COMING CLOSER, OFFICIALLY

Since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The BJP took the lead in normalising ties, but it was a Congress Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations

It may have taken more than two decades, but if Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon’s India visit is any indication, it seems like India is finally and firmly committed to correcting the historical anomalies of its relationship with Israel.

Mr Ya’alon’s visit comes less than three months after Union Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singh visited Israel and only four months after Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2014.

Mr Ya’alon is the first serving Israeli Defence Minister to visit India, and his presence at a platform like Aero India is an unapologetic acknowledgement of not just the strong relationship between India and Israel, but more specifically, of the close defence ties as well.

Israel is India’s second largest military supplier after Russia and India is reportedly Israel’s biggest defence customer. In 2014 alone, defence trade between the two countries stood at about $2.5 billion. Last year, India also picked the Israeli state-owned anti-tank guided missile over the American Javelin offer in a deal that’s worth $525 million. This year, at Aero India, media reports suggest, India and Israel are expected to sign deals worth $1.5 billion.

It’s not just the weapons’ sales, per se, that are driving the defence relationship ; there’s a strong strategic component as well. Let us not forget that the big turning point here was the Israeli military assistance to India during the Kargil war. India had only limited experience with this kind of sub-conventional warfare (which, notably, has almost become the norm now) while Israel’s expertise in this field remains unparalleled.

Yet, despite such close collaboration, which, in fact, can be traced back to the 1950s (when India had sought Israeli expertise in agriculture, for example), there has always been a reluctance at the political level to acknowledge the scale of the relationship. In fact, the last time an Israeli leader who had served as Defence Minister, visited India, it was a closely-guarded state secret.

In 1977, Moshe Dayan — he was Foreign Minister at that time but had previously held the defence portfolio — was invited by Prime Minister Morarji Desai. According to US diplomatic cables, released by Wikileaks, the leaders spoke for over an hour and Moshe Dayan believed that “(Egypt’s President Anwar) Sadat had asked Desai to use his influence with Israelis in seeking a Middle East peace settlement”. 

During the meeting, the leaders also discussed establishing diplomatic ties, but Desai said it would not be possible at that time. This was in keeping with the Indian Government’s anti-Israel policy of the time — the result of several factors, from India’s colonial baggage to Mahatma Gandhi’s personal views of the Zionist movement to the Congress’s misguided Muslim appeasement policies. Put together, they produced a strong anti-Israel bias that penetrated deep within India’s foreign policy establishment and have remained to some extent even after full diplomatic relations were formally established in 1992.

That said, it is also equally true that in the two decades since 1992, the anti-Israel bias of the India political class has lost much of its edge. The Bharatiya Janata Party took the lead in normalising ties but it was a Prime Minister from the Congress, PV Narasimha Rao, who established diplomatic relations.

 His successor from the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Delhi while the Congress-led UPA Government that came next allowed the relationship to flourish — so much so that bilateral trade, which spans across sectors as diverse as education and outer space, is now pegged at six billion dollars from just about $20 million in 1992.

What remains today from the policy baggage of the past is some anti-Israel posturing at international forums and the occasional impediment or irritant caused by individual leaders or bureaucrats within the system. For example, though India steers clear of criticising Israel on Palestinian issues, it continues to support resolutions against Israel at the UNHRC.

 Similarly, as recently as 2013, a senior Congress leader like Mr AK Antony, under whose watch as Defence Minister, India bought millions of dollars of weapons from Israel, reportedly backed out from a scheduled Israel trip at the last minute after he was told of reservations from the Muslim League. A third example here is of India’s odd reluctance to invest in Israel’s off-shore gas field, ostensibly because this might upset Arab states.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, it is hoped that abnormalities such as these will be ironed out. Mr Modi is known to be a strong supporter of Israel, and so are many of his top team members including Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, Home Affairs Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.

It is no coincidence that the $659 million of Israeli arms purchases that have happened since Mr Modi came to power (even though many of the deals were put in place by the UPA regime) are more than Israel’s total defence exports to India in the last three years.

Clichéd as it may sound, the India-Israel bilateral is an idea whose time has come. From India’s point of view, Israel can be a great partner in the Modi Government’s flagship Make in India project. Much of the long-term success of this project hinges on the willingness of foreign Governments and private companies to transfer technology to India.

From Israel’s point of view, a resurgent India presents a lucrative market, especially as Europe, Israel’s traditional buyer, struggles to get back on its feet. Israel’s support for India syncs well with its own Look East policy, which includes other Asian powers such as China, Japan and South Korea.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 20, 2015

IRAN, A STABILISING FACTOR IN WAR-TORN WEST ASIA

Tehran is one of the few power centres that is working to stem the region’s slide into chaos and anarchy

Hardly a day now passes when one doesn’t hear about something terrible happening in West Asia. If it’s not the Islamic State brutes that are beheading, enslaving and murdering people, their compatriots in other parts of the region are routinely blowing up towns and cities while insurgents topple Governments and terror groups take over entire countries.

True, the region has always been a hotspot (if nothing else, there’s always the Israel-Arab conflict) but the situation has undoubtedly worsened in the post Arab Uprising years. Every Great Power worth its salt has sought to bring stability to West Asia — and failed.

One major reason for this is that, not everybody gets the West Asia and nearabouts. The region is extremely complex and few foreign powers can legitimately claim to understand its ever-changing dynamics. Perhaps, the focus should be on strengthening regional powers and allowing them greater space to manage what is really their own backyard.

Traditionally, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been the big boys in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council is also an important force but it’s primarily an economic entity with limited political and no military prowess. Israel also could have been on the list, but given its own complicated relations with most countries in the region, it can hardly play the role of an interlocutor.

 Unfortunately, as of now, Iraq has all but collapsed while Egypt’s regional stature stands greatly diminished as it struggles to get its house in order. Saudi Arabia is a force to contend with, though its one-point agenda of pushing Wahhabism that has fuelled Islamist terrorism across the world, makes it a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution.

Besides, over the years, Saudi Arabia has shown that it couldn’t be bothered with cultivating ties and nurturing relationships because it believes that, with all the money it has, it can easily buy the influence it needs. This has not always worked out well. 

This leaves us with Iran — a large and stable country that has a civilisational connect in the region but has been ignored by the international community, primarily because of its controversial nuclear weapons programme.

 But if you keep that aside, there is an argument to be made for strengthening Iran’s hand in the region’s power matrix. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran doesn’t always have the kind of money to throw around. And so it practises old school diplomacy — working with local leaders, supporting friendly regimes and building up regional institutions.

Take, for example, the fight against the Islamic State. The West’s anti-IS coalition has been a non-starter, and that’s in no small measure because of the double standards of some coalition partners like Jordan and Turkey. The only ones that have succeeded against the Islamic State are the Kurds, but they have little support from the rest of the world. Iran, however, has been actively working with the Kurds and helping them with men and material on the ground.

Iran has also been working closely with the Government in Baghdad so as to stabilise the Iraqi regime, which is the key to retrieving that country from the clutches of the Islamic State. After all, it was the power vacuum in Iraq and Syria that created the fertile grounds for the IS to breed and nurture. Unless, these core issues are addressed, no military intervention can succeed. This, we have learned the hard way in Afghanistan.

In fact, even in the case of Afghanistan, Iran has sought to play the role of a regional stabiliser. The Americans were able to quickly topple the Taliban in the early days of the war primarily because of Iranian support. More recently, Tehran has also sought to persuade Pakistan (which is known to seek ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan) to not meddle in Kabul’s affairs. This is a point that India has also sought to underline but, understandably, with little effect, in Pakistan.

In fact, in terms of larger foreign policy principles, both India and Iran are staunchly opposed to foreign interventions and agree that is only well-mediated, political solutions are the only real solutions to some of the most crises of our times. Perhaps, the only point on which India and Iran have divergent positions is with regard to Israel.

While Iran doesn’t even recognise the Jewish state, India’s relations with Israel have strengthened significantly in the past two decades. While there is not much that India can do to change that dynamic, one can take comfort in the fact that both Iran and Israel say that neither will be the first to make the aggressive move.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 13, 2015

NEW RULES FOR THE GREAT GAME

Under the Modi Government, India is re-calibrating its relationship with the Great Powers, as the Obama visit stands proof. Now, it will be interesting to see how New Delhi projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums

This past fortnight has been a particularly busy one for Indian diplomacy. It started with US President Barack Obama’s visit to the country which was followed by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s relatively low key trip to China which included a trilateral meeting with Russia. Both visits are parts of larger processes wherein India, under the Narendra Modi Government, is re-defining the terms of its engagement with Great Powers. President Obama’s visit builds upon the Prime Minister US tour in September 2014 while Ms Swaraj’s Beijing trip sets the stage for the next India-China summit. Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s India visit last November, Mr Modi is now scheduled to travel to China in May, just before he completes his first year in office. In between, Russian President Vladimir Putin was in New Delhi for the annual India-Russia summit, and all the heads of Government also had an opportunity to deliberate during the G20 summit in Australia last year.

Though it’s too early to present a full picture of India’s foreign policy under BJP-led NDA regime, some of the salient features of the Modi doctrine, at least with regard to Great Power engagement, are becoming clear. At the top of the list is the end of anti-Americanism which has been best symbolised by the presence of the US President as the Republic Day parade. Though the US has long since ceased to be a subject of suspicion in contemporary public discourse, especially among the youth who have been raised on a staple diet of Americana, within India’s encrusted political and bureaucratic circles, the residues of that reflexively anti-US posture have remained. 

Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had sought to change that discourse but could only do that much with just one term in office. Thankfully, his successor Manmohan Singh, much more pro-America than the average Congress politician, continued without his efforts. Mr Singh dragged the Left-leaning political class, kicking and screaming (and quite literally so), into the 21st century geo-political scene and forced them to accept that India stood to benefit from a partnership with America. This is what led to the signing of the historic nuclear deal that legitimised India’s status as a nuclear power and also paved the way for the country to do nuclear commerce globally. It was also during Mr Singh’s tenure that defence cooperation was incorporated into the bilateral, another hugely symbolic policy shift, that also opened up the market for billions of dollars of weapons and technology trade.

Unfortunately, Mr Singh had exhausted all his political capital in the early years of his first term, and could not take the India-US project to its logical conclusion. Americans, who had lobbied the world to make an exception (no matter how well-deserved) for India, saw the 2010 nuclear liability law as a betrayal of sorts for it shut out US suppliers from the Indian market. Meanwhile, Indian politicians like Mr AK Antony, who served as the Defence Minister in the UPA Government, actively scuttled American projects and repeatedly spurned Washington’s offers to upgrade the relationship.

It is against this backdrop that the Obama visit needs to be evaluated. As some commentators have pointed out, tangible deliverables from the summit have been few: For example, though the Modi Government has said that it has ironed out most of those problems with regard to the operationalisation of the nuclear deal, the agreements are yet to be signed. But that’s okay. Often, complex negotiations such as these get stuck at the bureaucratic level and high-level political exchanges help remove the blockages. This is what the Obama visit, and the Modi visit before that, achieved. Equally importantly, the overwhelmingly positive optics of the visit, which critics have sought to write-off as style statements without substance, were, in fact, necessary to send out a clear and unambiguous message that India and America are friends and partners, and they will be doing business together, irrespective of how that fits into your ideological leanings.

The second big take-away from the Obama tour was the revitalisation of the American rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific, with India at its strategic core. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region didn’t get as much attention as the extensive US-India Joint Statement but it was here that the strategic aspect of the relationship came into full bloom. The US has now made clear that it wants India to play a leading role as a ‘security provider’ in the Indo-Pacific region (to use a term that Ms Hillary Clinton had famously used). In  other words, it wants India to ‘balance’ China’s tendencies to become the neighbourhood bully. Now, this is technically an old policy, as anybody who remembers Washington’s ‘pivot to Asia’ will tell you.

But the latter never quite took off, especially from India’s perspective. The Obama Administration was seen as pandering to Beijing, and more so, after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 that damaged America’s credentials as the world’s only superpower. Also, a still instinctively anti-US and somewhat diffident India did not appreciate either being dragged into a potential US-China crossfire or being portrayed as bulwark against China. America’s pivot to Asia (which hinged on solid India-US ties) didn’t quite dovetail with its ‘pivot to India’. The latter came first, in the early 2000s, with the Bush Administration; but it was petering out by the time the Obama Administration introduced the Asia Pivot.

Now, it seems that the two are better aligned. Apart from India and the US being on a much stronger footing than before, the Obama Administration has also firmed its view on the India-China dynamic, while India, under the Modi Government, is willing to play a more assertive role in the region. Additionally, America’s efforts to bring in more regional actors (Vietnam, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, apart from Japan) into the equation go well with India’s own Look East policy and its overall idea of an Asian century.

China, expectedly, is not happy with the developments. Yes, it can play Pakistan if it feels India is getting out of hand but that card is fast becoming a double-edged sword. Nonetheless, as Minister Swaraj’s recently concluded Beijing trip shows, China is not making a big deal about any of this — at least, not right away. We’ll know more when Mr Modi visits China. Remember, President Xi’s visit was dampened by Chinese transgressions along the Line of Actual Control. Either way, the focus of the Modi Government’s China policy is on economic issues. The Chinese tend to let these move at their own pace, without linking them to strategic issues.

Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see how India projects these new bilateral equations in multilateral forums. For example, the Russia-India-China joint communiqué, signed in Beijing by Ms Swaraj, had the usual anti-US tone, similar to many a BRICS declaration. Talk about India joining the SCO also includes concern over how much Delhi will be able gain from joining forums that are considered to be China-dominated. Finally, despite all the promised cooperation between the US and India on clean energy and climate change issues, there are still no guarantees that the two will find common ground in Paris later this year.

This article was published in the op-ed section of The Pioneer on February 5, 2015