Leveraging India's civilisational ethos

Less than a month after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s second swearing-in, the ongoing celebrations for the fifth iteration of the International Yoga Day (IYD) offer an excellent opportunity to consider how the grand narrative that he unveiled in 2014 will continue to drive his foreign policy over the next five years. IYD was one of the earliest and among the most significant of Modi’s diplomatic successes from his first term. A concrete policy initiative for which Modi was able to organise global buy-in, it offered some insight into how his government approached the issue global governance. Importantly, IYD embodied a key principle of Indian foreign policy - a notion of exceptionalism that suggests India’s ancient history and culture, in particular its rich tradition of spirituality, and allows it a unique position for moral leadership in the world (Miller and Estrada, 2017).

As Modi said during the first celebration in 2015, IYD marks “the beginning of a new era that would inspire humanity in its quest for peace and harmony”, and that the practice of yoga could result in a “dramatic reduction in conflicts and misunderstandings between families, communities and between nations”. In this context, IYD has not just been about promoting yoga, it is a campaign to take back ownership of one of India’s most significant exports to mankind as India prepares to take on a greater role in the international system; and the government is not squeamish about leveraging all its soft power credentials in the process. Of course, Modi isn’t the first Indian leader to either publicise yoga or seek to leverage soft power to enhance India’s global standing. Both have been part of Indian diplomacy since before independence. And both build on a deep-rooted sense of Indian exceptionalism, which has also animated India’s foreign policy thinking since before independence.

An excellent example of the historical and civilisational foundations on which this thought-process has evolved is offered by historian Kalidas Nag in his essay on ‘Indian Internationalism’. Written in 1922, the essay was presented at the prestigious Peace Congress of Lugano in Switzerland and re-published in the first edition of the journal produced by the Greater India Society which researched ancient India’s foreign policy footprint. Nag’s essay begins in the 14th Century BC with the warring Hittite and Mitanni tribes of Cappadocia (Turkey) invoking the Vedic gods, Mitra, Varuna, and Indra to conclude a peace treaty, and the twin-gods Nasatyas to bless a marriage alliance. Nag presents this event, recorded in the Boghaz Keui inscription, as the earliest evidence of India developing an idea of internationalism that’s focused on peace-making and spiritual unity - at the same time as, “Egypt”, he notes, “was proudly proclaiming her world-conquests through the famous Victory Ode of Thutmosis III, cataloguing with sublime egotism the vanquished nations and countries,” while the Achaeans were “thundering on the ramparts of the Aegian capital Knossos (Crete)” in the Mediterranean, leading to the collapse of the Minoan Kingdom.

Listing how the rise and fall of empires and civilisations has been a constant, throughout human history, Nag (1922) points out that early Indians also faced the same problem of “an autochthonous people barring the way of a more virile expanding power”. But while others responded with military might which offered only temporary respite till they too were vanquished by a more powerful force, early Indians realised that the only solution to this constant threat was to recognise “the title of their rivals to exist not merely as enemies but as collaborators in the building of a civilisation”. Hence, even when the sub-continent came under attack from the “barbarians of Central Asia”, who didn’t quite have a “civilisation of their own” like the Greeks and the Persians who came before them had, India maintained “supreme faith in her principle of international unity”, allowing for the assimilation of the Kushans and the Huns.

In another example of how India’s civilisational internationalism differed from that of its peers, Nag (1922) fast forwards a few centuries to Emperor Ashoka’s “new world of constructive politics” which, he says, was guided by the “philosophy of conquest by righteousness (dharma-vijaya)” and emerged as a “spiritual oasis”. Nag highlights that “In the same epoch that Rome… was pulverising… Carthage in the Punic wars, Ashoka had been celebrating the spiritual matrimony between countries and continents” by sending “missionaries of humanism” who spread the word of Buddha to modern-day Syria, Egypt, Libya, and the Balkans to the west, and Sri Lanka and Myanmar among others to the East. This, Nag writes, was the first time in history that there had been a “humanisation of politics”, and it was an Indian sovereign who shared the message of “peace and progress” across Asia, Africa, and Europe, binding them with the “ties of true internationalism”.

The Hindu-Buddhist civilisational compact, established by Ashoka, emerges as a keystone in Nag’s vision of India’s internationalism - as he notes, for instance, how Indian mariners found “Hindu-ised”, “culture-colonies” across south-east Asia, initially in Champa (Vietnam) and Cambodge (Cambodia), then in ancient Siam (Thailand), Laos, and across the Malay Archipelago from Borneo to Sumatra, going as far as Java. Together, this produced an extraordinary movement of “Hindu syncretism and cultural synthesis” in the region which Nag refers to as “Magna India” or “Greater India”.

This concept was institutionalised by the aforementioned Greater India Society, a think-tank of sorts, established in 1926 by a group of eminent Calcutta-based Hindu Bengali scholars (Nag included), which undertook a massive history-writing project to shed light on India’s ancient cultural links, particularly with South-East Asia. The Society’s work, depicting how Indian influences shaped art and architecture, religion and language, political and legal systems in the South-East Asia (think of Angkor Wat in Cambodia and Borobudur Temple in Indonesia), spurred a re-discovery of sorts of India’s ancient heritage (Handy 1930). Crucially, it also added more substance to the idea of Indian exceptionalism that had already been voiced three decades ago.

Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) had initiated the conversation around Indian exceptionalism with his famous speech at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. He promoted the idea that India was a civilisational power whose ancient spiritualism was its greatest strength. He argued that Hindu philosophy held the keys to global peace and unity, and that India had a duty to share this body of wisdom (Sullivan 2014). His teachings inspired a generation of nationalist thinkers that included the likes of Nag who, in turn, built on their own learnings and discoveries to re-purpose their understanding of Indian exceptionalism - in their case, shaping the anti-colonial discourse (and the related nationalist, pan-Asiatic, and universal-humanist discourses) in the decades leading up to independence (Vivekanandan 2018).

After independence, the Greater India discourse in particular ran out of steam with the Society publishing its last significant work in 1954. But the deeper spirit of Indian exceptionalism with a particular focus on Indian spiritualism continued to be part of the ideological framework undergirding India’s engagement with the world. Take, for example, India's decision to use the Ashok Chakra in the national flag instead of the Gandhian charkha. The latter was a key element of pre-independence nationalist iconography, yet one of the main reasons why the former was chosen was because the Ashokan connection reinforced the diplomatic role India envisioned for itself on the eve of independence (Brown 2009). As Jawaharlal Nehru noted in his remarks to the Constituent Assembly, “India’s ambassadors went abroad to far countries… not in the way of an Empire and imperialism but as ambassadors of peace and culture and goodwill.”

In the first two decades after independence, Nehru continued to leverage this sense of exceptionalism as he steered India’s engagement with the world - but not just for symbolic purposes. At a time when India had limited economic and military resources, he used Indian exceptionalism to portray the country as a peace-maker and a leader of the global South (Purushothaman 2010). Over the next seven decades, his successors interpreted the same idea into different forms to make the case for India as a responsible nuclear power: Indira Gandhi used it to counter criticism of framing the 1974 test as a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’; Atal Bihari Vajpayee used it to highlight a new nuclear power’s sense of restraint and responsibility as he oversaw the 1998 test; in 2005, Manmohan Singh won external validation for India’s nuclear discourse, still rooted in the ideal of civilisational exceptionalism, with the Indo-US nuclear deal (Chacko and Davis 2018).

As this essay details, while a sense of exceptionalism has long been and indeed remains a part of Indian strategic thinking, different leaders have leveraged the idea differently at different times in history to achieve different goals. Swami Vivekananda used the idea of Indian exceptionalism to awaken a subjugated nation to its past glories; a generation later, the likes of Nag and his colleagues at the Greater India Society used the same concept to resist colonial oppression even if by partly projecting itself as an enlightened colonial power; after independence, Nehru used the soft power stemming from Indian exceptionalism as a substitute for hard power. His successors at South Block used it to carve India’s place in the global nuclear order.

Now, the question is: How is Modi approaching this concept? What is his raison d’etre in the use of Indian exceptionalism? His first term had some hints - apart from the initiation of IYD, Modi has framed India’s recent leadership in climate change mitigation as a civilisational prerogative. He has also highlighted the importance of India shaping the rules of governance in the critical field of cyber-space. But perhaps his greatest opportunity lies in the re-alignment of global geographies with the emergence of the Indo-Pacific, which has also turned the spotlight on the Bay of Bengal regional grouping – the BIMSTEC. If in the next five years, connectivity with South-East Asia can be drastically improved, then Modi will have re-imagined India’s neighbourhood and created a new avatar of Nag’s Greater India. 

References: 

Brown, R. M. (2009). Spinning without Touching the Wheel: Anticolonialism, Indian Nationalism, and the Deployment of Symbol. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29(2), 230-245. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201X-2009-006.

Chacko, P. & Davis, A. E. (2018). Resignifying ‘responsibility’: India, exceptionalism and nuclear non-proliferation, Asian Journal of Political Science, 26:3, 352-370, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2018.1486218Handy, E. S. C. (1930). The Renaissance of East Indian Culture: Its Significance for the Pacific and the World. Pacific Affairs, 3(4), 362-369. doi:10.2307/2750560

Miller, M. Chatterjee and Estrada, K. Sullivan De. (2017). Pragmatism in Indian foreign policy: how ideas constrain Modi. International Affairs 93: 1 27–49; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiw001

Nag, K. (1922). Greater India: A Study In Indian Internationalism. Greater Indian Society Bulletin No. 1 

Purushothaman, U. (2010). “Shifting Perceptions of Power: Soft Power and India’s

Sullivan, K. (2014). Exceptionalism in Indian Diplomacy: The Origins of India's Moral Leadership Aspirations, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 37:4, 640-655, DOI: 10.1080/00856401.2014.939738

Vivekanandan, J. (2018). Indianisation of indigenisation? Greater India and the politics of cultural diffusionism, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 56:1, 1-21, DOI: 10.1080/14662043.2018.1411232

(This article was published by the Vivekananda International Foundation on June 27, 2019)

The Sri Lanka Attacks and the Threat Within

The Easter Sunday carnage in Sri Lanka that killed more than 250 people1 last month caught many by surprise2. The island nation had been enjoying a period of relative peace and stability since the civil war came to an end with the crushing defeat of the Tamil Tigers a decade ago3. Few had expected an obscure terror group that had no history of large-scale violence to launch a successful tri-city suicide bombing campaign. Moreover, social tensions in Sri Lanka had traditionally played out along ethnic lines, primarily between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, but not along religious cleavages4. And yet on April 21, members of the National Thowheed Jamath (TNJ), an Islamist group espousing Salafi-jihadi ideology, specifically attacked Christians and Western-tourists.

On April 23, the Islamic State (IS) officially took responsibility for the bloodbath and also released a video of the TNJ’s eight Sri Lankan bombers pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State’s chief5. This again was least expected. Sri Lanka had hardly been on the radar as an IS hotspot. Only a small number of 32 nationals from among Sri Lanka’s two million Muslims, had been radicalised enough to travel to join the IS in Syria. In contrast, neighbouring Maldives with a much smaller population of 4, 00,000 had sent as many as 200 fighters to the IS, according to a Soufan Center report6. And yet it was in Sri Lanka that the IS managed to carry out one of its biggest, most spectacular attacks outside of its base in Iraq and Syria.

One explanation for this is that even though Sri Lanka wasn’t a terror hotspot, it was a soft spot7. As the island nation enjoyed its decade of peace, security became lax and a sense of complacency set it. At the ground level, even the luxury hotels weren’t carrying out bag checks. At the top level, there was a lack of coordination within the security establishment and a bitter rivalry between the country’s top political leaders. The menace of Islamist radicalisation was also not taken seriously even though the Muslim community itself had raised multiple red flags. All these factors explain the government’s failure to foil the attacks in time even though the attackers were known to the law enforcement officials and the government in Colombo had received multiple warnings. However, they do not explain how a small organisation like the NTJ succeeded in pulling off a bombing campaign on this scale.

Initial reports suggested that the NTJ had some direct support from the IS. Yet, as more details emerge about the bombers and their operations, this assertion seems shaky. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks it was widely reported that at least one of the bombers, Abdul Latheef Mohammad Jamil, had travelled to and trained in Syria with IS fighters. However, on May 7, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe informed Parliament that though Jamil intended to travel to Syria and had contact with IS operatives, he only managed to go up to Turkey in 20148. The only person who was active in Syria was Mohamed Ibrahim Abdul Sadiq Haq9, reportedly an aide of the mastermind Zahran Hashim, but he wasn’t one of the bombers.

Sri Lankan investigators also believe that the attacks were self-financed (many of the plotters were wealthy) and locally planned and executed. According to a Wall Street Journal report10, the mastermind had claimed that he was receiving direct instructions from Syria but investigators believe he was exaggerating. The report also said that the men taught themselves how to build bombs from material posted online by the IS. The question then is: how much of their success can be credited to the Islamic State?

With the information available as of now, it seems like the IS’s direct involvement was minimal. It, of course, offered ideological inspiration but there was not much in terms of guidance on the ground - particularly when compared to previous incidents wherein IS operatives actively cultivated sympathisers through the internet and sought to turn them into deadly terror agents, such as in the case of India’s Yazdani brothers11. Instead, the attack shows how the IS is becoming a jihadi franchise. Local groups use the IS brand to grab easy attention at home and pin themselves on the map of global jihad. Meanwhile, the IS core group, which lost its last bit of territory in Syria in March, is happy to get credit for successful terror attacks around the world without having to make any significant investments itself. Herein, it is following the path of Al Qaeda - having failed locally, the IS is now going global.

As IS experts Charlie Winter and Aymen al-Tamimi note12, the Levantine group has been actively changing its identity to that of an international jihadi platform. Since 2017, it has bunched together its 19 ‘wilayats’ or provinces across Syria and Iraq into just two, while disparate groups in Africa, South and South-East Asia who had pledged allegiance to the IS have been promoted to ‘wilayat’ status. In fact, just weeks after the Sri Lanka attack, IS announced two new ‘provinces’ in India and in Pakistan (previously clubbed with Afghanistan in the Khorasan Province). The former was ‘established’, oddly, after an IS-affiliated militant was neutralised in Kashmir, while the latter came after two incidents in Balochistan. Neither indicate the emergence of a new threat, but they are tools to attract new recruits from places where jihadi militant pools already exist.

So, what does all this mean in terms of risk analysis?

First, the IS is nowhere and yet everywhere. The group’s core has been degraded but its depraved ideology continues to inspire jihadists around the world. This means that the IS flag will be seen not just in terror ‘hotspots’ like Yemen or Somalia but also in ‘soft spots’ like Sri Lanka. Indeed, as Scott Stewart notes for Stratfor, Sri Lanka was “the Islamic State’s surprise breakout theatre” 13this year - much like it was Indonesia (the Surabaya bombings14) in 2018, the Philippines (the siege of Marawi15) in 2017, and Bangladesh (the bombing of Dhaka’s Holey Artisan cafe16) in 2016. In each case, the local authorities were initially taken aback but afterwards clamped down on jihadi elements. Since then, the local terror franchisees have struggled to strike a second time with similar impact.

Second, a transnational threat calls for a transnational response. Even though Colombo failed to act on intelligence reports warning of an IS attack, it is noteworthy that almost all the Sri Lankan suspects were under scrutiny by Indian investigators. Similarly, India has also been working closely with Bangladesh where IS enjoys the allegiance of a rejuvenated Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 17. The JMB is suspected of being involved in the 2014 Burdwan blasts and the 2018 Bodh Gaya blasts in India. Earlier this year, three IS activists were arrested - two from Bangladesh18 and one from West Bengal’s Nadia district19, all linked to the JMB. This list can go on, but the point to be made is that while IS’s transnational jihadi lure is a challenge, it is still one that can be contained.

