Warmth of the Rising Sun

Tokyo must shed its old stand on the issue of India not having signed the NPT, especially if it wishes to work with New Delhi in the civil nuclear energy arena, which is the other big picture idea that could redefine India-Japan relations

Days after he hosted Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in New Delhi, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe in Tokyo during the course of his three-day visit that ends Thursday, there is no ignoring the dragon in the room. Sample this from Mr Singh’s speech on Tuesday to a high-profile gathering that included Indian and Japanese parliamentarians: “This region faces multiple challenges, unresolved issues and unsettled questions. Historical differences persist despite our growing inter-dependence; prosperity has not fully eliminated disparities within and between states; and there are continuing threats to stability and security.”

Now, place this against the backdrop of the recent Chinese incursion into Indian territory. Had it spun out of control, that episode could have well morphed into a full-scale military confrontation. Also, add to the picture China’s renewed effort to grab the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands administered by Japan. This, many strategists believe, today poses the most serious risk of a militarised conflict between the two nations since the second world war.

And this is just one illustration of how both India and Japan have a common interest in containing Chinese belligerence in Asia. Apart from the border dispute, India, for instance, also remains deeply concerned about China’s proximity to Pakistan and its continued support for the rogue regime in North Korea, which again is known to proliferate arms and weapons technology to Pakistan. Similarly, for Japan, it is China’s increasingly hostile posturing in the South and East China that is becoming untenable.

At the crux of much of this lies China’s hunger for more and more resource that comes amid growing domestic unrest. In other words, there is nothing to suggest that Chinese aggression in the region will diminish. If anything, it will be ramped up over the years — more the reason why India and Japan must join hands and strengthen their security partnership.

Already, New Delhi and Tokyo have institutionalised the ‘2+2 dialogue’ involving their respective Defence and Foreign Secretaries. This is a one-of-its-kind arrangement that India and Japan have, and it is only testimony to the increasing importance of their bilateral relationship particularly within a national and regional security paradigm.

Yet another reason that adds to the urgency of the India-Japan bilateral ties, especially in the China context, is the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy. Designed primarily to contain China, the strategy has India as its so-called lynchpin. Add to this the pre-established alliance between the US and Japan, and pieces of this puzzle begins to fall in place. While America may have lost some of its global influence in recent years, there is no denying that it still has one of the world’s most powerful militaries which could still prove to be a strategic game-changer any day.

But while these geo-political imperatives should bring the two countries closer, it is the return of Mr Abe to power that should add the much-needed momentum to the relationship. For years now, ties between India and Japan have been on a slow if steady track, but as the time now comes to take it to the next level, a booster shot is necessary. Who better to administer that shot than Mr Abe?

Apart from the fact that he is possibly the most pro-India of all Japanese leaders in recent times, the Liberal Democratic Party leader is also known for his staunchly nationalist views and is the least likely to take Chinese aggression lying down. Let us not forget that it was he, who in a historic address to the Indian Parliament in 2004, first spoke of the Indo-Pacific as a security paradigm and later went so far ahead as to suggest an informal military alliance between Japan, India, the US and Australia. Unfortunately, that idea never really took off. Even if the Japanese Prime Minister decides to resuscitate it, most strategists believe that it is unlikely to take any definite shape — mostly because it would make China furious. But that still does not change the fact that the Japanese Prime Minister views India as a strategic partner, and if Mr Singh’s Tokyo trip is anything to go by, New Delhi has signalled its willingness to embrace Mr Abe’s view of the Indo-Pacific.

However, if the India-Japan bilateral relationship has to realise its full potential, even within the security paradigm alone, Tokyo will first have to unshackle itself from post-War inhibitions. As of now, Japan does not export arms or weapons technology to India because of the three principles enshrined in its Constitution that effectively prevent such exchanges. Announced in 1967, these principles ban arms export to (i) communist countries (ii) countries to which arms exports are banned under UN resolutions, and (iii) countries which are or may be involved in an international military conflict. However, in 1976 the Liberal Democratic Party Government of the time expanded the restrictions to cover other countries not described in the principles, and also brought under cover defence-related technologies; thereby, imposing a veritable blanket ban on arms export.

