Calvinball plays out in Egypt

The euphoria over the appointment of Egypt’s first democratically elected President has been dampened by the Army’s efforts to emasculate that high office, prompting speculation of a soft coup. But there’s no clear winner. Just an open playing field and a game without any rules

The world had seen it before. The million-strong crowd, the triumphant flag waving, the sloganeering, the firecrackers and the life-size posters, and the relentless victory dance. The images that were broadcast from Egypt this past Sunday, when the name of that country’s first democratically elected President was announced, were both expectedly and yet ironically similar to the ones that had flickered on our screens 14 months ago when a popular pro-democracy movement led to the ouster of Egypt’s long-serving autocrat. The process of democratic transition that had started then with the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak, in effect came full circle on Sunday with the appointment of his successor — Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi. Expectedly then, the day’s celebrations matched in fervour and tenor the victory pitch of February 2011. But given the fact that Mr Morsi’s high office has already been emasculated by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces — the handful of Army Generals who currently run the country —Sunday’s euphoric revelry over a process that had surely started with a bang but has now been reduced to a whimper seemed rather silly.

SCAF’s sudden diktat came last week just as the counting of votes polled on June 16 and 17 had got underway. Issued in the form of an amendment to the original Constitutional Declaration, it severely limits the powers of the President, denying him not just oversight over the military but also negating his control over the key Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Moreover, through the amendment, SCAF has also conveniently accorded to itself sweeping powers over the Constitution drafting process that is yet to begin. And that is not all. Only days before the presidential election began, SCAF nullified a previous election law that disqualified a majority of Egypt’s elected legislators and effectively dismantled Parliament — this time through the Supreme Constitutional Court.

The popular mood was further dampened by the fact that Egypt found itself faced with two unpalatable choices for the post of President. With most of the leading candidates having been thrown out of the race on flimsy grounds in the first round itself, it was the Muslim Brotherhood’s second-choice candidate, Mr Morsi, and the military’s pro-regime candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, who found themselves catapulted to the forefront.

For many Egyptians, this last round polling was not about voting for a leader but against another. On the one hand was Mr Morsi — an unremarkable Muslim Brotherhood functionary barely known outside of his party offices with little political experience. On the other hand was Mr Shafiq — the military-backed, former Air Force commander who had briefly served as Mubarak’s last Prime Minister in the heady days of the ‘revolution’ in 2011. The deeply polarising nature of the presidential run-off was evident in the final votes tally. While Mr Morsi garnered 52 per cent of the votes, Mr Shafiq was snapping at his heels at 48 per cent. It was a close fight that was followed by a nail-biting week of anxiety as SCAF delayed the announcement of the results, leading to speculation of electoral fraud.

After all, the military had been understandably nervous of the Muslim Brotherhood capturing a lion’s share of the Egyptian political space. Little else explains its rash decisions to abolish the democratically elected Parliament where the Islamists held an overwhelming majority of the seats, and soon after clip the wings of the President at a time when there was a very real possibility that a member of the Brotherhood would occupy the high office.

There were also legitimate concerns that the SCAF might fudge the results and install Mr Shafiq as President. But manipulating an election is not that easy — especially not when the numbers have already been leaked and there are too many independent observers. Also, a Shafiq presidency would have earned the military tremendous public wrath that could have led to violence and instability.

For now, it seems like the SCAF chose to play safe and go with Mr Morsi as the President. However, that does not in any way diminish the chances of a showdown between the two parties. Already, a confrontation is brewing with Mr Morsi insisting that he be sworn in by a Parliament that, according to the SCAF, does not even exist. But then again, the Speaker of the House has made clear that he does not consider Parliament to be dissolved and, therefore, will be holding sessions as usual!

The situation remains fluid. The present is still unravelling and it is next to impossible to predict the future. Talks of an ‘Islamist winter’ and a soft coup by the military abound. Many have wondered if Egypt will go back to being a military dictatorship pretending to be a democracy. Others remain more concerned about the kind of governance Mr Morsi will provide. Will he protect Egypt’s Coptic Christians or will he impose shari’ah law that will discriminate against women and religious minorities? Will the Brotherhood form radical alliances with other Islamist groups across the region? Will there be the possibility of war with Israel?