End notes

1. "Sri Lanka blasts: 250 dead in Colombo, Negombo and Batticaloa - CNN." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/21/asia/sri-lanka-explosions/index.html.
2. "Why no one expected an ISIS attack in Sri Lanka - The Washington Post." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/24/why-no-one-expected-an-isis-attack-sri-lanka/.
3. "Death of the Tiger | The New Yorker." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/death-of-the-tiger.
4. "Sri Lanka's long, tragic history of violence - The Washington Post." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/21/sri-lankas-long-tragic-history-violence/.
5. "Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Sri Lanka Bombings - WSJ." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/sri-lanka-bombings-linked-to-new-zealand-mosque-shootings-government-says-11556009023.
6. "Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the ... - The Soufan Center." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Beyond-the-Caliphate-Foreign-Fighters-and-the-Threat-of-Returnees-TSC-Report-October-2017-v3.pdf.
7. "Sri Lanka's Perfect Storm of Failure – Foreign Policy." Accessed May 6, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/23/sri-lankas-perfect-storm-of-failure-bombings-government-mistakes-terrorism/.
8. "Daily Mirror - SL still under threat from global terrorists: Ranil." Accessed May 6, 2019. http://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking_news/SL-still-under-threat-from-global-terrorists:-Ranil/108-166637.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. "Not 'Lone Wolves' After All: How ISIS Guides World's Terror Plots From ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/world/asia/isis-messaging-app-terror-plot.html.
12. "The Sri Lanka Bombings Were a Preview of ISIS's Future - The Atlantic." https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/the-sri-lanka-bombings-were-a-preview-of-isiss-future/588175/. Accessed 17 May. 2019.
13. "What the Easter Attacks in Sri Lanka Tell Us About the Islamic State." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/easter-suicide-bomb-attacks-sri-lanka-islamic-state.
14. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://ctc.usma.edu/surabaya-bombings-evolution-jihadi-threat-indonesia/.
15. "Philippines: Addressing Islamist Militancy after the Battle for Marawi ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-addressing-islamist-militancy-after-battle-marawi.
16. "Bangladesh siege: Twenty killed at Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka ...." Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36692613.
17. "How Bangladesh Became Fertile Ground for al-Qa`ida and the Islamic ...." Accessed May 8, 2019. https://ctc.usma.edu/how-bangladesh-became-fertile-ground-for-al-qaida-and-the-islamic-state/.
18. "Bihar Police arrested two Bangladeshi nationals - DNA India." Accessed May 8, 2019. https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-bihar-police-arrested-two-bangladeshi-nationals-2733246.
19. "ATS nabs West Bengal youth with terror links | Pune News - Times of ...." Accessed May 8, 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/ats-nabs-west-bengal-youth-with-terror-links/articleshow/68621364.cms.

(Mayuri Mukherjee is an international security analyst and a consultant with the VIF. The paper is the author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author certifies that the article/paper is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication/web upload elsewhere, and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed, and are believed to be correct).

This article was published by Vivekananda International Foundation, a Delhi-based think-tank

NETANYAHU's ISRAEL STORY CONTINUES

When Israel went to the polls last week, it was as much to vote in a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu as it was to find a successor to the prime minister who is now in his fourth term. In this, Election 2019 was similar to Election 2015. And like in 2015, this year too, the electorate re-endorsed Netanyahu who will be forming the next government with the support of other right-wing and religious parties, but rejected almost all this potential successors.

The Blue and White (Kachol Levan), formed just weeks before the election, did well for itself but evidently not well enough. Led by former chief of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) Benjamin Gantz, who joined hands with Yair Lapid and his Yesh Atid party, and brought on board two other former IDF chiefs, one of whom was also Netanyahu’s defence minister, the new party won an impressive 35 seats (and tied with the Likud) in the Knesset. However, the Blue and White’s road to coalition-building was always a whole lot longer than the Likud’s because it did not have the necessary alliances with smaller parties to get past the half-way mark in Israel’s 120-seat Knesset.

Also, the Blue and White didn’t take away very many votes from the Likud (which grew from 30 to 35 seats). Instead, it mostly replaced the previous centre-left coalition from 2015--the Zionist Union--and expanded that space by adding the seat share of its constituent Yesh Atid party. Hence, it damaged the Left but didn’t carve a niche for itself on the Right against Likud.

The party also needs to build its own political identity--its motto, “Israel First”, sounds nice but doesn’t mean much. On social issues, it campaigned for some progressive legislation like civil marriages and public transport on shabbat but that’s been on the agenda of other Centre-left parties as well and would even have the Likud’s support if the Jewish orthodox Haredi parties weren’t a factor. On economic issues, it had little to offer even though at least the Lapid has always focused on economic issues, his lacklustre tenure as finance minister notwithstanding. On security issues, the so-called General’s party didn’t have anything new to say--not even during the flare-up in Gaza just before the election.

The Blue and White’s campaign focussed on getting rid of Netanyahu who is facing corruption charges. But that strategy didn’t work for the Zionist Union in 2015 and failed again for Blue and White in 2019. In contrast, Netanyahu’s response to run a gevalt campaign -- go into panic mode and urge supporters to vote him to ‘safety’--worked well in 2015 and even better in 2019. If the Blue and White even stays together for the next election, it will have to become more than just Likud-lite and present a real alternative to Netanyahu.

New Right: crash and burn

Among prominent politicians from the outgoing Knesset, Naftali Bennett and Ayelet Shaked, the education and justice ministers, were seen as heir apparents. Both served in elite IDF units, both had successful careers in hi-tech, and both offered a tantalising mix of a liberal values with conservative policy priorities. Bennett emerged as the Right’s blue-eyed boy when, under his leadership, the Jewish Home party (Habayit Hayehudi) soared from three to 12 seats in the Knesset in 2013. Shaked, meanwhile, was praised for being the only secular woman to represent a religious party in the Knesset. It was widely believed that first Bennett and then Shaked would eventually get the top job.

However, their electoral fortunes dipped in 2015 -- when the Jewish Home lost a third of its seats. Both still got ministerial portfolios but, after this election, they are not even in the Knesset. Bennett’s decision to quit Jewish Home and Shaked’s decision to follow him, and set up a new party backfired. Their New Right (HaYamin HeHadash) party did not even get past the electoral threshold. The Israeli Right’s power couple crashed and burnt -- but Shaked might still rise from the ashes. She is reportedly parting ways with Bennett, and might join the Likud.

Kulanu: Cut to size

Finance minister Moshe Kahlon had hoped to position his Kulanu party as a crucial swing factor. Though he has now placed himself in Netanyahu’s tent, he could have very well gone with Gantz. In fact, Kahlon had public stated that he would not sit in government with a prime minister who had been indicted on corruption charges. This would have been a deal breaker for Netanyahu. However, Kahlon’s party lost six of its 10 seats this time, barely making it past the electoral threshold. Fearing a complete washout in the next election, Kahlon has not only abandoned his anti-Netanyahu line but is merging Kulanu with the Likud; much like the Lapid, who joined Gantz, fearing electoral irrelevance.

Yisrael Beiteinu: Kingmaker, but not the King

In September 2018, Avigdor Liberman, then defence minister, resigned from the government and withdrew his Yisrael Beiteinu party from the ruling coalition over disagreements with Netanyahu on how to respond to Hamas’ provocative rocket fire from the Gaza strip. He was already being criticised for his sub-par performance; and calculated that by taking a hardline on Gaza against Netanyahu, he might be able to strengthen his hand. That strategy has brought only limited benefits.

Yes, Liberman has emerged as the king-maker. His party’s five seats are needed to put a Likud-led coalition past the 60-seat mark. And if those seats were to be taken to Blue and White, hypothetically, Gantz could have also built the winning coalition -- with external support from the Arab parties. But this was more of an academic exercise. In reality, Liberman would have had to return to Netanyahu -- though now he has the luxury of doing so on his own terms. These terms include return of the defence minister’s portfolio and ending the exemption from military service given to Haredi men. The former is do-able, the latter could bring down the government.

But while Liberman remains an important player and has done better than the younger lot of Lapid, Bennett, and Kahlon, the fact remains he hasn’t been able to measure up to Netanyahu’s towering figure on the Israeli political scene. Indeed, while Netanyahu has gone from strength to strength, Liberman’s block has consistently become smaller -- from 15 seats at its peak in 2009 to 13 in 2013, six in 2015, and now five.

In this election, Netanyahu fought a rising anti-incumbency sentiment, brought his challengers to their knees, and now has a coalition that is least likely to demand his resignation if he is, as is widely expected, indicted on corruption charges in a few months’ time. Clearly, he hasn’t lost his magician’s touch and remains the undefeated Melech Yisrael, the King of Israel. Only the question of who will inherit his kingdom remains a mystery.

(This article was published by the Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation on April 17, 2019)

INDIAN ELECTIONS 2019: WILL MODI’S “STRONGMAN” IMAGE BRING ELECTORAL SUCCESS?

On February 26, when India struck a terror camp inside Pakistan in response to the February 14 suicide bombing that killed 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) troopers in Pulwama in Indian-administered Kashmir, political pundits opined that the rare air strike would boost Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s electoral fortunes. They argued that his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government was being pilloried with charges of having mismanaged the economy, of being unable to create adequate new jobs, and of bungling the Rafale deal but the strike against Pakistan had helped distract public attention. Six weeks later, as the country prepares for the 2019 general elections, the question is: do Pulwama and Balakot still matter? And is this India’s national security election?

In a country as large and diverse as India, it is nearly impossible to predict the salience of any one election issue over others.  However, historically, the electoral impact of security and foreign policy issues has been limited, as several scholars and analysts have pointed out. For example, Roshan Kishore has analyzed the electoral fate of ruling parties in India in the immediate aftermath of military conflicts and found a mixed bag. Neelanjan Sircar specifically looked at the 1999 general election, which was held soon after India secured a decisive win in the Kargil War, and found that even though the BJP returned to power, the military confrontation against Pakistan was not an electoral game-changer. Other analysts like Aditya Menon and Soroor Ahmed have also come to the same conclusion.

To a certain extent, Pulwama/Balakot has been no different. After the predictable jump in nationalist sentiment in the immediate aftermath of the February 14 attack in Pulwama and the February 26 retaliatory airstrike in Balakot, several polls show that the issue has since subsided from the public agenda. However, it is interesting to note that even though national security is not on the people’s electoral priority list, the approval rating of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has continued to soar on the back of his security credentials.

For example, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies(CSDS)-Lokniti survey done in the last week of March found that 43 percent preferred Modi as the next prime minister (compared to 34 percent in May last year) though only 2 percent saw national security as the single most important issue for the election. In contrast, nearly 21 percent consider unemployment while 17 percent pointed to development as the key electoral issue. India Today’s Political Stock Exchange poll also showed that while Modi was able to leverage the Balakot air strikes and his popularity steadily rose from 46 percent in October last year to 48 percent in January to 53 percent in April, it is unemployment, and not national security, that voters see as the most important electoral issue followed by water and cleanliness.

