who have advocated talks with the Taliban have done so for different reasons at different times. This has clouded and confused official policy. Some hoped to ‘peel off’ low-level insurgents, whereas others preferred to encourage the development of a Taliban political party; some hoped to divide the movement, whereas others hoped to massage it in such a way that Taliban ‘doves’ were strengthened over ‘hawks’; some hoped to deal directly with the movement’s leaders while others saw them as the chief obstacles to progress. Many of these strands were in operation at the same time, contributing to a sense that talks were conducted in a strategic vacuum.”

Equally worrying is how the ‘Talk to Taliban’ strategy, which is fast becoming the crux of the American withdrawal plan, resembles the disastrous Soviet experience in Afghanistan — and clearly, how no lesson has been learnt from history. Primary among these is that both with the Soviet invasion and the American military intervention, the penchant for talk seems inversely proportional to the possibility of a military victory.

In the case of the Soviets, it became clear fairly early in the game that the Red Army was being unable to script itself a conventional victory on the battlefield. Therefore, by the early eighties there was already growing acceptance of the fact that some sort of a ‘diplomatic/political solution’ would be needed to end the fighting. And so, between 1980 and 1985, the Soviets followed a two-pronged approach of seeking a UN-sponsored solution on the one hand and trying to convince the Pakistanis on the other, to stop supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The plan was ineffective, mostly because Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq was suspicious of Moscow, which he perceived to be close to New Delhi. Eventually, the Soviets also reached out to their rival Americans, but the latter refused flat out and instead, stepped up their funding for the insurgents.

Then, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the communist party and decided to revamp the Soviet policy in Afghanistan. A year later, he sent in 26,000 additional troops, hoping to inflict a final military defeat that would close what he famously described as a “bleeding wound”, but the military surge bore limited results.

In the years ahead, there was a distinct change in Moscow’s policy towards counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, as Russian historian Artemy Kalinovsky notes: “Previously, the emphasis had been on winning over the population through economic incentives and establishing party and governance influence in the cities and countryside. The new initiative continued that policy but placed a much greater emphasis on pacification through winning over rebel commanders.” 

Moscow’s new policy also found reflection in the efforts of President Najibullah (who had taken over in 1986) to reach out to the mujahideen. He announced an unilateral ceasefire, released thousands of mujahideens from prison and even offered ministerial positions to insurgent leaders. Yet, none of these appeasement tactics worked as the insurgents saw no reason to accept concessions offered by an already weak regime. The turning point came with Mr Gorbachev’s February 1988 announcement of a troop withdraw timetable. This weakened the Soviets leverage as they went in to deliberate on the Geneva Accords — the results of which only laid the foundation for an even bloodier civil war.

The comparisons with the US invasion here are unmistakeable. Even though the Americans registered an early military victory in 2001 by removing the Taliban from power — which explains why the insurgents had no role to play in the Bonn Conference that established the interim Karzai regime — they failed to consolidate those early gains. Consequently, while the US got busy fighting another war in Iraq, the Taliban re-grouped and returned with a vengeance. For them, there has been no looking back since then, even as both the Afghan Government and the Americans have sought to reach out to the Taliban to cobble together some sort of a peace package. But the Taliban have refused to talk to the Afghan Government, which they do not even recognise, thereby torpedoing any effort towards an Afghan-led peace process.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 27, 2013)

A Politician's Coming of Age

Aung San Suu Kyi's public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum meet, completes her transformation from being a mere political dissident to an Opposition leader who desires to lead Myanmar in the near future

Aung San Suu Kyi's public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum meet, completes her transformation from being a mere political dissident to an Opposition leader who desires to lead Myanmar in the near future The latest edition of the World Economic Forum on East Asia that concluded in Naypidaw last Friday was arguably the most vocal acknowledgment from the international community of one the biggest developments in South Asia in recent years: Political reform in Myanmar. 

World leaders, industry titans and civil society activists from around the globe had gathered in the newly-built capital city to celebrate what the Forum called the ‘courageous transformation’ of Myanmar and to chart that country’s way forward. It was against this backdrop that Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s best known pro-democracy icon, announced to the world her desire to take on her country’s top job.

