HINDUS FOR TRUMP?

The recent community event in Edison, New Jersey, organized by the Republican Hindu Coalition (RHC) for presidential nominee Donald Trump has generated much mockery and some anguish in America and India. This is par for the course for just about any Trump event these days, and it is tempting to write it off as an amusing footnote in an election that has, if nothing else, been full of surprises, to put it gently.

And while it is no one’s case that the Hindus for Trump event marked any major shift, trend, or development in this election cycle – reportedly, many members of Trump’s audience in Edison do not even have a vote in the United States and most came for the entertainment and the samosas – it is worthwhile to ask if this event reflects the attitudes and aspirations of at least a section, even if small, of the Indian-American community.

The RHC seesm to be the only outfit in the United States that claims both a Hindu religious identity and a clear partisan political organization. All other Hindu groups, and there are quite a few with deep roots in the community and extensive networks across the country, are officially bipartisan. Fashioned after the Republican Jewish Coalition, the RHC has been floated by industrialist Shalabh (Shalli) Kumar who, along with his wife, has donated a large amount of money to the Trump campaign. The Hindus for Trump event was evidently his display of muscle power to the Republican party leadership – and in that limited context, it was a success. It drew about 5,000 people and remains the only occasion wherein the presidential nominee has addressed an Indian-American gathering. This is even more interesting because the Republicans don’t get very many Indian-American votes. The community, like most other immigrant groups, votes Democrat.

And while this trend is expected to hold strong through the current election cycle, there are indications of a sense of disillusionment within the Indian-American community, particularly with issues relating to Hindu beliefs, heritage, and history. We see this in the California school textbook controversy that goes back to 2006 and in the more recent Diwali school holiday issue. Additionally, there seems to be some disappointment with the Democrats’ India policies while Republicans are considered to be relatively more pro-India.

So, where does the Hindus for Trump rally, RHC, and Trump fit into all of this, if at all? There are two factors that seem to bring the two together: First is Trump’s strong rhetoric against Islamist terrorism which has emerged as an overarching concern among his support base.  The second factor is a little more complicated: for long, Indian-Americans who would have ideally voted Republican for conservative fiscal policies have shied away from doing so because of the latter’s evangelical wing. Trump, with his multiple marriages and many dalliances, has an uneasy relationship with the religious right. And that somehow makes him a fit for the vote bank being nurtured by the RHC.

But even this is an awkward fit at best – for example, Trump’s anti-immigration stance stands out like a sore thumb in this context, even though his supporters painstakingly seek to make the distinction between illegal and legal immigrants. Similarly, how does the RHC, which is presumably against cattle slaughter, support a candidate who once sold steak? There are many such loose ends. In the long term, it will be interesting to see if the Indian diaspora in the United States, like its counterpart in the United Kingdom, shifts to the conservative side or remains loyal to the Democrats.

This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform

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POST-URI STRIKES: INDIA’S TAKEAWAYS

In the several days since India announced its “surgical strikes” along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, there has been a plethora of commentary already with experts analyzing its military, diplomatic, and political angles threadbare. Now’s a good time to take a step back and view the larger picture – how does this change the India-Pakistan equation in Kashmir and beyond? What are its implications on India’s security matrix? How does it fit into Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Pakistan policy and India’s overall foreign and security policy?

Shorn of TRP-generating hyperbole and hysteria, the fact of the matter is that such cross-border raids have been carried out many times before, and there is little evidence to suggest that last week’s strikes were even qualitatively any better (either carried out deeper into Pakistani territory or inflicting greater damage or taking out targets higher up the value chain).  And that’s fine.

The key here is not that the raid occurred but that it was publicized. That was a first. Why? Why did this government break from the past? The easy answer is because it needed to assuage domestic sentiments. There had been a series of terror attacks – Gurdaspur, Pampore, Pathankot, Uri – and to the public at large, it was looking like the government was doing nothing more than kadi ninda (severe criticism), even though it was supposed to be more hawkish on security affairs.

But the Modi administration wasn’t the only one to have faced such public pressure. The government of Manmohan Singh, for example, was in a far worse situation after the Mumbai carnage in 2008, and even in 2013, when the LoC lit up after reports emerged of the two Indian soldiers being killed and their bodies being mutilated. At least in the latter case, it is believed that the Indian Army carried out retaliatory strikes across the LoC but these were not publicly acknowledged – until now. The Congress party recently listed three “surgical strikes” that had been authorized by the United Progressive Alliance government when it was in power.

The conventional wisdom (pushed in no small measure by the Pakistani establishment and contested in some Indian military circles) was that announcing such strikes would compel Pakistan to respond, and this could escalate into a full spectrum military confrontation between the nuclear-armed nations. While previous Indian governments have played safe against this backdrop, the Modi administration took a calculated risk.

It publicized the strike but also carefully framed it as a counter-terror operation, undertaken in the defense of Indian citizens and in an area that India considers to be its sovereign territory. It even urged the Pakistan Army to do its bit to control non-state actors, thereby drawing a line between the Pakistani state and its proxies. This was to ensure that at least on paper the attack was not seen as an attack on Pakistan itself.

Most importantly, Modi and his team seem to have reasoned that the Pakistani government, instead of forcefully responding to the attack, would in fact underplay the Indian strike. Because acknowledging such a strike, especially after it had been so announced by India, would make it look bad. Even in a worst case scenario, wherein Pakistan reacted more negatively than expected, it would be safe to assume that the international community would bear upon Pakistan to exercise restraint – just as it has with India, when the latter has been attacked and repeatedly so.

What this means from India’s point of view is that there is slightly more space than previously estimated for a conventional response to sub-conventional threats from Pakistan. This is the big takeaway, the big win. Now, how much more space there is, and how far the Modi government will probe it, remains to be seen. The lesson to be learnt is that the price of inaction is often greater than wrong actions.

Note that Modi or his team didn’t do anything that was drastically different from their predecessors (such as striking the Lashkar headquarter in Muridke, an option India considered after Mumbai 2008 but dropped). They have no magic wand or silver bullet to speak of. They have the same old toolkit—they just try to work it better.

