INDIAN ELECTIONS 2019: WILL MODI’S “STRONGMAN” IMAGE BRING ELECTORAL SUCCESS?

On February 26, when India struck a terror camp inside Pakistan in response to the February 14 suicide bombing that killed 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) troopers in Pulwama in Indian-administered Kashmir, political pundits opined that the rare air strike would boost Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s electoral fortunes. They argued that his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government was being pilloried with charges of having mismanaged the economy, of being unable to create adequate new jobs, and of bungling the Rafale deal but the strike against Pakistan had helped distract public attention. Six weeks later, as the country prepares for the 2019 general elections, the question is: do Pulwama and Balakot still matter? And is this India’s national security election?

In a country as large and diverse as India, it is nearly impossible to predict the salience of any one election issue over others.  However, historically, the electoral impact of security and foreign policy issues has been limited, as several scholars and analysts have pointed out. For example, Roshan Kishore has analyzed the electoral fate of ruling parties in India in the immediate aftermath of military conflicts and found a mixed bag. Neelanjan Sircar specifically looked at the 1999 general election, which was held soon after India secured a decisive win in the Kargil War, and found that even though the BJP returned to power, the military confrontation against Pakistan was not an electoral game-changer. Other analysts like Aditya Menon and Soroor Ahmed have also come to the same conclusion.

To a certain extent, Pulwama/Balakot has been no different. After the predictable jump in nationalist sentiment in the immediate aftermath of the February 14 attack in Pulwama and the February 26 retaliatory airstrike in Balakot, several polls show that the issue has since subsided from the public agenda. However, it is interesting to note that even though national security is not on the people’s electoral priority list, the approval rating of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has continued to soar on the back of his security credentials.

For example, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies(CSDS)-Lokniti survey done in the last week of March found that 43 percent preferred Modi as the next prime minister (compared to 34 percent in May last year) though only 2 percent saw national security as the single most important issue for the election. In contrast, nearly 21 percent consider unemployment while 17 percent pointed to development as the key electoral issue. India Today’s Political Stock Exchange poll also showed that while Modi was able to leverage the Balakot air strikes and his popularity steadily rose from 46 percent in October last year to 48 percent in January to 53 percent in April, it is unemployment, and not national security, that voters see as the most important electoral issue followed by water and cleanliness.

Yet, Modi and his team have continued to place national security at the heart of their election strategy. There are three reasons for this: first, even Modi’s hardest critics acknowledge that it is in this area that the government’s credentials are the strongest. In the public’s assessment too, it is here that Modi has broken new ground and gone where few others have tread before him (whereas the popular response to the prime minister’s other big bang initiatives such as demonetization or the Goods and Services Tax have been more checkered). Hence, the BJP’s effort to keep the focus on national security.

Second, the opposition has done a shoddy job of puncturing Modi’s security narrative. India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, has struggled to make any of its criticisms of the BJP’s security policies–be it with regard to Kashmir, China, or Pakistan–resonate with the public, even though scholars and analysts have found flaws aplenty in the ruling party’s policies. It was only on the Rafale deal that the Congress was making some progress with regard to challenging Modi. But that too didn’t go very far due to the Congress party’s own history of corruption, particularly in defense deals (think Bofors), as well as Modi’s reputation as a clean politician.

In 2016, Modi upped the ante by carrying out a similar “surgical strike” in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, in response to the attack in Uri that killed 19 soldiers. The operation further reinvigorated his security credentials, and since then, Team Modi has sought to ensure that the ‘legacy,’ for want of a better word, of the surgical strikes does not fade from popular memory. For example, in 2018, the government organized an official celebration to mark the second anniversary of the “surgical strikes” (though it had let the first one pass quietly). Unlike staid government events, this one had a carnival-esque feel with a three-day exhibition featuring actual footage from the strikes, a selfie zone, and performances by Bollywood singers who even wrote an anthem to the mark the occasion. The Bollywood film based on the strikes was released in January and has done well at the box office. Notably, the rallying cry of the film– “How is the josh?”, which loosely translates to “how is the (national) spirit?” was picked up and reiterated by several political figures including the prime minister. The post-Uri operation was no longer just a daring cross-border raid—it had transcended conversations among the strategic community about deterrence and counterterrorism to become a part of India’s popular cultural.Third and most importantly, Modi and his team have made a concerted effort to take discussion and debate of national security issues beyond the Delhi-based security elite and make it accessible to the masses. This has been possible in part because, as Ashutosh Varshney notes, a large part of the population is now firmly middle class and connected to the Internet, and therefore, receptive to issues that are not traditionally part of “mass politics.” But that’s not all. The government on its part has also carefully built up a national security narrative from the very beginning of its term. For example, within a year of taking office, after Naga militants operating along the India-Myanmar border killed 18 Indian soldiers in Manipur in 2015, Modi authorized a rare cross-border retaliatory raid. The operation was well-publicized and earned the government high praise for undertaking the sort of counterinsurgency action for which there had only been limited political appetite in the past.