It was not until 1983 that Tokyo made an exemption for the first time by allowing the export of military technologies to the US. In December 2011, then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of the Democratic Party of Japan relaxed the three principles and set fresh standards for arms exports. Under the new regime, export of defense equipment related to peacemaking and international cooperation is now permitted while co-development and co-production of defense equipment is also allowed if the partner country has a cooperative relationship with Japan over national security issues.

Naturally, this works well for India — and more so now that, given Mr Abe’s personal willingness to expand India-Japan security coordination, the Prime Minister can be trusted to take a more lenient approach towards exports arms to India.

It must be kept in mind that since India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, prior permission from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is needed when it comes to exporting dual-use products and technologies (such as the US-2 amphibious aircraft which Japan might soon sell to India) that may be used for the development or production of weapons. It is in situations such as these that it will help tremendously to have someone like Mr Abe in the driver’s seat.

Still, Tokyo will do well to shed its old stand on the issue of India not having acceded to the NPT, especially if it wishes to work with New Delhi in the civil nuclear energy arena — the other big picture idea that could redefine India-Japan relations.

After all, in 2008, even the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the export of nuclear-related products and technologies to non-NPT member countries, unanimously approved India’s exemption from the export restriction list. While it is true that since 2010, Japan and India have been discussing a civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement but the fact is that negotiations have been deadlocked since Tokyo insists on a provision that, should India resume nuclear testing, cooperation between the two countries will cease. 

This obviously is not amenable to New Delhi, which has maintained a principled stance on the matter. In this case, Japan will do well to learn a lesson from the US which signed the civil nuclear deal with India, keeping its eyes firmly on China.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 30, 2013.)

Trust Islamabad but Verify Too

New Delhi has many reasons to welcome Nawaz Sharif's third term as Prime Minister. However, this does not mean that India can throw caution to the winds and let down its guard. The Pakistani Army is still strongly entrenched in its anti-India posture, and so is the ISI

On May 11, as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan went to the poll to elect a new Government, democracy in that country received its strongest booster shot yet. For the first time since the country came into existence 67 years ago, one popularly elected regime had completed its full five-year term and was handing over power to another popularly elected entity. The socio-political and strategic import of this historic transition cannot be underestimated — especially, given that the election was held under the shadow of death and terror.

In the run-up to the poll, several candidates, including those from mainstream political parties, were killed by the Pakistani Taliban mostly in drive-by shootings. The ‘bad Taliban’, as the group is often labelled, had made it amply clear that it considered voting un-Islamic and, therefore, targeted leaders and voters alike right up to election day with sickening regularity. That the people of Pakistan still went to the polling stations in large numbers — the Election Commission noted a turn-out of nearly 60 per cent — and in the process thumbed their nose at the Taliban, is heartening indeed, not just for Pakistan but also for India.

In fact, with Mr Nawaz Sharif now returning to power in Islamabad — his PML(N) swept the election and won a comfortable 123 of the 272 seats in the National Assembly — India could have scarcely asked for a more favourable electoral result from Pakistan. The 63-year-old who has already been in the top job twice earlier, has been very vocal in his support for India, and has repeatedly and publicly said that improving bilateral ties between the countries is among his priorities.

Undoubtedly, the most pro-India of all the candidates, Mr Sharif had, as the Prime Minister in 1999, signed the historic Lahore Declaration with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, which was supposed to usher in a new era in India-Pakistan relations. However, that didn’t happen as Mr Sharif himself became the victim of a military coup and was ousted from office. Now, as he returns to power in Islamabad, he has promised to pick up the pieces from where he had left. He has also promised, for instance, to bring to justice those who mounted the 26/11 terror attack on India.

All this has naturally been well-received in India which can surely do with a little less venom and bad blood flowing from across the border. Towards that end, New Delhi has good enough reason to welcome Mr Sharif’s third term as Prime Minister. However, this does not mean that India can throw caution to the winds and let down its guard.