In fact, it is important not to confuse this old toolkit with the availability of a new one – India still does not have very many options for responding to Pakistani attacks in a way that will not only penalize Pakistan but also compel it to change its India strategy. India can develop some retaliatory options over time, such as covert strikes on terror training camps (not the same as launch pads), but even these will only be punitive. India’s basic problem with Pakistan – its sponsorship of anti-India terrorism – remains.

This article was published on the Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform

SAV REVIEW SERIES: CAN INDIA CHANGE PAKISTAN’S BEHAVIOR?

Imagine this chilling scenario: “In 2017, a group of young men hailing from Pakistan conduct a terrorist attack in a major Indian city killing hundreds of people and severely damaging an iconic Indian landmark. While Pakistani authorities initially deny any direct or indirect involvement in the attack, and insist that in recent years they have exerted themselves to tame militant groups, Indian officials declare that they have intelligence tying the attackers to a group with infrastructure in Pakistan that is, or should be, known to Pakistani security officials.” What could happen next is alarming – in George Perkovich and Toby Dalton’s new book Not War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism, the authors caution against this scenario leading to the possibility of both countries mobilizing their militaries, risking a full-scale war between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.

In real life, India’s reaction to terrorism emanating from Pakistan has been less dramatic. After the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Congress-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh exercised no ‘hard options’ and instead launched a diplomatic campaign to name and shame Pakistan, as the authors themselves note in the book. After the 2001 Parliament attack, the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee responded with massive troop mobilization but avoided military escalation. Both provocations were serious enough for India’s political and defense establishments to at least consider military retaliation, and yet in neither of the two cases did India go to war with Pakistan.

Presentation of the Argument and Critiques

With conventional warfare ruled out, the question that Perkovich and Dalton pose is: What else can India do to motivate Pakistan to prevent such incidences of cross-border terrorism? The authors specifically look at five options that India is likely to consider vis-à-vis Pakistan: (I) An army-centric proactive incursion into Pakistan; (II) a limited airborne operation against targets directly associated with terror organizations; (III) a covert operation fomenting insurgency in Pakistan; (IV) innovations in the nuclear doctrine that would complement the previous three options, and (V) a strategy of non-violent compellence.

In the army-centric option, the authors focus on what is popularly known as the Cold Start doctrine. They rightly highlight reasons why India should ignore this path including the fact that it simply does not have the military capabilities at this point to pursue this option with any degree of success. Also, the escalatory risks associated with it are extremely high, since it is difficult to imagine that Pakistan would not respond to an invasion of its territory. As the authors note, “[…] If Indian leaders authorize a proactive response to another terrorist attack, the Indian forces are unlikely to achieve the quick splendid victory that proponents of the strategy imagine.”

Next, the authors critique the case for airborne operations against select terror targets. This section is a must-read for those in India advocating for the Modi government to order a U.S.-style hit on Hafiz Saeed and Dawood Ibrahim in Pakistan. The authors note that while this seems appealing, especially since the United States and Israel already go for such options in their counterterrorism policies, they rightly argue that “India does not possess offensive capabilities remotely comparable with those of the US and Israel.”

The third segment on covert operations, makes for a timely read given that Prime Minister Modi recently emphasized Pakistan’s abuses in Balochistan in response to Pakistani criticisms of India’s human rights record in Kashmir. As the authors note, Ajit Doval, three months prior to his appointment as Modi’s National Security Advisor, had also said: “You (Pakistan) can do one Mumbai and you may lose Balochistan.” With this in mind, the authors assess the pros and cons of such a strategy wherein India facilitates covert actions in Pakistan in response to a terrorist attack on Indian soil. In the end, they argue that risks outweigh the benefits. This is debatable, depending on the scope and scale of Indian action. For example, if India is able to reasonably improve its ground intelligence and covert strike capabilities, attacking targets in Pakistan-administered Kashmir may be considered. Similarly, India could also consider upping the ante in Balochistan – this need not translate into instigating a full-scale Baloch rebellion but just enough to send the message that there is a price to be paid for mischief-making. That said, even those who advocate for such operations will do well to remember that Pakistan’s proxy war strategy has failed in its primary objective—to extract from India any major concessions on Kashmir.

The fourth option on nuclear capabilities has similar operational issues of the sort that plague the previous options, though the authors’ suggestion that India should stick with its no first use policy is debatable. As defense expert Abhijit Iyer-Mitra explains, “India has diluted the concept (of NFU) to the point of absurdity, with dangerous consequences: a buildup of its conventional forces, which has caused Pakistan to harden its nuclear stance.”

This brings us to the fifth option of non-violent compellence, which the authors argue would be “more cost-effective to turn the people and authorities of Pakistan and the international community against actors who would conduct terrorism in India.” This is where the book begins to falter. The authors suggest that since India does not have any real hard power options, it should look at soft power options to effectively isolate Pakistan on the global stage. While this can surely serve as one of many levers that India turns against Pakistan, the authors fail to provide a convincing argument for how this would actually change Pakistani behavior; the authors accentuate this point when they themselves note that the Pakistani state has only limited control over anti-India groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. Thus, it is unclear how these soft power options would create substantive differences from the status quo.

They argue that the restraint of Indian leaders after the 2001 and 2008 terrorist attacks “resulted in a Pakistani sense of loss.” But the point is that this rather vague notion of loss has not had any significant impact whatsoever on Pakistan’s India policies—much like the BDS movement against Israel, which the authors say has caused “deep concern” in Jerusalem but has not changed the way Israel approaches Palestinian terror.

The authors also consider the possibility of India lobbying for economic sanctions against Pakistan with an emphasis on getting American and Chinese support. Even if India were to achieve American support, it is extremely difficult to imagine China would ever support these sanctions because of its close relationship with Pakistan. And without Chinese support, such a suggestion is ultimately not a realistic one.

Concluding Thoughts

This brings us back to the question: What can India do to motivate Pakistan to prevent such attacks? Some 300 pages later, the answer seems to be: not much. India would struggle to mobilize its hard power against Pakistan; even if India did use hard power, it would risk escalation and nuclear warfare. The authors push for the use of soft power, but this seems like a mostly ineffective solution with no real change to the status quo.

Perhaps, the answer on how to change Pakistani behavior lies in the proposition that India should not try to change it in the first place. India could simply focus on improving its resilience by strengthening its borders and improving its homeland security apparatus to reduce the odds that terrorists might cross into India.