Then came the Balakot strikes, still hotly being debated in security circles. Here too, while analysts were scrutinizing satellite imagery, counting fighter jets, and searching for missing pilots, the public focused on Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, who had been taken into Pakistani custody. Upon his return, he was feted as a national hero. Newborns were named after him, his iconic moustache became an instant hit, and soon enough he even appeared on the ruling party’s election posters.

Then on March 27, India conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, which generally may not have generated much public excitement but Modi went the extra mile, announcing the test in a direct address to the nation. Though an important development, the test didn’t merit a prime ministerial speech in the way that, say, demonetization did in 2016, directly impacting the lives of every person in the country. And yet Modi announced the test himself, ensuring that the news gets full attention; he carefully framed the test as a technological breakthrough that benefits all of society and labeled it “Mission Shakti” to establish equivalence with the 1998 nuclear tests of the same name that marked India’s entry into the club of nuclear-armed nations. Later, at an election rally, he also referred to the ASAT test as a “surgical strike in space”—which fits in neatly with the idea of the surgical strike on land (post-Uri) and in the sky (Balakot)—effectively tying together the government’s main security achievements in one neat, catchy phrase.

Whether the electorate will respond to Modi and the BJP’s messaging on national security by way of voting remains to be seen. Traditionally, security has not had a direct electoral impact in India because these issues generally have low salience for a population that is still trying to fulfill its basic needs of food, clean water, housing, and education/jobs. However, there is little doubt that this time around, large sections of the public have participated wholeheartedly in the national security conversation–and to that extent, this has indeed been India’s national security election.

Image 1: Indian Air Force (cropped)

(This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform)

HOW HAMAS LAUNCHED ISRAEL'S NEXT ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Israel is back from the brink. But the situation could still boil over any time

Israel is now back from the brink after a tumultuous fortnight, first on the edge of war and then with its government on the verge of collapse. The controversial ceasefire agreement with Hamas, the armed group that controls Gaza, is holding up while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has managed to stay together even after losing a coalition partner. However, the situation could boil over yet again.

For one, the rocket fire from Gaza this month -- 500 missiles poured in on border communities, resulting in Israel bombing 160 Hamas targets -- was only the most recent in a series of such firefights that have repeatedly pushed Israel and Gaza close towards a full scale military confrontation. Also, since 30 March this year, Gazans have been regularly, and often violently, amassing at the border fence with Israel to demand that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be allowed to return and that Israel lift the blockade. The campaign was supposed to be six weeks long--from March 30 to May 15--but has continued to simmer over these past months.

In fact, thousands demonstrated in Gaza even during these past two Fridays--however, this time, Hamas kept them away from the fence as part of the Egypt-mediated ceasefire agreement. The agreement also allowed for Qatari cash to be delivered into the coastal enclave and other economic concessions. These are expected to ease the pressure on Gazans in return for a more durable quiet on Israel’s southern border but the agreement stands on fragile ground.

The Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority (PA), which is the internationally recognised representative of all Palestinians but only controls the West Bank, has also criticised the agreement because it undercuts its own dwindling authority. The PA is led by the Fatah party which was violently ousted from the Gaza strip a decade ago--since then, several reconciliation efforts have failed and the two remain at loggerheads. In fact, it was the PA that recently stopped paying for civil servants’ salaries, electricity and fuel subsidies for Gaza so as to turn up the public pressure on Hamas. It hoped that Hamas would eventually accede to PA’s authority and agree to the reconciliation plan from last year. But the firefight with Israel, the subsequent resignation of the Israeli defence minister, and the brief respite brought by the ceasefire deal only boosted Hamas’ credentials in Gaza; leaving the PA further isolated.

