IRAN, A STABILISING FACTOR IN WAR-TORN WEST ASIA

Tehran is one of the few power centres that is working to stem the region’s slide into chaos and anarchy

Hardly a day now passes when one doesn’t hear about something terrible happening in West Asia. If it’s not the Islamic State brutes that are beheading, enslaving and murdering people, their compatriots in other parts of the region are routinely blowing up towns and cities while insurgents topple Governments and terror groups take over entire countries.

True, the region has always been a hotspot (if nothing else, there’s always the Israel-Arab conflict) but the situation has undoubtedly worsened in the post Arab Uprising years. Every Great Power worth its salt has sought to bring stability to West Asia — and failed.

One major reason for this is that, not everybody gets the West Asia and nearabouts. The region is extremely complex and few foreign powers can legitimately claim to understand its ever-changing dynamics. Perhaps, the focus should be on strengthening regional powers and allowing them greater space to manage what is really their own backyard.

Traditionally, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been the big boys in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council is also an important force but it’s primarily an economic entity with limited political and no military prowess. Israel also could have been on the list, but given its own complicated relations with most countries in the region, it can hardly play the role of an interlocutor.

 Unfortunately, as of now, Iraq has all but collapsed while Egypt’s regional stature stands greatly diminished as it struggles to get its house in order. Saudi Arabia is a force to contend with, though its one-point agenda of pushing Wahhabism that has fuelled Islamist terrorism across the world, makes it a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution.

Besides, over the years, Saudi Arabia has shown that it couldn’t be bothered with cultivating ties and nurturing relationships because it believes that, with all the money it has, it can easily buy the influence it needs. This has not always worked out well. 

This leaves us with Iran — a large and stable country that has a civilisational connect in the region but has been ignored by the international community, primarily because of its controversial nuclear weapons programme.

 But if you keep that aside, there is an argument to be made for strengthening Iran’s hand in the region’s power matrix. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran doesn’t always have the kind of money to throw around. And so it practises old school diplomacy — working with local leaders, supporting friendly regimes and building up regional institutions.

Take, for example, the fight against the Islamic State. The West’s anti-IS coalition has been a non-starter, and that’s in no small measure because of the double standards of some coalition partners like Jordan and Turkey. The only ones that have succeeded against the Islamic State are the Kurds, but they have little support from the rest of the world. Iran, however, has been actively working with the Kurds and helping them with men and material on the ground.

Iran has also been working closely with the Government in Baghdad so as to stabilise the Iraqi regime, which is the key to retrieving that country from the clutches of the Islamic State. After all, it was the power vacuum in Iraq and Syria that created the fertile grounds for the IS to breed and nurture. Unless, these core issues are addressed, no military intervention can succeed. This, we have learned the hard way in Afghanistan.

In fact, even in the case of Afghanistan, Iran has sought to play the role of a regional stabiliser. The Americans were able to quickly topple the Taliban in the early days of the war primarily because of Iranian support. More recently, Tehran has also sought to persuade Pakistan (which is known to seek ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan) to not meddle in Kabul’s affairs. This is a point that India has also sought to underline but, understandably, with little effect, in Pakistan.

In fact, in terms of larger foreign policy principles, both India and Iran are staunchly opposed to foreign interventions and agree that is only well-mediated, political solutions are the only real solutions to some of the most crises of our times. Perhaps, the only point on which India and Iran have divergent positions is with regard to Israel.

While Iran doesn’t even recognise the Jewish state, India’s relations with Israel have strengthened significantly in the past two decades. While there is not much that India can do to change that dynamic, one can take comfort in the fact that both Iran and Israel say that neither will be the first to make the aggressive move.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 13, 2015

NEW RULES FOR THE GREAT GAME

Under the Modi Government, India is re-calibrating its relationship with the Great Powers, as the Obama visit stands proof. Now, it will be interesting to see how New Delhi projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums

This past fortnight has been a particularly busy one for Indian diplomacy. It started with US President Barack Obama’s visit to the country which was followed by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s relatively low key trip to China which included a trilateral meeting with Russia. Both visits are parts of larger processes wherein India, under the Narendra Modi Government, is re-defining the terms of its engagement with Great Powers. President Obama’s visit builds upon the Prime Minister US tour in September 2014 while Ms Swaraj’s Beijing trip sets the stage for the next India-China summit. Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s India visit last November, Mr Modi is now scheduled to travel to China in May, just before he completes his first year in office. In between, Russian President Vladimir Putin was in New Delhi for the annual India-Russia summit, and all the heads of Government also had an opportunity to deliberate during the G20 summit in Australia last year.

Though it’s too early to present a full picture of India’s foreign policy under BJP-led NDA regime, some of the salient features of the Modi doctrine, at least with regard to Great Power engagement, are becoming clear. At the top of the list is the end of anti-Americanism which has been best symbolised by the presence of the US President as the Republic Day parade. Though the US has long since ceased to be a subject of suspicion in contemporary public discourse, especially among the youth who have been raised on a staple diet of Americana, within India’s encrusted political and bureaucratic circles, the residues of that reflexively anti-US posture have remained. 

Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had sought to change that discourse but could only do that much with just one term in office. Thankfully, his successor Manmohan Singh, much more pro-America than the average Congress politician, continued without his efforts. Mr Singh dragged the Left-leaning political class, kicking and screaming (and quite literally so), into the 21st century geo-political scene and forced them to accept that India stood to benefit from a partnership with America. This is what led to the signing of the historic nuclear deal that legitimised India’s status as a nuclear power and also paved the way for the country to do nuclear commerce globally. It was also during Mr Singh’s tenure that defence cooperation was incorporated into the bilateral, another hugely symbolic policy shift, that also opened up the market for billions of dollars of weapons and technology trade.

Unfortunately, Mr Singh had exhausted all his political capital in the early years of his first term, and could not take the India-US project to its logical conclusion. Americans, who had lobbied the world to make an exception (no matter how well-deserved) for India, saw the 2010 nuclear liability law as a betrayal of sorts for it shut out US suppliers from the Indian market. Meanwhile, Indian politicians like Mr AK Antony, who served as the Defence Minister in the UPA Government, actively scuttled American projects and repeatedly spurned Washington’s offers to upgrade the relationship.

It is against this backdrop that the Obama visit needs to be evaluated. As some commentators have pointed out, tangible deliverables from the summit have been few: For example, though the Modi Government has said that it has ironed out most of those problems with regard to the operationalisation of the nuclear deal, the agreements are yet to be signed. But that’s okay. Often, complex negotiations such as these get stuck at the bureaucratic level and high-level political exchanges help remove the blockages. This is what the Obama visit, and the Modi visit before that, achieved. Equally importantly, the overwhelmingly positive optics of the visit, which critics have sought to write-off as style statements without substance, were, in fact, necessary to send out a clear and unambiguous message that India and America are friends and partners, and they will be doing business together, irrespective of how that fits into your ideological leanings.

The second big take-away from the Obama tour was the revitalisation of the American rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific, with India at its strategic core. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region didn’t get as much attention as the extensive US-India Joint Statement but it was here that the strategic aspect of the relationship came into full bloom. The US has now made clear that it wants India to play a leading role as a ‘security provider’ in the Indo-Pacific region (to use a term that Ms Hillary Clinton had famously used). In  other words, it wants India to ‘balance’ China’s tendencies to become the neighbourhood bully. Now, this is technically an old policy, as anybody who remembers Washington’s ‘pivot to Asia’ will tell you.

But the latter never quite took off, especially from India’s perspective. The Obama Administration was seen as pandering to Beijing, and more so, after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 that damaged America’s credentials as the world’s only superpower. Also, a still instinctively anti-US and somewhat diffident India did not appreciate either being dragged into a potential US-China crossfire or being portrayed as bulwark against China. America’s pivot to Asia (which hinged on solid India-US ties) didn’t quite dovetail with its ‘pivot to India’. The latter came first, in the early 2000s, with the Bush Administration; but it was petering out by the time the Obama Administration introduced the Asia Pivot.

Now, it seems that the two are better aligned. Apart from India and the US being on a much stronger footing than before, the Obama Administration has also firmed its view on the India-China dynamic, while India, under the Modi Government, is willing to play a more assertive role in the region. Additionally, America’s efforts to bring in more regional actors (Vietnam, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, apart from Japan) into the equation go well with India’s own Look East policy and its overall idea of an Asian century.

China, expectedly, is not happy with the developments. Yes, it can play Pakistan if it feels India is getting out of hand but that card is fast becoming a double-edged sword. Nonetheless, as Minister Swaraj’s recently concluded Beijing trip shows, China is not making a big deal about any of this — at least, not right away. We’ll know more when Mr Modi visits China. Remember, President Xi’s visit was dampened by Chinese transgressions along the Line of Actual Control. Either way, the focus of the Modi Government’s China policy is on economic issues. The Chinese tend to let these move at their own pace, without linking them to strategic issues.

Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see how India projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums. For example, the Russia-India-China joint communiqué, signed in Beijing by Ms Swaraj, had the usual anti-US tone, similar to many a BRICS declaration. Talk about India joining the SCO also includes concern over how much Delhi will be able gain from joining forums that are considered to be China-dominated. Finally, despite all the promised cooperation between the US and India on clean energy and climate change issues, there are still no guarantees that the two will find common ground in Paris later this year.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 5, 2015

OF KNOWN AND UNKNOWN DEVILS

Mahinda Rajapaksa’s influence may be waning but the Sri Lankan Opposition is not yet a force to reckon with. Glued together by its common dislike for the President, it has no collective vision for the future and is hardly a credible political alternative

Given that even the wise men who study the stars and the planets cannot seem to agree on who will win the Sri Lankan presidential poll, it is best that ordinary mortals like this writer keep away from the business of predicting who Sri Lankans will elect to lead their country, as they head to the polling stations today. On the one hand, they have President Mahinda Rajapaksa who is seeking re-election for a third term, and on the other, they have Mr Mithripala Sirisena, the Opposition’s ‘common candidate’, who until recently was a Minister in the United People’s Freedom Alliance Government. Technically, there are 17 other ‘minor’ candidates to choose from but for all practical purposes, Thursday’s vote is a contest between Mr Rajapaksa and Mr Sirisena. 

