Nasheed pins hope on democracy

President of Maldives Mohamed Nasheed, ousted in a coup, says an early election is the only solution

On the intervening night of February 6 and 7, the first democratically-elected President of Maldives, Mr Mohamed Nasheed, was ousted from power in a military coup engineered by those loyal to his Islamist predecessor, Mr Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the autocrat who ruled the archipelago for three decades. In the months since, Mr Gayoom has returned to the Maldives, his children and loyaltists have taken up high positions in the new Government while Mr Nasheed continues to campaign extensively for a fresh election to restore democracy.

Recently, he was in India to build greater support for his movement and convince New Delhi that wisdom lies in supporting him. He spoke to The Pioneer about the coup that cost him his presidency, how he plans to return to power, the relationship he hopes to build with India and the extent of the much talked about Chinese ‘influence’ on Maldives. The following are excerpts from the interview:

Q: The exact order of events leading up to the coup in February still remains hazy. Please take us through that night and the previous day as it happened.

A: On February 6, top battalions of riot police, without command and without control, left the barracks and went to the MDP Assembly home, attacked our party workers and ransacked the place. Then they went into the military headquarters and sat in front of it. There were about 70 of them. The Chief of Police told me to see if the military could restrain them. So I rang the military around 11.30 pm and they said ‘yes’. But by 5 am the next day, nothing had been done.

So I went to see what was going on. When I went there I saw that the place was deserted except for the Generals who were all in plainclothes and about 200 soldiers. Everybody else was on leave, I was told. The ones who were there were clearly in league with the riotous police, and by evening their numbers had swelled to about 500. These 500 people wanted to storm the military headquarters while I was in there.

I was just inches away from being mobbed, so I told them to take me to the President’s office and that I would resign there. In fact, I was planning to see if I could escape from that place. So they escorted me to the President’s office and the situation there was no different. The military and the police were everywhere. I was given a piece of paper and I wrote my resignation note. They told me to go out on TV. Then, afterwards, they took me to the President’s residence and told me to stay there for three days.

I wasn’t allowed to speak to anyone but still around seven that evening I was able to call upon the more loyal elements in the military and slip out of there. Then, I went to my family residence where I almost collapsed from exhaustion. The next day I called my party together and we went public with my side of the story. If this wasn’t a coup, then I am yet to understand what is a coup.

Q: Were you expecting this coup?

A: Two weeks prior to this, the intelligence chief was removed from his post and he had written to me a seven-page letter saying that this was in the brewing. So, yes, I was aware of this and many such schemings by the old regime trying to get a hold on us.

Q: How difficult do you think it will now be to remove the new Government, given that it is packed with members who are deeply entrenched in the system?

A: Well, the more time we give them without an election, the more entrenched they become. But I think if we have an election, we will win. The people of Maldives have seen what has happened to us, they know the truth.

You know, I was first elected as secretary of a municipal ward in Male and the Government arrested me soon after. Then, the people elected me as their MP from Male and again the Government arrested me. Now that the the people have elected me as their President, this has happened. The people understand what is going on. Also, we may think that these Generals have a lot of power and support, but ordinary people detest that kind of authoritarian power.

Q: Do you think if elections are held too soon there will be violence?

A: I think if you don’t have elections soon, then there will be violence. I always believe that asking the people is the proper way of consolidating democracy. I remember there being elections in Serbia while it was bombed; in Sri Lanka through 25 years of conflict — that’s why the Government there has survived. Now, take the example of Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvadore, where they didn’t have elections, and it has been much more difficult for those countries to come out of the cycle of violence.

Q: How do you think Maldives can shake off its dictatorial past?

A: It is easy to remove a dictator but it is much more difficult to flush out the remnants of dictatorship. Still, one of the ways to do it is through elections. So we have parliamentary elections, local council elections, school elections, board elections — the more the participation of the people, the more entrenched the democracy.

Q: If you return to power, what are the steps you will take to avoid such a situation from happening again?

A: We need to reform the judiciary, the military and the police. For instance, within the police we should have more community policing and less of such riot police with heavy gear and weapons. The Maldives is a small country, we don’t need this. We need to put in place proper checks and balances to avoid slips from democratic gains.

Q: How do you think India has responded to the crisis?

A: I think India dropped a catch initially, but in hindsight I understand its limitations in the region. It cannot come across as the ‘Big Brother’. If it did, in the Maldives for instance, Mr Gayoom would say that India is a bully. So it has to be mindful of that. Of course, in my frustration I wanted India to be more robust in action, but as someone who has been in Government I understand the Prime Minister’s difficulties.

Also, India has been working hard since then, much of it behind the scene. We hope that the establishment as a whole will work on the issue; that the Indian Government’s agencies, not necessarily the politicians, will take this forward. Still, I must say that often I find it is the politicians who have the answers and not the bureaucrats.