In Israel too, the ceasefire agreement has many critics, particularly in the southern border communities. These critics would like to see a tougher response to Hamas, though that’s hardly a long-term solution. Past military campaigns have taken a toll on civilian life and property without eroding Hamas’ ability to re-build its terror infrastructure. Israel has struggled to establish credible deterrence against Hamas. And now, it has other security concerns, such as Iranian presence on its northern border with Syria. A risk-averse Netanyahu would rather have the situation in Gaza ‘managed’ than erupt in a regional flare-up. This explains his support for the ceasefire agreement which has since become a political hot potato in Israel.

On 14 November, Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman resigned and pulled his hard-right Yisrael Beiteinu party from the Likud-led ruling coalition to protest the ceasefire which he viewed as a capitulation to terror. Soon after, Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked of the right-religious Habayit Hayehudi party also threatened to follow suit. Netanyahu reined them in but the ruling coalition now stands on a paper-thin majority. It has only 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. The tenure of the current government ends in November next year and the Prime Minister can call for elections any time before that (but the vote can only be held at least three months after the election is announced). What Lieberman sought to do with his resignation was to force an early election.

The timing here is important. First, Netanyahu is in a weak spot -- facing criticism for the rocket fire from Gaza and the ceasefire agreement. Second, Lieberman’s own tenure as defence minister has been below par, and his supporters feel he hasn’t delivered on his hardline credentials. By resigning on account of the ceasefire, he distanced himself from what his voters see as the government’s capitulation in Gaza and also positioned himself as a challenger to the right of Bibi. His numbers have since improved though he is hardly a serious contender for the post of prime minister.

Lieberman isn’t alone in favouring an early election. Bennett also made the same calculation. That’s why he publicly blackmailed the Prime Minister and demanded the defence minister’s post -- in a bid to position himself as the next leader of the Right. However, his electoral stunt flopped when Netanyahu called his bluff, and he had to backtrack.

Also wanting an early election (but reluctant to trigger one just yet) is Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon and his centre-right Kulanu party which made a stellar debut in 2015. Polls show that if elections were held now, it wouldn’t do as well; but Kulanu might glean away some Likudniks while Netanyahu’s chips are down.

Netanyahu has responded to all of this by presenting himself as the adult in the room: the statesman who negotiated for peace and quiet while the politicians pushed for war and sought to bring down the government during a national crisis. And now that his government has lived to see another day, Netanyahu’s focus will be on delaying the election as much as possible.

This may seem odd given that he was desperate to have early elections only a few months ago --when his poll numbers were high and before his corruption cases caught up. But now, the situation has changed. Netanyahu needs for some time to pass so that the public can move on from the Gaza crisis. He also needs to buy time to recover from the fallout of the three corruption cases.

In the first quarter of 2019, the attorney general is expected to decide on whether to indict the prime minister in these cases. Even if he decides against an indictment, Netanyahu would not like to go to polls around that time. But he would also not want an election campaign that’s drawn out over a year till next November with a fragile coalition at the helm.

Either way, the polls suggest that he has a good chance of winning, but given his personal and political troubles, he will need more than just the winning votes. He will need the numbers to build a strong coalition that will ultimately protect his four-term legacy that matches only with that of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Meanwhile, his opponents will be preparing for the day after Netanyahu is no longer the prime minister. They would want to make sure they are at the right place at the right time.

What does all of this mean for India? The upheaval in Israeli domestic politics is unlikely to impact India-Israel ties in any significant way. The relationship enjoys bipartisan support in Jerusalem and can be expected to continue along the present path even in a post-Netanyahu era. However, internal political equations as well as the nature of the new coalition government will of course impact how Israeli leaders deal with the Palestinian issue.

Netanyahu, for example, doesn’t like large military confrontations; he prefers smaller targeted operations that can be controlled. His successor may have a different approach. The latter may also have to deal with the possibility of the PA collapsing altogether. This will upend Israel’s security equation with the West Bank. For now, India has successfully de-hyphenated its Israel-Palestine policy but this might be challenged in case domestic instability -- both within Israeli and Palestinian political circles -- leads to another regional conflagration.

(Mayuri Mukherjee is a security studies scholar at the Tel Aviv University, Israel)

This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation, a Delhi-based think tank.

INDIA IN THE NEW NUCLEAR AGE

America’s withdrawal from one of the most important arms control treaties of our time is the result of a changing nuclear landscape that challenges policymakers in New Delhi as well.

US president Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty with Russia may have received scant attention in India, but in the West, it has already fueled concerns about a third world war involving nuclear weapons. This may seem alarmist but the fact is that Washington’s decision to walk away from one of its most significant arms control agreements with Moscow has important implications for global security--which India cannot ignore, especially as it deals with a changing nuclear landscape in its own backyard.

