The situation in Syria is turning from bad to worse. President Bashar al-Assad appears well and truly besieged, but he shows no signs of giving up. Will he triumph in the end or quit after leaving his country in a state of complete disrepair? No one seems to know for sure
On the morning of July 18, when a bomb went off in the same building where embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was meeting with his national security council, for a brief second its deafening noise even silenced the sound of gunfire that crackled in the background. And then reality struck: Three of Mr Assad’s top security chiefs — Minister of Defence Daoud Rajiha, former military intelligence chief and his brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, and another former Defence Minister who had remained a power to reckon with across the country’s vast military establishment, Hassan Turkmani — had been killed. The President’s cousin, notorious as the chief interrogator of the state security agency, Hafez Makhlouf, had been grievously injured. The President himself had escaped unhurt, but only just. The regime had been hit. For the first time since the popular uprising began 17 months ago, the rebels had finally been able to wound the obstinate Assad Government, deeply and definitively.
The endgame was here; it was the beginning of the end, proclaimed many a newspaper editorial and security pundit. A general consensus had quickly formed that the attack — which came four days into a rebel onslaught on the Government-controlled cities of Damascus and Aleppo — had so crippled the Assad regime that it would now quickly unravel and at least some of the bloodshed would finally stop.
In fact, in one of the many “endgame-is-here” type articles that appeared since the blast, a reputed international news magazine theorised that in every revolution there comes a moment when the tide turns against the regime — Libya, it was rise of Tripoli against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and in Egypt, it was when protesters occupied Tahrir Square and torched the ruling party’s headquarters. In Syria, it goes on to add, that moment when the balance of power shifted away from the Assad regime could have well been on July 18.
Today, it has been exactly a week since the deadly blast ripped through the high security, military compound in Damascus, hitting the brutal Ba’athist regime closer to its heart than ever before and prompting talks of an endgame. And yet, there has been absolutely no sign of either Mr Assad getting away on a jet plane to seek refuge in some exotic foreign location or reports of a slew of high profile defections that would hollow out the regime from within or even instances of rebel surge that could finally topple the Government, as it had been predicted earlier.
If anything, it seems the bomb attack, which was definite proof of the rebels gaining more strength, seems to have convinced the regime to dig its heels in deeper. Overall, apart from the empty rhetoric, there is little proof that the ‘endgame’ has begun for the Assad regime, or for that matter the regime has any reason to back out at this moment. Sure, it has come under a lot of pressure and yes, it will eventually collapse, but the time for that has not yet come — not until a huge Pearl Harbour kind of incident totally shakes things up.
And, therefore, it should not come as any surprise that in this past week Government forces renewed their offensive and even lashed out from the skies at the people. On Tuesday, warplanes bombed Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city and the country’s commercial capital. Once an Assad stronghold, unrest has also spread to this city prompting the Government to launch a coordinated attack that included heavy artillery shelling and rockets launched from military helicopters.
The fact that the Government has now resorted to aerial bombing, along with reports from Israel’s intelligence chief that the Syrian Army has removed all its soldiers from the Golan Heights border area and possibly redeployed them to Damascus and other cities, shows that the Assad administration is growing desperate. But it should also serve as a reminder that between the rebels and the regime, it is still the latter that is by far the more powerful player. Moreover, don’t forget that Mr Assad is yet to take out his big guns.
Let us also not forget that the Syrian President continues to have at his command one of the largest air forces in West Asia, and as he showed on Tuesday, he is yet to use it to full effect. Similarly, he is also sitting atop a huge stockpile of chemical weapons that includes sarin nerve agent, cyanide and mustard gas, and reports of them being moved out of their storage places, even if unconfirmed, remain a cause for worry. Will Mr Assad use chemical weapons against his own people and risk becoming an international pariah? There is no way one can tell for sure but given that the President has painted himself into a do-or-die situation, no options can be ruled out at this point. Besides, Mr Assad continues to enjoy the support of Russia and to a lesser extent, China. These two insulate him from international pressure and have emerged as his main source of external support.
Finally, one must also factor in the fierce loyalty of Syria’s elite security forces that belong almost entirely to the minority Alawite sect of Islam (an offshoot of the Shia faith), like Mr Assad himself. As this conflict, now officially tagged a civil war, draws out and takes on definite sectarian contours, pitting the country’s Sunni majority against the powerful Shia/Alawite minority, the President can trust upon the latter to defend him till his death and beyond. This, for instance, is in clear contrast to the case of Col Gadddafi, who had to depend largely on foreign mercenaries for his survival. But Mr Assad knows too well that, today more than ever before, the Alawites need him the most.
In the minds of the Alawite community, particularly those within the security forces and others closely associated with the Government, the fear of revenge and reprisals against them if Assad’s regime falls is a very real one — and perhaps, rightly so.

Today, there is a huge possibility that as the battle for Syria continues between the regime and rebel forces, a de facto partition of the state will occur, with the Sunni rebels gaining control over Daraa, Deir al-Zour, the Homs-Idlib corridor and the rural areas around Damascus and Aleppo, while Government forces will shrink to the old Alawite state. But such a state will be as non-viable today as it was in 1920, and hence the Alawites can only be expected to fight until the very end for the whole of Syria.
(This article was published in the Op-ed section of The Pioneer on July 26.)