HOW INDIA BECAME OBAMA’S UNEXPECTED FOREIGN POLICY WIN

As President Barack Obama’s eight-year tenure at the White House draws to a close, the general consensus is that his foreign policy record is mixed at best. However, on the India front, the president will be closing on a definitive high. U.S.-India ties are stronger today than they were at the beginning of Obama’s first term, and there is a sense of optimism about the bilateral relationship. This outcome is somewhat unexpected because India was hardly a priority for the Obama administration. In fact, the relationship got off to a rocky start in 2009 and it was not until the final years of the Obama presidency that relations began to flourish.

Initial Challenges

After Obama was sworn into office in 2009, the U.S. government and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh struggled to match the successes that marked the first half of that decade, most notably the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the 2005 defense framework. The nuclear deal marked a generational leap in bilateral ties and set the stage for a strategic partnership. It also acknowledged India’s “exceptional” position in the emerging world order, which manifested into U.S. support for India’s entry into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Thus, it would be unfair to expect something on this scale every two, five, or even 10 years.

Regardless, the inability of Singh and Obama to take the deal to its full potential was disappointing. Having spent all of his political capital securing the deal, Singh failed to defend it, resulting in the 2010 Indian nuclear liability lawwhich effectively gutted the deal. In the United States, Obama was so preoccupied with fixing the economy at home that he let his predecessor’s biggest foreign policy achievement fall by the wayside. Moreover, on the few occasions when he did take up issues relating to India in his early years, Obama usually made matters worse. For example, he appointed Richard Holbrooke as his first Af-Pak envoy, whose mandate, which was supposed to extend to India, was curtailed after New Delhi expressed its displeasure with the appointment.

Defense cooperation followed a similar pattern. Both Singh and Obama sought to build on the gains they had inherited, but could only make limited progress. For example, in 2012, they launched the one-of-a-kind Defense Technology and Trade Initiative that was supposed to spur joint development and production of high-end defense platforms, but failed to deliver any big ticket items right away.

On a person-to-person level, Obama and Singh, both sort of professorial, enjoyed a certain level of respect and comfort, which was evident during the state visits of 2009 and 2010. However, this bonhomie was not enough to arrest the decline in bilateral ties, which was marked by sparring at the World Trade Organization and an atrophying  defense partnership, exacerbated by unfavorable domestic and global environments. In India, one corruption scandal after another caused the prime minister’s reputation to plummet, and governance was paralyzed on all fronts, including foreign policy. In the United States, Obama’s much-touted “pivot to Asia” – with an eye on China – was having a hard time getting off the ground. At one point, India was supposed to be the linchpin of this pivot, but that too turned out to be a non-starter. Moreover, Obama’s pivot to Asia – and away from the Middle East – was ill-timed. It came when the Arab world was experiencing one of its biggest upheavals, and Obama’s stewardship (or lack thereof) disappointed many, including those in New Delhi’s security establishment.

Obama’s approach to Pakistan and the Afghan war was also criticized in India. Many believed that the United States was fleeing the conflict and leaving India to clean up the mess. Additionally, Obama’s Afghan commitments restrained him from pushing Pakistan on the issue of terrorism, which did not go over well in India. There was frustration on both sides, and just as many wondered if the bilateral relationship had been “oversold,” the 2013 Devyani Khobragade episode damaged relations even further.

Turning of the Tide

When Narendra Modi was elected prime minister in 2014, it seemed unlikely that the situation would improve. Modi had been on a U.S. visa blacklist for 10 years, and many perceived a temperamental disparity between him and Obama. The assumption was that the United States and India would have a pragmatic, business-only relationship at best.

However, Modi upended these calculations from day one. Not only did he put aside his personal grievances against the U.S. government, but also reached out to President Obama with open arms. Together, they injected new momentum into bilateral ties by joining forces in the fight against climate change and enhancing clean energy cooperation. Both men were passionate about these issues and placed them at the heart of the relationship.

Further, the discourse on climate change was inextricably linked to nuclear energy. These have become the two defining issues of the India-United States bilateral in the 21st century. In fact, one of the first big breakthroughs in bilateral ties was during Obama’s 2015 visit as chief guest for India’s Republic Day celebration when both sides announced that they had come to an understanding over the nuclear liability clause. This set the ball rolling for America’s Westinghouse Electric to begin work on its six nuclear energy reactors in India in the summer of 2016, marking the commercialization of civil-nuclear ties.