When the election was announced on November 20, 2014, it was not expected to be much of a contest at all as there was no real Opposition in sight. Calculating that getting re-elected a third time after more than a decade in power would be difficult for him, Mr Rajapaksa had called for the election two years before the expiry of his Government’s six year term, hoping to maximise his time at the helm while he  riding the popularity wave.

However, what he had possibly not foreseen was an internal revolt. A day after he announced the election, Mr Sirisena jumped ship. A close colleague of the President, he was serving as the Health Minister at the time and was also the general secretary of Mr Rajapaksa’s own Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

Mr Sirisena’s split from the ruling coalition also opened the floodgates for several other disgruntled UPFA leaders to move to the Opposition camp. Within weeks, Mr Rajapaksa lost the support of more than two dozen leaders, including some high profile Ministers and important allies. The January 8 election quickly went from being a cakewalk for the President to, what some pundits are now dubbing, as one of the biggest challenges in Mr Rajapaksa’s political career.

Even within Sri Lanka’s deeply polarised political milieu, there is now a consensus that Mr Sirisena will put up a tough fight of the sort that Mr Rajapaksa had not expected; and that even if the latter manages to return to power, his mandate will be relatively smaller. Poll pundits say that the election will be a close call and may even lead to a second round of counting wherein the preferential votes are taken into consideration.

For now, let’s take a quick look at how the frontrunners stack up against each other. Mr Rajapaksa’s biggest plus point is that he is a more popular, grassroots leader than Mr Sirisena especially among the country’s Sinhala Buddhist majority. Though Mr Sirisena is also a veteran politician with reasonably strong Sinhala Buddhist credentials, he has a relatively low profile and is not exactly a match for Mr Rajapaksa who towers over the Sri Lankan political scene.

Moreover, since Mr Rajapaksa decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009 and ended a three decades long bloody insurgency, he has been regarded as a war hero in Sri Lanka. His overwhelming mandate in 2010 is proof of this. Sure, four years later, some of that public adulation has ebbed but it has not been extinguished. As for Mr Sirisena, even though he was acting Defence Minister in the final weeks of the war, he has not been able to spin any of the credit for himself. All that he has been able to do on this count is ask: Has Mr Rajapaksa equitably delivered the peace dividends that came from the end of war?

Mr Sirisena’s critics have also been quick to point out that that he is backed by two prominent leaders — Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe and Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga — who had failed to defeat the LTTE when they were in power. In fact, Mr Wickremasinghe, when he was Prime Minister (a position he expects to return to, if Mr Sirisena wins) had signed a controversial ceasefire with the LTTE which the Tamil Tigers used to hit back with a vengeance.

Another factor that will play mostly in Mr Rajapaksa’s favour is governance record. Under his rule, the Sri Lankan economy has grown at a healthy pace, unemployment is low and there has been a visible growth in infrastructure. On this count, again, Mr Sirisena has little to show. In fact, one of the Opposition’s weakest points is that it does not have a roadmap for economic development. And because of this, it will probably not be able to capitalise on whatever anti-Rajapaksa sentiment there is, as effectively as it could have.

For example, in recent years, the President’s economic model, which is heavy on foreign-funded, infrastructure projects, has come in for much criticism. The President, his family members (who hold several important portfolios) and his small coterie are believed to have primarily gained from foreign investments while the benefits have not quite trickled down to the people. Also, the rising cost of living has become a major issue but the Opposition has no real solution.

Instead, Mr Sirisena’s campaign has put the debate over the executive presidency system at the centre of the poll agenda. Through the 18th constitutional amendment, made possible because the ruling coalition has a two thirds majority in Parliament, Mr Rajapaksa had given to the President’s office additional powers (including the power to appoint the Chief Justice and the election commissioner) that has weakened other democratic institutions and given rise to fears of a soft dictatorship. Now, Mr Sirisena has promised to either amend or repeal that amendment but it’s difficult to believe him because it means he will be using his powerful position to make it less powerful. Moreover, this is an abstract issue that doesn’t have as much traction as bread-and-butter matters.

