HINDUS FOR TRUMP?

The recent community event in Edison, New Jersey, organized by the Republican Hindu Coalition (RHC) for presidential nominee Donald Trump has generated much mockery and some anguish in America and India. This is par for the course for just about any Trump event these days, and it is tempting to write it off as an amusing footnote in an election that has, if nothing else, been full of surprises, to put it gently.

And while it is no one’s case that the Hindus for Trump event marked any major shift, trend, or development in this election cycle – reportedly, many members of Trump’s audience in Edison do not even have a vote in the United States and most came for the entertainment and the samosas – it is worthwhile to ask if this event reflects the attitudes and aspirations of at least a section, even if small, of the Indian-American community.

The RHC seesm to be the only outfit in the United States that claims both a Hindu religious identity and a clear partisan political organization. All other Hindu groups, and there are quite a few with deep roots in the community and extensive networks across the country, are officially bipartisan. Fashioned after the Republican Jewish Coalition, the RHC has been floated by industrialist Shalabh (Shalli) Kumar who, along with his wife, has donated a large amount of money to the Trump campaign. The Hindus for Trump event was evidently his display of muscle power to the Republican party leadership – and in that limited context, it was a success. It drew about 5,000 people and remains the only occasion wherein the presidential nominee has addressed an Indian-American gathering. This is even more interesting because the Republicans don’t get very many Indian-American votes. The community, like most other immigrant groups, votes Democrat.

And while this trend is expected to hold strong through the current election cycle, there are indications of a sense of disillusionment within the Indian-American community, particularly with issues relating to Hindu beliefs, heritage, and history. We see this in the California school textbook controversy that goes back to 2006 and in the more recent Diwali school holiday issue. Additionally, there seems to be some disappointment with the Democrats’ India policies while Republicans are considered to be relatively more pro-India.

So, where does the Hindus for Trump rally, RHC, and Trump fit into all of this, if at all? There are two factors that seem to bring the two together: First is Trump’s strong rhetoric against Islamist terrorism which has emerged as an overarching concern among his support base.  The second factor is a little more complicated: for long, Indian-Americans who would have ideally voted Republican for conservative fiscal policies have shied away from doing so because of the latter’s evangelical wing. Trump, with his multiple marriages and many dalliances, has an uneasy relationship with the religious right. And that somehow makes him a fit for the vote bank being nurtured by the RHC.

But even this is an awkward fit at best – for example, Trump’s anti-immigration stance stands out like a sore thumb in this context, even though his supporters painstakingly seek to make the distinction between illegal and legal immigrants. Similarly, how does the RHC, which is presumably against cattle slaughter, support a candidate who once sold steak? There are many such loose ends. In the long term, it will be interesting to see if the Indian diaspora in the United States, like its counterpart in the United Kingdom, shifts to the conservative side or remains loyal to the Democrats.

This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform

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POST-URI STRIKES: INDIA’S TAKEAWAYS

In the several days since India announced its “surgical strikes” along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, there has been a plethora of commentary already with experts analyzing its military, diplomatic, and political angles threadbare. Now’s a good time to take a step back and view the larger picture – how does this change the India-Pakistan equation in Kashmir and beyond? What are its implications on India’s security matrix? How does it fit into Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Pakistan policy and India’s overall foreign and security policy?

Shorn of TRP-generating hyperbole and hysteria, the fact of the matter is that such cross-border raids have been carried out many times before, and there is little evidence to suggest that last week’s strikes were even qualitatively any better (either carried out deeper into Pakistani territory or inflicting greater damage or taking out targets higher up the value chain).  And that’s fine.

The key here is not that the raid occurred but that it was publicized. That was a first. Why? Why did this government break from the past? The easy answer is because it needed to assuage domestic sentiments. There had been a series of terror attacks – Gurdaspur, Pampore, Pathankot, Uri – and to the public at large, it was looking like the government was doing nothing more than kadi ninda (severe criticism), even though it was supposed to be more hawkish on security affairs.

But the Modi administration wasn’t the only one to have faced such public pressure. The government of Manmohan Singh, for example, was in a far worse situation after the Mumbai carnage in 2008, and even in 2013, when the LoC lit up after reports emerged of the two Indian soldiers being killed and their bodies being mutilated. At least in the latter case, it is believed that the Indian Army carried out retaliatory strikes across the LoC but these were not publicly acknowledged – until now. The Congress party recently listed three “surgical strikes” that had been authorized by the United Progressive Alliance government when it was in power.

The conventional wisdom (pushed in no small measure by the Pakistani establishment and contested in some Indian military circles) was that announcing such strikes would compel Pakistan to respond, and this could escalate into a full spectrum military confrontation between the nuclear-armed nations. While previous Indian governments have played safe against this backdrop, the Modi administration took a calculated risk.

It publicized the strike but also carefully framed it as a counter-terror operation, undertaken in the defense of Indian citizens and in an area that India considers to be its sovereign territory. It even urged the Pakistan Army to do its bit to control non-state actors, thereby drawing a line between the Pakistani state and its proxies. This was to ensure that at least on paper the attack was not seen as an attack on Pakistan itself.

Most importantly, Modi and his team seem to have reasoned that the Pakistani government, instead of forcefully responding to the attack, would in fact underplay the Indian strike. Because acknowledging such a strike, especially after it had been so announced by India, would make it look bad. Even in a worst case scenario, wherein Pakistan reacted more negatively than expected, it would be safe to assume that the international community would bear upon Pakistan to exercise restraint – just as it has with India, when the latter has been attacked and repeatedly so.

What this means from India’s point of view is that there is slightly more space than previously estimated for a conventional response to sub-conventional threats from Pakistan. This is the big takeaway, the big win. Now, how much more space there is, and how far the Modi government will probe it, remains to be seen. The lesson to be learnt is that the price of inaction is often greater than wrong actions.

Note that Modi or his team didn’t do anything that was drastically different from their predecessors (such as striking the Lashkar headquarter in Muridke, an option India considered after Mumbai 2008 but dropped). They have no magic wand or silver bullet to speak of. They have the same old toolkit—they just try to work it better.

In fact, it is important not to confuse this old toolkit with the availability of a new one – India still does not have very many options for responding to Pakistani attacks in a way that will not only penalize Pakistan but also compel it to change its India strategy. India can develop some retaliatory options over time, such as covert strikes on terror training camps (not the same as launch pads), but even these will only be punitive. India’s basic problem with Pakistan – its sponsorship of anti-India terrorism – remains.

This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform