CRUCIAL INDIA-VIETNAM BILATERAL

Defence cooperation between the two nations has not received the public attention it deserves. The previous regime had taken important steps to strengthen ties, and the present Government has continued with the thrust. It’s part of India’s growing global maritime footprint

Amidst all the hullabaloo over the Modi Government’s first anniversary, the three-day visit of Vietnamese Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh received little attention. But that should not take away from the growing importance of the India-Vietnam bilateral, for both countries, particularly in the security sector. Vietnam is engaged in a bitter territorial dispute with China, which is looking to turn reefs in the South China Sea into islands that can host airstrips and other military facilities, according to aReuters news report. Vietnam would like India, the other big regional power, to stand up to Chinese belligerence in the South China Sea.

India, on the other hand, is trying to restrain China from taking full control of some of the world’s busiest sea-lanes as well keep the dragon out of its own immediate neighbourhood, the Indian Ocean Region. China had made the stunning revelation last year that it had sent submarines into the Indian Ocean. And more recently, the Pentagon in its report on the South China Sea also noted that Beijing is looking to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean region.

It is plausible that China is seeking to do so through ‘logistics’ overtures, rather than obvious military means (though that must not been ruled out either; only last year, China moved an oil rig, flanked by its naval and coast guard ships, into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, sparking a major diplomatic crisis) but the end result that it has in mind is the same.

Hence, with China’s assertive strategies in mind, India and Vietnam have now agreed to strengthen their defence and military cooperation. On Monday, at the end of delegation-level talks, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and his Vietnamese counterpart General Phung Quang Thanh signed a five-year-long vision statement as well oversaw the signing of a memorandum of understanding for cooperation between the Coast Guards of the two countries.

Notably, while Gen Thanh was meeting with Indian officials on Monday, four Indian warships set off for the South China Sea. The Eastern Fleet deployed stealth frigate INS Satpura, anti-submarine warfare corvette INS Kamorta, the destroyer INS Ranvir and the INS Shakti fleet tanker to the region, to participate in a four-day maritime exercise with Singapore’s Navy. The four Indian warships will also be making port-calls in Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia.

But that’s not all. On Tuesday, China released a White Paper on its military strategy which emphasises increasing the country’s naval reach to “open seas protection”. This is the first time that China has officially taken on the role of regional security provider so far from its shores and called for “active defence”. Clearly, this is a thinly-veiled threat to its smaller neighbours such as Vietnam but also the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, all of whom have maritime disputes with China. It is equally a challenge to India’s dominance in the Indian Ocean region. 

Notably, the Chinese White Paper also outlines plans to build lighthouses in disputed islands in South China Sea — and just in case anyone thought that Beijing wasn’t serious about implementing these measures, the Chinese transport Ministry conducted a groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of two multi-functional lighthouses in the Spratly Islands (which Vietnam claims as its own) on the same day that the Defence Ministry launched the White Paper.

That China released its White Paper less than 24 hours after Vietnam signed a defence pact with India was, of course, coincidental, but it does underline the immediate import of the situation. The Vietnamese are reportedly keen that India train their submarine personnel and there is already some joint military exercises that are ongoing. India is also looking at selling the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile to Vietnam. But the deal is yet to be finalised. Meanwhile, India is continuing with its oil and gas explorations in Vietnamese blocks in the South China Sea, despite recent Chinese objections.

Last year, there were at least three high-level interactions between India and Vietnam in as many months. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj visited Hanoi in August 2014, and President Pranab Mukherjee made a high-profile state visit in September. During Mr Mukherjee’s visit, India extended Vietnam a $100 million line of credit specifically for defence procurement. In October 2014, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung came to India and it was during this trip that New Delhi agreed to supply four patrol vessels to Vietnam to improve the latter’s maritime security capabilities.  Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also been invited for a visit later this year.

The deepening of ties with Vietnam started with the Manmohan Singh Government. There were several high-level visits during the UPA Government’s second term and there was a strong political push to deepen military ties, despite the Government’s general penchant for playing safe and not doing anything that might upset China. The incumbent NDA regime has thankfully continued with the UPA’s efforts to improve ties with Vietnam and will hopefully do so with more vigour and decisiveness, of the sort that has become the hallmark of Mr Modi’s diplomacy.

As such, India and Vietnam have   traditionally had strong bilateral ties,  even if the people-to-people connect has somewhat waned in recent years. Indians today may no longer chant slogans such as ‘Amaar naam, tomaar naam, Vietnam Vietnam’ which was popular in the 1970s Bengal, but political support has remained steadfast. Vietnam has emerged as an important regional partner for India in South East Asia and can be expected play a prominent role in the Modi Government’s Act East policy. India and Vietnam already cooperate in various regional forums such as the Association for South-East Asian Nations, the East Asia Summit, the Mekong Ganga Cooperation and the Asia Europe Meeting

Apart from India, Vietnam has also been looking to firm up its defence ties with other powers including the US. In fact, the US has agreed to partially lift its arms embargo against Vietnam, specifically permitting the sale of American defence equipment.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 28, 2015

MODI’S FOREIGN POLICY DOCTRINE

The Prime Minister has spent a significant amount of time in his first year in office improving the quality of India's engagement with the world. He hasn't made any major policy turnarounds but his out-of-the-box approach to diplomacy has made all the difference

This time, last year, as India prepared for a Modi Government to take charge, few had imagined that the Prime Minister would emerge as an international showman in his first year in office. The man had no significant political experience at the national level, his election campaign had a negligible foreign policy component, and there were many in Lutyen’s Delhi wondering if the chaiwallah’s son, whose spoken English was supposedly below par, would be comfortable at the global high table. Even those who were expecting Mr Modi to prioritise foreign policy, like this columnist, had underestimated how significantly he’d seek to improve the quality of India’s engagement with the world.