It was also during this visit that defense cooperation got back on track. The new bilateral defense framework was signed, and four “pathfinder projects” were announced under the DTTI in addition to cooperation on aircraft carrier and jet engine technology. Months later, Modi cleared the way for two additional major defense deals: the purchase of 15 Chinook and 22 Apache helicopters, which had been stuck in the pipeline for years.

Things began to move quickly thereafter. The U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, made possible by assertive political leadership in New Delhi, resuscitated the American pivot to Asia. In a related move, in September 2016, the Modi government broke with India’s Cold War apprehensions to sign a key foundational military agreementwith the United States. Then, in December, Obama codified India as a “major defense partner,” a unique designation not yet given to any other country.

It is anybody’s guess how President-elect Donald Trump will steer the relationship. However, one can be certain that if he encounters obstacles, the robust institutional framework of the U.S.-India bilateral, buoyed by strong bipartisan support, will help him stay the course.

This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform.

HINDUS FOR TRUMP?

The recent community event in Edison, New Jersey, organized by the Republican Hindu Coalition (RHC) for presidential nominee Donald Trump has generated much mockery and some anguish in America and India. This is par for the course for just about any Trump event these days, and it is tempting to write it off as an amusing footnote in an election that has, if nothing else, been full of surprises, to put it gently.

And while it is no one’s case that the Hindus for Trump event marked any major shift, trend, or development in this election cycle – reportedly, many members of Trump’s audience in Edison do not even have a vote in the United States and most came for the entertainment and the samosas – it is worthwhile to ask if this event reflects the attitudes and aspirations of at least a section, even if small, of the Indian-American community.

The RHC seesm to be the only outfit in the United States that claims both a Hindu religious identity and a clear partisan political organization. All other Hindu groups, and there are quite a few with deep roots in the community and extensive networks across the country, are officially bipartisan. Fashioned after the Republican Jewish Coalition, the RHC has been floated by industrialist Shalabh (Shalli) Kumar who, along with his wife, has donated a large amount of money to the Trump campaign. The Hindus for Trump event was evidently his display of muscle power to the Republican party leadership – and in that limited context, it was a success. It drew about 5,000 people and remains the only occasion wherein the presidential nominee has addressed an Indian-American gathering. This is even more interesting because the Republicans don’t get very many Indian-American votes. The community, like most other immigrant groups, votes Democrat.

And while this trend is expected to hold strong through the current election cycle, there are indications of a sense of disillusionment within the Indian-American community, particularly with issues relating to Hindu beliefs, heritage, and history. We see this in the California school textbook controversy that goes back to 2006 and in the more recent Diwali school holiday issue. Additionally, there seems to be some disappointment with the Democrats’ India policies while Republicans are considered to be relatively more pro-India.

So, where does the Hindus for Trump rally, RHC, and Trump fit into all of this, if at all? There are two factors that seem to bring the two together: First is Trump’s strong rhetoric against Islamist terrorism which has emerged as an overarching concern among his support base.  The second factor is a little more complicated: for long, Indian-Americans who would have ideally voted Republican for conservative fiscal policies have shied away from doing so because of the latter’s evangelical wing. Trump, with his multiple marriages and many dalliances, has an uneasy relationship with the religious right. And that somehow makes him a fit for the vote bank being nurtured by the RHC.

But even this is an awkward fit at best – for example, Trump’s anti-immigration stance stands out like a sore thumb in this context, even though his supporters painstakingly seek to make the distinction between illegal and legal immigrants. Similarly, how does the RHC, which is presumably against cattle slaughter, support a candidate who once sold steak? There are many such loose ends. In the long term, it will be interesting to see if the Indian diaspora in the United States, like its counterpart in the United Kingdom, shifts to the conservative side or remains loyal to the Democrats.