Yet, Modi and his team have continued to place national security at the heart of their election strategy. There are three reasons for this: first, even Modi’s hardest critics acknowledge that it is in this area that the government’s credentials are the strongest. In the public’s assessment too, it is here that Modi has broken new ground and gone where few others have tread before him (whereas the popular response to the prime minister’s other big bang initiatives such as demonetization or the Goods and Services Tax have been more checkered). Hence, the BJP’s effort to keep the focus on national security.

Second, the opposition has done a shoddy job of puncturing Modi’s security narrative. India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, has struggled to make any of its criticisms of the BJP’s security policies–be it with regard to Kashmir, China, or Pakistan–resonate with the public, even though scholars and analysts have found flaws aplenty in the ruling party’s policies. It was only on the Rafale deal that the Congress was making some progress with regard to challenging Modi. But that too didn’t go very far due to the Congress party’s own history of corruption, particularly in defense deals (think Bofors), as well as Modi’s reputation as a clean politician.

In 2016, Modi upped the ante by carrying out a similar “surgical strike” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, in response to the attack in Uri that killed 19 soldiers. The operation further reinvigorated his security credentials, and since then, Team Modi has sought to ensure that the ‘legacy,’ for want of a better word, of the surgical strikes does not fade from popular memory. For example, in 2018, the government organized an official celebration to mark the second anniversary of the “surgical strikes” (though it had let the first one pass quietly). Unlike staid government events, this one had a carnival-esque feel with a three-day exhibition featuring actual footage from the strikes, a selfie zone, and performances by Bollywood singers who even wrote an anthem to the mark the occasion. The Bollywood film based on the strikes was released in January and has done well at the box office. Notably, the rallying cry of the film– “How is the josh?”, which loosely translates to “how is the (national) spirit?” was picked up and reiterated by several political figures including the prime minister. The post-Uri operation was no longer just a daring cross-border raid—it had transcended conversations among the strategic community about deterrence and counterterrorism to become a part of India’s popular cultural.Third and most importantly, Modi and his team have made a concerted effort to take discussion and debate of national security issues beyond the Delhi-based security elite and make it accessible to the masses. This has been possible in part because, as Ashutosh Varshney notes, a large part of the population is now firmly middle class and connected to the Internet, and therefore, receptive to issues that are not traditionally part of “mass politics.” But that’s not all. The government on its part has also carefully built up a national security narrative from the very beginning of its term. For example, within a year of taking office, after Naga militants operating along the India-Myanmar border killed 18 Indian soldiers in Manipur in 2015, Modi authorized a rare cross-border retaliatory raid. The operation was well-publicized and earned the government high praise for undertaking the sort of counterinsurgency action for which there had only been limited political appetite in the past.

Then came the Balakot strikes, still hotly being debated in security circles. Here too, while analysts were scrutinizing satellite imagery, counting fighter jets, and searching for missing pilots, the public focused on Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, who had been taken into Pakistani custody. Upon his return, he was feted as a national hero. Newborns were named after him, his iconic moustache became an instant hit, and soon enough he even appeared on the ruling party’s election posters.

Then on March 27, India conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, which generally may not have generated much public excitement but Modi went the extra mile, announcing the test in a direct address to the nation. Though an important development, the test didn’t merit a prime ministerial speech in the way that, say, demonetization did in 2016, directly impacting the lives of every person in the country. And yet Modi announced the test himself, ensuring that the news gets full attention; he carefully framed the test as a technological breakthrough that benefits all of society and labeled it “Mission Shakti” to establish equivalence with the 1998 nuclear tests of the same name that marked India’s entry into the club of nuclear-armed nations. Later, at an election rally, he also referred to the ASAT test as a “surgical strike in space”—which fits in neatly with the idea of the surgical strike on land (post-Uri) and in the sky (Balakot)—effectively tying together the government’s main security achievements in one neat, catchy phrase.

Whether the electorate will respond to Modi and the BJP’s messaging on national security by way of voting remains to be seen. Traditionally, security has not had a direct electoral impact in India because these issues generally have low salience for a population that is still trying to fulfill its basic needs of food, clean water, housing, and education/jobs. However, there is little doubt that this time around, large sections of the public have participated wholeheartedly in the national security conversation–and to that extent, this has indeed been India’s national security election.

Image 1: Indian Air Force (cropped)

(This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform)

HOW HAMAS LAUNCHED ISRAEL'S NEXT ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Israel is back from the brink. But the situation could still boil over any time

Israel is now back from the brink after a tumultuous fortnight, first on the edge of war and then with its government on the verge of collapse. The controversial ceasefire agreement with Hamas, the armed group that controls Gaza, is holding up while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has managed to stay together even after losing a coalition partner. However, the situation could boil over yet again.

For one, the rocket fire from Gaza this month -- 500 missiles poured in on border communities, resulting in Israel bombing 160 Hamas targets -- was only the most recent in a series of such firefights that have repeatedly pushed Israel and Gaza close towards a full scale military confrontation. Also, since 30 March this year, Gazans have been regularly, and often violently, amassing at the border fence with Israel to demand that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be allowed to return and that Israel lift the blockade. The campaign was supposed to be six weeks long--from March 30 to May 15--but has continued to simmer over these past months.