The other big drawback for Mr Sirisena is, ironically, also his primary source of strength: The large section of Sri Lankan polity which has rallied around him. Thirty six parties make up the Opposition coalition and, while they might just able to pull together their votebanks and collectively push Mr Sirisena to victory, they definitely send out mixed signals. The parties have disparate, if not conflicting, ideologies, interests and agendas and come across as opportunistic. The dynamics of the minority votebank is a good example of this.

With the support of the Tamil National Alliance and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (a former UPFA member), the Opposition hopes to capture the minority votebank which is supposedly alienated from the Rajapaksa camp that has been accused of Sinhala majoritarianism. However, since the Sinhala ultra-nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (another former UPFA member) is also a member of the Opposition coalition, it is unclear how many of the minority votes will actually come through. The JHU is the parent organisation of the Bodu Bala Sena which has been held responsible for last year’s anti-Muslim riots, and the party is also not in favour of greater Tamil autonomy. In fact, with regard to the latter, Mr Sirisena’s positions are almost identical to that of Mr Rajapaksa, thereby giving the Tamils no reason to see him as an alternative political force.

Also, though Mr Sirisena is the face of the opposition, he isn’t always viewed as its driving force. Ms Kumaratunga and Mr Wickremasinghe are seen as the real power centres. This is bound to hurt the Opposition as both leaders are considered to be past their political prime. Mr Sirisena’s only real advantage over Mr Rajapaksa is that he is viewed as a clean politician, as opposed to the incumbent who is perceived as corrupt and dictatorial. Finally, despite the hype around the Sirisena campaign, the fact that apart from opposing Mr Rajapaksa, it has no positive agenda of its own. This is a problem that is sure to blow up if the Opposition actually comes to power.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on January 8, 2015

In 2015, Focus on Central Asia

Narendra Modi deserves full credit for re-invigorating Indian diplomacy in the seven months he has been in power. However, Central Asia, crucial for India’s energy security, has missed his attention. In the new year, his Government must improve India’s standing in that region

While only time will tell the kind of influence the Modi Government will have on Indian foreign policy, there is no denying that this year has been a turning point. The Prime Minister has infused life into India diplomacy and his foreign trips, especially have  helped reinvigorate Brand India. In the seven months that Mr Modi has been Prime Minister, he has placed a surprisingly significant amount of emphasis on his foreign policy. He has re-focussed our efforts in South Asia, earned plaudits for India at multilateral forums and hosted several world leaders.

However, the one area that is yet to catch his attention is Central Asia. While this is not surprising as the region has hardly ever been a foreign policy priority, it should not be relegated to inconsequence for long. India’s application for membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a powerful regional forum, is a step in the right direction but a lot more needs to be done.

India lags behind not just China but all other major players in the region — definitely the US and Russia but also Iran and Turkey. This is despite the fact that India has civilisational ties with central Asia that go back centuries; more recently, New Delhi has also made a conscious effort towards strengthening its presence in that region.

The Government of India’s official Connect Central Asia policy was unveiled by former Minister of State for External Affairs E Ahamed at the India-Central Asia Dialogue in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek in June 2012. More than two year later, the policy remains more aspirational than it is in the actual.

Yet, a strong presence in central Asia is important for India for two key factors: Energy security and military security. In the first case, India currently receives almost all of its oil and gas from West Asia but given how volatile that region can be, it is a good idea to look for other suppliers. Moreover, as the country’s energy demands continue to grow, New Delhi has no choice but to tap into other sources. In this context, energy-rich and proximate Central Asia is best positioned to become India’s next big oil and gas supplier.

China faces much the same challenges (growing economy, growing population) — except that it seems to have responded to them much better, as is evident from the deep inroads that it has already made into the Central Asian energy market. Beijing’s two trillion-dollar-strong foreign exchange reserves and a ruthlessly efficient Government not encumbered by the demands of democracy, have meant it has consistently managed to out-bid New Delhi in oil deals not just in Central Asia but across the world. For example, just weeks before the dialogue in Beijing, India lost to China the world’s largest oil find in five decades — the giant Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan.

In November 2012, India’s state-run ONGC Videsh Limited had struck a deal with America’s ConocoPhillips to buy the latter’s 8.4 per cent stake in Kashagan for five billion dollars.  However, the deal fell through in July 2013 when the Kazakh Government itself stepped in and informed ConocoPhillips that its own national oil company, KazMunaiGaz, will buy the American company’s stake for the same amount. Kazakh law allows the Government certain pre-emption rights as a result of which it has the authority to buy any oil asset for sale in the country at the price agreed on by the buyer and seller. KazMunaiGaz will now sell that stake to China National Petroleum Corp for a reported $5.3-5.4 billion.

But China is only one of India’s problems in Central Asia. What has most significantly limited New Delhi’s diplomatic efforts in that region is a stubborn Pakistan which has wholly refused India overland access to Central Asia, through Afghanistan. Ideally this would have been the shortest route for India; however, that is not to be — one of the big reasons why the ambitious Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India oil pipeline project, for example, has been a non-starter.