This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform

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POST-URI STRIKES: INDIA’S TAKEAWAYS

In the several days since India announced its “surgical strikes” along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, there has been a plethora of commentary already with experts analyzing its military, diplomatic, and political angles threadbare. Now’s a good time to take a step back and view the larger picture – how does this change the India-Pakistan equation in Kashmir and beyond? What are its implications on India’s security matrix? How does it fit into Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Pakistan policy and India’s overall foreign and security policy?

Shorn of TRP-generating hyperbole and hysteria, the fact of the matter is that such cross-border raids have been carried out many times before, and there is little evidence to suggest that last week’s strikes were even qualitatively any better (either carried out deeper into Pakistani territory or inflicting greater damage or taking out targets higher up the value chain).  And that’s fine.

The key here is not that the raid occurred but that it was publicized. That was a first. Why? Why did this government break from the past? The easy answer is because it needed to assuage domestic sentiments. There had been a series of terror attacks – Gurdaspur, Pampore, Pathankot, Uri – and to the public at large, it was looking like the government was doing nothing more than kadi ninda (severe criticism), even though it was supposed to be more hawkish on security affairs.

But the Modi administration wasn’t the only one to have faced such public pressure. The government of Manmohan Singh, for example, was in a far worse situation after the Mumbai carnage in 2008, and even in 2013, when the LoC lit up after reports emerged of the two Indian soldiers being killed and their bodies being mutilated. At least in the latter case, it is believed that the Indian Army carried out retaliatory strikes across the LoC but these were not publicly acknowledged – until now. The Congress party recently listed three “surgical strikes” that had been authorized by the United Progressive Alliance government when it was in power.

The conventional wisdom (pushed in no small measure by the Pakistani establishment and contested in some Indian military circles) was that announcing such strikes would compel Pakistan to respond, and this could escalate into a full spectrum military confrontation between the nuclear-armed nations. While previous Indian governments have played safe against this backdrop, the Modi administration took a calculated risk.

It publicized the strike but also carefully framed it as a counter-terror operation, undertaken in the defense of Indian citizens and in an area that India considers to be its sovereign territory. It even urged the Pakistan Army to do its bit to control non-state actors, thereby drawing a line between the Pakistani state and its proxies. This was to ensure that at least on paper the attack was not seen as an attack on Pakistan itself.

Most importantly, Modi and his team seem to have reasoned that the Pakistani government, instead of forcefully responding to the attack, would in fact underplay the Indian strike. Because acknowledging such a strike, especially after it had been so announced by India, would make it look bad. Even in a worst case scenario, wherein Pakistan reacted more negatively than expected, it would be safe to assume that the international community would bear upon Pakistan to exercise restraint – just as it has with India, when the latter has been attacked and repeatedly so.

What this means from India’s point of view is that there is slightly more space than previously estimated for a conventional response to sub-conventional threats from Pakistan. This is the big takeaway, the big win. Now, how much more space there is, and how far the Modi government will probe it, remains to be seen. The lesson to be learnt is that the price of inaction is often greater than wrong actions.

Note that Modi or his team didn’t do anything that was drastically different from their predecessors (such as striking the Lashkar headquarter in Muridke, an option India considered after Mumbai 2008 but dropped). They have no magic wand or silver bullet to speak of. They have the same old toolkit—they just try to work it better.

In fact, it is important not to confuse this old toolkit with the availability of a new one – India still does not have very many options for responding to Pakistani attacks in a way that will not only penalize Pakistan but also compel it to change its India strategy. India can develop some retaliatory options over time, such as covert strikes on terror training camps (not the same as launch pads), but even these will only be punitive. India’s basic problem with Pakistan – its sponsorship of anti-India terrorism – remains.

This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform

SAV REVIEW SERIES: CAN INDIA CHANGE PAKISTAN’S BEHAVIOR?

Imagine this chilling scenario: “In 2017, a group of young men hailing from Pakistan conduct a terrorist attack in a major Indian city killing hundreds of people and severely damaging an iconic Indian landmark. While Pakistani authorities initially deny any direct or indirect involvement in the attack, and insist that in recent years they have exerted themselves to tame militant groups, Indian officials declare that they have intelligence tying the attackers to a group with infrastructure in Pakistan that is, or should be, known to Pakistani security officials.” What could happen next is alarming – in George Perkovich and Toby Dalton’s new book Not War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism, the authors caution against this scenario leading to the possibility of both countries mobilizing their militaries, risking a full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

In real life, India’s reaction to terrorism emanating from Pakistan has been less dramatic. After the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Congress-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exercised no ‘hard options’ and instead launched a diplomatic campaign to name and shame Pakistan, as the authors themselves note in the book. After the 2001 Parliament attack, the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee responded with massive troop mobilization but avoided military escalation. Both provocations were serious enough for India’s political and defense establishments to at least consider military retaliation, and yet in neither of the two cases did India go to war with Pakistan.