In the 12 past months, Mr Modi has travelled to as many as 18 countries, participated in a bunch of multilateral summits and hosted several world leaders at home. He has energised a moribund foreign office, unshackled Indian diplomacy from stiff protocols, and talked up the India Story. He hasn’t really made any major policy turnarounds but his assertive and out-of-the-box approach to diplomacy has made all the difference. Let’s take a look at some of the defining features of his foreign policy, as they have emerged in this past year.

South Asia Focus: It all started with the grand inauguration that was attended by eight heads of Government from the neighbourhood, including the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The spectacle reiterated India’s position of influence in South Asia, and made clear that it is in the sub-continent that India’s global engagement will always be rooted. The star-studded show was followed by Mr Modi’s first foreign trip to Bhutan, and then Nepal, where the Prime Minister would go again, later in the year, for the SAARC summit. Next in the South Asia line-up was Sri Lanka. Soon after winning the presidential election, Mr Maithripala Sirisena came from Colombo with the promise of improving relations with Delhi, and, weeks later, Mr Modi paid a reciprocal visit. Then, in April, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made his first state visit to India. Though some of these tours were more high profile than the others, they were all considered to be reasonably successful.

But the real measure of how India’s South Asia policy has been shaping up under Mr Modi lies not so much in these incoming and outgoing visits but in his administration’s prompt and elaborate rescue, relief and re-building programme in Nepal and the ongoing ratification of the India-Bangladesh land border agreement. In both cases, Mr Modi showed how much of difference can be made by a decisive leader who doesn’t have to look over his shoulder and second-guess himself all the time.

Re-discovery of the Indian Ocean: There was a time when India was the dominant power in the Indian Ocean but that was more than 2,000 years ago. In the more recent past, the Indian Ocean has been Indian only in name because this country has had neither the political will nor the economic might to take on a greater role in the region. Also, India’s involvement in the Indian Ocean region has always been anchored in Sri Lanka, and as that island nation fought a bloody civil war, Delhi became stayed away from ocean politics. However, with China making forays into India’s maritime neighbourhood (and India’s own ability to be a regional security provider having somewhat improved), India seems to be keen on strengthening its position.

Hence, we had Mr Modi’s three-nation Indian Ocean tour of Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka earlier this year. In Mauritius, Mr Modi promised to upgrade sea and air links on the Agalega islands (which provide India a crucial foothold in the Indian Ocean) while, in Seychelles, he signed an agreement to develop infrastructure on Assumption island and also gifted a provided a Dornier aircraft for surveillance. The strategic implications are obvious. But while it is heartening to see India take a lead in the Indian Ocean region (which, by the way, has been largely welcomed by the island states), the fact is that China already has more than a toehold there and the smaller nations will seek to play the big powers against each other.

Strengthening cultural linkages: It is sometimes said that while other empires were built by soldiers who conquered land and took slaves, the Indian empire was built by saints and seers who found a place in people’s souls. Unfortunately, these civilisational linkages have been ignored by our policymakers and, to some extent, even the public at large. Mr Modi, who does not confuse secularism with irreligiosity or an irreverence for tradition, has sought to change this, so that India can finally leverage its soft power (which should go beyond Bollywood and chicken tikka masala) to the fullest. And so it is that he is scheduled to visit the Great Wild Goose pagoda in China which is dedicated to famous Buddhist pilgrim Huen Tsang. Similarly, when he was in Japan last year, he prayed at the Toji and Kinkakuji Buddhist temples while in Sri Lanka, he addressed Buddhist monks at the Mahabodhi Temple and prayed at the Mahabodhi tree in Anuradhapura. While these initiatives may not bring immediate political or economic benefits, it makes diplomacy more accessible to the people and goes a long way, forgive the cliché, in winning hearts and minds.

Wooing the Diaspora: An important element of Mr Modi’s strategy to increase India’s soft power abroad has been to tap into the vast Indian diaspora. This was evident in the huge community receptions that were organised in the US, Canada and Australia. While previous Governments have also sought to leverage the diaspora, there hasn’t really been a clear or sustained outreach plan. Mr Modi has sought to reinvigorate the official Indian connection with the diaspora, hope that the latter will emerge as a political force and not just remain a source of foreign remittance.

New buzzwords: Under Mr Modi, ‘climate change’ and ‘nuclear power’ have emerged as major talking points within the larger foreign policy narrative. This is an interesting development especially given India’s difficult positions and histories on both counts. The discourse on climate change is pegged to reduction in carbon emission levels but India has consistently refused to commit to any ceilings. Instead, it has based its arguments on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Mr Modi hasn’t changed this position but his emphasis on clean and renewable sources of energy has not gone unnoticed. Nuclear power is, of course, linked to the climate change issue because it is an important alternate power source that can fuel India’s growing economy in a clean and sustainable manner.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on May 14, 2015