This article was published on Stimson Centre's South Asian Voices platform as part of a four-part series reviewing authors  George Perkovich and Toby Dalton‘s book  Not War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2016).  Read the entire series here.

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WHY MODI PLAYED THE B-CARD

It is no coincidence that Beijing's much touted China Pakistan Economic Corridor which cuts through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, also traverses through Balochistan and includes the strategic Gwadar port

It’s official now: India is turning the Balochistan lever against Pakistan. After decades of keeping itself at an arms’ length from the issue, it is now changing tack, with the express aim of paying back Pakistan on its own coin. As Union Minister Venkaiah Naidu explained on Tuesday, “Pakistan lectures us about Kashmir, that’s why we have told them what is happening in Balochistan, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit”.

Since Indian security forces killed Hizbul Mujahideen operative Burhan Wani last month, there have been large-scale protests in Kashmir Valley, which according to New Delhi have been engineered by Pakistan. Pakistan has retorted that the protests are a popular uprising against an occupying force.

Without diminishing the fact that there is at least some genuine discontent and disillusionment in the Valley, it is also hard to ignore that the unrest in Kashmir comes at a time when Pakistan has been effectively isolated on the international stage. There has also been some chatter that Pakistan’s intelligence agency itself may have had a hand in Burhan Wani’s death.

Even if that wasn’t the case, there is no denying that Pakistan has played up the issue, ostensibly hoping to distract attention from its own problems at home and abroad. This, however, has had only a limited impact globally (even though it will not be a stretch to say that Kashmir is worryingly close to a third wave of militancy). This, in turn, only strengthens the argument that what was once Pakistan’s most potent weapon to flog India on the global stage has now been blunted beyond repair.

The results are there for all to see: From India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi fired the first salvo from an all-party meeting convened to discuss the Kashmir issue. He then brought out the big guns on Independence Day —From the ramparts of the iconic Red Fort, with a billion eyes and ears trained on his every word and gesture, Modi noted that the people of Balochistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have thanked him in recent days (he didn’t go into details but the reference to Pakistani atrocities in these regions was obvious), and then, with just about every foreign diplomat that India hosts in his audience, warned that the “world is watching”.

Experts have dubbed this as a game-changer in the India-Pakistan relationship — that will be true if India keeps up the pressure, but for now, what we have is a change in tone and tenor. Technically, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir has always been part of India’s official narrative though Modi has brought it centre-stage and put the spotlight on Pakistani excesses in the region. This is as it should be.

Balochistan, though, is a new ballgame altogether because unlike PoK it is not disputed territory that India claims as its own. India recognises Balochistan as Pakistani territory and, therefore, it could be argued that bringing up the issue violates India’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

But while such principles et all make for good speeches and even compelling academic discourse, the demands of realpolitik require us to craft a different approach. Simply put, this was why India went into East Pakistan and midwifed Bangladesh.

Now, this is not to suggest — at least not at this point, anyhow — that the Modi Government is planning a similar operation in Balochistan. But only to underline the fact that if in 1971, India, still a poor country that was struggling to stand on its own two feet, could carry out a foreign military intervention on humanitarian grounds, there is no reason why India, today in 2016, as an economic powerhouse that seeks a seat at the global high table, cannot at least draw the attention of the world to the situation in Balochistan. There is both, a strong moral case and, of course, an equally strong geo-political case for India to speak, and firmly so, about Balochistan.

Perhaps, the question to be asked is: Why is India bringing up the issue now? The easy answer is Modi himself and his confident, self-assured approach to diplomacy. But there is more to that — apart from changes in regional alignments (think Iran which has its own minority Baloch population to deal with or Afghanistan where India supported the Northern Alliance through its Zahedan consulate in Iranian Balochistan or even Iraq which once sent weapons to Baloch leaders, hoping the insurgency in Pakistan would fan out to Iran), there is the China factor that India must grapple with.

In this context, it is no coincidence that Beijing’s much touted China Pakistan Economic Corridor which cuts through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, also traverses through Balochistan and includes the strategic Gwadar port (notably, India has also upped its game in Chabahar which is to serve as the foil to Gwadar). 

Some concerns have been raised that doing so would push India off the moral high ground it has held vis-à-vis Pakistan, that it would add credence to Pakistani claims that India has been fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan, and that in turn would dilute India’s cross-border terrorism case against Pakistan in Kashmir.

One can argue endlessly on these issues but the fact of the matter is that these are essentially perception battles that have limited impact on the ground and are ultimately decided by hard power. Look at, for example, how Pakistan has spun an anti-India Kashmir narrative for its public that is irrespective of the realities in the valley or how China is rarely censured for its oppressive policies in Tibet or against the Uyghurs.

The more important question here is: Can India take the Balochistan issue (which also Pakistan has sought to exploit for against India) and effectively use it as a lever against Pakistan? No doubt, like in Bangladesh, Pakistan’s own excesses in Balochistan make India’s job easy but, it is still to be seen if India will keep up the pressure, particularly if there if a different dispensation comes to power in New Delhi in 2019.

(A shorter version of this article was published on the Stimson Centre’s South Asian Voices platform)

CAMPAIGN OF CALUMNY

Isolated on the world stage, Pakistan is now playing up the Kashmir card against India — but with little impact

Notwithstanding the absurdity of a country like Pakistan — where large-scale human rights abuses are carried out on a daily basis with state sanction, where the state uses terrorism as legitimate tool of its foreign and security policies — outraging over the unrest in Kashmir, our neighbour's painstaking efforts to get the world to chide India for the loss of lives in the valley in effect actually exposes its own fears and weaknesses. It is no coincidence that Pakistan's global campaign to highlight what it perceives as Indian atrocities in Kashmir comes at a time when it itself has been isolated on the international stage. Considered to be virtually a failed state, a hub for jihadi terror, and a serious threat to regional peace, Pakistan has few friends, and is faced with a growing list of powerful nations that have little patience for its shenanigans. Cornered and isolated, Pakistan's easiest option to get some traction globally is to play up the Kashmir card, no matter the latter's diminishing value.