In fact, thousands demonstrated in Gaza even during these past two Fridays--however, this time, Hamas kept them away from the fence as part of the Egypt-mediated ceasefire agreement. The agreement also allowed for Qatari cash to be delivered into the coastal enclave and other economic concessions. These are expected to ease the pressure on Gazans in return for a more durable quiet on Israel’s southern border but the agreement stands on fragile ground.

The Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority (PA), which is the internationally recognised representative of all Palestinians but only controls the West Bank, has also criticised the agreement because it undercuts its own dwindling authority. The PA is led by the Fatah party which was violently ousted from the Gaza strip a decade ago--since then, several reconciliation efforts have failed and the two remain at loggerheads. In fact, it was the PA that recently stopped paying for civil servants’ salaries, electricity and fuel subsidies for Gaza so as to turn up the public pressure on Hamas. It hoped that Hamas would eventually accede to PA’s authority and agree to the reconciliation plan from last year. But the firefight with Israel, the subsequent resignation of the Israeli defence minister, and the brief respite brought by the ceasefire deal only boosted Hamas’ credentials in Gaza; leaving the PA further isolated.

In Israel too, the ceasefire agreement has many critics, particularly in the southern border communities. These critics would like to see a tougher response to Hamas, though that’s hardly a long-term solution. Past military campaigns have taken a toll on civilian life and property without eroding Hamas’ ability to re-build its terror infrastructure. Israel has struggled to establish credible deterrence against Hamas. And now, it has other security concerns, such as Iranian presence on its northern border with Syria. A risk-averse Netanyahu would rather have the situation in Gaza ‘managed’ than erupt in a regional flare-up. This explains his support for the ceasefire agreement which has since become a political hot potato in Israel.

On 14 November, Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned and pulled his hard-right Yisrael Beiteinu party from the Likud-led ruling coalition to protest the ceasefire which he viewed as a capitulation to terror. Soon after, Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked of the right-religious Habayit Hayehudi party also threatened to follow suit. Netanyahu reined them in but the ruling coalition now stands on a paper-thin majority. It has only 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. The tenure of the current government ends in November next year and the Prime Minister can call for elections any time before that (but the vote can only be held at least three months after the election is announced). What Lieberman sought to do with his resignation was to force an early election.

The timing here is important. First, Netanyahu is in a weak spot -- facing criticism for the rocket fire from Gaza and the ceasefire agreement. Second, Lieberman’s own tenure as defence minister has been below par, and his supporters feel he hasn’t delivered on his hardline credentials. By resigning on account of the ceasefire, he distanced himself from what his voters see as the government’s capitulation in Gaza and also positioned himself as a challenger to the right of Bibi. His numbers have since improved though he is hardly a serious contender for the post of prime minister.

Lieberman isn’t alone in favouring an early election. Bennett also made the same calculation. That’s why he publicly blackmailed the Prime Minister and demanded the defence minister’s post -- in a bid to position himself as the next leader of the Right. However, his electoral stunt flopped when Netanyahu called his bluff, and he had to backtrack.

Also wanting an early election (but reluctant to trigger one just yet) is Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon and his centre-right Kulanu party which made a stellar debut in 2015. Polls show that if elections were held now, it wouldn’t do as well; but Kulanu might glean away some Likudniks while Netanyahu’s chips are down.

Netanyahu has responded to all of this by presenting himself as the adult in the room: the statesman who negotiated for peace and quiet while the politicians pushed for war and sought to bring down the government during a national crisis. And now that his government has lived to see another day, Netanyahu’s focus will be on delaying the election as much as possible.

This may seem odd given that he was desperate to have early elections only a few months ago --when his poll numbers were high and before his corruption cases caught up. But now, the situation has changed. Netanyahu needs for some time to pass so that the public can move on from the Gaza crisis. He also needs to buy time to recover from the fallout of the three corruption cases.

In the first quarter of 2019, the attorney general is expected to decide on whether to indict the prime minister in these cases. Even if he decides against an indictment, Netanyahu would not like to go to polls around that time. But he would also not want an election campaign that’s drawn out over a year till next November with a fragile coalition at the helm.

Either way, the polls suggest that he has a good chance of winning, but given his personal and political troubles, he will need more than just the winning votes. He will need the numbers to build a strong coalition that will ultimately protect his four-term legacy that matches only with that of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Meanwhile, his opponents will be preparing for the day after Netanyahu is no longer the prime minister. They would want to make sure they are at the right place at the right time.

What does all of this mean for India? The upheaval in Israeli domestic politics is unlikely to impact India-Israel ties in any significant way. The relationship enjoys bipartisan support in Jerusalem and can be expected to continue along the present path even in a post-Netanyahu era. However, internal political equations as well as the nature of the new coalition government will of course impact how Israeli leaders deal with the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu, for example, doesn’t like large military confrontations; he prefers smaller targeted operations that can be controlled. His successor may have a different approach. The latter may also have to deal with the possibility of the PA collapsing altogether. This will upend Israel’s security equation with the West Bank. For now, India has successfully de-hyphenated its Israel-Palestine policy but this might be challenged in case domestic instability -- both within Israeli and Palestinian political circles -- leads to another regional conflagration.

(Mayuri Mukherjee is a security studies scholar at the Tel Aviv University, Israel)

This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think tank.