Presentation of the Argument and Critiques

With conventional warfare ruled out, the question that Perkovich and Dalton pose is: What else can India do to motivate Pakistan to prevent such incidences of cross-border terrorism? The authors specifically look at five options that India is likely to consider vis-à-vis Pakistan: (I) An army-centric proactive incursion into Pakistan; (II) a limited airborne operation against targets directly associated with terror organizations; (III) a covert operation fomenting insurgency in Pakistan; (IV) innovations in the nuclear doctrine that would complement the previous three options, and (V) a strategy of non-violent compellence.

In the army-centric option, the authors focus on what is popularly known as the Cold Start doctrine. They rightly highlight reasons why India should ignore this path including the fact that it simply does not have the military capabilities at this point to pursue this option with any degree of success. Also, the escalatory risks associated with it are extremely high, since it is difficult to imagine that Pakistan would not respond to an invasion of its territory. As the authors note, “[…] If Indian leaders authorize a proactive response to another terrorist attack, the Indian forces are unlikely to achieve the quick splendid victory that proponents of the strategy imagine.”

Next, the authors critique the case for airborne operations against select terror targets. This section is a must-read for those in India advocating for the Modi government to order a U.S.-style hit on Hafiz Saeed and Dawood Ibrahim in Pakistan. The authors note that while this seems appealing, especially since the United States and Israel already go for such options in their counterterrorism policies, they rightly argue that “India does not possess offensive capabilities remotely comparable with those of the US and Israel.”

The third segment on covert operations, makes for a timely read given that Prime Minister Modi recently emphasized Pakistan’s abuses in Balochistan in response to Pakistani criticisms of India’s human rights record in Kashmir. As the authors note, Ajit Doval, three months prior to his appointment as Modi’s National Security Advisor, had also said: “You (Pakistan) can do one Mumbai and you may lose Balochistan.” With this in mind, the authors assess the pros and cons of such a strategy wherein India facilitates covert actions in Pakistan in response to a terrorist attack on Indian soil. In the end, they argue that risks outweigh the benefits. This is debatable, depending on the scope and scale of Indian action. For example, if India is able to reasonably improve its ground intelligence and covert strike capabilities, attacking targets in Pakistan-administered Kashmir may be considered. Similarly, India could also consider upping the ante in Balochistan – this need not translate into instigating a full-scale Baloch rebellion but just enough to send the message that there is a price to be paid for mischief-making. That said, even those who advocate for such operations will do well to remember that Pakistan’s proxy war strategy has failed in its primary objective—to extract from India any major concessions on Kashmir.

The fourth option on nuclear capabilities has similar operational issues of the sort that plague the previous options, though the authors’ suggestion that India should stick with its no first use policy is debatable. As defense expert Abhijit Iyer-Mitra explains, “India has diluted the concept (of NFU) to the point of absurdity, with dangerous consequences: a buildup of its conventional forces, which has caused Pakistan to harden its nuclear stance.”

This brings us to the fifth option of non-violent compellence, which the authors argue would be “more cost-effective to turn the people and authorities of Pakistan and the international community against actors who would conduct terrorism in India.” This is where the book begins to falter. The authors suggest that since India does not have any real hard power options, it should look at soft power options to effectively isolate Pakistan on the global stage. While this can surely serve as one of many levers that India turns against Pakistan, the authors fail to provide a convincing argument for how this would actually change Pakistani behavior; the authors accentuate this point when they themselves note that the Pakistani state has only limited control over anti-India groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. Thus, it is unclear how these soft power options would create substantive differences from the status quo.

They argue that the restraint of Indian leaders after the 2001 and 2008 terrorist attacks “resulted in a Pakistani sense of loss.” But the point is that this rather vague notion of loss has not had any significant impact whatsoever on Pakistan’s India policies—much like the BDS movement against Israel, which the authors say has caused “deep concern” in Jerusalem but has not changed the way Israel approaches Palestinian terror.

The authors also consider the possibility of India lobbying for economic sanctions against Pakistan with an emphasis on getting American and Chinese support. Even if India were to achieve American support, it is extremely difficult to imagine China would ever support these sanctions because of its close relationship with Pakistan. And without Chinese support, such a suggestion is ultimately not a realistic one.

Concluding Thoughts

This brings us back to the question: What can India do to motivate Pakistan to prevent such attacks? Some 300 pages later, the answer seems to be: not much. India would struggle to mobilize its hard power against Pakistan; even if India did use hard power, it would risk escalation and nuclear warfare. The authors push for the use of soft power, but this seems like a mostly ineffective solution with no real change to the status quo.

Perhaps, the answer on how to change Pakistani behavior lies in the proposition that India should not try to change it in the first place. India could simply focus on improving its resilience by strengthening its borders and improving its homeland security apparatus to reduce the odds that terrorists might cross into India.

This article was published on Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform as part of a four-part series reviewing authors  George Perkovich and Toby Dalton‘s book  Not War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2016).  Read the entire series here.

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WHY MODI PLAYED THE B-CARD

It is no coincidence that Beijing's much touted China Pakistan Economic Corridor which cuts through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, also traverses through Balochistan and includes the strategic Gwadar port

It’s official now: India is turning the Balochistan lever against Pakistan. After decades of keeping itself at an arms’ length from the issue, it is now changing tack, with the express aim of paying back Pakistan on its own coin. As Union Minister Venkaiah Naidu explained on Tuesday, “Pakistan lectures us about Kashmir, that’s why we have told them what is happening in Balochistan, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit”.

Since Indian security forces killed Hizbul Mujahideen operative Burhan Wani last month, there have been large-scale protests in Kashmir Valley, which according to New Delhi have been engineered by Pakistan. Pakistan has retorted that the protests are a popular uprising against an occupying force.

Without diminishing the fact that there is at least some genuine discontent and disillusionment in the Valley, it is also hard to ignore that the unrest in Kashmir comes at a time when Pakistan has been effectively isolated on the international stage. There has also been some chatter that Pakistan’s intelligence agency itself may have had a hand in Burhan Wani’s death.

Even if that wasn’t the case, there is no denying that Pakistan has played up the issue, ostensibly hoping to distract attention from its own problems at home and abroad. This, however, has had only a limited impact globally (even though it will not be a stretch to say that Kashmir is worryingly close to a third wave of militancy). This, in turn, only strengthens the argument that what was once Pakistan’s most potent weapon to flog India on the global stage has now been blunted beyond repair.

The results are there for all to see: From India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi fired the first salvo from an all-party meeting convened to discuss the Kashmir issue. He then brought out the big guns on Independence Day —From the ramparts of the iconic Red Fort, with a billion eyes and ears trained on his every word and gesture, Modi noted that the people of Balochistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have thanked him in recent days (he didn’t go into details but the reference to Pakistani atrocities in these regions was obvious), and then, with just about every foreign diplomat that India hosts in his audience, warned that the “world is watching”.

Experts have dubbed this as a game-changer in the India-Pakistan relationship — that will be true if India keeps up the pressure, but for now, what we have is a change in tone and tenor. Technically, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir has always been part of India’s official narrative though Modi has brought it centre-stage and put the spotlight on Pakistani excesses in the region. This is as it should be.

Balochistan, though, is a new ballgame altogether because unlike PoK it is not disputed territory that India claims as its own. India recognises Balochistan as Pakistani territory and, therefore, it could be argued that bringing up the issue violates India’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

But while such principles et all make for good speeches and even compelling academic discourse, the demands of realpolitik require us to craft a different approach. Simply put, this was why India went into East Pakistan and midwifed Bangladesh.