Mr Sharif is surely the best that India could have hoped for, but he is neither a saint nor a super-human. There are skeletons in his cupboard too. For instance, let us not forget that, if Mr Sharif helped script the Lahore Declaration, it was also during his rule that the Kargil conflict happened. Of course, Mr Sharif has consistently held that the military misadventure was planned behind his back by his treacherous Army chief Pervez Musharraf. But General Musharraf has claimed otherwise, going so far as to say that five days before Mr Sharif met Mr Vajpayee in Lahore, he had been briefed by the Army about the mission.

Either way, the Kargil conflict makes Mr Sharif look really bad. If he knew about the attack, then he is exposed as a duplicitous character. And if didn’t know about the attack, then he comes across as a weak and ineffective Prime Minister who didn’t known what his own Army was up to. And even by Pakistan’s standards of civil-military relations, that is a bit too much to accept at face value. Still, if this was indeed the case, one must ask if things will be any different this time around. 

As of now, there are no indications as to how Mr Sharif will define his Government’s relationship with the country’s military. It is true that given his own bitter experience with the Army, he may try harder than others to curb the latter’s influence but with what degree of success, remains an open question. Also, in this context it is important to dismiss the notion that has been doing the rounds of late that the military is backing out of Pakistan’s political space or will be reluctant to interfere like before in the functioning of the new civilian Government because of popular resistance. First, the military has never cared about daily administration issues as long as its own interests have remained secured. This is true not just in Pakistan but even in other countries where the military has played a domineering role in public life — such as in Egypt, for example.

Second, the Pakistani military has done nothing to suggest that it will concede any strategic space to the newly elected Government. On the contrary, Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s much-hyped media briefing prior to the election proved that the military was very much a political force to contend with. Even though the meeting with journalists was organised to put out the Army’s official story supporting democracy and popular representation et al, it quickly devolved into a session critiquing Pakistan’s political class as one that is inept, inefficient and ultimately incapable of protecting the nation’s interests. Somewhat correct as that analysis may be, Gen Kayani has already used it to set the narrative of a weak Government that might eventually have to be replaced by a stronger Army. Also, Gen Kayani’s term expires later this year and it is the transition of power that’ll happen then, that India should watch closely. 

Coming back to Mr Sharif, his continued dalliances with Islamists should be a cause for concern for India. The Prime Minister-elect is known to be close to the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and considers the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to be an electoral ally. The latter has been held responsible for a slew of attacks on minorities and Mr Sharif has scarcely, if ever, raised his voice in condemnation. And that is not all, when the Taliban came to power in Kabul, Mr Sharif’s Government in Islamabad was one of the few that recognised it.

Now, add to this the fact that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan did not attack the PML(N) during this election because it said it had no problems with the party, and a murky picture of the dangerous opportunist politics emerges. Especially now that the PML(N) is in power, make no mistake that the Taliban, who like to view themselves as the king-makers, will seek to extract more than just their pound of flesh from Mr Sharif and his Government.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 16, 2013)

Lessons This Tragedy Teaches

One can only hope that Sarabjit's sad story and his enormous suffering will move the establishments in both India and Pakistan to seriously reconsider the manner in which they treat each other's prisoners. Humanity shouldn’t be sacrificed

Less than a week after he was brutally attacked with bricks and iron rods by his fellow inmates at Lahore’s Kot Lakhpat prison, 49-year-old Sarabjit Singh is barely alive. His doctors at the state-run Jinnah Hospital have already declared him to be brain dead, and it is the crucial life-support system that keeps his heart pumping. Singh’s family has demanded that he be transferred to India so that he may receive better medical care, and the Union Ministry for External Affairs has reportedly gone through the motions of taking up that demand with the Pakistani regime. However, it is unlikely that the latter will cooperate.

As of now, there is a caretaker Government in charge in Pakistan and it has only the limited mandate of ensuring that the general election scheduled for May 11 is held in a free and fair manner. This gives an already reluctant Islamabad ample excuse to not take a decision either against or in favour of moving Singh to India. In all fairness, there is not much that New Delhi can do about it at this point anyway — more so, since mere diplomatic flexing is not expected to get it much leverage with Islamabad. And so it is, that once again India has been caught completely unaware and is now totally confused about how best to respond to the situation.