And so it is that the Government of Pakistan commemorated Wednesday, July 20, as a Black Day to draw attention to the July 8 killing of the Hizbul Mujahideen militant Burhan Wani and express solidarity with the people of the valley. The event was officially proposed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who described the operative of a designated terror group as a martyr of the Kashmiri independence movement, at a Cabinet meeting held last week specifically to discuss the situation in Kashmir. It was followed up with some enthusiasm by the Pakistani foreign office which took its India sob story to all and sundry.

It worked particularly hard at the UN, where letters were sent to senior officials and briefings conducted over supposed human rights violations in the valley. Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Maleeha Lodhi sought to underline her Government's “serious concern at the alarming situation” and draw attention to the “brutal killings of innocent civilians and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of the Kashmiris by the Indian occupation forces.” Her efforts went down the drains though as India's Permanent Representative to the UN Syed Akbaruddin slammed Pakistan as the country that “covets the territory of others, a country that uses terrorism as state policy, a country that extols the virtues of terrorists and provides sanctuary to UN-designated terrorists and a country that masquerades its efforts as support for human rights and self-determination.” He also underlined that Pakistan's “track record” on human rights was such that it couldn't even get elected to the UN Human Rights Council, where even Saudi Arabia, with its stone age practices of torture and beheadings, has a seat. The only international outfit that gave Pakistan any attention was, expectedly, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, a grouping of mostly Arab countries of the Muslim world. And it too just issued a template response deploring the use of excessive force by the Indian military and para-military forces.

In terms of major powers, the US has effectively ignored Pakistan's efforts. It has only reiterated its standard line (which reflects India's position) that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that needs to be resolved between India and Pakistan. Other than that, it has refused to be drawn into Pakistan's game and has made no comments on the violence in the valley. Pakistan's other ally and all-weather friend China has also issued a similarly anodyne statement that it is “concerned about the casualties in the clash”, and hopes that “relevant incidents will be handled properly”, adding only that “Kashmir is a leftover from history and relevant parties should address the issue peacefully through dialogue”.

And if all of this wasn't enough, the July 20 itself was a big failure as not only the Pakistani public but even Government officials, who were supposed to be sporting black bands while on duty, seemed least interested. No major demonstrations or protest marches were reported at foreign missions abroad and at home even Prime Minister Sharif didn't make a public appearance (he supposedly took a sick day). The party, the ruling PML-N, organised no rallies in major cities like Karachi and Islamabad. In Lahore, it had a small event which, PTI reported, was poorly attended. Clearly, it had no intention of being at the forefront of this movement (though it did pay for TV advertisements that ran all day).

The only ones who, in a sense, saved the day for the Pakistani Government was 26/11 terror mastermind Hafiz Saeed and his Jammat ud Dawa'ah while took out rallies in Multan, Bahawalpur and Faisalabad. They also organised an all-party conference in Lahore, and led a ‘Kashmir Caravan' that journeyed from Lahore to Islamabad in 24 hours. Hafiz Saeed was joined in his efforts by Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin and Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Azhar Masood. Not only does this speak volumes about the hollowness of Pakistan's campaign but more importantly gives credence to recent reports that the current wave of unrest in the valley has been largely manufactured across the border (even though it may seem like home-grown dissent with Burhan Wani being propped a local hero who embodied the fears and anxieties of the average Kashmiri).

The question then is: Why, after a period of relative quiet, has Pakistan now ramped up its efforts in Kashmir? There are a couple of reasons for this: First, as explained earlier, Pakistan has been completely isolated on the world stage. And so it is desperately trying to get some attention by India-bashing. Presumably, Pakistani officials can clearly see that this strategy is a non-starter but they are desperate and have few other options. Second, Pakistan's domestic political scenario remains a mess. An ailing Prime Minister Sharif is seen as incapable of delivering the goodies, while there have been suspicious calls for the military to take over already (in the form of large banners that lined Pakistani cities). Army chief Raheel Sharif has said that he won't be seeking an extension when his term ends but he remains quite popular with the masses especially after Zarb-e-Azb which the military has sold to the people as a hugely successful counter-terrorism operation.

STRENGTHENING INDIA-AFRICA TIES

The Prime Minister’s priority as he visits Africa will be strengthening trade ties, consolidating security ties and ramping up energy ties. None of this is new but what makes this moment special is the manner in which the aspirations of both partners complement each other

India’s relationship with the African continent may be a centuries-old civilisational compact but as Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeks to reinvigorate that relationship in all its nuances and across the full spectrum of diplomatic ties, the focus must, first and foremost, be on intensifying political engagement. This is essentially what the mega India Africa Forum Summit held last year in New Delhi, and attended by more than 50 African heads, was all about; and the Prime Minister’s four-nation tour of continental Africa that starts today must be seen against this same backdrop.

Indeed, it is no coincidence that Modi’s visit comes within weeks of President Pranab Mukherjee and Vice President Hamid Ansari’s Africa tours. While the former visited Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Namibia in June, the latter went to Tunisia and Morocco in May. The Prime Minister himself starts his tour with Mozambique, from where he will travel to South Africa, followed by Tanzania and Kenya. Technically, this will be his second trip to Africa - as he visited the island nations of Syechelles and Mauritius last year.

Notably, India’s ties with these east African countries in particular can be go back about 2,000 years when commercial ties were first established between traders from India’s west coast and the African east coast. The sea-borne trade was facilitated by the direction of the monsoon winds and a whole host of items were traded back and forth. In fact, the cotton and silk in which the Egyptian mummies were wrapped are believed to have come from India.

Though not many Indians settled in Africa at this time, a few did make their home in the trading towns of modern day Kenya, Zanzibar, Mozambique and the Comoros Islands, while some Africans made their home in Gujarat and along India’s western coast. In fact, one of the most famous ancient African traders, Bava Gor, is today worshipped by India’s Siddi community which descended from Africa’s Bantu tribe. Much later, in the 17th century, Dutch traders brought the first set of Indian labourers to South Africa, and they were followed in the 19th century by the British, who took about 30,000 Indians, mostly Sikhs from Punjab, to south-east Africa to work on large infrastructure projects, primarily the railway line that would connect Mombasa on the Kenyan coast to Kampala in interior Uganda.

In addition to the labourers brought by the British colonialists, ‘free traders’ from India also continued to make their way to this region and, in fact, helped east Africa move from a barter society to a money economy. As is well-known, these diaspora linkages, formed over centuries through shared experiences, were effectively leveraged, as both India and the African nations struggled to lift the yoke of colonial rule. Mahatma Gandhi is, of course, the most recognisable figure in this regard, but those familiar with Indian and African history know that he is not alone.