Signed during the Cold War, the 1987 INF treaty prohibited the US and the former Soviet Union from developing and deploying ground-based intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles. However, the treaty did not cover sea-based and air-launched missiles and was only applicable to the US and Russia. This wasn’t a problem at the time, and the treaty was in effective in bringing the two superpowers back from the brink of nuclear war.

Three decades later, however, the situation has changed--with China, North Korea, Pakistan and India all having intermediate-range land missiles. For the US, China’s arsenal is as much a matter of concern as that of Russia who it has accused of cheating on the treaty. US officials including national security adviser John Bolton argue that China’s arsenal poses a threat to US assets and allies in the region--and needs to be brought under an INF-like treaty. China, of course, has little reason to join such a treaty--and, for that matter, so does India.

But that being said, China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific is a matter of concern for India, which also finds reflection in Pakistan’s threat perceptions; thereby, creating a new set of concerns and conditions that could destabilise the region. Indeed, this problem is already taking shape as Pakistan follows India’s quest for sea-based nuclear deterrence.

Earlier this year, Pakistan conducted a second round of tests for the Babur-3 nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), following the first one in January 2017. It is expected that the Babur-3 will be mated with the Agosta 90B diesel-electric submarine. This should give Pakistan an assured second-strike capability--while land-based and air-borne systems can be destroyed in a first attack, nuclear submarines are considered to be much less vulnerable.   

India already has a small sea-based deterrent force. In April 2016, the K-4 nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile was successfully test-fired from aboard the INS Arihant, India’s indigenously built nuclear submarine, which was inducted into service in August that year; thereby, completing India’s nuclear triad. This was in keeping with India’s nuclear doctrine which enumerates a no-first-use policy but also makes clear that a nuclear attack on India will result in massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. For India, to secure such second strike capability, survivability of its nuclear weapons arsenal is key and hence the need for a sea-based force.

In other words, India’s naval nuclearisation--aimed at China, not Pakistan--buttresses New Delhi’s NFU policy and brings strategic stability. Pakistan’s naval nuclearisation, on the other hand, stems from its lack of trust in Indian NFU and is an effort to play catch-up. This is understandable but still destabilizing--both from a strategic as well as tactical point of view.

This may seem counterintuitive: if having nuclear weapons at sea enhances the survivability of Pakistan’s strategic forces, then that should add to strategic stability because Pakistan would have less of a use-it-or-lose-it dilemma. However, unlike India, Pakistan maintains an ambiguous nuclear policy for the use of nuclear weapons. This is meant to deter India, but it also implies that India would have to consider and prepare for a Pakistani first attack.

Almost every scenario involving a Pakistani first use begins with a Pakistan-sponsored spectacular terror attack on Indian soil like the 2001 Parliament attack or the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India sought to respond to the former with a show of force along the international border but Pakistan wasn’t perturbed. This led Indian strategists to propose a more pro-active response--a shallow-thrust offensive into Pakistan to seize a small piece of land to be used as a post-conflict bargaining chip. This strategy, known as Cold Start, isn’t official but it was acknowledged by the Army chief last year and the 2017 Indian military doctrine allows ample space for a similar proactive policy.

Pakistan responded to Cold Start by fielding tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) or low-yield short-range nukes which could be used on the battlefield. These seek to lower the nuclear threshold and allow Islamabad greater control of the escalatory ladder (which, otherwise, is in favour of the conventionally bigger power). Moreover, Pakistan justified its TNWs within the framework of full spectrum deterrence, moving away from credible minimum deterrence. Add to this the nukes at sea, and the intended effect, as Abhijnan Rej describes it, is to tie India’s hands in a nuclear bind: If India activates Cold Start, Pakistan can use its TNWs to repel the attack, while its nuclear-tipped missiles at sea would deter an Indian retaliatory attack.

On paper, this seems like a water-tight strategy but it isn’t. For one, TNWs only make the situation even more precarious, as Sylvia Mishra explains. And even with TNWs in the field, there is still strategic space for India to explore pro-active conventional military options against Pakistan as the 2016 ‘surgical strikes’ showed. Second, with regard to nuclear submarines, there is ample reason to doubt their survivability, as Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang point out.