Q: Did you reach out to India?

A: Yes, my National Security Adviser got in touch with New Delhi, but I don’t think there was anything that could have been done at that time. I think India was hasty in recognising the new Government, but that’s about it.

Q: What about your Government’s dealings with the Chinese? What kind of influence does Beijing wield in Male?

A: We have never had any dealings with the Chinese Government. When we came into power we had a defence agreement with the Chinese Government that needed renewal. It had been sitting on my desk for many months and I had not signed that document.

I don’t know how receptive the Chinese are towards us but we are very clear about whom we want to be friends with. I am very clear about how we should be running our foreign policy. It’s to get hold of a friend and be nice to that friend. We have chosen India as our friend and that choice is not dependent on our own personal fortunes, but on the principles that we, as a country, want to nurture.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 26, 2012.)

Arab Spring comes to Burma first

With its structured, top-down reform process, Burma has a far better chance at democracy than West Asia

If, on April 23 as scheduled, Burma’s best known dissident Aung San Suu Kyi is indeed sworn in as a newly-elected Member of Parliament, it will undoubtedly be a watershed moment in that country’s history. Ms Suu Kyi has been a glorious icon of democracy. For her to finally occupy a seat in her country’s Parliament is by far the most potent symbol of democratic reform that could have possibly come from Burma which, after five decades of military rule, has now launched a process of top-down political transition.


Burma’s move towards democracy began last year when the country’s long serving Commander-in-Chief Senior General Than Shwe resigned from his position as head of state and handed over the reins to General U Thein Sein. By all accounts, it was a carefully guided and tightly controlled change-of-guard that went so far as to manipulate the general election of November 2010 as well as handpick the successor. No wonder then, when Mr Thein Sein was sworn as President in March 2011, Burma and the rest of the world were suspicious, if not outright dismissive, of his bold assurances of political and economic reform. The mild mannered President was after all a career soldier who had only recently shed his military uniform to take up position in the country’s new semi-civilian Government. Democracy in Burma was still a long way off, critics had argued.


That was March 2011. Around the same time, large-scale popular protests by disgruntled masses had brought down deeply entrenched regimes in Arabia and were threatening to dismantle more in the region. Tunisia’s Ben Ali had already fled to Saudi Arabia, while Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak had left office after his presidency was besieged by an 18-day long protest movement beginning at Tahrir Square. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi was facing the biggest challenge ever to his 40-year-long leadership stint; in Yemen, then President Abdullah Saleh’s presidency was tottering, while in Syria the supposedly reformist President Bashar al-Assad was coming under increasing pressure to allow for a more open and inclusive society. The popular narrative of 2011 was that democracy was finally coming to Arabia. Once the Libyan despot was deposed, the Yemeni President forced in the footsteps of his Egyptian counterpart and the Syrian leader persuaded to accelerate his reform process, large parts of West Asia which had for so long resisted political change, would finally embark on the path to democracy.


Unarguably, the big story of democratic transition — made almost irresistible by its fable-like moral framework of how the good guys triumphed over the bad — was supposed to be playing out in Arabian desert, not in the distance hinterland of Burma.


In reality, however, that has far from been the case. Today, a little more than a year after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ came to West Asia, democracy is still elusive in the region. Autocrats there have been replaced by Islamists or entire countries have been pushed the brink of civil war and anarchy. Talk of a long and bitter Arab Winter now dominates all narative.


In Burma, however, a definite whiff of optimism is in the air. The new President had promised to overhaul the country’s dilapidated political structure, its decrepit economy and its decaying social fabric and has actually managed to walk the talk. Mr Thein Sein’s nominally civilian Government has indeed put in place a wide-ranging reform process, as the International Crisis Group detailed in a recent report.

For instance, in his March 2011 speech, the President had promised to reach out to political dissidents. Weeks later, he made good on that promise by offering the olive branch to Ms Suu Kyi, his establishment’s biggest critic. Indeed, Ms Suu Kyi’s agreeing to return to mainstream Burmese politics that she had long since boycotted, not only signalled a huge step towards political reconciliation but was also the strongest affirmation of Mr Thein Sein’s commitment to democracy.


Between March 2011 and 2012, the Burmese Government released almost all its political prisoners. In fact, some 300 of them were freed in January this year to allow them to participate in the April by-election. Also, unlike in the past, when released political prisoners continued to be under strict Government scrutiny, this time they have been able to easily resume their political activities freely and even travel abroad.


Under Mr Thein Sein’s watch, the Burmese legislatures have also emerged as key drivers of reform, taking tremendous initiatives to legislate on democratic rights and economic reforms. Most heartening perhaps is the fact that the country’s Parliament has shown a remarkably bipartisan spirit. The Opposition still has only a small share of seats there, but its motions have received overwhelming support from the military-backed ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, and vice-versa.


Furthermore, the new Government has also expanded several basic freedoms. Blocks on the internet have been removed and media censorship has been largely done away with. Business, entertainment and sports related news can now be published without being pre-screened; political articles still have to be sent to the censor board although there is talk that the board will abolished by the end of the year and replaced by a self-regulatory Press Council.


That apart, a largely successful attempt has also been made to reconcile with nearly all ethnic armed groups with at least 11 ceasefire agreements having been put in place. The Kanchin Independence Organ-isation is the only major group with which an agreement is yet to be reached, but community leaders agree that they have had fruitful talks with the Government. On the economic front too, there have been changes in the right direction such as a series of tax reforms and other measures to strengthen the Burmese currency, the kyat. Indeed, a managed float of the kyat at the start of this fiscal year was perhaps the most important step taken towards restructuring the Burmese economy.


Finally, the much talked-about threat from hardliners within the party has also proved to be a false alarm. Of course, there are individuals from the old guard whose interests will be hurt as the reforms get underway, and they may even succeed in scuttling some of these measures. But these people do not form a well-defined group. Overall, it is highly unlikely that these elements will ever coalesce in a manner that could possibly threaten Burma’s transition to democracy. After all, the process was internally initiated, not externally imposed upon the country.


Make no mistake: If Burma is walking the path of reform today, it is because the country’s ruling elite — not just one or two reform-minded leaders — collectively believe that it is time to restructure and rebuild. It is precisely because such a broad-based buy-in into the reform process exists that its reversal is highly improbable.


This does not mean that Burma will face no challenges in the years ahead. It most definitely will, but for now, that country has a far better chance at democracy than any other nation which has been hit by the ‘Arab Spring’ wave.


(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 19, 2012.)

A good idea killed by bad politics

UPA Government wants to interfere in the functioning of even those private schools that are not dependent on public funds. Here is a fact-check

The Supreme Court’s recent ruling on a controversial provision in the Right to Education Act, 2009 has left parents, students, teachers and school owners across the country confused about how exactly it will effect them. If school owners are worried about how to admit these students, parents want to know if they will now have to pay higher school fees while teachers are unsure if they will have to put in extra hours for the new students. This section attempts to answer all those questions and more:

What is the RTE?

It is the Right to Education Act, 2009, which makes access to education a Fundamental Right for every Indian child between the age of six and 14 years under Article 21(A) of the Constitution. The Act describes the modalities for free and compulsory education to every child in this age group.

What is the current brouhaha over the recent Supreme Court judgement all about?

The Supreme Court judgement essentially upholds an important clause in the RTE that makes it compulsory for even private schools that do not receive Government funding to reserve 25 per cent of their seats (in nursery) for children belonging to ‘economically backward’ families. Private unaided schools had earlier argued that such a clause was unconstitutional, but that argument has been dismissed by the apex court.

Does this clause apply to all schools in India?

Yes, for the most part, the ruling applies to all schools irrespective of which board they are affiliated to, which State they are located in and whether they are Government or private-funded. However, the Supreme Court ruling exempts minority institutions. Also, for schools that have both day scholars and boarders, the 25 per cent reservation shall apply only to day scholars.

When does the reservation ruling come into effect?

Technically, the 25 per cent reservation clause has been in effect since the Act came into being in 2010. Government schools, for instance, are already supposed to implement the clause. However, most private schools had chosen to challenge it. Furthermore, once the clause was disputed in the Supreme Court, school authorities argued that it would be irresponsible to admit poor children, as required by law, and then turn them away if the Court ruled the other way. Now, the ruling will have effect from the upcoming academic session of 2012-2013.

Who have been defined as ‘economically backward’ children?

Children who belong to households that earn less than one lakh rupees per year annually are deemed to be economically backward. However, it remains unclear what exactly constitutes a ‘household’.

Who is paying for the education of these children?

The Government has promised to pay for these children. The money will come from the State Government but will only be to the extent of the State’s own per child allocation for education. In Delhi, for instance, that comes to a little more than `1100 per child per month. If the school charges fees higher than that, as is most often the case, then the institution will have to bear the financial deficit.

What adverse impact can the  ruling have?

Since the deficit will only grow each year with more number of free students in every school, a decade from now every class in every school will have 25 per cent non-paying students. Either the other fee-paying parents will have to pay up the deficit or schools will simply have to shut down.

Will the Right to Education Act lead to Government interference in the management of private schools?

This is highly possible. If the Government is paying, even partly, for the education of some students, it could still want access to the school’s financial records.

Will these children study alongside other fee-paying children or will they be taught separately?

All students will study together in the same class. In this way, the Government claims to do away with social inequality and bring about greater inclusiveness.

Why can’t the Government teach these children in its own schools at similarly subsidised rates?

The Government knows that its own schools are a mess. There is barely any infrastructure, teachers rarely come to class, drop out rates are alarming — the list goes on. Naturally, even many poor parents don’t want their children to go to these schools. Conveniently, then the Government has now brought private schools that provide quality education, under the ambit of the RTE; hoping that they would be able to do better where it has failed so miserable.

(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 17, 2012.)

Not just another brick in the wall

At its fourth summit, BRICS presented an alternative to the Western narrative of international affairs. It was more representative of the developing world's concerns, and was needed not only to counter the West, but also to give a voice to the rest who are usually excluded

As the fourth annual BRICS summit concluded in New Delhi last week, one of the most significant questions that emerged was: Will it shift the global power centre from the West to within itself? In response, however, much of the same observations made in the past years about this odd five-country grouping, that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, were repeated. Yes, the group presents an emerging global force; no, the members are too disparate to make an impact; yes, they will work together to further their economic interests; no, they will be held back by their competing, even conflicting, interests. The fact remains that even four years after BRIC came into existence — the ‘S’ for South Africa was added a year later in 2010 — the world still seems to be largely undecided about how the group will shape up.


As of now, the developed world is unsure if the group will eventually morph into an alternative power structure that could potentially challenge its own authority (that, many believe, is already on the wane) in the international arena. That explains the West’s lukewarm response to the New Delhi summit. The developing world, on the other hand, remains sceptical about the group’s effectiveness; many are convinced that BRICS will devolve into a SAARC-like regional organisation with limited influence rather than become the EU-like power bloc it imagines itself to become.


It is still too early to either hail BRICS as the ‘next big thing’ in international politics or write it off as, well, just another brick in the wall. Still, there is a general agreement that, for the most part, BRICS has been making the right kind of noises. The group’s focus on greater economic cooperation and improved trade relations within the bloc, for instance, is bang on target.


As emerging global powerhouses (even though South Africa is still only a regional player at best and Russia’s growth rate is no longer as promising as it was when Goldman Sachs included that country into the group) these countries together account for 40 per cent of the global GDP and have been credited for 50 per cent of the world’s economic growth in the past decade. As they strive to find their niche in the global arena, it is imperative that they strengthen their economic relations. Towards that end, BRICS’ decision to settle trade transactions within the group in local currencies is also a game changer. Already, stock exchanges in BRICS countries have begun cross-listing their equity benchmark index derivatives since March 30. Not only does this encourage trading within the group, it also significantly protects the countries from financial pressures originating in the West.


Furthermore, the plan to set up a BRICS development bank is a step in the right direction. If well executed, such an institution will have the potential to challenge the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — two multilateral financial institutions that not only dominate global finance but also serve as monetary levers to further Western interests.


But, if BRICS hit the mark with intra-group economic cooperation, it failed to stand up the challenge when it came to demanding reforms within the global financial architecture. For instance, even though, the Delhi Declaration calls upon the IMF and the World Bank to choose their heads on the basis of merit, it steers clear of endorsing the ‘developing world candidate’ — Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala — for the post of president of the World Bank. This is most disappointing.


A reputed economist, Ms Okonjo-Iweala, has extensive experience in development economics and boasts of a stellar record for the years that she served the World Bank as its managing director. In any other situation, she would have gotten the job of president hands down. But, given the skewed structuring of the World Bank, it is the candidate endorsed by the US — Mr Jim Yong Kim, a Korean-American global health expert — who will probably take over from outgoing president Robert Zoellick. By shying away from putting its full weight behind Ms Okonjo-Iweala, BRICS has lost a golden opportunity to show to the world the kind of power it can collectively wield.


But then again, if BRICS has faltered in its response to the World Bank situation, it has gained brownie points for taking a unified stand on the Syrian crisis and the Iranian dispute. By insisting on a Syria-led democratic transition process in that country, BRICS has made clear that it does not favour a Western military intervention of the kind that was carried out in Libya. In the case of Iran, it has warned against escalating tensions and underlined Tehran’s right to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme. Overall, BRICS has successfully presented an alternative to the Western narrative of international affairs that no doubt is much more representative of the concerns of the developing world. This was much needed — not really to counter the West but to give voice to the rest.


In many ways then, the BRICS summit presented a two step forward-one step backward kind of situation, particularly with regard to the group’s equation with the West. This equation must also be balanced against the bilateral relations of each of the member nations with the West. Will India upset the US to stand by, let’s say, Brazil? We don’t know that yet.


But as we look for answers, it would perhaps be best to discard the unipolar lens through which we still tend to view world politics for that lens will soon be obsolete as the world inches towards a multi-polar global order. The 21st century is no longer the American century in the manner in which its predecessor was. At the same time, it will not even be the Chinese century or the Indian century or even the Asian century, as many predict it to be. It will however be a more global century where smaller power centres will emerge all over the world, and it is within this new multi-polar world order that BRICS will truly come into its own.


(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on April 06, 2012.)