This historical context, though it hardly does justice to the depth and complexity of the Indian diaspora in Africa, is necessary to underline for it is what separates India’s relationship with Africa today from that of other major powers partnering with the continent. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that in all four countries, Modi will be highlighting the diaspora factor. This is also in keeping with the Prime Minister’s overall efforts to enliven New Delhi’s connect with Indian diaspora across the world - be it in the Gulf or the US and Canada.

The other priority areas for Modi in Africa will be strengthening trade ties, consolidating security ties particularly in the Indian Ocean region, ramping up defence cooperation, as well as securing energy ties.  This will be in addition to scaling up existing cooperation though developmental aid (a small part of which will be highlighted when Modi meets the ‘solar mamas’ in Tanzania) and lines of credit. While most of these have been on the India-Africa diplomatic agenda even before Modi, what makes this moment in the India-Africa relationship special is the manner in which the interests and aspirations of both partners complements the other.

This is best exemplified in two key policy documents that have been adopted in recent years by the member states of the African Union which outline the continent’s economic, security and political goals, which in turn, form the basis for its external engagement.

The first document is Agenda 2063 which maps out a 50-year overarching vision for the continent. This masterplan includes ending conflicts by 2020, eradicating poverty by 2025, doubling intra-African trade by 2022 and transforming nations and economies through large-scale industrialisation and employment generation. India has already been working on these lines through well-established programmes which focus on education, training and skill development. India has also shared its knowhow in a wide variety of sectors, from IT to agriculture to the manufacturing, with its African partners as well set up several large infrastructure projects across the continent.

In fact, these have been in keeping with the priority areas recently identified in the AU’s Programme on Infrastructure Development for Africa (PIDA): Transport (to link production and consumption centres, connect major cities, set up new transport hubs to open up landlocked regions); Information and Communication Technology; Water security (setting up multipurpose dams and leveraging Africa’s lakes and river basins); and Energy Infrastructure. The ultimate aim is to build "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena" - and India can help every step of the way. This will not only benefit Africa but is necessary for India as well as it grows as a manufacturing power and requires new markets.

The other big policy document is the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy which builds on the concept of a blue economy and reflects the keenness of Africa’s littoral states to effectively leverage their geographical prowess. Adopted in 2012, it sets the framework for building a maritime economy in competitive but sustainable manner. And while it incorporates a lot of great ideas, like Agenda 2063, it is an ambitious plan that needs international funding and support. This is where India can and should help, especially as it itself, particularly under the Modi Government, somewhat re-discovers its own maritime potential. Indeed, as India seeks to assert itself as the predominant power in the Indian Ocean region, working with the friendly east African nations that also share the Ocean is imperative. We have already seen steps being taken towards this end during Modi’s visit to Seychelles and Mauritius when defence cooperation emerged as a key theme, and hopefully, we’ll see the same over the next few days as Modi tours continental Africa.

BUILDING DIPLOMATIC ECOSYSTEM

Prime Minister Modi, in his second year at the helm, maintained his Government's trademark focus on enervating India's political engagement with the world. However, it also became clear that his administration is not able to keep up due to institutional inadequacies

Continuing the trend he set in his first year in office, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his second year at the helm, maintained his Government’s now trademark focus on enervating India’s political engagement with the world. He travelled to more than 20 countries, hosted many foreign dignitaries, including more than 50 African leaders at the massive India-Africa Forum Summit and the heads of the Pacific Island nations at the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation, and took the lead on key multilateral initiatives. However, even as the Prime Minister maintained his frenetic diplomatic pace, it also became clear that his administration is not able to keep up, primarily due to institutional inadequacies.

Political engagements: If the first year was about focusing on the Indian sub-continent and the larger Indian Ocean region, Modi’s second year in power saw major engagements with West Asia (United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), Central Asia, Europe, Africa, and even the Pacific Islands, apart from the usual meetings with the big powers. Not all of them necessarily produced momentous tangibles, in terms of path-breaking deals or generational upgrades in the bilaterals, but each one was crucial for boosting India’s political interaction with that country or region.

The importance of this interaction, which is necessary to convert economic ties into strategic partnerships, cannot be overstated. In past decades, especially during the 10 years that the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance was in power, such rendezvous had been reduced to a bare minimum, mostly because Indian leaders were too busy firefighting at home. Modi, heading India’s first majority Government in three decades, is trying to make up for these losses.

His efforts were most visible in West Asia where India already has extensive economic ties, a significant diplomatic presence, and, of course, a large diaspora. High-level political engagement with this region was the missing piece, and this is what Modi has brought to the table, PR Kumaraswamy of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi told this writer. Once the quality of political engagement improves, New Delhi will better understand the complexities of the region, he further added. This may lead to India moving from a blanket friends-with-everybody policy towards a more nuanced and informed list of priorities.

Multilateral diplomacy: Modi raised India’s profile in this realm, with the high point being the United Nations Climate Change summit in Paris last December. Modi re-positioned India so that it was no longer seen as an obstructionist force but a leading voice of the developing world — specifically through the solar alliance initiative. Notably, renewables make for just one side of India’s new energy coin — the other is nuclear energy. Both have been incorporated into the core of India’s foreign policy objectives under Modi.

Reiterating motifs: Three themes were carried over from year one to year two. First was the diaspora focus, as part of which the Madison Square Garden template developed in New York was reapplied with aplomb in Dubai, Dublin, San Jose, London, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Brussels, and then somewhat modified for Riyadh.

Second, was projecting India as an ocean power — this theme emerged in year one through the US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, signed during US President Barack Obama’s January 2015 visit, and was reiterated during Modi’s Indian Ocean island tour in March 2015. In his second year, this motif was re-emphasised by the International Fleet Review, which brought 50 foreign navies to India’s shore and was a tremendous show of strength.

The third theme is that of religious diplomacy. If year one had Modi making temple visits in Nepal and Japan, and launching International Yoga Day, year two saw him with folded hands at a Buddhist temple in China, hosting an international Sufi conference in New Delhi, and bringing a sizeable foreign diplomatic contingent to the Simhasth Maha Kumbh in Ujjain.