Third, putting nuclear weapons on conventional vessels is extremely dangerous for any country and could lead to accidents at sea--for example, if its adversaries are unable to distinguish between conventional and non-conventional submarines or if there is a break in the command-and-control system. At some point, Pakistan will have to choose between submarine-based weapons that are ‘totally secure’ or ‘readily usable’ in a real crisis, and Christopher Clary and Ankit Panda suggest that it will in all probability go with the latter--making both the country and its nuclear weapons less safe.

But Pakistan isn’t the only state moving in the direction of ‘easy nukes’. In recent years, Russia has been toying with the idea of using TNWs in a conventional war in a “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy . And the US has responded, in  the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, by advocating for “useable” nuclear weapons and full spectrum deterrence. These pose a challenge to policymakers across the world as they seek to manage old hostilities while responding to new developments in technology and geo-politics.

HOW ISRAEL MADE FRIENDS IN INDIA

Israel’s bottom-up diplomacy has paid off.

The recent award of a $777-million contract to Israel Aerospace Industries for the supply of air and missile defense systems to the Indian Navy has re-emphasized how India-Israel relations have evolved in the last two and a half decades. From outright hostility at the time of independence seven decades ago to a strategic partnership today, the bilateral has come a long way.

That this has been possible in part because of robust defense cooperation between New Delhi and Jerusalem is well-know but what is less acknowledged is the importance of cooperation with Indian States, in fields such as agriculture and water-management. So while the IAI deal made international headlines, the Israel tour of the chief minister of one of India’s most prosperous States, Punjab, went under the radar. During his five-day visit from October 21-25, Capt. Amarinder Singh toured the NaanDanJain agricultural facility, the Dan Region wastewater treatment plant, the Afikim dairy farm, and met with President Reuven Rivlin. Earlier in the year, his counterparts from the States of Gujarat and Haryana also visited Israel, and agriculture featured prominently on both their agendas. 

This decentralized strategy of partnering with different political and private players including State governments, through cooperation in agriculture and allied fields, has long been an integral part of Israeli diplomacy in India – especially in the early years when Jerusalem had few friends in New Delhi.

For example, in 1949, Israel favorably considered India’s request for assistance in agriculture even as India refused to recognize the Jewish State and opposed its UN membership. Israel’s Histadrut maintained ties with India’s labor leaders, many of whom visited the Jewish State. In 1960, two large Indian delegations – one comprising land reforms activists from the Bhoodan movement, and another comprising young farmers – visited Israel. In 1970, India’s leading agriculturist Appasaheb Pawar lived in Israel for months, studying new agro-tech. His brother, Sharad Pawar – who would later serve three terms as Maharashtra chief minister and two as Union Minister – also played an important role in building agri-ties between the two countries.

This decentralized approach to diplomacy continued even after India and Israel established diplomatic ties in 1992. A significant development in itself, it, however, did not translate into policy shifts on the ground. Delhi issued a curt official statement and kept the new bilateral on a low profile. Left-wing parties opposed diplomatic ties and argued that India should have waited till Palestinian statehood had been achieved.

However, the normalization of India-Israel ties coincided with the liberalization of the Indian economy – and States were now empowered to work with foreign governments to bring in economic investment. Israeli diplomats seized the opportunity. Often ignored in the power corridors of Delhi, they sought to build durable partnerships in state capitals.

A slew of chief ministerial visits to Israel, from across party lines, followed--starting with Gujarat’s Chimanbhai Patel (Congress) in 1992, then Maharashtra’s Sharad Pawar (Nationalist Congress Party), who led an 800-member strong delegation to the agritech conference in 1993, then Rajasthan’s Bhairon Singh Shekhawat (Bharatiya Janata Party) in 1994, and Karnataka’s Deve Gowda (Janata Dal-Secular) in 1995.

In 1996, Deve Gowda became Prime Minister and, within six months, hosted President Ezer Weizman in Delhi – even though his own party had opposed normalization. Gowda and Weizman signed four agreements, including one to set up a model farm at India’s premier agriculture research institute near Delhi. By this time, Israeli firms had also begun to build a profile in India – Tahal was working on water management in Gujarat and Rajasthan while Netafim had a joint venture with an Indian firm that it had been doing business with even before 1992. Both Israeli companies now have a pan-India presence.

The bilateral grew stronger with the pro-Israel BJP coming to the helm in Delhi in 1998. In 2000, West Bengal’s Jyoti Basu, a Communist party veteran, broke taboo and visited Israel with a large business delegation. This was a big win but it was derailed by the Second Intifada. Still, Prime Minister AB Vajpayee hosted Ariel Sharon in 2003, indicating a qualitative improvement in bilateral ties.