INDIA IN THE NEW NUCLEAR AGE

America’s withdrawal from one of the most important arms control treaties of our time is the result of a changing nuclear landscape that challenges policymakers in New Delhi as well.

US president Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia may have received scant attention in India, but in the West, it has already fueled concerns about a third world war involving nuclear weapons. This may seem alarmist but the fact is that Washington’s decision to walk away from one of its most significant arms control agreements with Moscow has important implications for global security--which India cannot ignore, especially as it deals with a changing nuclear landscape in its own backyard.

Signed during the Cold War, the 1987 INF treaty prohibited the US and the former Soviet Union from developing and deploying ground-based intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the treaty did not cover sea-based and air-launched missiles and was only applicable to the US and Russia. This wasn’t a problem at the time, and the treaty was in effective in bringing the two superpowers back from the brink of nuclear war.

Three decades later, however, the situation has changed--with China, North Korea, Pakistan and India all having intermediate-range land missiles. For the US, China’s arsenal is as much a matter of concern as that of Russia who it has accused of cheating on the treaty. US officials including national security adviser John Bolton argue that China’s arsenal poses a threat to US assets and allies in the region--and needs to be brought under an INF-like treaty. China, of course, has little reason to join such a treaty--and, for that matter, so does India.

But that being said, China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific is a matter of concern for India, which also finds reflection in Pakistan’s threat perceptions; thereby, creating a new set of concerns and conditions that could destabilise the region. Indeed, this problem is already taking shape as Pakistan follows India’s quest for sea-based nuclear deterrence.

Earlier this year, Pakistan conducted a second round of tests for the Babur-3 nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), following the first one in January 2017. It is expected that the Babur-3 will be mated with the Agosta 90B diesel-electric submarine. This should give Pakistan an assured second-strike capability--while land-based and air-borne systems can be destroyed in a first attack, nuclear submarines are considered to be much less vulnerable.   

India already has a small sea-based deterrent force. In April 2016, the K-4 nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile was successfully test-fired from aboard the INS Arihant, India’s indigenously built nuclear submarine, which was inducted into service in August that year; thereby, completing India’s nuclear triad. This was in keeping with India’s nuclear doctrine which enumerates a no-first-use policy but also makes clear that a nuclear attack on India will result in massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. For India, to secure such second strike capability, survivability of its nuclear weapons arsenal is key and hence the need for a sea-based force.

In other words, India’s naval nuclearisation--aimed at China, not Pakistan--buttresses New Delhi’s NFU policy and brings strategic stability. Pakistan’s naval nuclearisation, on the other hand, stems from its lack of trust in Indian NFU and is an effort to play catch-up. This is understandable but still destabilizing--both from a strategic as well as tactical point of view.

This may seem counterintuitive: if having nuclear weapons at sea enhances the survivability of Pakistan’s strategic forces, then that should add to strategic stability because Pakistan would have less of a use-it-or-lose-it dilemma. However, unlike India, Pakistan maintains an ambiguous nuclear policy for the use of nuclear weapons. This is meant to deter India, but it also implies that India would have to consider and prepare for a Pakistani first attack.

Almost every scenario involving a Pakistani first use begins with a Pakistan-sponsored spectacular terror attack on Indian soil like the 2001 Parliament attack or the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India sought to respond to the former with a show of force along the international border but Pakistan wasn’t perturbed. This led Indian strategists to propose a more pro-active response--a shallow-thrust offensive into Pakistan to seize a small piece of land to be used as a post-conflict bargaining chip. This strategy, known as Cold Start, isn’t official but it was acknowledged by the Army chief last year and the 2017 Indian military doctrine allows ample space for a similar proactive policy.

Pakistan responded to Cold Start by fielding tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or low-yield short-range nukes which could be used on the battlefield. These seek to lower the nuclear threshold and allow Islamabad greater control of the escalatory ladder (which, otherwise, is in favour of the conventionally bigger power). Moreover, Pakistan justified its TNWs within the framework of full spectrum deterrence, moving away from credible minimum deterrence. Add to this the nukes at sea, and the intended effect, as Abhijnan Rej describes it, is to tie India’s hands in a nuclear bind: If India activates Cold Start, Pakistan can use its TNWs to repel the attack, while its nuclear-tipped missiles at sea would deter an Indian retaliatory attack.

On paper, this seems like a water-tight strategy but it isn’t. For one, TNWs only make the situation even more precarious, as Sylvia Mishra explains. And even with TNWs in the field, there is still strategic space for India to explore pro-active conventional military options against Pakistan as the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ showed. Second, with regard to nuclear submarines, there is ample reason to doubt their survivability, as Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang point out.

Third, putting nuclear weapons on conventional vessels is extremely dangerous for any country and could lead to accidents at sea--for example, if its adversaries are unable to distinguish between conventional and non-conventional submarines or if there is a break in the command-and-control system. At some point, Pakistan will have to choose between submarine-based weapons that are ‘totally secure’ or ‘readily usable’ in a real crisis, and Christopher Clary and Ankit Panda suggest that it will in all probability go with the latter--making both the country and its nuclear weapons less safe.

But Pakistan isn’t the only state moving in the direction of ‘easy nukes’. In recent years, Russia has been toying with the idea of using TNWs in a conventional war in a “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy . And the US has responded, in  the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, by advocating for “useable” nuclear weapons and full spectrum deterrence. These pose a challenge to policymakers across the world as they seek to manage old hostilities while responding to new developments in technology and geo-politics.