Now, this is not to suggest — at least not at this point, anyhow — that the Modi Government is planning a similar operation in Balochistan. But only to underline the fact that if in 1971, India, still a poor country that was struggling to stand on its own two feet, could carry out a foreign military intervention on humanitarian grounds, there is no reason why India, today in 2016, as an economic powerhouse that seeks a seat at the global high table, cannot at least draw the attention of the world to the situation in Balochistan. There is both, a strong moral case and, of course, an equally strong geo-political case for India to speak, and firmly so, about Balochistan.

Perhaps, the question to be asked is: Why is India bringing up the issue now? The easy answer is Modi himself and his confident, self-assured approach to diplomacy. But there is more to that — apart from changes in regional alignments (think Iran which has its own minority Baloch population to deal with or Afghanistan where India supported the Northern Alliance through its Zahedan consulate in Iranian Balochistan or even Iraq which once sent weapons to Baloch leaders, hoping the insurgency in Pakistan would fan out to Iran), there is the China factor that India must grapple with.

In this context, it is no coincidence that Beijing’s much touted China Pakistan Economic Corridor which cuts through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, also traverses through Balochistan and includes the strategic Gwadar port (notably, India has also upped its game in Chabahar which is to serve as the foil to Gwadar). 

Some concerns have been raised that doing so would push India off the moral high ground it has held vis-à-vis Pakistan, that it would add credence to Pakistani claims that India has been fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan, and that in turn would dilute India’s cross-border terrorism case against Pakistan in Kashmir.

One can argue endlessly on these issues but the fact of the matter is that these are essentially perception battles that have limited impact on the ground and are ultimately decided by hard power. Look at, for example, how Pakistan has spun an anti-India Kashmir narrative for its public that is irrespective of the realities in the valley or how China is rarely censured for its oppressive policies in Tibet or against the Uyghurs.

The more important question here is: Can India take the Balochistan issue (which also Pakistan has sought to exploit for against India) and effectively use it as a lever against Pakistan? No doubt, like in Bangladesh, Pakistan’s own excesses in Balochistan make India’s job easy but, it is still to be seen if India will keep up the pressure, particularly if there if a different dispensation comes to power in New Delhi in 2019.

(A shorter version of this article was published on the Stimson Centre’s South Asian Voices platform)

CAMPAIGN OF CALUMNY

Isolated on the world stage, Pakistan is now playing up the Kashmir card against India — but with little impact

Notwithstanding the absurdity of a country like Pakistan — where large-scale human rights abuses are carried out on a daily basis with state sanction, where the state uses terrorism as legitimate tool of its foreign and security policies — outraging over the unrest in Kashmir, our neighbour's painstaking efforts to get the world to chide India for the loss of lives in the valley in effect actually exposes its own fears and weaknesses. It is no coincidence that Pakistan's global campaign to highlight what it perceives as Indian atrocities in Kashmir comes at a time when it itself has been isolated on the international stage. Considered to be virtually a failed state, a hub for jihadi terror, and a serious threat to regional peace, Pakistan has few friends, and is faced with a growing list of powerful nations that have little patience for its shenanigans. Cornered and isolated, Pakistan's easiest option to get some traction globally is to play up the Kashmir card, no matter the latter's diminishing value.

And so it is that the Government of Pakistan commemorated Wednesday, July 20, as a Black Day to draw attention to the July 8 killing of the Hizbul Mujahideen militant Burhan Wani and express solidarity with the people of the valley. The event was officially proposed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who described the operative of a designated terror group as a martyr of the Kashmiri independence movement, at a Cabinet meeting held last week specifically to discuss the situation in Kashmir. It was followed up with some enthusiasm by the Pakistani foreign office which took its India sob story to all and sundry.

It worked particularly hard at the UN, where letters were sent to senior officials and briefings conducted over supposed human rights violations in the valley. Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Maleeha Lodhi sought to underline her Government's “serious concern at the alarming situation” and draw attention to the “brutal killings of innocent civilians and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of the Kashmiris by the Indian occupation forces.” Her efforts went down the drains though as India's Permanent Representative to the UN Syed Akbaruddin slammed Pakistan as the country that “covets the territory of others, a country that uses terrorism as state policy, a country that extols the virtues of terrorists and provides sanctuary to UN-designated terrorists and a country that masquerades its efforts as support for human rights and self-determination.” He also underlined that Pakistan's “track record” on human rights was such that it couldn't even get elected to the UN Human Rights Council, where even Saudi Arabia, with its stone age practices of torture and beheadings, has a seat. The only international outfit that gave Pakistan any attention was, expectedly, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, a grouping of mostly Arab countries of the Muslim world. And it too just issued a template response deploring the use of excessive force by the Indian military and para-military forces.