Consequently, New Delhi has had to look for new routes that bypass Pakistan altogether. Towards that end, the North-South Transportation Corridor which connects India to the Central Asian region through Iran was envisaged as a game-changer. Initiated in 2003, this project aims to connect the port in Mumbai to the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas through maritime transport, and then develop road and rail networks linking these two ports with Afghanistan and other Central Asian Republics.

 Some initial progress was made in this regard — India’s Border Road Organisation invested $136 million to set up a road link from Zaranj to Delaran which was inaugurated in 2009. This 215km long road is a crucial part of what is known as Afghanistan’s garland road network that goes around the country connecting Herat to Kabulvia Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. But this road link apart, the North-South Transportation Corridor has mostly been gathering dust for a decade now.

In the meantime, the Chinese have aggressively built similar road and rail networks penetrating deep into the heart of Central Asian Region. The Karakoram Highway, which is under-construction in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and stands a direct threat to India’s security interests in that region, is also essentially an extension of this plan, and so is the Gwadar port in Pakistan that is being developed as a counter-balance to the Chabahar port in Iran, located less than 200km away.

This brings us to military-security aspect of India-Central Asia dynamic. As of now, India’s military footprint in that region is next to nothing. New Delhi had sought to shore up its prospects by taking over the Ayni air base in Tajikistan which would have given tremendous strategic depth in the region but its plans have most definitely been thwarted by Russia, the big brother in the region. India began renovating the Ayni air-field, located just outside the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, in 2004 and up until the end of 2010, Indian engineers were still working there. However, since then the Tajik Government which depends considerably on Moscow for financial aid, seems to have made clear that it will only let Russia use the air-base.

India’s other military assets in the region include a military hospital in Farkhor, also in Tajikistan. Set up in 2001 to treat Northern Alliance members fighting the Taliban, it was shut down after the US removed the militant group from power. But in recent years, there have been talks of re-opening that field hospital.

The India-Tajik relationship is as far as India’s military presence goes in that region. And while there have been some positive indications of improving that footprint, it is unlikely to change significantly in the near future. Not only because China and Pakistan will do all that they can to limit India’s presence but also because Russia will probably not go all out to support India. The US is the only country which has unequivocally stated that it would like India to emerge as its regional partner (this explains Russia’s reluctance) especially post the 2014 Afghan pullout.

India remains an important player in its New Silk Road project that hopes to integrate the Afghan economy into that of Central and South Asia. But with America’s diminished clout at this point (the NSR project has been all but discarded), it is unclear how far Washington, DC will be able to help. In other words, India is on its own.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on December 25, 2014)

Taking Responsibility for SAARC

India fancies itself as a global power. However, its claims to leadership have always been undercut by the fact that it has failed to deliver on its home turf in South Asia. Prime Minister Modi has promised to change that by leading Saarc from the front

The big question at the 18th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is this: Will India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, finally step up and take leadership responsibility for the forum? For the eight member grouping that includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, this is an existential question. For Prime Minister Modi, who has sought to establish a strong foreign credential in his first six months in office, this will be his biggest, diplomatic test — and he knows it.

The South Asian forum which turns 30 next year has largely been a disappointment, if not an entirely failed project. Look at it any which way you want but there is no denying that Saarc has been unable to deliver on two of its basic promises: Prevent war between its member states and encourage greater economic cooperation among them. Some of this failure is the result of geography — except for Afghanistan and Pakistan which share a border with each other, all the others only share a border with India, thereby making Saarc a rather India-centric project; some of the others causes can be attributed to history — while under the British Raj, the region functioned as a cohesive trading unit, it split up into rather inward-looking nations that were wary of free enterprise, and defined by bitterly contested borders, in the post-colonial period.

The difficult bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan, inarguably one of the biggest roadblocks for Saarc, is a product of both history and geography. Moreover, as recent reports about Pakistan playing spoilsport in signing the important rail transport network treaty shows, this is a problem that is not going away anytime soon. Having said that, however, it is also important to underline that Pakistan is not the only one responsible for the sad state of affairs at Saarc. India, its Pakistan problems notwithstanding, has also failed to in its role as the group’s natural leader.

In the early years of Saarc, India routinely gave preference to developing its relations with its neighbours on a bilateral basis, rather than strengthening the multilateral forum. It was only after the economic liberalisation of the 1990s that New Delhi’s approach began to change. As the country grew stronger, and indeed more confident of itself, it also became more willing to assert itself on regional and international forums.

Very quickly, India went from a country that wanted no part of any pie (think Non-Aligned Movement) to demanding a finger in every pie. As India’s international profile grew stronger, and Saarc continued to wither away, many wondered if this country had outgrown its neighbourhood.  Having been found access to the global high table, was India now disinterested in its home turf?