“I want to run for President, and I’m quite frank about it”, said the 67-year-old at the Forum, where she was the undisputed star of the show. While this was not the first time that Ms Suu Kyi had spoken of her presidential ambitions, her forthright approach combined with the timing and the venue amplified the impact of her statement which made headlines around the world. Be that as it may, the fact remains that Ms Suu Kyi cannot run for election, and she knows that. Under the present Constitution, anyone who is married to a foreign citizen or whose children hold foreign passports is prohibited from running for either President or the Vice President’s office. Ms Suu Kyi’s deceased husband was British and her sons also hold British passports. A Constitutional amendment is of course the most obvious solution to this problem but it is easier said than done, as several procedural difficulties stand in the way.

First, such an amendment to the Constitution would require a 75 per cent parliamentary approval which will be hard to come by, since 25 per cent of the seats in Parliament are reserved for the military while the bulk of the remaining is occupied by military loyalists. Second, even if Parliament were to somehow pass the amendment, the proposed change would then have to be approved by the majority in a national referendum before it could come into effect. Organising such a referendum is laborious and time-consuming, and offers a perfectly legitimate excuse for the Generals looking to prevent Ms Suu Kyi from running for President.

In other words, a long and arduous path lies ahead before Ms Suu Kyi’s desire to lead her country can turn into reality. And through much of that journey she will have to manoeuvre and out-manoeuvre the men in uniform who, while they may have grudgingly warmed up to her, somewhat, in recent times, they are by no means willing to concede any real political space or power yet. Let us not forget that the rule regarding relatives with foreign citizenship was introduced by the junta only in 2008 —just two years before the landmark general election of 2010 that paved the way for a semi-civilian Government to take over the reins from the military — with the sole intention of keeping Ms Suu Kyi away from the presidency.

And if that isn’t enough, sample this: According to the Wall Street Journal, immediately after Ms Suu Kyi announced her presidential ambitions at the World Economic Forum, President Thein Sein (a former Army General who shed his fatigues to take charge as a civilian ruler in 2010) cancelled her invitation to the gala dinner that he was hosting later that evening. And this is despite reports that the two leaders share a strong, personal bond that many observers believe played an important role in facilitating Ms Suu Kyi’s return to the political mainstream in Myanmar.

But either way, there is no denying that with Ms Suu Kyi’s public announcement of her presidential aspirations at the World Economic Forum, her transformation from a political dissident to an Opposition leader is now complete. And while there is little by way to predict how it will shape her career as a politician in the years ahead — especially since much of it will also be determined by how the military responds to her political rise — this is a good time to look back at the past two years that she has spent in active politics after being released from decades of house arrest.

Three events stand out: First, Ms Suu Kyi’s cleansweep victory in the by-elections held in April 2012 that saw her National League for Democracy win 43 of the 44 seats it had contested. Not that there was ever any doubt about how much support she commandeered among her people, but still, the electoral victory was an important indicator of the power she could wield within a democratically-elected Government — something that must have made the Generals cringe.

Second, Ms Suu Kyi’s support for the Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Division was both a huge risk and a political game-changer. The mine is currently being developed by a Chinese firm and has been met with severe opposition from locals who accuse the Government-run Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited of land grab. Ms Suu Kyi headed the commission that investigated the matter and reported in favour of the regime, as she believed that commitments made by the previous Government to foreign investors had to be honoured — or else, potential investors will be reluctant to invest in the country. This is something that Myanmar simply cannot afford. While this bought her the Generals’ confidence as someone who was a ‘fair player’, it also led to much criticism from certain segments of the public which felt that she had sold out to the military; others pointed fingers at her for supporting crony capitalism.

Third, Ms Suu Kyi’s studied silence on the issue of Rohingya Muslims who violently clashed with the country’s Buddhist majority, also disappointed many who expected her, as a proponent of democratic values, to take a stronger position. But as a politician, Ms Suu Kyi saw no merit in polarising an already difficult and historically complex situation. Also, by highlighting the issue she would have played into the hands of the military, which would like nothing better than a ‘national security’ crisis that could shore up its image and importance  at a time such as this. 

That, as an opposition leader, Ms Suu Kyi faces a tough challenge, is without a doubt. One only has to look at how the regime has ensnared her — while losing no political capital itself — in both the cases described above, to understand the gravity of the situation. And there will be more of these double-edged swords in the future too. For instance, there have been reports that after the 2015 election, the regime may offer her the position of Foreign Minister. Not only will such a move make the Generals look good, it will effectively allow them to enlist Ms Suu Kyi as their official spokesperson. For Ms Suu Kyi, of course, this would just be more of the tightrope situation that she is already having to navigate.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 13, 2013.)