But these are questions for the future. For now, there are more pressing concerns, such as how the new President-elect will even function without a Parliament and a Constitution, or how he will share political space with the military? There is no doubt that both the military and the Muslim Brotherhood need each other for their survival. And while they will do well to learn to live with each other, the judiciary, as the third key player in this situation will also have to act more responsibly. In recent months, it has shown an unending capacity for the imaginative and the ludicrous that has significantly eroded its credibility and rendered it a wild card of sorts.

At this time, anything is possible. There is no definite authoritative figure, no laws, no goals, and no principles — just an open playing field. As a commentator recently observed, the situation in Egypt is akin to a game of Calvinball — the game that has no rules. Introduced by Bill Watterson in his widely popular comic strip Calvin and Hobbes, in this game players make up the rules as they play along. Through the course of the game, players change, goals change, scoring techniques change. To win, the players have to respond quickly, imaginatively and effectively to the ever changing circumstances.

The game sometimes resembles other sports such as football but often turns out to be something entirely different — much like Egypt seems to be in the process of a democratic transition but no one really knows how the ‘revolution’ will actually play out. In the comic strip, a game of Calvinball provides much humour as ball players become spies and spies become double agents with hidden goal posts. The situation in Egypt too would have been rather funny given how power has shifted from Mubarak to the military to Morsi and now may be back to the military. Only, if it had not been so confusing.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 28, 2012.)

Building an equal partnership

US must take India’s concerns into account if it wants the latter to be a security anchor against China

That there is a nice ring to lofty statements about the shared ideals and values between the world’s largest democracy and the world’s most powerful democracy is without a doubt, much like all the talk about deepening ties between these two countries allows for some solid diplomatic bonhomie. But rhetoric, no matter how pleasant and passionate, does not necessarily convert into good policy. It is against this backdrop that the Third India-US Strategic Dialogue that Union Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna co-chaired with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington, DC on June 13 must be viewed.

The high-level, capstone dialogue between the two countries was instituted in 2010 to promote greater cooperation between the two countries and broaden the scope of bilateral relations. In other words, it is here that the basic framework of India-US relations is defined and demarcated, and then re-defined. The current round of talks, however, has come at a particularly interesting time in the history of the India-US relations.

After a lukewarm start in the late 1990s, ties between India and the US were only strengthened in this past decade. Throughout the mid-2000s, the Bush Administration freely courted New Delhi — their alliance culminating in the groundbreaking India-US civil nuclear energy agreement — but by the time the Obama Administration came to power in 2008, the honeymoon was decidedly over. Washington’s continued pandering to Islamabad, for one, was beginning to take a toll on its relations with New Delhi.

Since then, however, the situation has changed significantly with the US now making it amply clear that it wishes for India to take on a greater role as an ‘ally’.  For instance, during his recent visit to India last week, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta talked at length about India’s importance in the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. More importantly, he also described India as the “linchpin” of the US’s new foreign strategy which envisions a “pivot to Asia”. Introduced earlier this year, the strategy is essentially America’s response to a changing world order — notably to China’s alarming growth as an economic and military powerhouse that has come at a time when its own influence is waning. Today, as Washington attempts to re-calibrate its relations with Beijing, it has decided to hedge its bet with New Delhi.

Now, the ball is in India’s court. If New Delhi indeed wishes to be part of this new gameplan, the chatter coming out of Washington’s power corridoors is that the former must do more to show greater commitment — it must prove that it is indeed willing to be US’s partner. India’s response in this situation is a definite policy challenge, and how exactly Mr Krishna and his delegation rise to the occasion is to be seen. Still, the team will do well to lay down some ground rules that delineate what exactly it is that New Delhi wants from the US.

Here are the top five non-negotiables that must feature on Mr Krishna’s agenda.

First: Don’t ask us to fight your war with China.