The narrative changed again with Prime Minister IK Gujral’s foreign policy doctrine which said that India’s welfare was intrinsically linked to the fortunes of its neighbours, and focussed New Delhi’s efforts on South Asia. Successive Governments led by Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, carried forward this policy — at least in spirit, even if implementation was often patchy.

Now, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also reiterated the neighbours-come-first policy. And it is hoped that, unlike his predecessor, he will be able to convert policy formulations into practicable solutions. His invitation to all the Saarc leaders for this inauguration ceremony earlier this year, reminiscent of an emperor’s coronation where the kings come calling, was, a diplomatic masterstroke. Not only was it befitting the landmark mandate that he had been given but, more importantly in this context, it was a powerful signal to the rest of the neighbourhood that India, under Prime Minister Modi, will no longer shy away from its leadership responsibilities in South Asia. But strong signals apart, what about the substance? After all, even with the best of intentions, Mr Modi can’t turn things around single-handedly. 

For one, there are certain issues, like Pakistan, that lie beyond his control. Given the current situation in Pakistan, there is no space for a peace deal on matters related to Kashmir and other boundary disputes. Also, on the issue of terrorism, there is little that India can do, except for strengthening its fences, if Pakistani deliberately rears snakes at home, hoping to let them loose them this country. Outside of the Pakistan problem, India also has little control on political developments in other countries (for example, coups and rigged elections) which tend to fuel instability in the region. Sure, India can, and should, play a supportive role (as it did in Nepal with reconciliation of the Maoists) but it cannot force wholesale political changes (like keeping Islamists out of power).

But while the challenges facing Mr Modi in the region are myriad, there is also ample scope for him to bring about changes that can impact and improve the lives of more than a billion citizens.  A good place to start with the Saarc reform process is at home. Economically, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world —intra-regional trade is abysmally low at just five per cent of the total official trade; intra-regional investments are equally paltry. And India, by far the biggest economic entity in the region, is also embarrassingly the least open to intra-regional trade.

Talk of reversing this situation has been going on for quite a few years now. For example, in 2007, when India was leading the Saarc summit, President Pranab Mukherjee, then serving as External Affairs Minister under the UPA regime, had said at a conference of Saarc parliamentarians that this country, as the largest nation in the region, was willing to “to accept asymmetrical responsibilities, including opening up her markets to her South Asian neighbours without insisting on reciprocity.” Unfortunately, there was little change on the ground.

Economic cooperation apart, Mr Modi could also look at enhancing collaboration in some of the other areas where joint challenges exist. For example, climate change is a major concern for all members particularly the Maldives. Similarly, energy security is a pressing matter for all South Asian countries, with the exception of Bhutan to some extent.

(This article was published in the oped section of The Pioneer on November 27, 2014)

 

Rawalpindi is the Real Villain

Peace in Afghanistan is a difficult project but it’s possible if Pakistan cooperates. Unfortunately, it is still plotting ways to ensure all of us in the region remain in hell and no one gets to go to heaven alone. It will only change its ways once the costs it incurs shoot up

In Afghanistan’s long drawn out transition process to peace and stability, this year has been particularly crucial. Western troops who have held the country together over the past decade and a half are now wrapping up their combat missions. Only about 21,000 will remain to assist the Afghan forces, and it is still unclear how well the latter will be able to hold fort. Already, there have been reports of the Taliban taking back villages in the south from where they had been ousted. A new Government has taken charge in Kabul but it stands on a precarious power-sharing deal between two bitter rivals. In a wide-ranging interview to The Pioneer, former chief of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security Amrullah Saleh acknowledges the challenges ahead but also expresses optimism that Afghanistan’s political establishment will not betray the people’s aspirations. Excerpts from the interview:

Do you believe the new National Unity Government will be stable?

We have passed more difficult times than this in the past 40 years, so I am optimistic. First, the people of Afghanistan want both leaders to work together, so there is popular pressure demanding convergence. Second, the pressure from international community to make this Government work is also massive. Each world leader who calls on the President also calls on the CEO who’s powers are akin to that of a Prime Minister. Regional powers, minus Pakistan, are also supportive. This is unlike in the 1980s and 1990s when the region was divided on the kind of Government that Afghanistan should have. Third, the two leaders know that if they don’t work together, they’ll open the gates for the Taliban to stage a comeback.

How do you think the arrangement will work, in terms of sharing of portfolios etc, given that both leaders have competing interests?

The NUG has not yet taken off. It still has to be assembled. This won’t be an easy task because interest groups will inevitably play tricks. There will be diverse dynamics, and lot of pulling and pushing by vested interests. It is up to the two men at the top to show more statesmanship. So, yes, there all ingredients of instability but the opportunities (for stability) are greater than the challenges.

How is the personal relationship between between President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah?

Since they signed the deal, both sides have taken a more humble approach. They understand they have about five years together — two years until the launch of the loya jirga and another three after that. You know, human beings who claim that they have forgotten the past are saying utter lies. But good leaders suppress past feelings and move on.