This was again taken down a notch when the Congress party returned to power in 2004 and rolled back public engagement. However, bilateral trade in general and cooperation in agriculture in particular continued to grow. In 2007, Israel’s NaanDan joined with India’s Jain Irrigation Systems to form NaanDanJain which now provides irrigation solutions across 100 countries. In 2008, the flagship Indo-Israel Agriculture Project was established. Jointly implemented by the India’s horticulture mission and Israel’s MASHAV, it now has more than 15 agricultural centers across nine Indians states.

When the BJP returned to power in 2014, the pro-Israel Prime Minister Narendra Modi was able to build on decades of quiet but effective diplomacy that had already delivered tangible benefits. Modi himself was chief minister of Gujarat for 14 years, during which time his state developed a close partnership with Israel. When he became Prime Minister, few other diplomats had the kind of access to him as the Israeli Ambassador in New Delhi.

Israel’s bottom-up diplomacy has paid off. By focusing on agriculture and water management, instead of, say, lobbying to change India’s foreign policy perspectives, Israel had shifted the core of its India’s policy from a politically-charged single issue (the Palestinian cause) to a much wider non-political grassroots platform. This is not to suggest that cooperation in other areas, particularly defense, was not important – it was and is. But defense cooperation is also inherently susceptible to secrecy and negative opinion, which can be challenging for public diplomacy. In contrast, agricultural cooperation at the state level, allowed Israel to accrue the goodwill of the people, make friends across the ideological spectrum, and shield the bilateral from political upheavals.

(This article was published in the Jerusalem Post on September 30, 2018)

2017 IN REVIEW: INDIA

From enhancing capabilities for connectivity and security in the region to staring down the neighborhood bully to clearing out outdated ideological policy formulations, 2017 saw India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi take on a more self-assured and assertive approach–at home and abroad. And there is reason enough to expect that this trend will continue into 2018 as the ruling party continues to consolidate power in the run up to the 2019 general elections.

Doklam Standoff

When considering the events of this past year, the Doklam crisis emerges at the top of the list. The 73-day military standoff pitted India against China, and sparked fears that the world’s two most populous, nuclear-armed neighbors were on the brink of war. The border dispute between the two has quietly festered for many decades, but aggressive border intrusions in recent years have threatened that trend of peace. It is unclear if these intrusions will compel both parties to resolve the dispute sooner rather than later, but for now it adds to a growing list of irritants in their relationship.

Though the standoff was resolved through diplomacy this time, there is ample reason to worry that such conflagrations may disrupt regional stability. In fact, on December 1, the Chinese military hinted that it will not withdraw its troops from the Doklam region as is customary during the harsh winter months, but instead maintain a sizeable presence. Currently, India enjoys a tactical military advantage—its Doka La post oversees the area of the actual standoff. However, with China beefing up its own presence in the region—which borders the vital sliver of land that connects India’s northeastern states with the rest of the country—New Delhi cannot afford to be complacent.

The crisis will, of course, impact the ongoing border negotiations between India and China, but it also tests India’s abilities as a regional security provider. Technically, Doklam is disputed between Bhutan and China, and India intervened to protect Bhutanese sovereignty. For now, whether India can or will be a counter-balance to China is an open question, but in this context, recent efforts to revive the decade-old idea of a security allianceamong India, Japan, Australia, and the United States to bring stability to the Indo-Pacific region is of significant interest.

India and the Quad

The first official-level discussion on the Quad since 2007 took place in November, on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and East Asia summits in Manila, and though the grouping is still in an embryonic stage, it is worth noting that the Malabar naval exercisebetween India, the United States and Japan is growing bigger and more complex with every passing year. Of course, India has sought to make clear that the grouping isn’t directed at any one country but Delhi’s participation in the Quad meeting does indicate a more confident and assertive foreign policy vision–and a willingness to work more closely with friends—both old (Japan) and new (the United States, Australia). Notably, this also ties in nicely with the United States’ Asia policy under Trump, which envisages a wider role for India in the Indo-Pacific as well as in South Asia. Herein, the inauguration of two new India-Afghanistan trade routes that bypass Pakistan indicate how the many pieces of the geopolitical puzzle fit together.  