In terms of major powers, the US has effectively ignored Pakistan's efforts. It has only reiterated its standard line (which reflects India's position) that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that needs to be resolved between India and Pakistan. Other than that, it has refused to be drawn into Pakistan's game and has made no comments on the violence in the valley. Pakistan's other ally and all-weather friend China has also issued a similarly anodyne statement that it is “concerned about the casualties in the clash”, and hopes that “relevant incidents will be handled properly”, adding only that “Kashmir is a leftover from history and relevant parties should address the issue peacefully through dialogue”.

And if all of this wasn't enough, the July 20 itself was a big failure as not only the Pakistani public but even Government officials, who were supposed to be sporting black bands while on duty, seemed least interested. No major demonstrations or protest marches were reported at foreign missions abroad and at home even Prime Minister Sharif didn't make a public appearance (he supposedly took a sick day). The party, the ruling PML-N, organised no rallies in major cities like Karachi and Islamabad. In Lahore, it had a small event which, PTI reported, was poorly attended. Clearly, it had no intention of being at the forefront of this movement (though it did pay for TV advertisements that ran all day).

The only ones who, in a sense, saved the day for the Pakistani Government was 26/11 terror mastermind Hafiz Saeed and his Jammat ud Dawa'ah while took out rallies in Multan, Bahawalpur and Faisalabad. They also organised an all-party conference in Lahore, and led a ‘Kashmir Caravan' that journeyed from Lahore to Islamabad in 24 hours. Hafiz Saeed was joined in his efforts by Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Azhar Masood. Not only does this speak volumes about the hollowness of Pakistan's campaign but more importantly gives credence to recent reports that the current wave of unrest in the valley has been largely manufactured across the border (even though it may seem like home-grown dissent with Burhan Wani being propped a local hero who embodied the fears and anxieties of the average Kashmiri).

The question then is: Why, after a period of relative quiet, has Pakistan now ramped up its efforts in Kashmir? There are a couple of reasons for this: First, as explained earlier, Pakistan has been completely isolated on the world stage. And so it is desperately trying to get some attention by India-bashing. Presumably, Pakistani officials can clearly see that this strategy is a non-starter but they are desperate and have few other options. Second, Pakistan's domestic political scenario remains a mess. An ailing Prime Minister Sharif is seen as incapable of delivering the goodies, while there have been suspicious calls for the military to take over already (in the form of large banners that lined Pakistani cities). Army chief Raheel Sharif has said that he won't be seeking an extension when his term ends but he remains quite popular with the masses especially after Zarb-e-Azb which the military has sold to the people as a hugely successful counter-terrorism operation.

STRENGTHENING INDIA-AFRICA TIES

The Prime Minister’s priority as he visits Africa will be strengthening trade ties, consolidating security ties and ramping up energy ties. None of this is new but what makes this moment special is the manner in which the aspirations of both partners complement each other

India’s relationship with the African continent may be a centuries-old civilisational compact but as Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeks to reinvigorate that relationship in all its nuances and across the full spectrum of diplomatic ties, the focus must, first and foremost, be on intensifying political engagement. This is essentially what the mega India Africa Forum Summit held last year in New Delhi, and attended by more than 50 African heads, was all about; and the Prime Minister’s four-nation tour of continental Africa that starts today must be seen against this same backdrop.

Indeed, it is no coincidence that Modi’s visit comes within weeks of President Pranab Mukherjee and Vice President Hamid Ansari’s Africa tours. While the former visited Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Namibia in June, the latter went to Tunisia and Morocco in May. The Prime Minister himself starts his tour with Mozambique, from where he will travel to South Africa, followed by Tanzania and Kenya. Technically, this will be his second trip to Africa - as he visited the island nations of Syechelles and Mauritius last year.