Also, the past here is not just the past six months. The leaders should remember the past four decades. They should remember the fate of Afghan leaders who didn’t work together. Afghan history is full of instances wherein the people have given a mandate and the leaders haven’t to work together and they have all lost.

The international community seems optimistic about the NUG. Do the Afghan voters share its optimism or do they feel cheated out of their mandate?

For the masses, ‘hope’ is a commodity. For the people at the top, hope is neither a commodity nor a policy. The only measurable factor is the document outlining the NUG. Moreover, there is little room for violation of the deal. If either side violates the provisions, the people will see that, given the role of media.

What is your assessment of the Afghan security issue?

We are suffering. We are in pain. We wake to headlines of bomb blasts, casualties and tears. I am not hiding that. But the legitimacy of the constitutional democratic space is so strong that the people are willing to defend it.

As for the Taliban, the Afghan system has not been dogmatic in its approach by insisting on the use of force. It has kept the negotiation gate open. But the Taliban are not ready to negotiate because they want to dictate certain terms.

But they can’t continue forever as, compared to the 1980s and 1990s, they are getting support from a much weaker Pakistan. There is a civil-military divide in Pakistan over the Afghan policy, and also over how to tackle extremism within that country and re-brand Pakistan.

Remember even up to the 1990s, Pakistan had a good brand. It was an ally, a front line ally ready to help the free world; it had its own challenges but was not ready to say goodbye to democratic values forever. But what is the Pakistani brand today? It is a hub for extremism and sectarianism; it has a dirty record of nuclear proliferation and the shadow of the army is bigger than physics of democracy. Still, there is one Pakistani side which is constantly reaching out to the Afghan people but the other half, which is the military, is playing a dirty power game. This can’t go on. They will have to realise this or they’ll be forced to realise this.

How are talks with the Taliban progressing under the new Government?

A breakthrough in this regard will come only when Rawalpindi creates one. But Rawalpindi is not interested in peace. Taliban leaders showing some interest in peace have been killed in covert attacks. It is only if Pakistan’s cost of war goes up that that it will force the Taliban to lay their arms. Currently, Pakistan pays too little and gains too much. It gives maybe $30 million to $40 million to the Taliban, and in return, it get billions of dollars in aid from the US (to fight the Taliban). Ironically, the US is financing both sides of the war.

To what extent is Pakistan still cultivating Afghanistan as its ‘strategic depth’ depth against India?

The question should be will it ever get away from this nostalgic idea? Will Pakistan ever realise that it is punching far above their weight? Also, Pakistan should realise that no one has ever been able to dominate Afghanistan. As I told a Western friend recently, “You are subsidising Afghanistan today, for which we are grateful, but can you say we are a pro-West nation with confidence?” Finally, Afghanistan is now a changed country. The new population has different aspirations and is no longer the bearded country that Pakistan wanted it to be.

Some Westerners say Afghanistan is being victimised by India-Pakistan rivalry. What’s your take?

India works with the Afghan Government and doesn’t sponsor non-state actors. India is associated in my country with electricity, education and entertainment. If Pakistan wants to jump into these spheres, we welcome that. But the problem is everything good that India builds in Afghanistan, Pakistan wants to destroy it. That is an evil effort of ‘either we all remain in hell or you alone cannot go to heaven.’ In Afghanistan, Pakistan is trying to put itself at parity with India using wrong means.

Also, India has never looked down upon Afghanistan but Pakistan does not show us respect. We get hurt when we are not respected and our culture is ridiculed. This is what the Pakistani elite used to do. They’d brief Western officials in London and Washington, DC, that, “The Afghans are a bunch of tribes; they are disassociated; you help us, we manage them”. India has never said that.

How will Kabul’s India policy shape up under the new Government? Will the Karzai consensus hold?

I am not in Government, so I can’t speak with authority. But as an informed commentator, I’d like to say that there are realities that politicians cannot change. The reality of our region is that India is a force for stability. With Nato reducing its presence, there has to be another power filling that void. Who else, if not India? Who else has the same amount of interest in maintaining constitutional order in Afghanistan? If the new leaders say ‘no’ to India, then who do they say ‘yes’ to?

(This interview was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on October 30, 2014)

No Hiding From This Relationship

The Narendra Modi Government must seize this moment to ‘normalise' the India-Israel bilateral, so that Israel gets the respect and support that India accords to its friends, irrespective of the political party in power in New Delhi

The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu this Sunday in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly was undoubtedly a landmark one. It was the first official engagement between the top leaders of the two countries in more than a decade, and marked a unique coming-out-of-the-closet moment for the India-Israel bilateral. While the two countries have quietly worked with each other since independence, formal diplomatic relations were  established only 1992; and even in the two decades since then, the relationship has been underplayed. This has been despite Israel’s steadfast support to India, and increased cooperation between the two countries in fields as diverse as agriculture and outer space. In this context, some have noted that the little attention given to Sunday's meeting does not do justice to its high significance. While this is a valid point, the fact that there wasn’t much of a hullabaloo about the meeting tells another story of how far the bilateral has progressed in these past two decades.

The last time an Indian Prime Minister met with the Israeli Prime Minister was in 2003, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee hosted Ariel Sharon. The tour,  though successful, was also marked by staunch opposition from large sections of the Indian Left, which condemned the Government for hobnobbing with the man who had been dubbed as “the killer of Muslims” and portrayed the meeting as a grave insult to India’s Muslim population in particular. Much water has flowed under the bridge since then, but Palestinian issues remain somewhat of a tender point in India — even if only in some university campuses and newspaper Op-ed pages. That there was not even a pipsqueak of protest even from these quarters shows that there is broad political consensus on the India-Israel bilateral. The Modi Government must now seize this moment to ‘normalise’ (for want of a better word) the bilateral, so that Israel gets the attention, respect and support that India accords to its friends — irrespective of the political party in power.

Up until now, the India-Israel bilateral has remained as some sort of a ‘BJP project’ as it is leaders of the BJP who have most often advocated better relations with Israel. At the top of the list is the indomitable Subramanian Swamy, who was the first senior Indian politician to visit Israel. Prime Minister Vajpayee also deserves full credit for being the only Indian head of Government to have hosted an Israeli Prime Minister. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj is a self-declared fan of Israel and has also served as chief of the India-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Committee. When the Gaza crisis erupted this summer, she put up a strong defence for India’s pro-Israel stance in the Lok Sabha.

As for Prime Minister Modi, he has a long-standing relationship with the Israelis. Like all the aforementioned leaders, he too has travelled to Israel and is well aware of how much the Jewish nation can offer India. During his tenure as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, he successfully brought Israeli technology, investment, innovation to his State — and it is widely believed that few diplomats had the kind of access to him as the Israeli Ambassador to New Delhi. Against this backdrop, it is in the fitness of things that after one Prime Minister from the BJP welcomed his Israeli counterpart home, another has proudly acknowledged the India-Israel partnership on the global stage.

This, however, is not to suggest that the Congress did nothing for the India-Israel bilateral. Even if one does not count in Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao who established diplomatic ties with Israel, given his strained relationship with the Congress high command, there can be no two ways about the fact that the India-Israel bilateral grew rapidly and robustly under the UPA regime of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Israel quickly became one of India’s biggest defence suppliers, second only to Russia, and bilateral trade has boomed from a $20 million in 1992 to six billion dollars now. There was even a high-level visit during the UPA years by former External Affairs Minister SM Krishna. 

Also, the pro-Arab ideological tendencies (which resulted in anti-Israel gestures) that the Congress had inherited from its previous generation of leaders seeking to win over Muslim voters and minimise the influence of the Muslim League during Independence, had lost currency. For example, while some may have been reading much into the fact that Prime Minister Modi did not bring up the Gaza issue during his meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the fact is that this has been the template for years now. Palestinian/Arab issues are almost never brought up by Indian leaders in their meetings with Israeli leaders and diplomats, who, however, often get an earful from the Europeans and Americans.

In effect, the Congress’s ‘anti-Israel’ policy of the past had, in recent years, been reduced to supporting largely meaningless resolutions against the Jewish nation at the UN. Its so-called support for the Palestinian cause was also limited to a small budgetary allowance and a big handshake with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the UNGA. Notably, Mr Modi did not meet Mr Abbas in New York this time — this was reportedly because of scheduling issues, but either way, it comes as no surprise, given the Prime Minister’s strong dislike for meaningless photo-ops.

That said, some parts of the old template still remain — and even the Modi Government hasn’t been able clear them out. India’s vote in favour of the anti-Israel resolution at the UN Human Rights Council, is one example. But the consequent public backlash it generated shows that the Government needs to catch up with popular sentiment. For years, Israel has been viewed more favourably in India than in most other countries.

Apart from the fact that Jews in India have never faced religious persecution, Indians today have a special admiration for Israel — a tiny country that has not just survived, but thrived, even amidst relentless hostility. Though it is unfair to compare Israel’s relationship with its Arab neighbours and India’s with its South Asian neighbours, the point is that Indians understand what it is like to live in a difficult neighbourhood.

With political and popular support aligned, now is the time to complete the ‘normalisation’ process of the India-Israel bilateral. Even those who are critical of Israel’s policies and would perhaps like to lobby New Delhi on these matters should support this move — ‘normalisation’ of relations will create space for a more honest conversation; it will mean that those in India who support Israel do not have to be constantly defensive about the bilateral; and finally, it will allow the mainstream Right in India to effectively rein in fringe elements, who have been using the ‘support Israel’ platform to gain easy publicity for their extremist campaigns.

(This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on October 2, 2014)