Although Washington will never say it in as many words, what it essentially wants from India is a positive affirmation that in case of a US-China military stand-off (or an outright war, which is of course quite unlikely), New Delhi will stand by its side. That is the crux of the whole “linchpin” narrative. But India has its own issues with China that range from long-festering border disputes to disagreements over sovereign rights in the South China Sea. These again have to be balanced with the fact that today China is India’s biggest trading partner — bigger than the US even. Plus, China is in India’s immediate neighbourhood and, simply put, New Delhi cannot afford to have a confrontational relationship with Beijing for it will be at the cost of our national interest. Washington must understand and acknowledge that.

Second: Stop bullying us over Iran

New Delhi is already doing as much as it possibly can in this situation — it has cut down on its Iranian oil imports as desired by Washington so as to squeeze Tehran over its controversial nuclear programme — but India has its limits too. We don’t like the idea of a bomb in the hands of the Ayatollah anymore than the Americans do, but the fact of the matter is that India needs Iran to meet its rapidly growing energy demands. As an emerging market economy, it is simply not possible for India to completely give up on cheap Iranian oil. Further, Tehran also provides New Delhi key access to the rest of Central Asia and finally, there is no denying that the two share a cultural relationship that goes back centuries. If Washington expects New Delhi to publicly censure Tehran, especially at a time when there is little proof that the former’s own policy of sanctions is working, it really is asking for too much.

Third: Please turn off the Pakistani aid tap, for a change.

If anything , the events of this past year — from the Raymond Davis episode and the unilateral raid that killed Osama bin Laden to the attack on Western targets in Afghanistan by Pakistani militants and the shutting of Nato supply routes — have made it crystal clear that billions of dollars in American aid have bought Washington absolutely no leverage, either in Islamabad or in Rawalpindi. Since the money is literally going down the drain to ultimately fund terror activities that hurt both US and Indian interests, New Delhi must insist that Washington turn off the aid tap. And that should serve as the first step in a long process of holding Pakistan accountable for its many crimes.

Fourth: Clean up the mess in Afghanistan before you leave from there.

There is also no denying that the locals are far from ready to protect their country from the Taliban. And it is not just the security forces but even Afghanistan’s political class is unprepared to resist a Taliban takeover that is sure to happen once Nato troops leave that country in 2014. Hence, it is imperative that India impress upon the US that a rushed exit from Afghanistan will only undo hard-earned gains in the region. If New Delhi fails to do, it will be the one left holding the can afterwards.

Fifth: Give us space and time.

Just like in a successful marriage both partners need adequate personal space and enough time to grow and eventually find their place in the relationship, the same rules apply here too. India has shown that it is committed to building a strong alliance with the US but it must be allowed to do so on its own terms. New Delhi must be an equal partner in its ties with Washington — and not a subordinate member of a group led by the US, Cold War-style.

Ultimately, the US must acknowledge that only an independent and empowered India can make for an effective partner.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 14.)

Egypt's last Pharaoh turns prisoner

Now, that country must decide if it wants an Islamist or a military man as President

Bedridden, he had been wheeled into the Cairo courtroom cage on a hospital gurney replete with white sheets and white pillow covers. His eyes may have been hidden behind dark glasses but his arms remained crossed defiantly against his chest. On that fateful Saturday evening, as the judge sentenced him to a life in prison, Hosni Mubarak’s stern, almost stoic, face betrayed no emotion.

No, it was not until the former Egyptian strongman realised that he had been flown to the high-security Torah Prison in Cairo that he finally broke down. Like a belligerent child on its first day of school, the 83-year-old Mubarak refused to be taken off the helicopter. Instead, he demanded that he be taken to the military-run International Health Centre where he had been detained in a luxury suite for the most part of his nine-month-long trial. Even as his sons and aides intervened, the situation took a turn for the worse as a “surprise health crisis” (as it has been commonly described in the media) ensued.

It was not until after two hours that Mubarak finally relented. He was then taken to his cell located in the hospital wing of Torah Prison where he is currently lodged. In the days since then, the former President, who had ruled the country with an iron fist for three decade, has been given the prison’s regulation blue uniform (one that he initially refused to wear but now sports grudgingly) as well as assigned a prison number. He has also been allowed to be tended by doctors of his choice, and his sons, who are detained in the same prison on charges of insider trading, have been moved closer to his cell for company. Still, the former President, who liked to see himself as an Egyptian Pharaoh, has had a tough time accepting his new life as a prisoner. He has complained of maltreatment while prison officials report that his health has been deteriorating, that he suffers from depression and often refuses to take his medicines. On Tuesday, after he collapsed several times due to breathing trouble, he in fact had to be put on the ventilator.