The Government tried to bring back a fourth theme, “neighborhood first”, but suffered significant setbacks. With Nepal and the Maldives, New Delhi struggled to play the role of a protective big brother without getting drawn into the domestic politics of sovereign nations. With Pakistan, the talk-terror cycle continued despite the efforts of Prime Ministers Modi and Nawaz Sharif to mend ties. In the aftermath of the Pathankot attack, it seemed like for every step forward, the India-Pakistan bilateral was doomed to take two steps backwards. With Sri Lanka, the JF17 issue was a bit of a dampener.

Last mile delivery: Lack of follow-through is the biggest problem with Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy that has come to light in his second year in office. Several deals have been announced amidst much fanfare but few are signed and sealed. For example, the military logistics deal with the United States was not signed during US Defence Secretary Ash Carter’s visit, even though it has reportedly been finalised. Similarly, French President François Hollande came and went in January this year but the Rafale deal couldn’t be delivered, just as the agreement with Westinghouse to build six nuclear reactors is yet to come through despite the 2015 “breakthrough” on the nuclear liability clause. India’s efforts to gain access to the four key export control regimes have also made only limited progress.

There’s a sobering lesson here: Successful diplomacy is a team effort, and Modi’s team needs more time and space to get things done. This is primarily because the severely under-staffed Ministry of External Affairs simply does not have the bandwidth to power Modi’s agenda. Perhaps, this is where the Prime Minister should now focus his attention — on building up the MEA and the Indian foreign service corps’ institutional capabilities so that they can effectively represent the interests of a rising power.

(A shorter version of this article was published on the Stimson Centre’s South Asian Voices platform)

BE BOLD, NOT JUST A BALANCER

India needs a credible response for China, especially for the Indian Ocean region, where it must remain the big power. American support can help significantly in this regard. India just needs to be confident enough to leverage that in its favour

Earlier this month, when Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter agreed in principle to sign a logistics support agreement intended to enhance military ties, many in India wondered if the pact would push the country into an unnecessarily tight embrace with the United States.

More importantly, they worried that an increasingly assertive China would not tolerate such alliances. In this context, many presumed that the high-level interactions between Indian and Chinese officials, incidentally scheduled for right after Carter’s visit, would be designed to make nice with Beijing. However, this was far from the case.

Soon after Secretary Carter’s visit to India, Parrikar went on his maiden trip to China while External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj met with her Chinese counterpart in Moscow. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval was also in Beijing for the 19th round of India-China boundary talks. With none of them did the Chinese harp on about the logistics agreement.

Only the state-run Global Times ran an opinion piece to coincide with Parrikar’s visit. It noted that while “traditional distrust” between India and the United States was one of the reasons why the LSA was yet to be signed, India, in the game of superpowers, “would like to continue to be the most beautiful woman wooed by all men.” This was only a tad bit stronger than the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s anodyne comments after the LSA was announced the week before.

Beijing’s decision to underplay the pact is interesting, because, even if in a limited sense, the LSA does have a bearing on Chinese strategic calculations. Officially known as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, the pact will institutionalise India-US military activities, particularly between the navies. It won’t add much to the existing range of activities (such as berthing, re-fueling, and servicing at each other’s bases), but will serve to put these on auto-pilot instead. It will also put in place a system to settle payments collectively instead of individually. This will certainly help the US Navy, which plans to deploy 60 per cent of its surface ship in the Indo-Pacific in the near future.

For India, the big benefits, almost entirely in the form of technology, will come more from the other ‘foundational agreements’ — Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence — as and when (and if) they are signed. This technology will be especially key, experts argue, for the Indian Navy to maintain an asymmetric advantage over the Chinese, at least in the Indian Ocean.

So, why isn’t China raising a hue and cry over this? For two reasons: First, it’s still early days. CISMOA is still being discussed while BECA is yet to jump the sovereignty hoop and make it to the negotiating table. More importantly, LEMOA has been finalised but not signed. Second, the very expectation that China will go ballistic (and perhaps retaliate with aggressive posturing along the Line of Actual Control, much of which is disputed) is overblown. Consider this: A tiny nation like Sri Lanka, where China has made multi-million dollar investments, has signed the LSA with the United States without so much as a pipsqueak from Beijing. Meanwhile, India has gained nothing by pussyfooting around an increasingly belligerent Beijing in recent years. China has only upped the ante with repeated transgressions along the border.

The regime in New Delhi understands this, and thus the Modi Government is trying to face China with a more confident and self-assured avatar (though it does falter often). This explains why one of the biggest issues on the Indian agenda in Beijing (and Moscow) this past week was Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar. In order to shield its all-weather friend Pakistan, China blocked India’s efforts at the United Nations to tag Azhar (who is one of the ISI’s posterboys for its anti-India project ) as a terrorist, and India is rightly raising a stink over it. The issue was highlighted repeatedly by all three Indian officials — Parrikar, Doval, and Swaraj.

At the same time, India also gave a visa to a prominent Uighur activist who China considers a terrorist, to attend a conference in Dharamsala. However, after this was widely reported in the media, and China expressed its displeasure on the issue, the visa was cancelled. It is not clear if this was directly due to Chinese pressure or if it was a bureacratic bungle or even a pre-planned move designed to put China on the spot. Either way, cancelling the visa after it had been issued made the Government look bad — and was a reminder that this is going to be a bumpy ride.

Still, those worrying that such measures would derail the India-China bilateral should note that both countries have now agreed to set up a hotline at the level of Director-General Military Operations and establish at least one more border meeting point. Sure, these are small confidence-building measures, but the border question was not going to be resolved overnight anyway.

That said, a note of caution for India is in order as well. If New Delhi wants to play the great game, it needs to look at the larger picture and think big. Did it make sense to invest so much precious diplomatic bandwidth in China on Masood Azhar, important as it may be to pursue the case against him? After all, in India’s larger fight against terrorism emanating out of Pakistan, UN sanctions will be more symbolic than substantial. 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed’s case is proof.

Instead, India needs to focus on the large-scale military reforms underway in China. President and now Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping is preparing his men not only for the next war but also to bolster the country’s aggressive economic forays abroad, through its ambitious One Belt, One Road project. Notably, an addendum of sorts to this project, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor which will connect Gwadar with Xinjiang, is planned to cut through parts of Kashmir that Pakistan currently occupies.