India-Israel Ties

India’s assertive and confident foreign policy approach was also evident in Modi’s trip to Israel in July, the first-ever official visit to the Jewish state by an Indian prime minister. Though relations between India and Israel have grown significantly since the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1992, a pre-Modi India was reluctant to acknowledge the full potential and scope of the partnership, fearing that this would upset Arab states. Since 2014, the Modi government, however, has sought to dismiss these outdated policy formulations: de-hyphenating India’s Israel and Arab state policies, and leveraging the India-Israel bilateral for all that it has to offer—in sectors as diverse as defense, agriculture, and water technology.

Developments in Kashmir

In Kashmir, the state’s reinvigorated anti-militancy campaign, “Operation All Out,” has eliminated nearly 200 militants as of November 19. The Army has said that there will be no let up in its efforts during the winter season, so this is an ongoing operation and, therefore, it’s too early to assess its impact at the political level. For example, in October, the central government appointed former Intelligence Bureau (IB) director Dineshwar Sharma as India’s interlocutor to Jammu and Kashmir, but he hasn’t fared any better than his predecessors as of yet.

However, on the ground, it seems that the government has been able to turn things around after the unrest in mid-2016 that continued well into 2017 following the killing of militant leader Burhan Wani. The turning point came with the Lashkar-e-Taiba terror attack on Hindu pilgrims in south Kashmir—the only major attack on civilians in the country in 2017 but the deadliest targeting Amarnath yatris since 2000. The July attack galvanized “Operation All Out” and has since sought to hollow out the ranks of the anti-militancy operation. Expectedly, there have been reprisal attacks on police and military positions, but for now, it is the government that seems to have the upper hand.

Economic Reforms

Another example of assertive policymaking this year has been the rollout of the Goods and Services Tax. This is the single largest tax reform in the country since independence. It unifies India’s two-trillion-dollar economy and effectively converts it into a single market. Also a big win for cooperative federalism, this tax reform has been in the works for about two decades but is still riddled with flaws and loopholes. This was perhaps only to be expected, nevertheless, it will be interesting to see if the Modi administration continues with its reform agenda–especially as it enters the last phase of its five-year tenure, and all political parties prepare to go into election mode next year.

State Elections and the BJP

In this context, the state elections of 2017–which arguably serve as a sort of mid-term assessment of the ruling party–provide some valuable inputs. Five states went to the polls in the first half of the year–Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa, and Manipur. While the Congress managed a rare victory in Punjab, the BJP won Uttar Pradesh and managed to form a government in all the other states as well. The BJP also achieved two electoral triumphs in Himachal Pradesh, a Congress-BJP battleground state, and Gujarat, a BJP stronghold, in December. During the year, the Indian Electoral College voted BJP leaders Ramnath Kovind and Venkaiah Naidu as President and Vice President respectively. The BJP also increased its strength in the Upper House where, for the first time, it emerged as the single largest party–by mid-2018, it is expected to have a majority, paving the way for easy passage of just about any legislative item. 

Conclusion

The ruling coalition has been consolidating power at all levels of the polity and will go into the New Year on a high note. Whether it uses that momentum to push for reform, growth, and development remains to be seen.

Editor’s note: This article was published by the Stimson Center on its regional policy platform--South Asian Voices. It was the fourth piece in the '2017: Year in Review' series. In this six-part series, contributors assess the most significant domestic and foreign policy developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal in 2017 and how these developments will impact the countries and the region in 2018. Read the entire series here.

Click here to read this article in Hindi

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Image 1: The Kremlin

Image 2: Sam Panthaky/AFP via Getty Images

INDIA-ISRAEL TIES: TRADE, TECHNOLOGY, TOURISM TO BE TEMPLATE FOR NEXT 25 YEARS

Investments to boost tourism, education and cultural ties and building bridges with the Indian diaspora in Israel can help boost ties between the two countries

Tuesday afternoon at Ben Gurion airport was one for the books. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi disembarked from Air India One and engaged his counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu in a bear hug, it marked the beginning of the first ever state visit by an Indian prime minister to Israel. The optics were encouraging; Netanyahu gave Modi the red carpet welcome that’s otherwise reserved for Israel’s closest allies and the Pope.

Modi on his part has also been gracious enough to accord this visit the attention and visibility it deserves. Not only has he kept Ramallah off his itinerary (having already hosted the Palestinian president in New Delhi earlier in the year), he also honoured the memory of the victims of the Holocaust at Yad Vashem and paid tribute to the founding father of modern Zionism, Theodor Herzl.