And yet, it did not have to be like this. Gruesome and gut-wrenching as it was, the April 26 attack on Sarabjit Singh was predictable. In fact, according to some news reports, Singh’s lawyer, Mr Awais Shaikh, had written a number of letters to the prison authorities as well as to high-level Government officials that his client had received death threats from some of the inmates as well as from jihadigroups.

These threats were made ostensibly in retaliation to the hangings of Ajmal Kasab, the Pakistani terrorist convicted for his role in the 26/11 terror attack, and Afzal Guru, the Kashmiri separatist who was sentenced to death for master-minding the 2001 Parliament attack. While Kasab was hanged on November 21, 2012, Guru’s sentence was carried out earlier this year on February 9. It is important to note in this context that after Guru’s hanging, Pakistan’s National Assembly had passed a resolution condemning the execution; in response, India also adopted a parliamentary resolution condemning Pakistan’s needless interference in its sovereign affairs.

In other words, the fact that Singh could have been targeted in Pakistan for the hanging of Kasab and Guru, was something that not only the Indian authorities should have foreseen (and taken up proactively with their Pakistani counterparts), but also one that the Pakistani authorities should have prepared for. After all, if, after the attack on Singh, India can increase security for Pakistani prisoners lodged in its own jails without Islamabad’s prodding, then why couldn’t the Pakistanis have done the same for their Indian inmates?

Kot Lakhpat prison officials were duty-bound to ensure the safety of Singh as much as they were responsible for the security of the other inmates under their charge. It is imperative that the Pakistani Government investigate and punish the officials for such serious dereliction of duty — especially since Singh is not the first Indian prisoner to have come under attack while being under its watch. In January this year, Chambail Singh, a native of Pragwal in Jammu & Kashmir, was reportedly beaten to death by prison staff at the same Kot Lakhpat jail. Chambail Singh had been convicted on charges of espionage and was serving his time at the time of the attack. The Indian High Commission in Pakistan was only informed of his death, and no other details were given. More than four months later, it is still unclear if a post-mortem was ever conducted — requests for such reports from even Union Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid have been ignored — and if any action was taken against the errant officials.

Against this backdrop, the Pakistani Government must also look into allegations that prison authorities were in fact actively involved in the brutal attack on Sarabjit Singh as well. These allegations gain further credence when viewed alongside Indian intelligence reports that the attack on Singh was ordered by the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. If this was indeed the case, then it is unlikely that the attack could have been carried out without a wink-and-a-nod from the prison authorities, if not their bosses higher up in the establishment.

The fact is that both India and Pakistan have historically been guilty of using prisoners from the other country as pawns in their own petty political games. Take Sarabjit Singh’s case as an example: Convicted for his alleged role in four bomb blasts in Lahore and Islamabad in 1990 in which 14 people were killed, Singh was sentenced to death in 1991.

But in 2008, the new Government in Pakistan was willing take into consideration his repeated pleas that he had been a victim of mistaken identity and that his sentence should be commuted to a life term — which would also be seen as a goodwill gesture to India. But then President Pervez Musharraf turned down Singh’s mercy plea, although the convict’s hanging was postponed for an indefinite period.

It was only much later in 2012 that Singh’s sentence was finally commuted by President Asif Ali Zardari. At that time, Singh was in fact supposed to be released as part of a prisoner swap deal, but at the last moment, another Indian convict was freed, resulting in much confusion in the process.

There are similar stories playing out on this side of the border too. Pakistani scientist Khalil Chisti, for example, spent two decades imprisoned in India on murder charges, until he was released following an order of the Supreme Court on December 12, 2012. Prior to that, the President of Pakistan had appealed to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for Chisti’s release on humanitarian grounds, but that had done little to help his case.

The way things stand now, there is little that can be done to help Sarabjit Singh’s condition. However, one can only hope that his story and his suffering will move the establishments in both India and Pakistan to seriously reconsider the manner in which they treat each other’s prisoners. Singh may have been accused of terrorism against the state of Pakistan, but there are many others who are lodged in Pakistani and Indian jails for lesser crimes — such as straying across the border or fishing in alien territory. They deserve a better deal.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 2, 2013.)