But even as Mubarak struggles to adjust to a new routine that includes three meals a day and medical assistance but few other luxuries, outside the gates of Torah Prison a struggle of a very different kind has been unfolding.

The people of Egypt are deeply disappointed by the Mubarak verdict and have once again returned to the streets to reclaim their hard-fought revolution. On Tuesday, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in Cairo’s iconic Tahrir Square to demand a death sentence for the convicted. The overwhelming feeling is that the Mubarak trial has been a sham. This, of course, is not far from the truth.

That Mubarak was indeed responsible for many crimes of corruption and human rights violations committed over a period of three decades is beyond doubt. Yet, the charges that were brought against him were vague and lacked legal substance. Furthermore, they were poorly supported by the prosecution that failed to provide strong evidence of Mubarak’s alleged crimes. The verdict that was delivered on Saturday, unsurprisingly then, reflects the chaotic and haphazard manner in which the Mubarak trial was conducted.

It sentences Mubarak and his former Interior Minister to prison for killing protesters during the pro-democracy movement of 2011 that ousted the long-serving President from office but lets off the hook the six police officials who were directly responsible for carrying out the orders. Additionally, it also clears Mubarak and his sons of many of the corruption charges that were levelled against them. And don’t be surprised if the verdict on the killing of protesters is also turned on appeal. Egyptian lawmakers feel this is a definite possibility, at least from the legal point of view, because ultimately the case that has been put together against Mubarak is, by common consent, weak and can easily be ripped apart.

To anybody with an independent eye, it should be clear that the Mubarak trial was essentially a smokescreen put up by the military — which helped ease Mubarak out of office and currently runs the country through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces — to soothe the frayed nerves of an increasingly polarised Egyptian public. The mob at Tahrir has long been baying for Mubarak’s blood; by offering him to the public as a grand sacrifice of sorts, the military which lost much public support since last year (when it was viewed as a hero for siding with the protesters) has not only tried to win over the people but also hopes that it would deflect attention from its own crimes. However, it seems to have achieved only limited results which have dangerous consequences.

Not only has the trial verdict unleashed popular anger on the streets, it has served as an easy political tool that is being manipulated by Egypt’s fractured political class to further vested interests at this crucial time of democratic transition. Earlier this year, Egypt held its first genuinely free and fair elections in decades to find itself a new President. Twelve candidates fought it out, including Islamists and secularists, Leftists and communists, and lawyers and activists. The two leaders who got the most votes — Mohammed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq — are scheduled to face each other again in a run-off election on June 16 and 17. The winner will then be declared Egypt’s new President.

The problem is that Egypt does not want either candidate as its President. While Mr Morsi is an unremarkable leader put up by the Muslim Brotherhood after its initial firebrand choice was disqualified, Mr Shafiq is a former Air Chief who briefly served as Mubarak’s Prime Minister in the days before the then President stepped down from office. Both claim to want to guide Egypt on a new path, but neither claim has cut ice with the public.

On his part, Mr Morsi has tried to portray himself as a man of the revolution but has failed to convince the people. It is widely accepted that the Muslim Brotherhood kept away from the protests last year but has since gate-crashed the Tahrir party. Mr Shafiq, on the other hand, has tried to distance himself from the old regime to which he belongs, highlighting instead his secular leadership credentials. But the people still see him as a Mubarak-era official and that does not augur well for his presidential campaign. Generally speaking, there is no saying who will win the upcoming election — no, not while Egypt is still caught in an identity crisis of its own.

Meanwhile, the military continues to keep a watch from the wings — waiting for the right moment (that will include just the right amount of chaos and anarchy) to take charge, for good. Already, the Council has set an absurd 48-hour deadline for political parties to finalise the formation of a 100-member panel to write a new Constitution. Or else, it has threatened to draw up its own blueprint signalling the beginning of an all new era in Egyptian politics. A great amount of uncertainty, then, awaits Egypt.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on June 7, 2012.)