India needs a credible response for China (and no, this isn’t a polite way of pushing for a confrontational approach), especially for the Indian Ocean region where it must remain the big power. American support can help significantly in this regard. India just needs to be confident enough to leverage that in its favour.

(A shorter version of this article was previously published on the Stimson Centre’s South Asian Voices platform)

INDIA-US: A WIN-WIN PARTNERSHIP

A strong defence relationship with the US is in India’s interest especially as it seeks to reiterate its position in the Indian Ocean region. Ideologically-motivated opposition mostly from the Left must be countered with a dose of realpolitik

US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s three-day trip to India ended on Wednesday with both countries announcing progress in some technology-sharing programmes but falling short on some key issues such as the joint development of a Indian aircraft carrier and the signing of at least one of the three so-called ‘foundational documents’ necessary to enhance bilateral defence cooperation. This, in a sense, encapsulates the state of the India-US defence relationship: While huge strides have been made, particularly in this decade, a lot more needs to be done to realise its full potential. In some cases, the bottlenecks are technical or bureaucratic and need time to be resolved. But in most others, the hold-up stems from political or ideological reasons. This is particularly the case for the three foundational documents, which the US says will help strengthen bilateral defence cooperation but which India has resisted for more than a decade.

After 10 years of debate and discussion, only one of these, the Logistics Supply Agreement, has now been finalised, according to Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. And even that agreement is yet to be signed and no firm commitments have been made, although it has been reported that the officials may sign on the dotted line any time within a few weeks to a few months. This has already generated a colourful array of headlines on how the US military will now use Indian bases, not to mention the slew of think pieces that came out in the run up to Carter’s visit, chiding the Modi Government for falling into America’s embrace, discarding Delhi’s long held principles of non-alignment, and putting India on a dangerous collision course with old friends like Russia and powerful adversaries like China. One may even be forgiven for assuming that the agreement is some sort of a path-breaking initiative that will change the India-US dynamic. Yet, the agreement is actually a standard document that the US has signed with some 80 countries including its Nato partners as well as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Basically, it allows both parties to easily berth and re-fuel at each other’s bases without having to pay for these services every time. Such an arrangement is particularly convenient during joint military exercises (which the US and India have quite often), large multi-national operations such as the search for MH370, and also during multi-national humanitarian relief operations.

The last one, in fact, is a big consideration. In recent years, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief has become an important element for the Indian military and is a wonderful tool for this country’s power projection in the Indian Ocean region. The 2004 tsunami relief operation  during which India deployed 32 naval ships, seven aircraft and 20 helicopters over five rescue, relief and reconstruction missions that extended not only to its own affected States but also to Maldives (Operation Castor), Sri Lanka (Operation Rainbow), and Indonesia (Operation Gambhir) was the turning point. After the tsunami, India bolstered its HADR capabilities by acquiring a landing platform dock, INS Jalashwa, from the US in 2007. 

In between, in 2006, the Indian Navy launched Operation Sukoon to evacuate Indian, Sri Lankan and Nepalese citizens from Lebanon. In 2008, INS Rana and INS Kirpan were sent with aid to Myanmar after the devastating Cyclone Nargis. This was followed by Operation Safe Homecoming in Libya in 2011. INS Mysore, INS Aditya and INS Jalashwa brought thousands of Indians from Benghazi and Tripoli to Alexandria in Egypt from where they were flow back home by Air India. In 2013, when Typhoon Haiyan flattened large parts of the Philippines, the Indian Navy sent out a war ship with relief material. And then, of course, when Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 disappeared, both the Indian Navy and the Air Force participated in the global hunt. Last year, both were also involved in the evacuation of Indian nationals from Yemen (Operation Rahat), not to mention Indian assistance to the Maldives during the Male water crisis.

Now, some media reports have portrayed the LSA as a first of its kind arrangement, while the Opposition is already whipping up images of American soldiers overrunning Indian bases. The Left’s criticism doesn’t even deserve to be entertained because it is a template response to all things America. From the Congress, former Defence Minister AK Antony, who did precious little to ensure the military’s war preparedness, has now labeled the agreement as “anti-national”. This is absurd. American sailors and airmen already dock at Indian ports and access Indian resources. The agreement will only institutionalise such cooperation and put most of it on auto-pilot.

This also has raised concerns in some quarters: If America goes to war (especially against a country that is friendly with India), then India will be obligated to support its war-time efforts. In response, Defence Minister Parrikar has assured that the LSA has been tweaked the new pact is called the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement  so that Indian autonomy is not comprised. Also, it is worthwhile to recall that during the 1991 Gulf War, India had allowed US planes on their way to Iraq to refuel at Bombay’s Safar airport and others. And this was a generation before India and the US were to forge the defining partnership of the 21st century.

Coming back to the agreements, the second in line is the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement which will essentially improve interoperability between the two militaries. This will be a big plus during joint military operations which, again, is not necessarily a reference to war but includes anti-piracy efforts as well. Moreover, CISMOA will pave the way for Indian access to US defence high-tech. For example, had India signed the CISMOA earlier, its Boeing P-8I Poseidon multi-mission maritime aircraft (which was used to hunt for MH370) would have come equipped with the most advanced communication equipment. Now, it is true that India has been able to make the platform work well with indigenously developed hardware, but that’s hardly a reason to be deprived of the best technology in the market. CISMOA critics argue that agreement would expose sensitive Indian communications to the Americans. This is both defeatist, as clauses are built into the agreement to protect such information, as well somewhat silly: If the US, back in 1998, could hack into the Israeli Air Force system, one of the most advanced defence systems in the world, then it doesn’t need a bilateral agreement to get inside Indian systems.

The third agreement is the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement which will improve ease of access to geospatial data such as satellite images, maps and charts. This is possibly the most contentious as it supposedly involves ‘sovereignty issues’ (for example, ground sensors). Yet, the benefits of this agreement are manifold especially in multi-nation operations as well as in civilian operations. Now, India is also developing its own geo-satellite system called the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System. However, this isn’t fully operational yet and will only have limited coverage. 