And in another well-judged move, Modi is scheduled to meet 11-year-old Moshe Holtzberg, whose parents were murdered in the Chabad house attack during the 2008 Mumbai carnage. Moshe, barely two years old at the time, was rescued by his Indian nanny Sandra Samuel. It is worth mentioning here that in December 2008, when then minister of state for external affairs E. Ahamed presented the government of India’s views on the attack at the UN, he listed all the buildings that had been targeted except one: the Chabad house. Nine years later, when Modi meets young Moshe, it will be portrayed as a reminder of the common security challenges that both India and Israel face but it will also perhaps be the most genuine acknowledgement of India’s embrace of the Jewish nation.

That said, it is important to place the evolution of India’s Israel policy in context.

Since India established full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992, relations between the two countries have grown at an astonishing pace, covering a wide range of issues from defence and homeland security, to agriculture and water management, and now education and even outer space. And while Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have historically been more supportive of India’s relations with the Jewish nation, let’s not forget that it was a non-BJP prime minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic ties, and also that bilateral ties continued to grow apace even during this past decade of Congress rule.

Similarly, while Modi deserves full credit for going public with India’s de-hyphenation of its Israel and Palestine policies (and taking the related course-correction measures such as rethinking India’s voting choices on anti-Israel resolutions at the UN and dropping the demand for East Jerusalem as capital of a future Palestinian state), the fact remains that in private this de-hyphenation had already taken place. 

In effect then when Modi landed in Jerusalem on Tuesday, he did not necessarily start a new chapter in India-Israel relations but took the one that was opened 25 years ago to its logical conclusion. And while that is a fine thing in itself, for the visit to be truly substantive, it is the roadmap for the future that will hold the key.

In particular, two issues deserve attention.

The first is trade. From just $200 million in 1992, bilateral trade (excluding defence) peaked at about $5 billion in 2012 but since then it has dropped to about $4 billion—which is a pittance compared to both India and Israel’s trade numbers with other countries in the region. Also, bilateral trade has not diversified much—diamonds and chemicals still make up for the large chunk of the pie just as they did in previous years; high-tech is only a small part of the deal. Sure, a few Israeli companies such as Teva Pharmaceuticals, Truphatek, Netafim and Amdocs have big offices, factories or subsidiaries in India, but their numbers pale in comparison to the Israeli presence in the West.

One big reason why India-Israel trade has in fact stagnated is that the Israeli private sector has struggled to find its feet in India. No doubt, India can be a tough market to crack but Israeli businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises, mostly remain focused on the Western markets that they are familiar with and for which their products are designed. This also means that those same products are not always well-suited for the price-sensitive Indian market. Costs can be reduced by leveraging the large Indian market and deploying the economies of scale but this isn’t an Israeli strongpoint and Indians haven’t been able to fill the gap either.

This problem with scaling up technology is also evident in the agriculture sector—one of the core areas of bilateral cooperation. Take, for example, the numerous Israeli “centres of excellence” that showcase Israeli agricultural expertise and provide know-how to Indian farmers across India: as individual units they are a huge success, but they are not viable businesses yet.

From the Indian side, there have been only a few major investments in Israel—for example, in 2013, Tata became the lead investor in the $20 million innovation fund at Ramot, the technology transfer company of Tel Aviv University; last year, it also helped set up a new technology incubator; Mahindra, Wipro, Sun Pharma, Reliance Industries and Infosys have also made investments in Israel, but there’s still a long way to go. The Israeli market is too small for most Indian small and medium enterprises, though the big conglomerates stand to gain significantly from investments in research and development.

A third factor for the lukewarm business ties is cultural difference: Israelis and Indian approach business differently and often find it difficult to get on the same page. Finding the right business partner can be tough, and connections between the business elites of the two countries aren’t particularly strong. This sort of feeds into the larger problem of inadequate people-to-people ties between the two countries—which is the second issue that deserves attention.

Simply put, Indians and Israelis don’t know enough about each other. For the vast majority of Indians, Israel is a war-ravaged country that’s located somewhere in the Middle East; for a few others, Israel is this mythic military power, slaying the demon of Islamist terror. From the Israeli side, again, India doesn’t feature on its mental map of the world, and when it does, it is usually as an exotic holiday destination.

Investments to boost tourism, education and cultural ties and building bridges with the Indian diaspora in Israel can help significantly in this context. Indeed, these are the low-hanging fruits in the bilateral relationship that can be plucked right away. 

This article was published on livemint.com