Notably, India’s ties with these east African countries in particular can be go back about 2,000 years when commercial ties were first established between traders from India’s west coast and the African east coast. The sea-borne trade was facilitated by the direction of the monsoon winds and a whole host of items were traded back and forth. In fact, the cotton and silk in which the Egyptian mummies were wrapped are believed to have come from India.

Though not many Indians settled in Africa at this time, a few did make their home in the trading towns of modern day Kenya, Zanzibar, Mozambique and the Comoros Islands, while some Africans made their home in Gujarat and along India’s western coast. In fact, one of the most famous ancient African traders, Bava Gor, is today worshipped by India’s Siddi community which descended from Africa’s Bantu tribe. Much later, in the 17th century, Dutch traders brought the first set of Indian labourers to South Africa, and they were followed in the 19th century by the British, who took about 30,000 Indians, mostly Sikhs from Punjab, to south-east Africa to work on large infrastructure projects, primarily the railway line that would connect Mombasa on the Kenyan coast to Kampala in interior Uganda.

In addition to the labourers brought by the British colonialists, ‘free traders’ from India also continued to make their way to this region and, in fact, helped east Africa move from a barter society to a money economy. As is well-known, these diaspora linkages, formed over centuries through shared experiences, were effectively leveraged, as both India and the African nations struggled to lift the yoke of colonial rule. Mahatma Gandhi is, of course, the most recognisable figure in this regard, but those familiar with Indian and African history know that he is not alone.

This historical context, though it hardly does justice to the depth and complexity of the Indian diaspora in Africa, is necessary to underline for it is what separates India’s relationship with Africa today from that of other major powers partnering with the continent. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that in all four countries, Modi will be highlighting the diaspora factor. This is also in keeping with the Prime Minister’s overall efforts to enliven New Delhi’s connect with Indian diaspora across the world - be it in the Gulf or the US and Canada.

The other priority areas for Modi in Africa will be strengthening trade ties, consolidating security ties particularly in the Indian Ocean region, ramping up defence cooperation, as well as securing energy ties.  This will be in addition to scaling up existing cooperation though developmental aid (a small part of which will be highlighted when Modi meets the ‘solar mamas’ in Tanzania) and lines of credit. While most of these have been on the India-Africa diplomatic agenda even before Modi, what makes this moment in the India-Africa relationship special is the manner in which the interests and aspirations of both partners complements the other.

This is best exemplified in two key policy documents that have been adopted in recent years by the member states of the African Union which outline the continent’s economic, security and political goals, which in turn, form the basis for its external engagement.

The first document is Agenda 2063 which maps out a 50-year overarching vision for the continent. This masterplan includes ending conflicts by 2020, eradicating poverty by 2025, doubling intra-African trade by 2022 and transforming nations and economies through large-scale industrialisation and employment generation. India has already been working on these lines through well-established programmes which focus on education, training and skill development. India has also shared its knowhow in a wide variety of sectors, from IT to agriculture to the manufacturing, with its African partners as well set up several large infrastructure projects across the continent.

In fact, these have been in keeping with the priority areas recently identified in the AU’s Programme on Infrastructure Development for Africa (PIDA): Transport (to link production and consumption centres, connect major cities, set up new transport hubs to open up landlocked regions); Information and Communication Technology; Water security (setting up multipurpose dams and leveraging Africa’s lakes and river basins); and Energy Infrastructure. The ultimate aim is to build "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena" - and India can help every step of the way. This will not only benefit Africa but is necessary for India as well as it grows as a manufacturing power and requires new markets.

The other big policy document is the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy which builds on the concept of a blue economy and reflects the keenness of Africa’s littoral states to effectively leverage their geographical prowess. Adopted in 2012, it sets the framework for building a maritime economy in competitive but sustainable manner. And while it incorporates a lot of great ideas, like Agenda 2063, it is an ambitious plan that needs international funding and support. This is where India can and should help, especially as it itself, particularly under the Modi Government, somewhat re-discovers its own maritime potential. Indeed, as India seeks to assert itself as the predominant power in the Indian Ocean region, working with the friendly east African nations that also share the Ocean is imperative. We have already seen steps being taken towards this end during Modi’s visit to Seychelles and Mauritius when defence cooperation emerged as a key theme, and hopefully, we’ll see the same over the next few days as Modi tours continental Africa.