In the final tally, India needn’t sign America’s template documents; instead, as it has done with the LSA, it should work with the US (which is also open to addressing Indian concerns) and find the middle path that best suits its interests. But as mentioned earlier, the problem isn’t technical but political  Will China be upset? Will Russia complain? Maybe they will but if Sri Lanka can sign the LSA and still be wooed by Beijing, and Russia sell helicopters to Pakistan because India has been buying hardware from the US and Israel, then there is no reason why India can’t sign an agreement that strengthens its military ties with the US while still maintaining its ties with other powers. Ultimately, all nations work in their own self-interest. India should too.

(This article was published in The Pioneer on April 14, 2016)

BEING PIVOT IN NUCLEAR SECURITY

India has an opportunity to take on a global leadership role against the spread of nuclear weapons. For that, it has to be more transparent about its own nuclear security and safety, especially as nuclear power becomes a bigger part of the country’s energy basket

The fourth Nuclear Security Summit comes at an important time in India’s own nuclear history and diplomacy. At one level, India, now no longer a nuclear pariah state, is seeking to integrate itself into the global non-proliferation architecture. It is seeking memberships to four of the main global nuclear clubs  the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement — as well hoping to play a more prominent role in nuclear diplomacy. India’s has already streamlined its export control lists so that they are more or less in sync with the lists maintained by the global technology control regimes. However, there are political issues that need to be addressed before India can accede to these clubs.

At another level, India is now looking to leverage nuclear power in a big way to fuel its domestic needs in a sustainable manner. Currently, nuclear is just a small segment in India’s energy basket  just 4.8 GW of the total installed power generation capacity of 240 GW. The plan is to increase those figures to 60GW of 1200GW by 2035. That still won’t be even 10 per cent of the total basket but it will be an important element nonetheless. It is against this backdrop that India’s role at the NSS must be seen.

To be held on March 31 and April 1 in Washington, DC this is the fourth and in all probability the final in a series of summits that aimed to secure nuclear weapons, fissile material, and nuclear facilities so that terrorists couldn’t use them to wreak havoc. The NSS was US President Barack Obama’s initiative, which built on his predecessor’s legacy.  After 9/11, the Bush Administration brought out two important nuclear security pacts  a 2005 amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which requires states to physically protect nuclear materials on their territory, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism which facilitates judicial actions related to nuclear terrorism.

In 2009, President Obama while speaking in Prague, said that nuclear terrorism was “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security” and announced “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.” In 2010, the first NSS was organised. Forty-seven nations, including India, and three international organisations participated. This was followed by another summit in 2012 in Seoul, and a third one in 2014 in The Hague. Except for the 2014 conference, India was represented by its Prime Minister at all others — an indication of the importance that New Delhi attaches to the NSS.

An interesting aspect of the NSS was that of the ‘house gift diplomacy’ wherein participants themselves bring to the table political commitments or national pledges on specific issues such as nuclear forensics or nuclear smuggling, instead of everybody having to sign on one master document. Since the Seoul summit, groups of participants have also come together with a bundle of pledges, making for some ‘gift basket diplomacy’.

At the first NSS in 2010, for example, India’s promised a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership. This Centre is being set up in Bahadurgarh, Haryana, and is expected to begin operations from April 2017, though it has already been doing off-campus programmes and workshops since 2011. In December 2010, India also placed in a safeguarded facility its enriched uranium-based fuel used in the Apsara reactor. The reactor no longer uses Highly Enriched Uranium. In 2012, India made a voluntary contribution of a million dollars to the Nuclear Security Fund. However, India has not just joined any of the ‘gift baskets’ though it may reportedly join at least three this year.

Overall, the NSS process has produced mixed results  bringing some tangible deliverables to the table but still falling short of its larger goal. Among its achievements, the NSS lists the following: Removal and/or disposition of over 3.2 metric tonnes of vulnerable HEU and plutonium material; completely removing HEU from 12 countries; verified shutdown or successful conversion to low enriched uranium fuel use of 24 HEU research reactors and isotope production facilities in 15 countries including India; completion of physical security upgrades at 32 buildings storing weapons-usable fissile materials; and installation of radiation detection equipment at 328 international border crossings, airports, and seaports. 

An important deliverable, or gift basket rather, was the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Initiative that was signed at 2014 summit by two-thirds of the participants, who pledged to meet follow the Atomic Energy Agency’s security recommendations and accept regular reviews of their nuclear security arrangements. Notably, India didn’t sign the initiative but that same year, it ratified an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency which had been in the works for five years. This Additional Protocol  which will surely be highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Washington this year  covers 20 facilities that include the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad, the Tarapur atomic power plant, the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station, and both units of the Kudankulam power plant.

At the NSS this year, the focus will  understandably be on the big picture: The  deliberations haven’t produced a treaty and many of the commitments are vague with much wriggle room. There are also many areas like cyber threats to nuclear security that remain unresolved. Still, there is no doubt that the NSS process gave high-level political momentum to the issue of nuclear security.

Now, the question is: How to take the process forward? Five institutions are expected to take up the task — The IAEA; the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (a group focused on exercising existing capabilities and sharing best practices); the UN (specifically a committee that enforces UNSC resolutions calling on states to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction); the international law enforcement organisation Interpol; and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (a funding group). 

Additionally, a Nuclear Security Contact Group comprising of the Sherpas -- the senior officials who developed the summit outcomes and prepped their leaders -- will also be formed. They’ll ensure that past promises are effectively implemented. India will be in this group, which will also be open to those countries that weren’t part of NSS process.

India has an opportunity to take on a leadership role at this stage. However, for that, it has to be more transparent about its own nuclear security and safety. This is not to suggest that the security situation here is bad (although some international experts are of that opinion) but that the Government should allow for more transparency  not just to boost international confidence but also to allay concerns at home, especially now that nuclear power will be a bigger part of India’s energy basket.

 The shutdown at the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station in Surat, after the heavy water used to cool the nuclear reactor leaked, earlier this month, highlights the urgency of the situation. Indeed, in 2012, the Central Information Commission had directed the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited to release two reports on the safety assessment systems at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant. The nuclear operator responded with a court order staying the CIC’s directive and arguing that making the report public would hurt strategic interests. This was odd given that, after 2011 Fukushima accident, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board had already uploaded on its website a comprehensive report on the safety of our reactors.

(This article was published in The Pioneer on March 31, 2016)